Professor Andrew Steven and Professor Christopher Hodges OBE gave evidence.

Right, that is a surprise: we have sound and vision. Excellent. We were not expecting vision, so that is all the better. We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Andrew Steven, professor of property law at the University of Edinburgh, via Zoom, and from Professor Christopher Hodges, emeritus professor of justice systems at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford. We have until 12.40 pm for this session. Could the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record? We will start with Professor Hodges.

Professor Hodges:

Good morning. Thank you for the invitation. I am not an expert at all in property law, but I am an expert in regulation, which picks up the point that Mr Fuller was just asking, so I hope to be able to help you on that. I am also an expert in dispute resolution systems—questions of ombudsmen and tribunals—which are fairly peripheral for today but are relevant to the broader regulatory systems. The interest I have is that I chair the housing and property redress group, which is an ad-hoc committee of the president of the property tribunal, the various three ombudsmen and the property and redress scheme.

Members have a profile of our witnesses, so let us get to the questions. Thank you for that. Would our other guest introduce himself?

Professor Steven:

Hello. I am Andrew Steven, professor of property law at Edinburgh University. I was a Scottish law commissioner from 2011 to 2019, and I am a member of the Scottish Government’s cladding remediation taskforce. I can hear you but I cannot see you.

We can see you, so if you want to come in on any question, gesticulate and you will hopefully catch my eye. That goes for both of you.

Q Thank you for your time, gentlemen. We have half an hour, but I would love to get in three specific questions, so I encourage you to be as brief as you can while answering.

The first question is on commonhold. Professor Steven, you have published extensively on the Scottish experience of commonhold legislation; Professor Hodges, I believe that you are a member of the Commonhold Council. On Tuesday, we heard from Professor Hopkins of the Law Commission that there are risks associated with a partial implementation of the Law Commission’s recommendations on commonhold. Do you agree with that, and if you do, are there any sensible steps we might take via amendments to the Bill to pave the way for commonhold in the future—for example, share of freehold in flats?

Professor Hodges:

I think that was for Professor Steven.

Professor Steven:

I am reluctant to answer that in any detail, because I am really not an expert on English land law. May I say something briefly about the Scottish perspective? The difference goes all the way back to 1290, when Edward I, in England, said, “You cannot have feudal grants of property.” Leasehold therefore had to be used, particularly for flats, because of the desire to impose obligations in relation to maintenance and contributions to maintenance. In Scotland, feudal grants were not banned until 2004, which means that flats and other properties were sold that way. We do not have leasehold in the way that you do. Existing feudal holdings were converted into outright ownership in 2004. We also had legislation on long leases that took effect in 2015, which also converted into ownership. The context is quite different.

Q In that case, I will move over to Professor Hodges, in the interests of time, if that is okay.

Professor Steven:

Absolutely, and I can see you now.

Professor Hodges:

I am very supportive of all the work that the Law Commission has done on commonhold, and we discussed it two or three years ago. I would do it, and this is part of a wider discussion that I expect we will get on to shortly. It is about change management. At the moment, it is rather like the point mentioned by the three previous witnesses. Property law moves terribly slowly—for heaven’s sake, just get on with it. We have the agents, the tenants and the landlords. What we are doing is saying, “Well, do this. Then do that. Then do that. Then do that.” We know where we need to get to, and that would be a very good system if we can get there. They need to train and do all sorts of things. You want to take out repetition or unnecessary cost in doing several things at once. It really is a change management point. We know where we want to get to—just do it basically.

Q Unless they confound us, the Government have been very clear that they are not going to do a commonhold package. Would share of freehold be a good interim step?

Professor Hodges:

It is the obvious thing to do, isn’t it? But I would go further.

Q That is all I was looking for. My second question relates to non-litigation costs. The Government, when they published the Bill, claimed that it protected all leaseholders from non-litigation costs. However, clause 12 allows those costs to be passed on, either as they are or at a prescribed rate, in cases of low-value claims. That was because the Law Commission said that the shorter the expired term, the greater the risk for leaseholders in not extending but buying out their lease. This is a point about litigation in some senses, but do you think that, because of the difficulties of challenging a claim to that prescribed sum, leaseholders will be deterred from initiating the process of extending their lease or acquiring their freehold, if they still face, even at a prescribed rate, essentially non-litigation costs as part of claims?

Professor Hodges:

Quite possibly, and this is a generic point about access to justice and simplifying dispute resolution. I think the answer to that is to move towards an integrated system, which actually the tribunal and several of the ombudsmen have been working on in the past year in relation to service charges. There are too many places where disputes can go. If we simplify that to an integrated system that supports decision making—part of the answer is clarity and transparency in regulation—but if you support that, things move much more quickly. It has always been the case that, for example, courts are slow. They are a very careful process and therefore you need experts and lawyers, and it takes money—it costs. Whereas, with tribunals and improvement, ombudsmen are free and they move quickly. Getting a modernisation of that system is the answer to this basically. That is not there yet, but it is absolutely within sight and achievable.

