Simon Mullings, Giles Peaker and Liz Davies gave evidence.

May I welcome our three witnesses to the first of several sessions this afternoon in which we are taking expert evidence on the Bill? We are now in public and our proceedings are being broadcast. Perhaps it would be easiest if the witnesses introduced themselves.

Liz Davies:

My name is Liz Davies. I am a barrister specialising in housing and homelessness law at Garden Court chambers; I also act as a legal consultant to the Renters’ Reform Coalition.

Giles Peaker:

I am Giles Peaker, a solicitor and partner at Anthony Gold solicitors and a housing law specialist.

Simon Mullings:

I am Simon Mullings, co-chair of the Housing Law Practitioners Association. The experience I bring to this panel is 20-odd years of housing law practice, which includes representing tenants in possession proceedings on court duty in seven or eight different London courts across the years.

I thank each of you for coming to give evidence to us. I have two questions. The first relates to the amended grounds for possession, which we have discussed numerous times in previous evidence sessions. There are concerns about the amended or new grounds, particularly the de facto no-fault grounds that remain. Can you give us your view on some of those? Should they be removed entirely, made discretionary, or tightened in a way that might better protect residents from loopholes, abuse and exploitation by a minority of landlords?Q135

Who wants to go first?

Liz Davies:

May I start and deal in a little detail with ground 8A? I will then say a couple of things about 1 and 1A, but my colleagues can develop that. There is a great deal of concern about ground 8A, and the “three sets of rent arrears in three years and you’re out” ground. There is a concern that that is a mandatory ground and that it is punitive. There can be an awful lot of reasons why people in insecure employment or on zero-hours contracts, or just because of life events, can slip into arrears—and then make them up, of course—that get as far as two months. If that happens to you three times, you know that you will be subject to a mandatory possession order unless the landlord has kindly told you that you are not. It is punitive and unnecessary because we have ground 8. I would like to see ground 8 made discretionary, but we have it currently as a mandatory ground and we have the discretionary grounds 10 and 11 for rent arrears. I think there is a worry about unintended consequences, because once a tenant is in that third set of rent arrears, you have to ask what incentive they have to remedy that position if they think they are inevitably going to lose their home. I am very concerned about ground 8A and would like to see it omitted altogether.

The courts have plenty of flexibility to deal with tenants who persistently do not pay their rent: such tenants can be subject to an outright order under any of grounds 8, 10 or 11. If ground 8A is to remain, much the best thing would be to make it discretionary, so that at least the court could look at whether this has happened inadvertently to somebody—whether they are now back in a reasonable financial position, can pay their current rent, have made up the arrears and should be able to stay in their home, paying rent to their landlord, which is of course a good thing for the landlord. The courts could enforce that. Equally, the courts are relatively wise: they can spot quite well a tenant who has no intention of paying rent in the future, and they can make an outright possession order if it is a discretionary ground. A discretionary ground is not a “get out of jail free” card for the tenant, by any means. I would like to see ground 8A either omitted altogether or made discretionary.

On grounds 1 and 1A, the deep concern is the short period of time that a tenant is protected—the six-month protected period. The Renters’ Reform Coalition and I would like to see that being much longer, because the six-month period merely reflects the current assured shorthold tenancy regime. The other big concern—I will not go into the detail, but you can ask me—is of course the extent to which a landlord may have no real intention of selling or moving back in: they simply wait three months and re-let. There has to be much greater provision about abuse.

Giles Peaker:

I totally agree with Liz’s points. On 1A and 1B, the three-month period and the potential fine for breaking the three-month period both need to be looked at. If you consider what London rents are, the potential fine is actually less than three months’ rent, so there is an issue there. As it is currently drafted, the three-month period also appears to run from the point when the landlord has given notice and the tenant has left—it does not apply to a period after a court has made a possession order—so if the landlord brought possession proceedings and a possession order was made, they could then re-let the next day, with no penalty, even though the possession proceedings were on the basis that a family member was moving in or they were intending to sell.

I would also add a few words of caution—I am afraid that this is anecdotal, but it is certainly what I have gathered—from various practitioners in Scotland. There is a degree of gaming going on. There certainly have been a few tribunals in which a landlord who had supposedly been intending to sell most certainly did not and had never set the process in train—ditto in the case of a family member intending to move in. There is a question of what the evidential requirements would be for a landlord to establish that they were intending to sell, that they were in the process of trying to sell, or that they or the family member were intending to move in as their only or principle home. A simple statement that that is their intention cannot really be sufficient when the consequences for the tenant are quite severe. There is an option to use this as a sort of get-out for the abolition of section 21. The three-month period is too short.

