I beg to move amendment 77, in schedule 1, page 155, line 6, at end insert—

“(1A) In the heading of Part 1, omit ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

(1B) Omit the heading of Part II.”

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 73, in clause 4, page 4, leave out lines 35 to 37 and insert—

“(a) omit subsection (3);

(b) in subsection (4)—

(i) omit ‘Part II of’; and

(ii) omit ‘, subject to subsections (5A) and (6) below,’”.

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

Amendment 74, in schedule 2, page 175, line 40, leave out from “claims),” to the end of line 41 and insert “omit subsection (6)”.

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. The intention of this amendment is to make all grounds for eviction discretionary for the court. As the Committee heard from experts during oral evidence, many in the sector are concerned that none of the grounds will be discretionary.

There are a range of circumstances in which discretion would be advisable in deciding eviction cases. The tenant may be terminally ill—a cancer patient, for example—and I understand that that example was considered during the last Parliament in relation to the previous Bill. The court would have no discretion to enable a stay of eviction in that case. The tenant could have caring responsibilities, perhaps for a disabled person. Again, there would be no discretion to vary the terms of the eviction.

There could be undue hardship caused if the tenant was unable to stay for a given period. Perhaps the tenant had already arranged to move and arranged new accommodation, but that was not available on the timescale in the Bill; in that case, there would again be no discretion. The tenant might have an impending examination to sit or a work commitment that was vital to their career. Again, there would be no discretion for the courts. The tenant may be a disabled person and need extra time or support to arrange the physical burden of moving home.

In a previous discussion, the Minister talked about the importance of taking the personal circumstances of tenants into account, and that is the intent behind this amendment. The courts will not be able to take personal circumstances into account because there will be no discretion on the terms of eviction.

Parties are especially concerned about this issue in relation to grounds 1 and 1A, which concern eviction for repossession by the landlord or their family or for the sale of the property. We heard from Liz Davies KC during oral evidence that, in many cases, a tenant could have done nothing wrong but would still be subject to eviction without any discretion for the courts to vary the terms of that.

Even if the Government do not accept the amendment, I argue that there should be discretion for the courts, if not in every case of eviction, at least in exceptional circumstances. I urge the Government to take that on board in the spirit in which I have moved this amendment.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments, which allow us to have this debate. In my view—I think this is shared across the House —landlords must have robust and clear grounds for possession where there is good reason for them to take their property back. I hope that he will appreciate the steps the Government have already taken to ensure that the grounds are fair to both parties. We have overhauled the previous Government’s Renters (Reform) Bill to provide additional protections for tenants, including longer notice periods, a longer protected period and a higher rent arrears threshold. We have also scrapped the previous Government’s harmful proposals to introduce a new ground for repeat rent arrears, and we have reduced the discretionary antisocial behaviour threshold to behaviour “capable” of causing nuisance or annoyance.

However, amendments 73, 74 and 77, which would make all grounds discretionary, are a step too far. Indeed, I never argued for all grounds to be discretionary when we considered the previous Government’s Bill. Making all grounds discretionary would mean that landlords have no certainty that they would be awarded possession even if the grounds were otherwise met. That includes in situations of serious antisocial behaviour—where the tenant has been convinced of a serious criminal offence or has broken an injunction put in place to stop their behaviour. Landlords wanting to sell or move into their property could be prevented from doing so, and specialist sectors, such as temporary and supported accommodation, would not be able to guarantee regaining possession in order to house new individuals who require their support.

I assure the hon. Member that there are still many discretionary grounds in the Bill and that judges will have discretion in less clear cases or where possession may not always be reasonable, despite the ground having been met. It is absolutely right that judges have discretion where possession takes place in those circumstances, and that includes smaller breaches of a tenancy agreement or low levels of rent arrears. I believe the steps that we have taken to protect tenants provide sufficient protections against unfair evictions. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member not to press his amendments.

I would like to speak in favour of the amendment and to bring the Minister’s attention to the evidence we received from experts, which highlighted the fact that discretionary grounds do not make it impossible for the court to award possession. In fact, in many cases, especially ones involving antisocial behaviour, it is reasonable to assume that the courts would apply a high threshold for where to exercise discretion. Nevertheless, that does not negate the principle that there may be extremely exceptional circumstances in which discretion is needed. The Government completely tying the hands of the courts so that they are unable to consider those extenuating circumstances is counterproductive.

I accept what the Minister says about the Bill’s intent and that there are very limited circumstances in which discretion would be available. It is disappointing, though, that it is not recognised that courts require more discretion than is given. The Bill would provide discretion only in those very limited circumstances.

Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. The mandatory grounds for possession are very limited and specific—for example, grounds 1 and 1A, where the landlord has a clear intention to move back into the property or move a family member in or to sell the property, and they have to evidence that with the court. I ask hon. Members to consider—this was put to me many times in the evidence sessions—the challenges that our courts face and the burden that this legislation places on them. Making every ground discretionary, irrespective of how reasonable it is for a landlord in those grounds 1 and 1A circumstances, for example, to take back their property quickly, risks overburdening the courts. As I say, many of the grounds remain discretionary. However, we think that there is a good reason why a certain number of mandatory grounds are in a different bracket from the discretionary one.

I hear what the Minister says. The case was made forcefully by witnesses in oral evidence that the discretionary grounds for eviction are far too limited and that we need to see further discretion given to the courts. This would not prevent evictions continuing or the courts from making the decisions in accordance with the Bill’s provisions, and it would provide discretion to the courts. I urge the Government to consider widening the categories of discretion for the courts in evictions. I hope that the Government will consider that issue during the passage of the Bill, and I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.

I certainly do not want to imply that there would be any degree of political love-in, but on this matter, I agree with the Minister. It is worth saying for the record that we in the Opposition understand that when the courts are considering this matter, the first issue will be an evidential test: has the necessary threshold for the mandatory ground to be triggered been met? If the court’s opinion is that there is some doubt about that, clearly it has the discretion to act differently because it considers through an evidential test that the threshold has not been met.

In practice, courts deal with this matter with a high degree of discretion, as they do with all other matters that are alike. As Members of Parliament, we will be aware of situations where constituents have been victims of serious, persistent, long-term antisocial behaviour. The grounds outlined are examples where evidence has been accumulated and a court can swiftly make a decision to grant possession in order for the situation to be resolved for the wider benefit of other people affected.

We therefore support the Government’s position that the mandatory grounds should be framed in this way and that moving to make all grounds discretionary would add an element of doubt over and above the evidential test. That would, in turn, enable those who wish to perpetrate long-term antisocial behaviour to get away with it for a longer period of time.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 4, page 5, line 40, at end insert—

“(fa) after subsection (5A), insert—

‘(5B) Where the court makes an order for possession on grounds 1 or 1A in Schedule 2 to this Act (whether with or without other grounds), the order shall include a requirement on the landlord to file and serve evidence no later than sixteen weeks from the date of the order.

(5C) Evidence provided under subsection (5B) must—

(a) provide details of—

(i) the state of occupation of the dwelling-house since the date of the order, and

(ii) the progress of any sale of the dwelling-house, and

(b) be accompanied by a statement of truth signed by the landlord.’”

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 69, in clause 4, page 5, line 41, at end insert—

“(2A) After section 7, insert—

‘

(1) The court shall not make an order for possession on grounds 1 or 1A in Schedule 2 to this Act unless the landlord has complied with subsections (2) to (4) below.

(2) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on grounds 1 or 1A, the court must be provided with evidence verified by a statement of truth signed by the landlord.

(3) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on ground 1 and the dwelling house is required by a member of the landlord’s family as defined in paragraphs 2(b) to (d) of that ground, the court must be provided with evidence verified by a statement of truth signed by that family member.

(4) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on ground 1A, the evidence referred to in sub-section (2) must include a letter of engagement from a solicitor or estate agent concerning the sale of the dwelling house.’”

The amendment’s purpose is to require the evidence to be provided by landlords on grounds 1 and 1A, in the case of occupying the home or selling the property, to be clearly stated in the Bill, so that it is clear what evidence needs to be provided and the test is clearly stated. The Government have indicated that the evidence required will be contained in guidance, but it would significantly reassure Members in this House and in the other place if we could see the evidential test for landlords to gain possession. The amendment sets out the need for a statement of truth and suggests that a letter of engagement from a solicitor in the sale of a property is the kind of evidence that should be in the Bill. I believe the amendment is self-explanatory in that regard.

While I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments—indeed, as a shadow Minister, I probed the previous Government on this point when discussing the previous Bill—on reflection, I do not think they are the right approach for the following reason, which relates to the previous debate. We have overhauled the Bill in a number of ways to strengthen protections for tenants, and we must be careful about tipping the balance too far the other way and penalising good landlords, who, in certain circumstances, have a right to certainty that they will get their property back and that this will move through the courts in an orderly fashion.

