Matt Brewis gave evidence.

We will now hear from Matt Brewis, director of insurance at the Financial Conduct Authority. We have until 3 pm for this next session. Will the witness please introduce himself for the record?

Matt Brewis:

Hi. I am Matthew Brewis. I am director of insurance at the FCA, so I am responsible for regulation of all brokers and insurers that operate in the UK.

Thank you for coming to give us evidence, Mr Brewis. The FCA published a report in September 2022 on insurance for multi-occupancy buildings. In a general sense, on the basis of the recommendations and potential remedies you outlined, to what degree do clauses 31 and 32 faithfully enact those recommendations? Furthermore, it would be useful to know whether the FCA might have any ongoing role in the arrangements that those clauses will introduce. Finally, in that report, the FCA made a recommendation about a pooled risk insurance scheme. Could that be introduced into the Bill as an additional means of providing leaseholders with protection?

Matt Brewis:

I will set out what the FCA is responsible for and what it is not, because that is the context for this and probably the questions to follow. Insurers write a policy and brokers sell it to a freeholder or property management agent who is the customer. They pass on charges to the leaseholder, who is partly a beneficiary of the product, but the primary beneficiary is the freeholder. The FCA is responsible for the insurer and the broker, the creation and selling of the product. That is where its role ends.

Traditionally, the customer has been the freeholder, who has been the beneficiary, but our review found that there was no benefit in freeholders shopping around to get the best price, because they simply pass on the cost to the leaseholder, often with significant add-on charges and other functions. We found that the risk price that insurers charged between 2016 and 2021 pretty much doubled. The brokerage charge by brokers increased by more than three times, or 260%-ish. The service charges added on increased by about 160%, so they more than doubled.

In our report, we recommended a number of pieces, including that leaseholders should be partially party to the contract, in that they should be provided with a copy of the documentation—previously, they have not been—and that insurers and brokers, when creating and selling products, should consider the needs of leaseholders, the people who are paying, in a way that insurers and brokers have previously not been required to.

We also made a number of recommendations about the parts that were not relevant to FCA regulation but were part of the chain and to do with freeholders and property management agents. That is where the clauses that you mention, 31 and 32, come into effect—where there is a restriction on the commission that can be charged by the brokers or by the property management agents to the leaseholders. I think that how much impact these clauses will have will depend on how broadly or tightly the secondary legislation around these points is drafted. Of course, I and my colleagues will work closely with the Department as that gets put together.

In terms of your second question, “Should a pooling scheme be included as part of the legislation?”, we believe, based on how parts of the market currently work, that pooling does work. By putting together buildings under one roof, as it were, for an insurance contract, you spread the risk; that reduces the cost of insurance. We see that as how it operates at the moment. We recommended that the Association of British Insurers work with the market in order to put together a pooling arrangement, which they have been working on—

Q For a very long time.

Matt Brewis:

For a very long time. Unfortunately, I do not have the power to force anybody to write business that they do not want to. But the ABI has been working closely with a number of firms, and progress is being made. I believe that pooling remains the best option to reduce the cost to leaseholders. In terms of how that could be achieved, I think it is appropriate that the market try to do that. It is always possible for the Government to step behind that, albeit that would be at a significant cost—

Q But it would not necessarily require primary legislation—or would it, in your view, in terms of how you would implement such a recommendation?

Matt Brewis:

It does not require primary legislation for the market to do it itself, as it is seeking to do at the moment, working with us, working with the brokers and working with colleagues at DLUHC.

Q Mr Brewis, thank you for coming here. Is it within your remit or do you have any helpful information for the Committee to understand a point that has been put to me and that I am seeking to test with you, which is that when some of these freeholds have been sold off in the past, the insurance obviously is then sold off—sorry, let me start again; it is very complicated. The contention is that in the past some leaseholds have been sold off or converted, so now the freeholder, which may be an insurance company or a pension scheme, does not have that income stream that it used to have, and there is a consequent risk on insurance companies or pension funds that have previously been reliant on that income stream to make the returns to the pensioners. Is that something that you recognise? Do you have any powers to update us on it? Do you have any powers to investigate it? Do you have any thoughts on it?

Matt Brewis:

If I understand your question correctly, you are saying, “Is there pressure on freeholders to charge more to make increased returns to pension funds?” I cannot answer that question, I am afraid; it was not part of our review to date. Sorry, I cannot tell you—

Q Okay, but do you recognise that as an issue, if I can put it that way? It is a fact that in the past some leaseholders have been able to buy out their freeholds, so the freeholder then would not have the income stream from the insurance—

Matt Brewis:

I understand. What we have found in the past is that actually, for the insurance part, it is not necessarily a panacea for leaseholders to take over the freehold, because, as I was just explaining, when you have a pooled number of properties, that can reduce the cost. We have found, for leaseholders who have tried to insure their building on their own, that it has proved more costly when they have done so. That is more to do with market dynamics and trying to insure one building as opposed to a portfolio of buildings. It does not necessarily follow that it is cheaper for leaseholders who have taken over the freehold to—

Q That is really helpful, although it was not quite what I was trying to get at. If you are a freeholder, you may also be an insurer. A lot of big freeholders are insurers, and pension funds and so on, that are underwriting the pensions of many people in the country—in the NHS and so on. The claim that they have made is that in the past some of the leaseholders have bought out their freeholds. I might have slightly misunderstood the situation, but it has been put to me that, now that this flow of insurance is no longer coming to the insurers—or, to put it another way, now that the service charges and so on that are paid by the leaseholder to the freeholder are no longer coming to the insurance industry—that will somehow destabilise the insurers’ balance sheets and make them unable to meet their commitments. Is that something that you recognise, from your industry perspective? I am not talking about the individual leaseholder.