On 8A, I simply echo what Liz said. If you are in a position in which, on literally three days—three separate, individual days—over three years, you find that you have slipped into two months’ rent arrears, even if you could make them up the very next day, you still face mandatory possession proceedings. That is extremely draconian. There would be no appeal to the courts’ understanding that your rent payments were otherwise perfect apart from those occasions, because it is a mandatory ground. It needs to be addressed.

Do not feel that you have to say anything, Mr Mullings, unless you have something different to say.

Simon Mullings:

On 1 and 1A, I would echo what my colleagues have said. I think you heard evidence earlier in the week in relation to the notice period for those grounds and how that could, in fact, benefit landlords and the court system in allowing more time for a tenant to find accommodation in those circumstances. I do not need to say any more about that.

I think 8A really does warrant more discussion. You have heard from both Giles and Liz how 8A is inapt, in that it is a far too draconian sanction for people who can find themselves triggering 8A through no fault of their own. In a cost of living crisis—

I am sorry to interrupt, but we have only 45 minutes and then I will cut you off even if you are mid-sentence. Saying that you agree with one another does not add to the Committee’s general understanding, so say different things and do not feel that all three of you have to answer all the questions.

Please go on. I rudely interrupted; I apologise.

Simon Mullings:

Not at all. The second thing about 8A is that it is not just inapt; it is inept because it will not do what it is designed to do, which is to stop the gaming of ground 8. First of all, in my experience—I hope this is useful to the Committee—I have only seen one example in 25 years of that occurring. On that example, the tenant then became subject to a suspended possession order under ground 11, which was a perfectly adequate way of dealing with it.

It is inept because it is perfectly possible to game ground 8A anyway. Let us assume that people do want to try and game it, but I really do not think people are doing that for a moment. If you get into two months or more’s arrears on a first occasion and then on a second occasion, you would think perhaps you should bring your arrears down to less than two months at that point. Well, not really; not if you want to game the system. You keep your arrears at two months or more so you do not trigger the third occasion. Then, when your landlord brings you to court, that is the moment at which you then pay off the arrears and try to game avoiding a possession order. So it is perfectly possible to game 8A anyway. It is not just inapt; it is not going to do what it is supposed to do.

Q Briefly, to follow up on clause 6, which revolves around challenging the amount or increase of rent, we have concerns that even with the expanded right to challenge, the tribunal system will not provide sufficient protection. Do you have any thoughts on how, leaving aside other options, that process might be tightened? For example, should the tribunal’s ability to award rents higher than what the landlord specifies be taken out of the Bill? Should there be other protections that allow renters to leave if they are served with that higher notice? Should they have another section 13 notice? I am keen to hear your views on how we might tighten clause 6.

Simon Mullings:

A simple amendment to do exactly what you are saying, which is so that the tribunal does not set a higher rent than the landlord is asking for, would be extremely welcome. The reason for that is that if somebody comes to me asking whether they should challenge the rent that has been set by their landlord, I am bound to advise them that, unlikely as it is, the tribunal could set a higher rent. That has a real chilling effect on somebody’s willingness to then challenge a rent. It has been in section 14 of the Housing Act 1988 since it came into force in 1989, but this is a real opportunity to cure what seems to be a rather bizarre anomaly. I am not really sure why it was there in the first place, but it has this chilling effect. Also, section 13 challenges will become much more important when the Bill passes.

Q Thank you to our panel of witnesses. We have spoken a few times about ground 8A. What would you say to someone who said that it is unfair for landlords to suffer multiple breaches of rent arrears? And on a completely separate thing from ground 8A, we are introducing a new ombudsman to the private rented sector. How do you think that ombudsman can work? Would you say that it can help to reduce the pressure on the court system?

Liz Davies:

I will start with the point about multiple breaches of rent arrears. I think that the answer to that is to trust the wisdom of the courts. The courts have the mandatory ground at the moment under ground 8—again, the concern is gaming and you have heard Simon’s answer on that—and they have discretionary grounds for possession under grounds 10 and 11. A well-advised landlord who wants to ensure that they can get a possession order from the type of tenant you have just described will ensure that they plead all the rent arrears grounds available to them, including ground 8A, if you put that through.