Amendment 68 is an attempt to deter abuse of grounds 1 and 1A, which is an honourable intention. It seeks to require landlords to present further evidence that they have fulfilled the grounds after the possession order has been granted. It does not detail what should happen if a landlord does not present the evidence. Furthermore, it will have no impact on cases that do not make it to court. Where a landlord has obtained a possession order through the courts, they will already have presented evidence to a court to satisfy a judge of their intent to meet the grounds. The amendment would also place an additional burden on courts, which would need to set up new processes to deal with the evidence, taking time away from progressing possession claims.

The hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington asked me to consider whether grounds that are currently mandatory should be discretionary, and I thought very carefully about which grounds should be discretionary and which mandatory when developing and overhauling this piece of legislation over recent months. On the basis of that reflection, I have concluded that increasing the prohibition on remarketing and reletting a property after using these grounds, including in cases that do not reach court, is a better mechanism for preventing abuse than adding requirements for evidence. This will allow a tenant to take action if they see, for example, their property advertised online following eviction.

Amendment 69 seeks to put into legislation prescribed evidential requirements for grounds 1 and 1A. We just had a discussion about how we should trust judges and their judgment on these matters. I believe that judges are best placed to consider and determine the evidence before them on these mandatory grounds. Setting an enhanced evidence threshold may mean that judges are less likely to consider wider evidence, and it could inadvertently lower the threshold where an eviction is ordered. It is right that judges have the discretion to respond to the evidence provided on a case-by-case basis. That is what the Bill provides for, and I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

The Minister says that the amendment does not include what would happen if the evidence was not provided—clearly, the evidence would not be there and the case would be weakened on that basis. I contest the idea that this is an onerous or burdensome requirement. The statement of truth is an extremely simple document—many on the Committee will have seen them—that can be produced easily and at little expense. I also contest the idea that courts need separate processes to look at statements of truth. They look at statements of truth all day, every day; new processes are not required.

The engagement of a solicitor in the sale of a property is not a particularly onerous requirement on someone selling their property. I assume that the person selling the property would, in any event, have to engage a solicitor, and would therefore need a letter of engagement. It is not an onerous requirement in any shape or form. The Minister said that judges would have less discretion. Again, I contest that, because judges would simply have more evidence in front of them; it would not have any effect on the amount of discretion that judges have. I urge the Minister to continue considering the issue, but I can do the maths, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

Again, I agree with the Government on this matter. A lot of residential property transactions are undertaken by licensed conveyancers rather than by solicitors. That is a much more affordable and efficient option, often done on a fixed-fee basis, and that is particularly relevant to smaller landlords. Introducing a requirement that a solicitor must be used would be unduly onerous and would inhibit the number of transactions in the market.

I wish to provide further reassurance to the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, because I fear that we are dancing on the head of a pin here. Under the provisions in the Bill, judges will have to consider evidence to justify the use of mandatory grounds 1 and 1A. When I gave evidence to the Committee, I provided examples of the types of evidence that judges may require. It is up to individual judges to ask for that evidence and to make a decision on the basis of what is put in front of them. We trust judges to do that. With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, I do not accept the idea that judges are not looking at evidence and not ensuring that the use of these grounds is properly justified. That is misplaced, so I am glad he has indicated that he will withdraw the amendment.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 4, page 6, line 14, leave out “1A,”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 70, in clause 4, page 6, line 15, leave out “4A,”.

Amendment 57, in clause 4, page 6, line 16, at beginning insert “1A,”.

Amendment 71, in clause 4, page 6, line 20, after “4,” insert “4A,”.

These amendments relate similarly to the issue of notice periods for grounds for sale. It is important to recognise that a very significant part of our housing supply continues to come from the private rented sector—in particular, from the buy-to-let market. Drawing on my experience as a financial adviser, one of the key issues for lenders in advancing buy-to-let mortgages arises because of the risks associated with them—in essence, people are much more likely to pay their mortgage payments on their own home than when they are borrowing to secure a home for investment purposes—so there is a risk premium, or a rating, on the mortgage interest. Consequently, a significant supply of finance is required to support the development of the buy-to-let market.

The introduction of significant restrictions on the length of notice periods will mean that when there is a default on those payments and they are not being made, it will be more difficult for the possession for the purposes of sale and the settlement of the outstanding debt to the bank to be progressed. That could have a chilling effect on the ability to secure finance and, in turn, an impact on the supply of properties available to those needing to secure a home in the private rented sector.

Once again, it is part of a broader, small “p”, philosophical and political argument. We are very much of the view that securing the maximum possible supply is very important, and we need to strike the correct balance so that we do not see a chilling effect having the unintended consequence of a reduction in supply.

