Amendment proposed (this day): 134, in clause 73, page 65, line 5, at end insert—

“(3A) The Code must make explicit that any criminal behaviour perpetrated by persons under the chief officer’s direction and control disclosed as a result of proceedings in the family courts must be considered during the vetting process.”—

This amendment ensures criminal behaviour that is uncovered within family courts is disclosed within the vetting process of police officers.

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 6—Automatic dismissal on conviction for a serious criminal offence—

“(1) Section 50 of the Police Act 1996 (Regulations for police forces) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) After subsection (3) insert “and subject to any regulations made under subsection (3ZA)”.

(3) After subsection (3G) insert—

“(3ZA) Regulations made under this section may provide that upon the conviction of a member of a police force for a certain type of criminal offence, that person shall be dealt with by way of automatic dismissal without the taking of any disciplinary proceedings against that person.”.”

New clause 7—Automatic suspension of officers charged with specified allegations—

“(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 50 of the Police Act 1996 may make further provision as set out in this section.

(2) Where an officer is charged with an indictable-only or an either-way offence, the Regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and any other relevant legislation shall not initially apply.

(3) In a case falling within subsection (2), regulations may provide that the appropriate authority must automatically suspend the officer from the office of constable for an initial period of 30 days.

(4) Where an officer is suspended in circumstances falling under subsection (3), regulations may provide that—

(a) the officer remains a police officer for the purpose of the Police (Conduct) Regulations,

(b) the suspension must be with pay,

(c) at or prior to the expiry of the initial period of suspension, the appropriate authority must make a determination as to whether the suspension conditions in Regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 are satisfied, and

(d) upon the making of a determination referred to in paragraph (c) that an officer should remain suspended, Regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations shall apply thereafter to that officer.”

New clause 8—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—

(a) the officer fails vetting, and

(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.

(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—

(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and

(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.””

New clause 9—Duty of officer to hand over personal mobile phone—

“(1) Section 50 of the Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) After subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) Regulations under this section may, in connection with the procedures that are established by or under regulations made by virtue of subsection (3), provide that an officer has a duty to hand over to the appropriate authority a personal telecommunications device capable of storing information in any electronic format which can readily be produced in a visible and legible form, belonging to that police officer where there is a request by the appropriate authority in circumstances where the appropriate authority has reasonable grounds to suspect the police officer of behaving in a way that could amount to gross misconduct and in respect of which information stored on the device may be relevant to the suspected misconduct.

(4B) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4A), regulations may provide for—

(a) the form of the request to be made to the police officer concerned and any related information that must be provided by the police officer in releasing the device including, but not limited to, any passcode required to access infor-mation stored on the device;

(b) the time period within which the device must be provided to the appropriate authority and any sanction which may be imposed on the police officer for failing to do so;

(c) the provision to the police officer concerned of reasons for the requested possession of a device;

(d) the arrangements to be put in place for the protection of confidential, privileged or sensitive information stored on the device which is not relevant to the matter under investigation;

(e) the period of time that the device may be retained by the appropriate authority and arrangements for the return of the device when it is no longer required for the purposes of the investigation;

(f) the deletion of information obtained from the device and retained by the appropriate authority other than information which is reasonably required to be retained in connection with the matter under investigation; and

(g) the making of ancillary and consequential amendments to other regulations as may be considered necessary.

(4C) In subsections (4A) and (4B) “appropriate authority” has the meaning given in article 2 (interpretation) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.””

New clause 33—Police perpetrated domestic abuse as a recordable complaint—

“(1) Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 1(2)(b) insert—

“(c) it is alleged by any person, including any person serving with the police, that a person under his direction and control, whether in the course of their duties or otherwise, has engaged in domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 or abuse of position for a sexual purpose,”

(3) After paragraph 2(6B)(c) insert—

“(ca) the complaint is one which alleges that a person serving with the police, whether in the course of their duties or otherwise, has engaged in domestic abuse or abuse of position for a sexual purpose; and “domestic abuse” has the meaning set out in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021,”.”