When you get to the court hearing, courts are perfectly capable of identifying somebody who has got into arrears in the past but has made them up or is in a position to pay current rent and to pay off the arrears within a reasonable period. Courts deal with people in financial hardship day in, day out; they are very good at scrutinising budgets and knowing whether or not an offer to pay is realistic. They are equally good at looking at a rent arrears history, no doubt prodded by the landlord, and saying, “Hang on a minute. You’ve just told us when your payslips were and you were not paying rent at that time. You really have been abusing the system.” And they will make an outright possession order.

Case law on suspended possession orders on the basis of rent arrears requires that a suspended possession order, as an alternative to an outright order, can be made only where the court is satisfied, first, that the current rent will be met in the future, and secondly, that if there are arrears at the date of hearing, those arrears will be paid off over a reasonable period. There is some case law, depending on a landlord’s circumstances, about what a reasonable period is. Courts are very sympathetic to the point that private landlords in particular need that money paid back to them, so they are not going to approve an unrealistic repayment offer. I think that all the appropriate safeguards are there in the courts now. Of course, they are not currently used by private landlords because of section 21, which means that they do not need to. I think that those safeguards are there against the scenario that you have just suggested.

On the ombudsman, I will leave Simon and Giles to develop that point. All I would say is that an ombudsman is a very good thing. Access to justice through the courts is also a good thing. It would be wrong if some of the matters that courts deal with on behalf of tenants are then solely dealt with by the ombudsman. You have to have two opportunities.

Giles Peaker:

Briefly on the ombudsman, in principle it is a very good thing, but it generally tends to depend on the ombudsman. It really is a question of somebody actually being able and willing to take a serious and proactive approach. I think that there has been quite a market change in the social housing ombudsman over the last five or six years, and performances have really turned around. An ombudsman is not necessarily an answer in and of itself, but it can be a very good thing and, in the right hands, it can be extremely useful.

Simon Mullings:

We heard Mr Blakeway’s land grab earlier in the week—he fancies a crack at it. As Giles said, Mr Blakeway has done extremely well in the social housing sector, and, as Liz said, the ombudsman will do well in the jobs that it can do. It is not fair for landlords to face that situation, but it is also not fair for landlords to face a ground for possession that, whether they use it or not, will incentivise tenants to stop paying rent. I really believe that that is what 8A will do in certain circumstances.

Currently, the tribunal on rents is to make a determination of whether the rent could be reasonably expected to be made in the open market, and it therefore looks at new rents and not necessarily existing rents and other factors. There are some things that are disregarded and some things that the courts must have regard for. Is that enough, or should the courts have a stronger regard for other factors, in terms of a reasonable rent?Q

Liz Davies:

Entering into a new tenancy at market rent is one thing, but there is a real worry about rent increases to market rent. Although it initially plausible sounds—why should rent not go up to the same level as elsewhere, if it was a new tenancy?—the problem is that you may then end up with an unaffordable rent for the tenant, who had entered into the tenancy on the slightly slower rent, and they then leave voluntarily, but as a result of economic pressure; and when I say voluntarily, I do not mean entirely voluntarily, but it is not due to a notice served or a court order. The Renters’ Reform Coalition is certainly suggesting that the tribunal’s power should be limited to inflation or local median wages to increase rents, along, of course, with the prohibition on increasing them more than the landlord has proposed. I think that must be right. I understand that landlords are conducting a business, but they have let the tenancy initially at rent x; it is not that unfair for both landlord and tenant to have certainty that rent x will increase only by inflation or median wages, rather than out there in the open market.

Simon or Giles, do you have anything to add?

Giles Peaker:

I do not have much to add, but I am not sure whether we have detailed information about what in-tenancy rent increases look like, as opposed to new tenancies, and what the comparator would be. Are in-tenancy raises usually reaching new tenancy market rents, or do they consistently remain at a lower level across the lifetime of a tenancy? I do not think we have that information.

Q I suspect that the property portal will suddenly tell us that information, if it is collected. I also wanted to ask about deposits. At the moment, deposits are held in a deposit protection scheme. The deliberation as to whether or not it has been fairly withheld is done privately, and the only recourse is to appeal in the courts, which is quite a high burden. Is there a better way that some of those deposits could be handled? Could they be covered by the ombudsperson, or should there be a process whereby deposit disputes at least have to published? We do not even know the outcomes of deposit disputes at the moment.

Liz Davies:

Three lawyers silent! I throw the question of how back to you, but I think there is something quite important about publishing the principles under which various disputes are determined, and therefore the exact cases. You may or may not provide the names and addresses, although, with the property portal, we would say you should do; it would be the sort of thing one would want to know about a landlord.