As the hon. Gentleman has just made clear, amendments 56 and 57 seek to reduce the notice period for the selling ground 1A from four months to two months. The Government believe that the notice period for tenants being evicted through no fault of their own should be four months, to give them adequate time to find new accommodation. An eviction notice can turn a family’s life upside down, and four months means they will not be forced to move during a school term. I draw the Committee’s attention to the remarks I made previously about the changing nature of the private rented system and the fact that more older people and families now live in it compared with the situation in the late ’80s, when the system was introduced.

Selling a property is often a long-term decision that involves significant planning on the part of landlords. We do not believe that landlords are likely to need to evict tenants with only two months’ notice, given the time it takes to secure a sale. They also have the option of selling with tenants in situ.

Amendments 70 and 71 were tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. They would make an extreme change that would reduce the notice period for the new student ground 4A to a mere two weeks from the current four months.

The Government believe that students are just as deserving of adequate notice as other tenants. The purpose of the student ground is to try to balance security of tenure with the need to preserve the annual cycle of typical student tenancies. These amendments do not assist the ground in that purpose at all. Student landlords plan their business models long term around the academic year, and after our reforms will factor the four-month notice into their planning.

There is no circumstance where a competent student landlord would suddenly need to evict tenants in line with the academic year with only two weeks’ notice. Indeed, currently they have to give two months’ notice under section 21. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment is a retrograde step vis-à-vis the current iniquitous arrangements that we are trying to undo.

Students often lack the capital to organise a move at short notice. A two-week notice period means it is likely they are given notice to leave during the summer break when they might be working, or even during their exams. We believe that it is right that they have four months’ notice to organise their move.

I therefore ask the hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Amendments 70 and 71 would align the two weeks’ notice for students in HMOs with the two weeks’ notice that the Bill provides that students would have in purpose-built student accommodation. All the points that the Minister has made in relation to the short-term notice period apply to the Bill because that is the Government’s intent in relation to purpose-built student accommodation. The amendments would simply align those properties under HMO ownership with those that are university or purpose-built student accommodation.

Landlords of HMO accommodation are likely to be smaller businesses than universities. Under the provisions in the Bill, universities would enjoy much greater flexibility on eviction than much smaller landlords, who would suffer as a result.

My concern is that there would be a reduction in the amount of student accommodation because of those very different terms on which HMO landlords would be able to let their properties to students compared with other tenants. Any reduction in the availability of supply of student accommodation, particularly in university towns, would have a serious impact on family housing, which is of course often occupied by students, much to the chagrin of residents who are looking for family homes.

It is vitally important that an unintended consequence of the Bill is not the reduction in supply of student accommodation. That is why we seek alignment with what the Bill provides for purpose-built student accommodation.

I urge the Government to consider reducing, if not to two weeks, then to two months, the grounds for eviction in other student accommodation, so that it is more closely aligned with the provisions that the Bill makes for the majority of student accommodation. I urge the Government to consider that and I will not press the amendment.

I will consider that matter further. To be candid with the Committee, some judgments on provisions relating to student accommodation are finely balanced. We are trying to strike a balance between giving student tenants the right level of security while maintaining that annual cyclical nature of student accommodation.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we are treating purpose-built student accommodation differently from that of students living in the general PRS. We recognise the limited market for such accommodation. Regarding students in the general PRS, I am reluctant to accept the hon. Gentleman’s advice. Student landlords will adapt to the system and factor the four-month notice period into their business models. I am happy, however, to reflect further on the arguments he made.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 4, page 7, line 6, at end insert—

“(5) After section 11 of the 1988 Act insert—

‘11A Possession on ground 6A: compensation of tenant

(1) This section applies where a court makes an order for possession of a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy on Ground 6A in Schedule 2 to this Act (whether or not the order is also made on any other ground).

(2) The court may order the landlord to pay to the tenant such sum as appears sufficient as compensation for damage or loss sustained by that tenant as a result of the order for possession.

(3) In deciding whether to make an order under this section, and what compensation to order, the court must (in particular) take into account the circumstances which led to Ground 6A being available as a ground for making an order for possession (including any conduct by the tenant which caused or contributed to Ground 6A being available).’”

This gives the court power to order the landlord to pay compensation to the tenant where possession is obtained on Ground 6A (failure of premises to comply with planning requirements etc).

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Without the threat of arbitrary section 21 evictions, tenants will be evicted only when landlords have reasonable grounds for doing so. Clause 4 amends the grounds for possession in schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1988. The grounds themselves are amended by schedule 1 of the Bill, which we will debate shortly. Most crucially, clause 4 sets out the notice periods for the grounds for possession. It extends notice periods for the main grounds where the tenant is not at fault, including where a landlord wishes to move in or sell the property.