If you do not have anything to add Professor Stephen, I will move on to my third question.

Professor Steven:

Please move on.

Q My last question relates to ground rents. Clause 21 gives effect to schedule 7, which provides leaseholders with a right to permanently replace their ground rent with a peppercorn, without extending their lease. However, the Government are proposing to apply it only to those with very long leases, so 150 years left or more. The rationale is, as per the Law Commission, that the shorter the unexpired term, the greater the likelihood of disadvantage. Do you have any thoughts on why the Government have chosen that 150-year limit? The Law Commission said 250 years. Do you think it is right, in principle, that someone with a 120-year lease, who may wish to extinguish their ground rent but not extend, is prohibited from doing so on the basis of the Bill, as it stands?

Professor Hodges:

I think that it is outside my competence to know the background. My answer would be: just move to commonhold.

Q Professor Steven, do you have anything to add?

Professor Steven:

No, I agree with my colleague. From a Scottish perspective, I would be more in favour of commonhold.

Professor Steven, my question is to you. Last week, in the House of Lords, the Government indicated that they were looking at the Scottish system of tenements. Could you perhaps explain that to the Committee? My understanding is that the Scottish Law Commission has been looking to review tenement structure and actually make it more like commonhold. Is it correct that there is a lack of standardisation and no ability to ensure those share costs are split proportionately under the tenement structure, and therefore that would not be a quick cut-and-paste for the Government if they are considering what to move forward to?

Professor Steven:

Yes, I absolutely agree. The legislation in Scotland is the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004, which is 20 years old and is fairly basic. It does not have owners associations, for example, so it is less sophisticated than the commonhold proposals that the Law Commission for England and Wales made. But we have problems in Scotland too. There are always problems, no matter what the law says.

There are two particular problems. The first is where money comes from to make repairs to flatted properties—we typically call them tenements in Scotland. The second, sadly, is apathy. I was watching the earlier session, and I saw how engaged your witness in Worthing was, but sadly in other cases the owners are not so engaged. Even if you have an owners association regime, which the Scottish Law Commission is now looking at, it still depends on people being engaged. There are no easy solutions. I favour commonhold, but it will not be a magic wand.

Q Nothing takes away the capacity of people to disagree with each other. I want to ask you a further question, which Professor Hodges may also have a view on. In the early 2000s in Scotland, the Government did away with feu duty in one fell swoop. You got rid of the inefficiencies of that system. Is it not unfair that we are going through all these inefficient qualifying criteria to ensure that enfranchisement happens only on a development-by-development basis? Could we not do this in one fell swoop in England too? I see Professor Hodges is smiling from ear to ear, but I will allow you to come in first, Professor Steven.

Professor Steven:

As a former law commissioner in Scotland, I am reluctant to disagree with the Law Commission for England and Wales, given the amount of work it has done on this. It is clearly very complicated.

You said that we got rid of our feudal system in one fell swoop in 2004. That is broadly true, but in 1974—50 years ago—we banned new feudal payments, which are like ground rents. There was a system whereby the existing feudal payments had to be paid off when the property was sold, so by 2004 there was not much left. My impression is that in England there is quite a lot left, in terms of ground rents. Because there was not so much left in Scotland, the compensation issues and the European convention on human rights issues that Dr Maxwell spoke about on Tuesday were not so prominent. Although we had the feudal system till 2004, it was a shell of what it originally was. In a certain way, it would be much simpler just to change leasehold into commonhold, but I fear that it would lead to all sorts of unforeseen consequences.

Q Just to make you feel a little better about disagreeing with your Law Commission counterparts in England, of course they were constrained in what they could do by the parameters the Government set them.

Professor Hodges:

Very briefly: modernise, because we are still living in the past; simplify, because we can easily do that on a comprehensive basis; and get it done so that people can plan, retrain and know what they have to do. You then get good behaviour throughout the system. I am very tempted to repeat facetiously the “Get it done” slogan, which crops up a lot.

Q My questions are for Professor Hodges. We have to deal with the Bill as it is—on the commonhold thing—so, “Get it done” is not particularly helpful, if I may say. It might be a good indication, but not particularly detailed, so help us on the detail of that. Often in Parliament, we regulate and think that that is the solution. I do not know whether you have had a chance to look at some of the regulatory details in the Bill, but what would be your guidance be to us about where it is pointing in the right direction, where it might be going wrong, and the pitfalls that we should look out for?

