Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 16 to 18 stand part.

We pick up a point we have just debated, which is the enforcement framework that the Bill provides for. The reforms we are putting in place will be underpinned by an effective, consistent and proportionate enforcement framework. In the Government’s view, serious breaches of the law should entail serious consequences, and we are clear that we will take action where it is needed to prevent abuse of the new system. To that end, clause 15 extends councils’ powers to issue financial penalties against landlords who flout the rules. The clause allows councils to penalise initial or minor non-compliance with a fine of up to £7,000—for example, for failing to provide a written statement of terms, such as we have just discussed, or for purporting to bring a tenancy to an end orally.

Serious, persistent or repeat non-compliance will be met with a fine of up to £40,000, with the alternative being criminal prosecution. That includes knowingly or recklessly misusing a ground for eviction, and re-letting or re-marketing a property within 12 months of using the moving in or selling grounds. Local authorities will be able to take robust action against the landlord who decides they will routinely evict tenants under a false claim to be moving a family member into a property or planning to sell it. That will act as a powerful deterrent and—although this is not the original purpose of the sanction—fines will provide valuable funding for local authority enforcement activity.

Clause 16 sets out the process that local housing authorities must follow when issuing financial penalties. That includes the appeals process, recovery of unpaid penalties and how local authorities may use the proceeds of the financial penalties. It includes the stipulation that proceeds of the financial penalties should be used to fund future enforcement activity. The clause provides clarity to local housing authorities on the process they must follow when issuing financial penalties to unscrupulous landlords.

I reassure the Committee that this clause also protects good landlords. The process allows landlords to make representations to local housing authorities for consideration when issued with a notice of intent, as well as appealing a final notice to the first-tier tribunal.

Clause 17 provides definitions for terms used in sections 16D to 16L and schedule 2ZA—for example, “local housing authority” and “relevant person”. That is simple and straightforward, and it requires no further elaboration.

Clause 18 provides that criminal offences contained within section 16J do not bind the Crown, which means that the Crown cannot be found criminally liable for these offenses. However, should the Crown break the rules, it is possible for a council to issue a fine in the same way as with private landlords. The Government believe that this is a reasonable approach and one that maintains precedent established in previous legislation, such as the Tenant Fees Act 2019. However, those acting in the service of the Crown will not be exempt from criminal liability. It is only fair that they are subject to the same financial penalties and criminal offences that apply to other individuals. I commend clauses 15 to 18 to the Committee.

In practice, the measures contained in this section of the Bill will probably be the most important for our constituents who are tenants. Their ability to secure enforcement, where there is a breach of the legislation, will be critical. The Minister will know that the Opposition have shared concerns about ensuring that the resource from the enforcement regime will be sufficient to be self-sustaining. It strikes me that the enforcement regime, as set out, is very similar to that which already exists for local authorities in respect of environmental crime, such as fly-tipping, where it is assumed that the proceeds from fines and costs will be sufficient. Most of us will recognise that, in reality, that is rarely the case—carrying out that enforcement action always represents a cost to the council tax payer. Although it is not a matter for legislation, it would be helpful to understand how the Government intend to engage with local authorities to understand the cost of these new burdens fully and use the new burdens doctrine to ensure that they are appropriately resourced.

As the Minister has said, there is a point at which enforcement action outside criminal prosecution is taken, and there is a stage at which criminal prosecution may be the only available option. With other types of enforcement, many local authorities find that the push towards criminal prosecution is necessary to bring an end to the antisocial behaviour that is causing the problem in the first place. The challenge is that the proceeds of any fine resulting from criminal prosecution go into the consolidated fund of central Government expenditure, rather than accruing to the local authority. Even if there is not an award of costs, the largest part of that resource, which in theory is available to sustain the system, in fact goes into a different Government pot for other uses. It would be helpful if the Minister indicated what process of engagement and consultation the Government envisage they will take with local authorities. That must be designed to ensure that the resources derived from enforcement find their way to the sharp end of it, so that in practice, in the real world, it makes the difference that we hope it will.

I completely agree with the shadow Minister that many of the provisions in the Bill will not work as intended without robust local authority enforcement. We have increased the fines from the levels in the previous Government’s Bill to £7,000 and £40,000. It is also worth noting that those fines can be issued repeatedly—they are not a one-off—if landlords continue to breach the relevant provisions.