This new clause would ensure all allegations of Police Perpetrated Domestic abuse are treated either as a recordable police complaint or as a recordable conduct matter.

New clause 34—Domestic abuse complainants: police officers and police staff—

“(1) Section 29(4)(a) of the Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) After “person whose conduct it was” insert “, save that this paragraph does not apply where the conduct alleged (assuming it to have occurred) falls within the definition of domestic abuse in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 or constitutes abuse of position for a sexual purpose,”.”

This new clause would ensure that police officers and members of police staff have the same right to make a complaint of domestic abuse against a member of their force as do members of the public.

New clause 35—Vetting: duty of chief officers—

“(1) Chief officers must ensure that all persons under their direction and control have valid and current vetting clearance appropriate to their role.

(2) All persons under the direction and control of a chief officer must be re-vetted—

(a) within a period of five years from an individual coming under the direction and control of a chief officer; and

(b) within a period no longer than every five years thereafter.

(3) Vetting clearance must not be granted to persons who have received a caution or conviction for serious violent or sexual offences including, but not limited to offences involving—

(a) domestic abuse,

(b) coercive and controlling behaviour,

(c) stalking,

(d) harassment,

(e) sexual assault or abuse,

(f) rape, or

(g) female genital mutilation.

(4) A person who does not have valid and current vetting clearance appropriate to their role will be dismissed.”

New clause 36—Allegation of violence against women and girls: withdrawal of warrant card—

Where a police officer is the subject of an allegation that the officer has perpetrated violence against a woman or a girl, the officer’s warrant card must be withdrawn pending investigation.”

This new clause creates a provision requiring the removal of warrant cards from police officers who are under investigation for crimes relating to violence against women and girls.

New clause 43—Domestic abuse: automatic referral to Independent Office for Police Conduct—

“(1) A chief officer of police must ensure that any allegation of domestic abuse made against a person under the chief officer’s direction and control must be referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct for determination of the mode of investigation.

(2) If the Independent Office for Police Conduct determines that the investigation must be referred back to the chief officer’s force, then such an investigation must be conducted and concluded.

(3) The Independent Office for Police Conduct may also refer the complaint to the chief officer of police for a different police force and direct that the complaint be investigated independently by that force.”

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. I rise to reply to the thoughtful speeches given before lunch by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, on various amendments and new clauses related to clause 73.

The Government are extremely clear on the need for substantial improvements to police standards, which is why last August they announced in principle a series of significant reforms to strengthen the disciplinary, vetting and performance systems in policing. Those changes, on which we have had detailed engagement with stakeholders, are being progressed at pace, and the work already under way relates to many of the amendments.

With the exception of the amendment made by clause 74, the reforms that we propose to introduce can be delivered by secondary legislation using existing regulation-making powers. I will go through the detail of some of that in a moment. The work on that is under way as we speak, and we expect to lay the relevant regulations before Parliament this side of the summer recess. We anticipate that part of those changes can be brought into force as soon as the spring, with the rest of the measures being introduced a little later, but in any event before summer recess. The announcements made in August are being implemented; work is happening on that as we speak, and will be delivered fairly imminently.

To replicate or cut across that work by legislating here would in fact delay the implementation, because we would have to wait for the Bill to pass and then for any subsequent regulations to be made. The Government agree with the substance of a lot of what the amendments and new clauses do. We have already committed to that in our August response, and the regulations to implement that legally are being worked on at the moment. That is an overarching point that applies to almost all the work in this area.

There is one item that can be done only by primary legislation, which relates to the right of a chief constable to appeal. If a chief constable is in a two-to-one minority when a misconduct panel chooses not to dismiss an officer, but the chief constable thinks they should be dismissed, at the moment the only remedy is a judicial review, so we will create a right of appeal for the chief constable to the police appeals tribunal. That is in clause 74. Everything else that we want to do, the Opposition would probably broadly agree with.