Matt Brewis:

I do not believe that the size of the insurance part of the market is significant enough to destabilise any firms. I have not heard that claim before, but I do not think that this part of the market, in the types of firms that we are talking about, is of a size that would cause structural issues.

Q In September, Sheldon Mills, an executive director at the FCA, issued a strong statement:

“Insurance firms must now act in leaseholders’ best interests and ensure that their policies provide fair value.”

Now I will give you a live case, which happens to be in a neighbouring constituency to mine. It is called The Decks. They have a remediation day and Taylor Wimpey has accepted responsibility, yet insurance premiums are going up again—poor value and high cost, as I think was cited in the review. New year was going to be a new broom to intervene and shape the market, yet you have got insurance companies like this, and many more up and down the country, laughing at people in this room—key stakeholders such as yourselves. What are you going to do? What powers have you got to intervene? Also, we have discussed insurance. Are clauses 31 to 33 in part 3 sufficient to deal with the issue?

Matt Brewis:

Our new rules around ensuring that these products are fair value came into force on 31 December last year. The cost of insurance of multiple-occupancy buildings has increased, and our report of 2022 found that this was not an area where insurers were making significant profits, or super-profits, of any form because of a number of different parts—around fire safety risks, but more to do with some of the structural issues around the quality of the buildings and how they had been constructed. Escape of water was something that was causing significant losses in these buildings.

We found some of the biggest issues around the brokerage charges, which were increasing, and the payaways—payments that insurance brokers were making to property managing agents for services that they were apparently providing for them. So our new rules require them to be very clear what value they are providing and how they are doing that as brokers, as managing agents, and for that to be made clear to the leaseholders. We are undertaking reviews of those with a number of firms. This will provide leaseholders with more information so that they can challenge their freeholders, so that they can challenge the insurers and the brokers at a tribunal if necessary.

Where this Bill goes one step further is that although, as I have explained, we are not responsible for the managing agents or the freeholders, by effectively banning those payments of any commissions, as the Bill does in the clauses that you mention, it will go significantly further than I can with the powers that the FCA has to restrict the payments to other parties and therefore to reduce the cost to leaseholders. In my view, this is in line with the recommendations that we made in that report and results in a better product—a cheaper product—for leaseholders.

This morning, we heard from the founders of the National Leasehold Campaign about some of the poor practices that their members had told them about. Do you think that provisions in this Bill make it easier for consumers? Do they address the challenge of transparency and the ability to obtain information from freeholders in a way that will be noticeable to owners of leasehold properties?Q

Matt Brewis:

In terms of the provision of information, yes. And it goes alongside the rules that we have introduced that require brokers and insurers to pass information to the freeholder to pass on to the leaseholder. This further tightens up that. It allows for leaseholders to take their freeholders to tribunal to reclaim costs, as necessary, that have been incurred. So this does go further, and I welcome that.

Q With regard to the redress element, again, it is a small, individual leaseholder taking a ginormous freeholder, managing agent, or whatever, to court. There is an imbalance there.

Matt Brewis:

Yes.

Is that suitably addressed in this legislation?

Matt Brewis:

We have talked with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities about how to do that. The tribunal is a mechanism, but from talking to leaseholders, we recognise that taking a firm to court is a big step for anyone. There are a number of routes that strengthen that in this Bill, and we welcome that, albeit—

Q So are there no other ways that the balance of power could be shifted to make it easier for the small homeowner who is facing the challenge of dealing with something that is far, far bigger than themselves?

Matt Brewis:

There are other mechanisms—an alternative dispute resolution mechanism—that we have seen used in some parts of financial services. The Financial Ombudsman scheme is one, where it is not a legal test; it is more of a fairness test about how you are treated as a consumer. But the tribunal is another mechanism—the insurance part is a very narrow part of a much wider piece, and I am not equipped to talk more broadly about the leasehold ownership structure.

No, that is helpful. Thank you very much.

Q Mr Brewis, I think we all welcome the FCA’s work to try and make things more equitable for leaseholders, so thank you for your endeavours there. I am sure you will be familiar with the Riverside case from before Christmas, in which it was discovered that an FCA-regulated broker could not provide a written contract of the insurance to the first-tier tribunal. Do you find that strange?

Matt Brewis:

I cannot talk about individual cases. However—

Q Okay. Should there be a case in which an FCA broker is unable to provide a written contract to a first-tier tribunal, would you find that strange?

Matt Brewis:

Yes.

