(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (5A) after ‘In a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case.

(3) In subsection (6) after ‘In a case other than a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case’.

(4) After subsection (8F) insert—

‘(8G) For the purposes of this section ‘a domestic abuse case’ is a case where—

(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,

(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and

(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).

(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).’

(5) In subsection (9) after ‘householder cases’ insert ‘and domestic abuse cases’.—

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 32—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—

(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,

(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and

(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.

(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.

(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—

(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or

(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.

(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and

(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.

(5) For the purposes of this section ‘relevant characteristics’ means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.

(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.

(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New schedule 2—Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply—

Common Law Offences

1 False imprisonment.

2 Kidnapping.

3 Manslaughter.

4 Murder.

5 Perverting the course of justice.

6 Piracy.

Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100)

7 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—

• section 4 (soliciting murder)

• section 16 (threats to kill)

• section 18 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm)

• section 20 (malicious wounding)

• section 21 (attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle in order to commit or assist in committing an indictable offence)

• section 22 (using drugs etc to commit or assist in the committing of an indictable offence)

• section 23 (maliciously administering poison etc so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm)

• section 27 (abandoning children)

• section 28 (causing bodily injury by explosives)

• section 29 (using explosives with intent to do grievous bodily harm)

• section 30 (placing explosives with intent to do bodily injury)

• section 31 (setting spring guns etc with intent to do grievous bodily harm)

• section 32 (endangering safety of railway passengers)

• section 35 (injuring persons by furious driving)

• section 37 (assaulting officer preserving wreck)

• section 38 (assault with intent to resist arrest).

Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3)

8 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Explosive Substances Act 1883—

• section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property)

• section 3 (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property)

• section 4 (making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances).

Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (c. 34)

9 An offence under section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (child destruction).

Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12)

10 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to children).

Public Order Act 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 c. 6)

11 An offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (control etc of quasi-military organisation).

Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)

12 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).

Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27)

13 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—

• section 5 (possession of prohibited firearms)

• section 16 (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life)

• section 16A (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence)

• section 17(1) (use of firearm to resist arrest)

• section 17(2) (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for specified offence)

• section 18 (carrying firearm with criminal intent).

Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)

14 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—

• section 8 (robbery or assault with intent to rob)

• section 9 (burglary), where the offence is committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, or to do unlawful damage to a building or anything in it

• section 10 (aggravated burglary)

• section 12A (aggravated vehicle-taking), where the offence involves an accident which causes the death of any person

• section 21 (blackmail).

Criminal Damage Act 1971 (c. 48)

15 The following offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971—

• an offence of arson under section 1

• an offence under section 1(2) (destroying or damaging property) other than an offence of arson.

Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)

16 An offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state).

Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2)

17 An offence under section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (indecent or obscene articles).

Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28)

18 An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking).

Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36)

19 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation Security Act 1982—

• section 1 (hijacking)

• section 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft)

• section 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft)

• section 4 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).

Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)

20 An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).

Child Abduction Act 1984 (c. 37)

21 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—

• section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc)

• section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).

Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64)

22 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—

• section 1 (riot)

• section 2 (violent disorder).

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33)

23 An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).

Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52)

24 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988—

• section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving)

• section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs).

Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31)

25 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990—

• section 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes)

• section 9 (hijacking of ships)

• section 10 (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms)

• section 11 (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety)

• section 12 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation)

• section 13 (offences involving threats).

Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570)

26 An offence under Part 2 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (SI 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system).

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40)

27 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—

• section 4 (putting people in fear of violence)

• section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)

28 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—

• section 29 (racially or religiously aggravated assaults)

• section 31(1)(a) or (b) (racially or religiously aggravated offences under section 4 or 4A of the Public Order Act 1986).

Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)

29 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000—

• section 54 (weapons training)

• section 56 (directing terrorist organisation)

• section 57 (possession of article for terrorist purposes)

• section 59 (inciting terrorism overseas).

International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17)

30 An offence under any of the following provisions of the International Criminal Court Act 2001—

• section 51 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes)

• section 52 (ancillary conduct).

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)

31 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001—

• section 47 (use of nuclear weapons)

• section 50 (assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas)

• section 113 (use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate).

Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)

32 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—

• section 1 (female genital mutilation)

• section 2 (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia)

• section 3 (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia).

Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)

33 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—

• section 1 (rape)

• section 2 (assault by penetration)

• section 3 (sexual assault)

• section 4 (causing person to engage in sexual activity without consent)

• section 5 (rape of child under 13)

• section 6 (assault of child under 13 by penetration)

• section 7 (sexual assault of child under 13)

• section 8 (causing or inciting child under 13 to engage in sexual activity)

• section 9 (sexual activity with a child)

• section 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)

• section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons)

• section 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence)

• section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming)

• section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child)

• section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)

• section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child)

• section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act)

• section 25 (sexual activity with a child family member)

• section 26 (inciting a child family member to engage in sexual activity)

• section 30 (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)

• section 31 (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity)

• section 32 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)

• section 33 (causing a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to watch a sexual act)

• section 34 (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)

• section 35 (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception)

• section 36 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a mental disorder)

• section 37 (causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception)

• section 38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)

• section 39 (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity)

• section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder)

• section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act)

• section 47 (paying for sexual services of a child)

• section 48 (causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)

• section 49 (controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography

• section 50 (arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)

• section 61 (administering a substance with intent)

• section 62 (committing offence with intent to commit sexual offence)

• section 63 (trespass with intent to commit sexual offence)

• section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration)

• section 65 (sex with an adult relative: consenting to penetration)

• section 66 (exposure)

• section 67 (voyeurism)

• section 70 (sexual penetration of a corpse).

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)

34 An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm).

Terrorism Act 2006 (c. 11)

35 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—

• section 5 (preparation of terrorist acts)

• section 6 (training for terrorism)

• section 9 (making or possession of radioactive device or material)

• section 10 (use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes)

• section 11 (terrorist threats relating to radioactive devices etc).

Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c. 30)

36 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015—

• section 1 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)

• section 2 (human trafficking).

37 (1) An offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed in this Schedule.

(2) An offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence listed in this Schedule.

(3) An offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence listed in this Schedule.

Over six years ago, in 2017, the then Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said:

“There needs to be a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system when they themselves are victims of abuse”.

However, no such review has ever taken place, and the criminal law still fails to protect those who experience abuse that drives them to offend. We all know that it does that and there has been endless evidence over many years; the Corston report, now decades old, still stands. While householders have legal protection when they act in self-defence against an intruder, no such protection is available to victims—survivors—acting in self-defence against their abuser.

New clauses 31 and 32 would introduce two measures to address that: a new statutory defence for those who are coerced into offending, and an amendment to the law on self-defence for those who use force against their abuser. Common law defences are outdated and ill-fitting to the context of domestic abuse, leaving survivors with no effective defence. These amendments would modernise the law and reflect improved public understanding of domestic abuse. They are based on legal precedents in place to protect other groups and are not gender-specific. They would address gaps in legal protection for survivors, strengthen recognition of the links between victimisation and offending, and deter inappropriate prosecutions. These reforms should be accompanied by a cross-Government policy framework to aid implementation. We propose that the two new clauses and new schedule 2 be added to the Bill.

New clause 31 amends the law on self-defence and is modelled on the provisions for householders in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. There are Acts that seem to be about two completely separate things put together; it is good to see that Labour Governments did that as well! The clause would allow survivors acting in self-defence against their abusers the same protection as householders defending themselves against an intruder. In the case of a householder using force against an intruder, section 76(5A) of the 2008 Act provides that the degree of force used by said householder

“is not to be regarded as having been reasonable…if it was grossly disproportionate”.

A householder can therefore use force that is dispro-portionate, but not grossly disproportionate, provided that the degree of force was reasonable. It is outrageous to deny equivalent protection to women who are victims of domestic abuse defending themselves against someone who has raped, tortured, abused and attacked them. As Nicola Wake has argued, that disparity in protection is impossible to justify.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 introduce statutory defences for survivors modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act. They would give survivors of domestic abuse similar protections to victims of human trafficking who are compelled to offend. A case study from the Centre for Women’s Justice makes the need for that clear:

“YS is charged with driving whilst disqualified, driving with excess alcohol, driving without insurance and dangerous driving. An officer noticed a vehicle with its brake lights permanently illuminated and swerving from side to side. He activated the siren, indicating for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle did not stop, and a chase continued for five minutes. In the driving seat was a woman, YS.