Q So deposit complaints should be included in the property portal?

Liz Davies:

I am thinking about it; I had not thought about it before, and it is a good point. However, on the process of determining a dispute between a landlord and tenant about whether or not the tenant has been in breach, whether the deposit can be returned and whether in whole or in part—there is something to be said for that to be published, whether that is by the current providers or within the property portal. The property portal would allow future tenants to know whether they might have difficulties getting their deposit back.

Simon?

Simon Mullings:

I have nothing to add on that.

Can I ask for your views on the Government’s intention to delay the abolition of section 21 pending court reform? You are all litigators. Is that necessary, given the present state of play? What do you think the delay might entail? What reforms would be required in order to ensure that the courts were meeting the standard that the Government are settingQ ?

Simon Mullings:

No, it is not necessary.

Short answers are fine.

Simon Mullings:

We are lucky because we have had very recent statistics. The timescales for the various stages of possession and litigation are exactly as they were in 2019, when this Bill started its slow journey to where we are today. There is no doubt that there is a need to improve processes through the courts. What we have at the moment is an extremely good network of county courts, with a very evolved set of civil procedure rules that deal with possession claims very well. What we lack is resources for the county courts for both the physical estate and the personnel in the court to be there to provide the sort of first-class service that you would like to see in possession cases.

HLPA members have been campaigning on court reform and improvements to the court system since around 2015 or 2016, so we are all for it. I echo what Shelter’s director said earlier in the week: it is so important that we move forward with the Bill and the abolition of section 21, which is a key driver of homelessness and of misery, particularly for families with children in schools, who want the stability of knowing that the children can go to the local schools. Section 21 is also a driver of rent increases in various ways—I am telling you things you all know. I do not think there should be any further delay whatsoever.

Giles Peaker:

I do not think it is necessary. I am reluctant to think that the process of legislation should be based on whether the courts are functioning as they should be. I agree with Simon: the actual process of possession proceedings is probably one of the quicker processes within the county courts at the moment and is fairly well honed. I would add that the current time from issue to a possession order under the accelerated possession proceedings—an “on the papers” process, without a hearing—is roughly the same as under the section 8 process with an initial hearing. There is no great time lag for the section 8 process as opposed to accelerated possession proceedings. Most possession claims will go no further than first hearing—if there is no defence, that is it. There would not be such a significant impact on the courts’ functioning to make this a concern that should cause further delay.

Q We heard evidence this morning that suggested that the courts are currently overwhelmed and that the abolition of section 21 would increase contested cases. That is not your assessment?

Giles Peaker:

I do not see that it would necessarily increase contested cases. It would inevitably involve the process that leads to an initial hearing—those are 10-minute hearings on a list day. I really do not see why it would increase the number of contested hearings, because unless there is a defence, the possession order is highly likely to be made at the first hearing. On at least some of these new grounds, if the ground is made out, there is no defence. So I am unsure of the amount of additional burden.

Liz Davies:

I think that is the point. Currently, under section 21, landlords can get possession on the papers. There is no court hearing: the papers go in; the tenant has the right to respond; the district judge considers on the papers whether or not there is a defence. If there is no defence, the possession order is made; if there is a defence, it is put over to a hearing. Once section 21 is abolished, the starting point is that there will be a five or 10-minute hearing, which is usually about eight weeks after issue. That is about the same period of time as for the paperwork procedure I just described. At that hearing, the question for the court is, “Is the case genuinely disputed on grounds that appear to be substantial?” That is set out in the rules.

The great thing about that hearing is that there are housing duty solicitors at court. If a tenant does not have legal advice or advice from a citizens advice bureau beforehand, they turn up and talk to a duty solicitor—I am sitting next to one of them. Duty solicitors give realistic advice. If there is a defence—if the landlord has got it wrong—the duty solicitor will go in front of the court and say, “Actually, there is a defence,” and it gets adjourned for a trial, and that is right and proper. But if there is not a defence, the duty solicitor will say, “I’m sorry, there is absolutely nothing that can be said legally to the court,” and a possession order will be made.

One of the important things about advice, and indeed early advice, is that tenants get realistic advice, so they know whether they have any realistic chance of prolonging the proceedings, and so forth. In many ways, a hearing with a duty solicitor will be beneficial to landlords, and, as Giles says, it takes about the same length of time. There is lots to be said about county courts’ efficiencies and inefficiencies, but I do not think that is the problem.