Q Thank you. After a three-year campaign, that poor leaseholder managed to find out, through the leasehold tribunal, that £1.6 million had been paid to her landlord for the insurance services. You will be aware that this Bill outlaws commission as a permitted charge for landlords to charge. However, you will also be aware that, in that first-tier tribunal case, it was not regarded as a commission. In fact, it was accounted for as a fee, which is chargeable under this proposed legislation. How will that leaseholder know that this legislation does not allow her to be ripped off in exactly the same way as she was ripped off before?

Matt Brewis:

The value assessments I talked about require firms to approve what value they are providing, for there to be transparency to a leaseholder around—

Q How do you do that if you cannot get a written contract?

Matt Brewis:

Under our new rules, which came into force at the start of this year, that needs to be provided.

Q But that is not actually here in the Bill, is it? Would it be helpful if, under clause 31 or at another appropriate place, we were to say that a written copy of any insurance contract must be provided to all leaseholders? Then they can at least see what it is they are supposed to be benefitting from.

Matt Brewis:

The new Financial Conduct Authority rules around this do provide that, in a way that was not the case previously.

Q But the Bill does not.

Matt Brewis:

I believe that would be duplication of a clause that is already in the new rules from the regulator, which require a broker to provide that information.

Q No, sorry; there is a distinction here. You are talking about the broker providing it to the landlord; I am talking about the landlord providing it to the leaseholder. If you want transparency here, surely that also has to be part of that transparency? Ultimately, we know that it is not the landlord paying for the insurance services—it is the leaseholder. Indeed, in the case that you cannot particularly talk about, it was the landlord getting £1.6 million of a kickback for the privilege.

Matt Brewis:

In the event that the freeholder is not forthcoming with the contract, it is incumbent on the insurer to provide a copy of the contract to the leaseholder directly. It is in our rules that the leaseholder has the option of going directly to the insurer now, in order to get a copy of that contract, in a way that was not previously possible.

Q To be absolutely clear: a leaseholder can write to the insurer—the insurance company—to obtain a copy of the contract that their landlord has, which insures their property?

Matt Brewis:

Yes, and they will be in breach of the FCA rules if they do not provide it.

Q Does that rely on the landlord telling the leaseholder who the contract is with?

Matt Brewis:

Which insurer it is?

Yes.

Matt Brewis:

Oh, goodness.

Q Because at the moment, there is no compulsion on the landlord to do that, is there? It is certainly not in this Bill.

Matt Brewis:

If you follow that chain of events, when they do not know who the broker is and they do not know who the insurer is, and the landlord refuses to provide the documentation—

Q Then the leaseholder has no access to the contract.

Matt Brewis:

One would hope—expect—that it is a very low-likelihood situation, but that would be the case.

Q We have made legislation on the basis of optimism before, and it has not proved successful.

Matt Brewis:

For some buildings that have material issues around fire safety or other issues, it can be very difficult to place insurance. It is about time and cost. There is value in the services that brokers provide, and sometimes some of that work is outsourced to property-managing agents. Assuming that is done appropriately—itemised and billed—I have no issue with the payment of commission or brokerage, where it is for services that have been rendered effectively. Where it is a blanket case, in the way that you described—

Q Of course, those fees for insurance services are chargeable under clause 31, in proposed new section 20G of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, but there is nothing in the Bill that says they have to be reasonable. The Bill says that excluded insurance costs have to be

“not attributable to a permitted insurance payment”,

but not that they have to be costs that are reasonable. There is a difference between a permitted insurance payment and a reasonable permitted insurance payment, is there not?

Matt Brewis:

My understanding is that the secondary legislation that will follow will set out what those are.

Q God bless the Secretary of State! So we are waiting to see whether the Secretary of State introduces the word “reasonable”—or would it not be better to have the word on the face of the primary legislation?

Matt Brewis:

One would still need to define reasonable.

I think the law has done a pretty good job of that over the years.

Q To further explore Mr Gardiner’s point about fees, not commissions, what is your understanding of proposed new section 20G of the 1985 Act, which defines these excluded insurance costs? What would that cover? Or is that something for the secondary legislation as well? In which case, what should it cover, to fully protect leaseholders from all types of insurance costs that might be passed on unreasonably?

Matt Brewis:

It is quite a significant list. The question effectively is: what are the reasonable costs of writing an insurance policy, and then the appropriate checks to be carried out to ensure that that policy is enforceable? From my perspective, that is focused on providing the information to the insurer or the broker that allows them to appropriately price the insurance—to understand the risk factors of that building, to determine the likelihood of escape of water, the quality of its fire defences and other things, all of which in sum add up to whatever the risk price is. There are different methods for determining what is an appropriate brokerage fee. We have seen some firms come out to suggest that it should be a maximum of, say, 10% of the cost. Others take a time-and-costs-incurred approach, based on how much work they have done. Being clear about things that are directly relevant to the pricing of the insurance is the best starting point for what should be allowed to be charged.

Q In general terms, do I take from that that we should seek to define excluded insurance costs fairly widely, beyond a strict definition of commission, to ensure that we are broadly protecting leaseholders from the problems that you outlined in your September 2022 report?

Matt Brewis:

Yes.

Thank you. If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness. We will now move on to the next panel.