YS explained she had been dragged from her home partially dressed by her partner, forced to drive, and that he threatened to kill her if she did not drive on. The partner was screaming at her throughout, punching her in the ribs and trying to grab the steering wheel.

The police stop this vehicle and YS is prosecuted. Despite running duress and despite her being viewed as credible, she is convicted. Her conviction was upheld on appeal to the High Court.”

Duress was brought up earlier, and I got some points in the break on the defence of duress from some lawyers who have run these cases. As demonstrated by that case study, the defence of duress in these cases is inadequate. For example, the duress defence emphasises the threat of death or serious injury and ignores complexities of DA: a barrister I spoke to in the break said, “Basically, the reason duress doesn’t work is because it doesn’t work. You have to basically prove you had a gun to your head in the moment.” It does not recognise sexual, financial or psychological abuse. It also fails to recognise the nature of domestic abuse, because for the defence of duress to succeed, the threat of physical harm must be imminent—it has to be a gun to your head. The proposed statutory defence is closely modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which provides a defence for victims of trafficking who offend as part of, or due to, their experience of modern slavery or trafficking. The same protections should be offered to victims of domestic abuse.

I will be brief, because my hon. Friend’s contribution was very thorough. The explanatory statements make it clear that the aim of these new clauses would speak to the agenda of the House in relation to ending violence against women and girls while ensuring that they get the protection of the law. There is no doubt that the development of such defences in law is far from easy—in fact, it is extremely complicated, as was illustrated—but it is important that we get it right. Labour is determined that women and girls are protected from violence. The work done by my colleagues will help to ensure that we as a society do better in that regard.

No one can doubt that women can be driven to defend themselves when subject to controlling behaviour and domestic abuse, and they can then face prosecution for their actions. Similarly, the controller can drive them to commit other crimes for the benefit of that controller. It can be well argued in both cases that those women are not responsible for their own actions. I am interested in what the Minister will say and how she will address such things to ensure that the victim is not turned into a criminal.

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling new clauses 31 and 32 and new schedule 2, which would create two new statutory defences for victims of domestic abuse. She mentioned the defence of self-defence, which is not available to householders only; self-defence is a complete defence available to anyone put in a situation where they are required to engage it. I make that point in passing.

The Committee is aware of the work that the Government have done on domestic abuse, so I will confine my remarks to our most recent work, which has focused on the issues set out in the hon. Member’s new clauses and new schedule. First, she is aware that we commissioned a domestic homicide review—undertaken by Clare Wade KC, who has given evidence to the Committee—which was the first from any Government to look at homicide in a domestic context. As part of that exercise, we invited Clare Wade to look at the law on domestic abuse defences. She did not have time to do so then, but she recommended that a further review should be undertaken. At the end of 2023, we commissioned that review by the Law Commission to look specifically at women driven to kill their abusive partners and the defences available to them, and to consider specifically whether legislative change was necessary. The review is due to conclude later this year—I understand by the summer.

I hope to reassure the hon. Member by reading out a few sections—I will only read short sections—of the review’s terms of reference, which I believe dovetail neatly with the points she has made in her new clauses and new schedule. Those terms of reference state:

“Most deaths that occur in the context of domestic abuse involve male abusers who kill their female victims. A much smaller number of (almost entirely female) victims of domestic abuse kill their (almost entirely male) abusers…Despite reforms to the partial defences of provocation (now loss of control) and diminished responsibility, concerns continue to be raised that the existing defences to murder and their application in the courts do not achieve just outcomes for this group of victims of domestic abuse who become defendants.”

