I beg to move amendment 137, in clause 74, page 66, line 1, leave out “a local policing body” and insert

“the Independent Office for Police Conduct”.

The power to seek a referral to the police appeals tribunal should sit with an independent organisation, such as the IOPC.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Everyone will be pleased to hear that I have only a few paragraphs to read.

Clause 74 has been proposed with a view to strengthening the oversight of police chiefs. Although this is an important goal that the Bill seeks to achieve, the clause in its current form is misguided. If clause 74 seeks to address inadequacies in internal processes, the Government must instead implement measures to improve the efficacy and independence of the system, rather than delegating these powers to police and crime commissioners.

Disciplinary procedures must be independent and not subject to political influence, which would be a huge risk if the power to refer a police chief to a police tribunal sits with PCCs. In order to maintain the integrity of the system, these powers must sit with an independent body. The Independent Office for Police Conduct has been established specifically to hold police behaviour to account, so we should give the powers to refer a police chief to a tribunal to an organisation that exists to uphold police integrity.

I do not wish to besmirch any particular PCC, but having spent nine years in this building trying to overcome, and make processes to overcome, political interference and political patronage in cases of misconduct, I am always anxious when politicians and friends mark the homework of their friends.

To some degree, the Minister has made the case for the clause already, but we support that element. It relates, of course, to the dismissals review commissioned in the light of the Casey review.

I did not hear this from the Minister, but—I think this speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has just made—we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater when it comes to the input of individuals who are independent. I know that that was not the point that the Minister was making about legally qualified chairs. I understand the point he was making about some of the delays and how unintentionally cumbersome the system has become. Nevertheless, as my hon. Friend said, the principle of independence is important for public confidence in the system. It would doubtlessly be an odd quirk if we got stuck with a system that had been designed to stop chief constables protecting staff who perhaps should have been dismissed, but which actually had the opposite effect in some cases of officer misconduct at more junior ranks. Having spoken to chiefs, I know there are frustrations there.

Again, the most important thing is that the process is fair, transparent and as simple and speedy as possible, so of course a judicial review cannot be a part of that process. That is of course wrong, so changing to a different appeal mechanism is probably a good thing to do. That leaves me with only one question for the Minister. This clause does not make the regime that he has mentioned and that I have spoken about, but gives the powers to make such a regime. I wonder why regulations are preferred for that and whether he has a sense of the timing for that and for the consultation, because clearly there will be a lot of interest in that—I am talking particularly about proposed new subsection (1A) of the Police Act 1996. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s rationale.

I explained in the last debate the rationale for clause 74, which, as the shadow Minister said, is to allow the chief constable to initiate an appeal where he or she disagrees with the finding of the misconduct panel on which the chief constable is in a minority—there are two independent members. To the point about independence, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised, given that there are still two independent members, and the chief chairs it but is in the minority, that gives quite a good assurance. Of course, the individual police officer has a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal, which is an essentially digital function, and in this clause we are also giving the chief constable a right to appeal if they do not like the decision.

Turning to the amendment and who should initiate the appeal where it is the chief constable themselves who is the subject of the misconduct proceedings, let me make a couple of points. First, the police and crime commissioner, or the deputy mayor where there is a mayoral model, ultimately exercises oversight of the chief constable. They can fire them for poor performance, for example, and they are responsible for hiring them as well, so it is consistent with that hiring and firing power that they make the decision on whether to appeal where a finding misconduct is made against the chief constable themselves.

It is worth repeating the point I made just now that the panel that makes a finding has two independent members, so that is pretty independent. We are not giving the police and crime commissioner the right to, as it were, ratify or reject the finding of the panel; we are merely giving a power to refer it to the Police Appeals Tribunal, an essentially judicial body that will then hear the appeal. It is simply a right of referral to the Police Appeals Tribunal, not a right to make a decision. For that reason, I think it is the right way to approach things. On that basis, I urge the Committee to not adopt amendment 137, but to incorporate clause 74 as part of the Bill.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.