Q The Government dropped 111 pages of amendments on us on Tuesday evening, which is not particularly good practice—I will put that on the record—so you may not have had a chance to look through them, but if you have, do you have any thoughts about whether they address some of the deficiencies in the Bill that we and others have highlighted? My reading of the decent homes standard amendment is that it does most of what we want it to do; my reading of the “No DSS” amendment is that it does not. I wonder if you could flesh out a couple of the amendments that have been introduced and whether they do what is needed.

Simon Mullings:

Two of us were involved in Rakusen v. Jepsen, and we were very happy about amendment 21—thank you very much for that; Christmas has come early. I understand that Shelter is looking very carefully at the “No DSS” amendment. I do not want to try to drive a tank on its lawn; I suspect that it will write in with any concerns it has about that. The principle, though, is extremely welcome. Forgive me, Mr Pennycook, but you mentioned another one.

Liz Davies:

The decent homes standard amendment.

Simon Mullings:

There was too much to read overnight, I am afraid, so I do not have anything particular to say on that.

Liz Davies:

I was very pleased to see it, in principle. I am reserving my position on the wording. I am sorry; I am in the same position you are in, Mr Pennycook, from Tuesday night.

Q Maybe I could invite you all to share any further thoughts you have down the line.

Liz Davies:

We will write in.

If you do, please write to the entire Committee.

I want to pick up on the point about delays in the court process. We heard this morning that the president of the Law Society is concerned about the lack of access to legal aid and the fact that, because so many people are unable to access it, they will be disadvantaged in the court process. My first question is, what are your thoughts on that?Q

My second question is about clause 18 and local authorities no longer having a duty to help people when they have been made homeless. Shelter has said that the Bill does not specify when help to prevent homelessness should be available to private renters. Do you have a view on that and how it could be addressed?

Liz Davies:

First, housing legal aid is absolutely in crisis. The number of housing legal aid providers is diminishing each year. The Law Society has an amazing and heartbreaking interactive map where you can press on a county and discover that there are no housing legal aid providers or one of them in the area. Obviously, London is slightly better served. That is letting down everybody who cannot afford to pay for housing legal advice.

That needs fixing, and it needs an injection of resources—there is no doubt about that—but that is not a reason why there would be difficulties for landlords in obtaining possession under these new proceedings, not least because the Government have put this money into the duty solicitor scheme. Where there are no housing legal aid providers and a tenant turns up at court having been unable to find advice in advance, they will see the duty solicitor. While Richard Miller is absolutely right to be concerned about the sustainability of the housing legal aid sector—we all think it could collapse in a few years—this particular area of getting advice about possession is covered by the duty solicitor scheme. That is the first thing.

Homelessness is covered partly in clause 18 and partly in schedule 1, but this is one of the unintended consequences that the Committee should look at. The current position is that somebody is threatened with homelessness if they are likely to be homeless within 56 days. If they have a valid section 21 notice, which is two months or 56 days, they are threatened with homelessness. It is deemed. All that a local authority has to do is look at the notice and say, “Yes, that’s valid,” and that means that it owes the tenant what is called a prevention duty—a duty to help them to prevent the homelessness—and spends the next two months trying to help them to find somewhere else to live. That is a good thing, because if it works, it averts the crisis of homelessness. It means that someone can move from their previous tenancy into their new one.

As a result of the abolition of section 21, this Bill retains the definition of threatened with homelessness within 56 days, but takes away the deeming provision whereby if you have a notice of possession within 56 days, you are deemed to be threatened with homelessness. If that was reinserted, if a tenant received what would be a section 8 notice requiring them to leave within two months, you would be back in the straightforward position that they go along to a local authority, the local authority would say, “Yes, you are threatened with homelessness. We don’t need to make further inquiries or think about it any more. We accept that we owe you a prevention duty and we will help you to find somewhere else to live.”

That is absolutely the best thing, because it front-loads all the looking for somewhere else to live while a tenant still has a roof over their head, rather than waiting for the crisis moment when they have to go into interim accommodation or end up on the streets. I urge the Committee to think about an amendment that requires that section 8 notices count as deemed homelessness. I know there have been some drafts flying around, so the work has been done.

Q I have three questions, if we can squeeze them in—I will get in as many as I can. Do tenants have enough power to enforce the measures in this Bill via rent repayment orders, and if not, where might we seek to reasonably apply them where they do not apply as the Bill is currently drafted?