It continues:

“The Law Commission will review the use of defences in domestic homicide cases in the light of modern understandings of the effects of domestic abuse on victims. The project will consider, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) whether the existing defences to murder, and arguments as to lack of requisite intent for murder, operate satisfactorily in the context of a defendant who has suffered domestic abuse;

(2) if not, whether reform of the existing defences or a new bespoke defence or defences are needed for the group identified…while ensuring that reformed or new defences are appropriately limited…

(3) the operation of the applicable rules of evidence, procedure, and ways that the defences are considered from the beginning of the police investigation up to and including at trial, in this context”.

I recognise all that good work, and I was pleased to see that, but that is specifically about murder and killing, not offending per se, which is what I was talking about. The Law Commission will not come back to the example I gave, with duress defences being used. I was talking about magistrates court cases, where medical evidence of domestic abuse needs to be produced to get a duress defence.

The hon. Member is correct. I will come on to the other parts but I am starting with the most serious category of offences; I think there has been a particular concern in the law about whether they are adequately dealt with. However, I hope she will understand why we are keen to see the Law Commission’s review through to its conclusion, although we are sympathetic to the general aims.

I will turn to new clause 31 on the so-called householder defence, which was introduced specifically to address the acute circumstances of dealing with an unexpected intruder. In fact, the last Labour Government introduced it in response to the very controversial Tony Martin case. The Committee will recall that he was a farmer who had been repeatedly burgled by the same people, and he eventually shot one of the burglars on their second or third time round his house—he shot him in the back when he was leaving, and ended up in prison. It was that highly controversial case that resulted in the householder defence.

However, new clause 31 would apply those specific provisions to domestic abuse cases, meaning that disproportionate force against an alleged abuser could be regarded as reasonable, no matter where or when that force is exerted, if the person has suffered domestic abuse at any point at the hands of that person. The Government recognise the horrific harm suffered by victims of domestic abuse. However, given the rationale behind the householder defence, we do not see it as directly comparable, although we are currently undergoing a review of the law in an equivalent circumstance. The householder defence was, of course, introduced to deal with homicides, which is why I started by talking about homicides. I want to make that clear.

I want to outline the defences that exist, not because they are perfect but because they exist in law and it is important to put them on the record. There is a full defence of self-defence, which applies in circumstances of domestic abuse; a person can obviously use extreme reactions if it is self-defence. There are partial defences: loss of control or diminished responsibility may be applicable where the accused who is being prosecuted for murder was previously a victim of domestic abuse. If successful, the defendant will instead be convicted of manslaughter.

The appeal courts have dealt with these cases in quite thoughtful ways in the past. They took a particularly new turn in the early 1990s with the case of Ms Ahluwalia, who had been a victim of domestic abuse for many years. In the end, she poured petrol all over her husband when he was asleep on a bed and set fire to him. She was initially convicted of murder on the basis that loss of control did not apply because what she did was pre-meditated, but her conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal, which said that different circumstances applied in domestic abuse cases. That has really set the tenor of the common law in dealing with cases of this nature ever since, and it remains an important authority.

The fact that an accused person is also a victim of domestic abuse will be considered throughout the criminal justice process, from the police investigation through to any Crown Prosecution Service charging decision, to the defences deployed at trial under the existing law.

Is the Minister still talking about murder? I am not denying that it would be taken into account in murder, but it would not be taken into account in theft or the car incidences. It would not be taken into account like any offence would be for a victim of modern slavery. I am not talking about murder; I recognise the environment for that.

Well, I have made the point. I was addressing new clause 31. The householder defence is really a homicide defence; those were the circumstances in which it came up, which is why I made those remarks.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 seek to create a new and specific statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence. The first version provides a defence where a person aged 18 or over does an act because they are compelled to do so as a result of the fact that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and a reasonable person in the same situation as that person, with the same relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. The second version applies to persons under 18, and provides a defence where a person acts as a direct consequence of being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse. New schedule 2 sets out the offences to which that proposed defence would not be available.

I am sympathetic to the thrust of this new clause, particularly because of the correlation between domestic abuse and women who find themselves in the prison system. I know that the Prison Reform Trust, in conjunction with the Centre for Women’s Justice, has done really important work on this issue.