Professor Hodges:

As far as the detail of the Bill is concerned, looking technically at what is in there without expressing a view as whether it is a good or a bad idea substantively, it seems to me to be fine. You asked a wider regulatory question earlier on—

I will come to that in a minute. But just in here, on this Bill, is there anything that we should look out for?

Professor Hodges:

As far as the detail is concerned, there is nothing that stands out to me, as a regulatory expert, that says, “This is a problem”.

Okay, so more generally then, on regulators—Ofgem on energy prices and Ofwat on sewage and water—that approach seems not to provide the outcomes that perhaps were originally indicated when the legislation was passed. What are your thoughts about the political use of regulation? Is there anything from those general principles that you think might apply here?

Professor Hodges:

I sat on Lord Best’s RoPA—regulation of property agents—working group, and there was strong consensus around the room that you need regulation of agents. Since then, how we do regulation has evolved. Regulation, in the broadest sense, is an all-encompassing idea, and looking at the problems with Ofgem, Ofwat and so on, there are two aspects that strike me. First, one historically gave specific regulatory bodies certain remits that turned out to be not wide enough, and there were not enough people involved in the conversation; they were not regulated or contributing to good behaviour.

Secondly, the traditional way within which regulation is thought of, in the way that Parliament works, is that you make a number of requirements, rules and procedures. You then identify breaches of those rules and requirements and you then enforce. You can do that through traditionally public or private ways. Public ways in the property sector would be through trading standards authorities or environmental health locally, not a national regulator, as such. The private ways would be through the courts, but that has evolved in relation to the alternative dispute resolution ombudsmen being the best model at the moment and an integration between the tribunal and ombudsman, which is on the cards and may well occur. However, that is not enough because enforcement does not affect behaviour as such. We like to think that it does, but it is a myth, and there is an enormous amount of psychology and evidence published showing that it is not enough.

Therefore, if one stands back and says, “How do we get an effective regulatory system?”, it is about how one does it. That involves getting all the stakeholders together —again, that goes back to the first point about how it is not just a regulator telling people what to do, like an Ofgem or Ofcom—and saying, “How are we going to behave and how are we going to do it?” You need the rules, but you also need codes and systems involving data and support.

Rules, codes, systems, data, penalties, redress, different organisations—this is your answer as a better solution to caveat emptor?

Professor Hodges:

Yes, absolutely. Now, let me give you one example only—

In all circumstances or specifically on this Bill? Well, we ought to stick to the Bill. I just want to be clear: you have just outlined the solution—this Bill is going part of the way to that—but the old way was, “I have personal responsibility,” “I am responsible for the decision I make,” “This is a very big decision about what I buy,” and so on. I just want to make sure that we are not trying to put too much faith—one of the last witnesses made some very good points on shared ownership and the fact that people may not have the encompassing knowledge—but I just want to make sure, from your expertise on regulation, that, in this field, you cannot see any damaging consequences for the principles of caveat emptor and personal responsibility by this regulatory structure that you have outlined?

Professor Hodges:

Not at all. The most striking example—

Please answer briefly if you can, because I want to get some more people in.

Professor Hodges:

There are various regulatory systems in this country that are now modernising. In many ways, the most outstanding example, which has been there for several decades, is aviation safety. Everyone works together, and they call it an “open and just culture”. They are actually collaborating. They have lots of rules, but you have almost no enforcement, because the Civil Aviation Authority does not need to do it—everyone is doing something.

There are various sectors where you do need public enforcement, and where I would say you need a national system regulator. But you can do a lot through ombudsmen, codes and support. That is now emerging in, say, information and data protection, food standards and various other areas. It is absolutely ideal for property and housing.

Thank you very much. We have 10 minutes left. Mike Amesbury wants to come in, and then I will call Matt and Barry.

Q This question is to both witnesses. Are you satisfied with the provisions in the Bill to regulate what is commonly known as the “fleecehold” phenomenon, where what leaseholders pay for communal areas—in the broadest sense—maintenance, service charges and administration charges is uncapped? Is it strong enough at the moment?

Professor Hodges:

I do not really think that is a question I can answer, because it is a policy question within which economics and other factors are relevant. Technically, as a regulatory system, I do not see anything wrong with it.

Professor Steven, do you have anything to add to that?

Professor Steven:

I do not.