In the current system, tenants can be evicted with as little as two months’ notice, even when they have done absolutely nothing wrong. In future, landlords will usually need to provide four months’ notice when the tenant is not at fault, such as when a landlord wants to sell or move in. Longer notice periods are critical to ensure that tenants have time to find alternative housing.

The previous Government’s Renters (Reform) Bill did not propose longer notice periods, maintaining the two months’ notice tenants face under existing section 21 arrangements. That was one of the main concerns expressed by the Opposition at the time, as well as by groups such as Shelter and Generation Rent. I am pleased to say we have addressed their concerns here. Crucially, four-month notice periods will also mean that families with children will never be forced to move during school term time when they are not at fault. That is fundamentally a matter of fairness from the Government’s point of view. Children’s education should not be disrupted simply to allow for the quicker sale of property, or to have another individual move in. Correcting that is at the heart of the Government’s opportunity mission.

The notice periods for the rent arrears ground will be increased from two weeks to four weeks. That will give vulnerable tenants who are struggling to pay their rent longer to find funds or alternative accommodation. I am confident that that will not burden landlords unfairly, and will give a little more time to tenants to find new accommodation if necessary, or to repay their arrears.

When landlords and communities are faced with antisocial behaviour, landlords will be able to make a possession claim to the court immediately. That will ensure that poor behaviour can be dealt with swiftly. That is currently only the case for the discretionary ASB ground 14, but we are expanding it to the mandatory ASB ground 7A, for which very serious behaviour must have occurred. It is a peculiar quirk of the current legislation that the discretionary ground allows landlords to take action more swiftly than the mandatory ground where tenants have committed very serious crimes. The clause would end that anomaly.

We acknowledge that permitting landlords to seek possession immediately, although appropriate, will not give tenants long to seek legal advice on their situation, or find a new home. The court will therefore not be able to make an order for possession that takes effect within 14 days from when the landlord serves notice on the tenant. In addition to notice periods, clause 4 would make provision for specific circumstances of possession. For example, the clause would ensure that superior landlords can continue possession claims made by an intermediate landlord, even after the head tenancy has expired. That will ensue that superior landlords requiring vacant possession will not have to begin a new claim when the intermediate landlord has already done so.

Finally, clause 4 would make further and consequential changes to the Housing Act 1988, to reflect wider changes made by the Bill, including the abolition of fixed-term tenancies and the introduction of new grounds for possession. That includes ensuring that protections for Case A tenants under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 continue in the new system.

Members of the Committee might wonder what the wording in subsection (4),

“Disapplication of conditions where notice dispensed with”,

is designed to achieve. The use of certain grounds, including ground 4A, 5G and 6, hinges on the serving of valid notice. However, section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 permits a court to dispense with a notice requirement when it is reasonable to do so. This change will ensure that the grounds continue to work when this dispensation has occurred. The changes we are making in clause 4 will give tenants more time to find a place to live while ensuring that landlords can recover possession in a timely way when they have a legitimate reason to seek possession. That will ensure that the system works as intended.

I now turn briefly to Government amendment 1. Ground 6A allows landlords to evict their tenants when eviction is necessary to comply with enforcement action—for example, if a property is overcrowded or the landlord has received a banning order. While we understand that this ground is needed to prevent landlords being left in legal limbo indefinitely, we want to ensure that tenants are fairly compensated for having to vacate their home. As we debated at length on the previous Government’s legislation, this possession ground potentially sets up a scenario where the tenant is penalised for a landlord’s poor practice and, in some circumstances, criminal behaviour. We think it is important that they are compensated in some form.

The Government amendment inserts new section 11A into the 1988 Act. It will allow the court to require the landlord to pay compensation to the tenant when ordering possession under ground 6A. The power to award compensation may be made by the court in respect of any damage or loss sustained by the tenant as a result of the order of possession, such as moving expenses. The court will have discretion to consider what is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

The amendment also ensures that the court considers whether any actions from the tenant caused the landlord to use ground 6A. Such a situation may occur if, for example, the tenant moved into the property without the landlord’s knowledge, causing overcrowding. The new provision will increase fairness for tenants being evicted when the landlord is at fault, helping them to meet the costs of an unexpected and unfair move.

The Opposition supports the vast majority of these measures. We all recognise situations where a landlord is in breach of planning regulations, resulting in a property being overcrowded and potentially being turned into an HMO without the appropriate licence and so on, which can bedevil our constituents. It seems appropriate to take these steps to raise the stakes for landlords who seek to behave in that manner and drive them out of the market.

I do not have much to add to what I have already said. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.