I will respond to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley about the case that she mentioned. She called it “JS”, but I think it is fair to use its title, because it is in the public domain: Stevens v. The Director of Public Prosecutions. She was quite right to outline the facts of the lady concerned, who said that she had found herself behind the wheel of a car, she was in her pyjamas and her other half was next to her; I think he had cocaine in his system. There was a background of coercive control. However, it is also true to say that her defence failed not only at first instance but on appeal, and I will just tell the Committee why, because I was troubled by the case and I wanted to see what factors the Court had considered.

The woman was driving dangerously at the time. However, she had already been disqualified from driving and she purchased the car when she was disqualified from driving. She conceded that she had driven it unlawfully a number of times before, with or without her husband. I am simply going through the factors. These are the factors that the Court of Appeal—the High Court, I think it was—had considered.

The jury took into consideration the fact that the woman did not tell the police at the time, or even in the police station, that she was under duress; she had also called her mum and had not mentioned being under duress. She had also—

Terrible defence.

Well, this is the decision of the Court of Appeal.

I am afraid all the Minister is doing is identifying that this change is needed. So that woman did not tell her mother what her cocaine-fuelled partner, who her mother probably hated, was doing to her? Her mother has probably been isolated from seeing her daughter. She did not tell her mother? Has the Minister told her mother about every terrible thing that has ever happened to her? This is all just based on absolute myth and stereotype.

I am simply going through how the higher court approached it. The point is that the Court found that the jury had not been persuaded that this was a duress case; duress was advanced as a defence, but that defence was not accepted. That is the nature of the system. So, it was not a case that the arguments were ignored; it was that she was not believed.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Before I do, may I say that I am not asserting my own view, but I did bother to read the case, because I thought it was a difficult case? And I think that it is probably difficult in Committee for MPs to weigh in to whether the appeal courts are right or wrong. The Court’s conclusion was that she had not made out her case; that was its conclusion. That is not my view; it is a fact.

It may very well be a “fact” that that woman was not successful in getting the defence of duress. In different circumstances, would she have been able to get the defence that I am talking about today? That would be easier to prove, because cases of duress require relevant characteristics to be established, including “battered woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness”. Those are outdated concepts, which pathologise women rather than offering an effective defence suitable for the actual circumstances. These concepts require a production of medical evidence—I do not have that for coercive control. That is not practicable and in many cases involves low-level offending tried in magistrates courts.

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, which leads into the point I wanted to address in her new clause. Subsection (3)(b) of new clause 32 says that the criminal offence must be:

“a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.”

My point is that whatever we make of this case, that woman did not prove causation; the jury was not satisfied that there was causation. And that would still be the case even under the new clause, as drafted. Someone would have to prove a causal connection between domestic abuse and the criminal offence that took place.

So, while we are interested in this area of the law, at the moment it is difficult to see how the new clause changes the defences of duress or self-defence, which already exist in common law.

I will just quote the Minister to herself. Earlier, when we were discussing spiking, she said that it was all too well and easy to say, “This already exists. We shouldn’t do anything about it.” I am just quoting her back at herself. These defences already exist.

I am simply making a point about causation. The hon. Member has put a causal measure into her new clause and she raised a case, and I am simply saying that it was the conclusion of the jury in that case that causation was not established. I cannot go behind that finding, because we have an independent court system.

Apart from the Post Office.

That has assisted there.

A new statutory defence would also be restrictive in how it is framed and, unlike the common law defence, is less able to respond to the changing nature of forms of domestic abuse. We have seen how in recent years the courts have recognised the development of certain forms of domestic abuse, such as controlling and coercive behaviour, and have been able to weigh that into the application of certain defences in law.

I am interested in this area of the law; I just do not think the new clause is right yet. It is very wide and could provide a full defence to any criminal act, save for those offences listed in schedule 2, without considering the range of seriousness. I recognise that the list of behaviours in schedule 2 is based on the modern slavery defence, but the behaviours covered by that statutory defence are much narrower than those in the Bill, and they apply only where the pressure on the defendant would amount to an offence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

To conclude, the Government do not agree at present that the measures proposed by new clauses 31 or 32 are necessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley not to press them.

I will just read the first bit of my speech again and then sit down, because we have to get through proceedings today. More than six years ago, in 2017, the Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said there needed to be

“a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system”.

I will welcome it when it eventually comes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.