Q I am trying to adjust my questions to your areas of expertise, but I am trying to focus on the Bill rather than abstract discussions about regulatory systems and what we might want. I have a specific question that follows on from Mr Amesbury’s question. Part 4 of the Bill provides for a new regulatory regime for private and mixed-use estates. Do you think that that is a good idea in principle? We in the House—particularly Mr Fuller and a specific set of Members in whose constituencies this is a very real issue—have been talking for years about a separate management regime. Do you think it is a good idea in principle to establish a completely separate stand-alone regulatory regime for estate management, or should we look instead to incorporate it in the existing system? Essentially, these people are all paying into the same pot, so should they not be covered by the same regulatory system?

Professor Hodges:

I think there is an enormous missed opportunity for simplifying across social housing, private and so on. In particular, I would introduce the regulation of property agents working group reforms immediately. Almost everyone wants them, as far as I can see, and it would be easy to do, because you would just cut and paste the relevant regulatory bits from the recently enacted Building Safety Act 2022 and put them in for private managing agents.

As I said in the paper that I sent to you—I gather that Andrew Bulmer was talking about this two days ago here—there are three very good reasons why you need the regulation of property agents, each of which stands up on its own. There are obvious risks if you do not put that building block in place, because things are going to go wrong and there will be detriment to tenants and landlords.

Q To be clear, I agree with you on managing agents; I am talking about the regulation of private estates. The Bill provides for a new regulatory regime for private estates, which are not currently regulated. It is separate from the service charge regime. I am just wondering whether your simplification point works in this case too.

Professor Hodges:

Everyone should be in and under the same regime—absolutely everyone in the system.

Professor Steven:

I do not have a strong view on this.

Q Professor Hodges, my colleague Richard Fuller sought to make a point about caveat emptor to you. Is it your experience that the inequity of power and information between developers or freeholders and the potential purchaser—the leaseholder—is so great that caveat emptor is inappropriate and that you need the power of regulation to sort out that inequity? I think it was the Law Commission that concluded that

“any financial gain for the landlord”— or freeholder—

“will be at the expense of the leaseholder…Their interests are diametrically opposed, and consensus will be impossible to achieve.”

Professor Hodges:

In any consumer or property—certainly social housing—dispute system, there is an obvious imbalance of power. People do not have the money to do things. I have chaired the Post Office Horizon compensation board advising Ministers in the past few weeks. The whole reason why Parliament needs to step in is to correct a massive imbalance of power. Private litigation did not work, or it only half worked. There have been many stories about people being traumatised, and not just unable to enforce their rights. That is why we have invented things like legal aid, Citizens Advice and an ombudsman, and we are still moving—we are still improving that one—because of the ongoing imbalance of power between the little people and larger organisations.

Q Indeed. Thank you for that, and I think everyone will also want to thank you for your work on the Post Office inquiry.

I want to ask you about introducing insurance commission. I do not know whether you heard what the witnesses said on Tuesday, but you may know of the Canary Riverside case, in which £1.6 million in commission was given to a freeholder by the insurer—in a kickback—which was deemed to be inadmissible, and that is what the tribunal, mercifully, found. Although the Bill is outlawing commission, it is introducing fees for insurance services. In the Canary Riverside case, that is precisely what that £1.6 million was called. Do you fear that the Bill appears to dispense with commission, but actually reintroduces it by the back door?

Professor Hodges:

Possibly, but that is why you need regulation. That is an obvious example of an imbalance of power and lack of transparency, for which you need external people to get involved. Exactly what the final result ought to be, I would leave to a regulator—for them to say that so much commission is either allowable or not allowable, or indeed not at all. It depends on the circumstances.

We will hear about—

Can I just interject and ask whether Professor Steven has anything to add to what you have asked so far?

Professor Steven:

Very briefly, insurance law is UK-wide, but in Scotland insurance of blocks would normally be handled by managing agents because we do not have the freeholder. Since 2011, we have had legislation in Scotland that regulates managing agents. I know that that is being considered in England as well, but that might be of interest.

Q Thank you very much, Professor Steven.

Turning to the value of the building and property rights, we heard from an eminent lawyer on Tuesday about property rights in relation to ground rent. Looking at enfranchisement, I think it was the Residential Freehold Association, which is charged with guarding the property rights of freeholders, that said that their share in the value of the building was only 2.5%. The corollary of that, of course, is that the leaseholders’ share in the value of the building is 97.5%. Do you feel that the way in which the costs of enfranchisement look at the total value of the building is therefore unjust?

We have less than a minute left.

Professor Hodges:

I would need to know an awful lot more to be able to answer that question, as a non-property expert. It is a very interesting question, and my answer would be that it is one for Parliament and the regulatory system to engage with.

Thank you very much. Professor Steven?

Professor Steven:

I have nothing to add.

I thank the two witnesses for taking the time to give evidence to us today. Thank you for beaming in, Professor Steven, and thank you for attending, Professor Hodges. We will now move to our next witness—Paul Broadhead, come on down.