More generally on local authority resourcing, I make two points. First, it is important to note that many of the provisions in the Bill will not need to be enforced immediately. They will come into play one or two years down the line, so not every measure in the Bill that needs enforcement will require it from the date of Royal Assent. We have made it clear in previous debates that although we think that fines are part of the answer—we want the “polluter pays” principle to be at the heart of the Bill—we recognise that in many cases, they alone will not be enough. That is why I have set out that in accordance with the new burdens doctrine, we will ensure that additional burdens on local authorities that result from our reforms are fully funded.

The shadow Minister made an interesting point, as he has done several times today, that challenges me to go away and think about the final destination of fines from criminal prosecutions. I will take that away and give it serious consideration. We are in agreement that we need to ensure that where local authorities enforce breaches of the provisions set out in this Bill, those funds should come to local authorities. I will come back to him on the point he raises about the consolidated fund, if he is amenable to me doing so.

The Minister’s response prompts me to ask a further question. I am grateful to him for undertaking to write back on the consolidated fund. In other enforcement regimes modelled on this system that provide scope to issue significant fines, there is a common pattern of local authorities outsourcing the responsibility to third-party enforcement agencies. We see that with littering, environmental crime and all manner of areas of local authority duty. Essentially, business makes a pitch, and if they receive the delegated authority to act on behalf of the council in the performance of its duties, they will enter into a profit share agreement. In the case of parking regimes, historically, for each parking ticket that was issued, some money went to the company and some money to the local authority.

That creates a risk—this was mirrored in the earlier debate—of perverse incentives. At local authority level, the incentive could be to pursue the landlords who are easiest to deal with and most likely to yield financial restitution to contribute to the bottom line of the business undertaking the work. That could result in a scarcity of resources to deal with the more difficult and intractable cases, and the most vulnerable tenants.

Have the Government thought about how, in their engagement with local authorities, they will seek to ensure that the regime is enforced equally? Local authorities have an understandable desire to outsource. Particularly in built-up urban areas where there may be a high density of rogue landlords, how can we ensure that the process will not result in extremely vulnerable people falling outside the enforcement regime because it simply is not profitable to pursue it in other parts of the country?

I thank the shadow Minister for that thoughtful point. To be entirely open, it is not one that I have considered. I think it is a fair challenge, and I will go away and give some thought to how we can ensure that local authorities look at all breaches in the round and apply the same approach to each, rather than targeting the low-hanging fruit. To provide reassurance on the concern about good landlords being caught up in the process, I repeat that the process allows landlords to make representations to local housing authorities and the first-tier tribunal if they think that that has happened.

The other point, which we will debate in quite extensive detail, is that enforcement by local authorities is not the only means that the Bill provides of tackling rogue landlords and breaches. I draw the shadow Minister’s attention to the significant strengthening of rent repayment orders, which offers an alternative, tenant-led enforcement mechanism. As I think I said in my evidence to the Committee last week, across the country—in local authority terms, enforcement is a real postcode lottery—the most effective thing I have seen is where well-resourced and effective local authority enforcement is complemented by tenants taking action with rent repayment orders. When the two work in tandem, it can be of real benefit in driving bad landlords out of the sector. I will give further consideration to the shadow Minister’s specific, well-made point.

I want to build on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner has just made. It may not quite fit at this point in the consideration of the Bill, but it has come to mind while we have been talking about this. I am sure that we all have been contacted by a tenant and then found out that they are one of five or six tenants, all with the same rogue landlord. What can we do in the Bill to enable the trigger point for one tenancy to be used as an opportunity to explore other tenancies with the same landlord? I have dealt with such a case, where I encountered a landlord with five or six tenants across a city, managing properties with appalling conditions and treatment of tenants. We do not want to have to repeat the exercise six times.

Is there anything in the Bill that would enable the local authority to see whether there are any other tenants in the same situation, or is that a bit too Big Brother—would it be pursuing it too far? The whole Bill is aimed at tackling rogue landlords. Are we slowing down that process by taking each property individually? Is there a mechanism whereby we could collect them all together?

If I have understood the hon. Lady correctly, and if she is amenable to it, I will fold this point into the written response that I have already promised her, but multiple fines can be levied for breaches. If a landlord in a particular part of the country with multiple properties is in repeated breach over that portfolio of properties, local authorities will be able to levy fines on more than one occasion, so it is not a £7,000 limit in the first instance, or £40,000 for more serious cases, per landlord. Again, I will expand on it in a written response, but I think the database can do some work here in terms of landlords in a particular area registering all their properties. I think it will become apparent quite quickly—it depends on how we use the database—if particular landlords show a pattern of behaviour whereby they are not treating their tenants appropriately. Let me come back to the hon. Lady in more detail as part of the response that I have already committed to.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 16 to 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.