Simon Mullings:

Rent repayment orders create, as I have said before to officials in DLUHC, an army of motivated enforcers, because you have tenants who are motivated to enforce housing standards to do with houses in multiple occupancy, conditions and all sorts of things. There are clearly opportunities to expand the rent repayment order scheme, perhaps to sit alongside existing enforcement measures to do with offences. I am sorry that I do not have really specific references for you, but certainly expanding the rent repayment order scheme could in principle take some burden off local authorities in terms of their obligations, which would be an extremely important measure.

Giles Peaker:

Was the question about enforcement of RROs or about the use of RROs in enforcing?

I suppose it was about their application—I think Mr Mullings has answered on whether they should be expanded in principle.

Giles Peaker:

I would agree. I think that since the Housing and Planning Act 2016 they have been a success.

Simon Mullings:

You would expect a legal aid lawyer to say that it would be great if legal aid were available to help tenants to bring RROs.

Q Can I ask about the portal? At the moment it is a broad framework of powers, and we think that there are requirements that should be woven into it. I am thinking, for example, of all the preconditions and requirements surrounding section 21 that will fall away. Do you think there should be other information as a condition in that portal that goes much further, such as previous applications for grounds of possession, or even rent levels under previous tenancies? How much information should be transparent and available to tenants, in your view, on the portal?

Simon Mullings:

I am tempted to say, “As much as possible.” For example, with ground 1 or 1A, if it were decided that post-possession order information was needed to ensure that they operate correctly, the portal is an ideal way of dealing with that. Very often, information relating to tenancies is a cause of disputes in possession proceedings—all the time. You have mentioned the conditions that attach to a section 21 notice at the moment; it will be extremely advantageous to landlords and to tenants, in an information and communication sense, to be able to essentially deal with those through a transparent portal.

Giles Peaker:

To very quickly follow up on that, there is certainly the dropping of consequences for not providing gas safety certificates, energy performance certificates and so on. Everything except the deposit has effectively been dropped. Those are very important documents that are important for maintaining housing standards, so there need to be some consequences, other than a hypothetical prosecution by the Health and Safety Executive, for failing to provide that. Those kinds of things do need to be in there.

Q I want to ask your views on the amendment to ground 14 on antisocial behaviour. What safeguards do you think would need to be incorporated to ensure that, for example, that does not lead to vulnerable people—people with mental health problems, or those experiencing domestic violence and so forth—being at risk?

Liz Davies:

The change from “likely” to “capable” is a worry. Ground 14 remains discretionary; I made the point about the wisdom of the courts, and one would hope that, where it is a case of domestic abuse, or a case of mental health, and so forth, the courts would have the wisdom to see that that person was not at fault. However, I do not see any need to reduce the threshold. If antisocial behaviour is such that a private landlord needs to get their tenant out because of the effect that that behaviour is having—usually on the neighbours but sometimes on the landlord themselves—then it is going to cross the threshold of “likely to cause”. I do not see the point in lowering it.

Q Thanks for that, Liz. We heard evidence this morning to suggest the contrary, as some build-to-let landlords were having to evict six or seven properties because of one that was causing antisocial behaviour. I guess that the whole thread through this Bill is about creating a system that is fair and balanced. Do you think that it is fair that a landlord would have to put up with a tenant creating antisocial behaviour and would potentially have to move other tenants on because they could not get that tenant out through the court process?

Liz Davies:

No, clearly that is not fair, but the current ground 14 allows for a possession order when the tenant or somebody residing in or visiting the tenant’s property

“has been guilty of conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance” to other people residing, living nearby or next door, visiting, and so on. So, that test is there. There is an antisocial behaviour ground for possession. It is discretionary, but the Bill will continue it as a discretionary ground; it simply lowers the threshold by a small amount from “likely to cause a nuisance” to “capable of causing a nuisance”. I really cannot see the circumstances in which a very difficult tenant who has been causing the sort of antisocial behaviour that you have just talked about will not meet the threshold of “likely to cause” but will meet the threshold of “capable of causing”. It is a very narrow distinction.

The point is that antisocial behaviour grounds are there—they really are—and courts use them. At the moment, they are used only by social landlords because of section 21, but we can all tell you that courts are very heavy on antisocial behaviour, and it is impossible for a tenant to remain in possession unless the court is satisfied that that behaviour has stopped and will continue to stop. Courts do not allow tenants to remain in possession under the current test.

I thank our three witnesses: Simon Mullings, co-chair of the Housing Law Practitioners Association, Giles Peaker of Anthony Gold solicitors, and Liz Taylor KC of Garden Court chambers. Thank you all very much for giving us the benefit of your wisdom.