The changes that will be set out in regulations include but are not limited to: introducing a presumption that an officer will be dismissed where there is proven gross misconduct; and providing that conviction for certain offences will automatically be considered to amount to gross misconduct, meaning that dismissal will follow.

Should I expect that the offences in my amendment are likely to form part of those offences?

Broadly speaking, yes. That will be set out in regulations, but the principles that we are debating are broadly speaking matters of consensus, as he will have seen from the statement that we made in August.

I have listed two of the changes that will be set out in regulations. Another thing, which I have mentioned before, is introducing a statutory requirement to have and maintain vetting, which I think is in the College of Policing’s code of practice, published in July, and has been implemented, but we intend to put it on a statutory footing by changing the regulations in the spring; it needs to be on a statutory footing as well. That is one of the changes we will make.

There will be a clarified and expedited route for removing officers who fail to maintain vetting, and there will also be measures to streamline and speed up disciplinary proceedings. One of the complaints we have heard from chief constables who are trying to clean up their forces quickly, including Sir Mark Rowley, the Met commissioner, as well as from campaigning groups, is that these proceedings take a very long time, which is unfair on victims and undermines public confidence; it is also unfair on officers to have proceedings hanging over them for a long time, and quite a lot of money is wasted, because often officers are suspended on full pay while investigations take place.

The very long, legalistic and convoluted process is not good for anybody—not for the taxpayer, the victims, public confidence, or the officer who stands accused—so we are making changes to speed the process up. Those changes include the presumption that there will be fast-track hearings, in which the chief constable makes a unilateral decision without a panel or a tribunal, for officers or special constables who have resigned or retired. We intend to make the chief constable chair the panel, rather than the legally qualified chair.

There were good intentions behind the introduction of a legally qualified chair; it aimed to make the process better, but it has turned the process into a legalistic one, almost like a Crown court trial with disclosure hearings, and the hearings take a week or two. Very often they do not dismiss the officer when the chief constable wants to dismiss them. The only remedy at the moment is to judicially review that decision. The chief constable ends up having to JR a decision of a panel on which he or she was a minority but was overruled by the legally qualified chair.

We think that whole thing has become too legalistic and too convoluted. Chief constables who want to clean up their force have not been able to. Making the chief constable chair will de-legalise the process quite a lot. There will still be two independent members of the panel, so there is an independent element. There will be a legally qualified adviser to make sure that the process is fair, but the chief constable will chair it.

There is then, of course, a right of appeal. If a police officer thinks that they have been unfairly dismissed, they can, as now, appeal to the police appeals tribunal. If the chief constable ends up in a minority, with the other two independent members voting to keep an officer and the chief constable wanting to dismiss them, and the chief is not very happy about that, they can then appeal to the PAT, rather than having to judicially review. That is in clause 74.

For completeness—this is not a misconduct issue but is worth mentioning—we will also streamline the performance process. This is not about misconduct; it is about where an officer is just not performing—they are not showing up for work, not doing the job properly, or whatever. At the moment, the process to remove someone on performance grounds is very convoluted. It has three stages, each of which has an appeal, so it is effectively a six-stage process. Sometimes it can take years. I do not think it serves the public interest for an officer who is not performing to be on the payroll for years and years. We will significantly streamline that process. Obviously, there will be some safeguards, so that chief constables cannot arbitrarily fire police officers unfairly, but it needs to be streamlined. Police leaders have asked for that. If we are asking someone to lead a police force, or any organisation, they need to have more control of who serves in uniform.

Those are some of the broad principles of the changes being made. I will move on to talk in a little more detail about some of the new clauses and amendments. I have set out what we will do through regulations—things that I think the Opposition will agree with us on. We all have the same objectives; I do not think these issues are contentious, politically.

New clause 6, tabled by the Mother of the House, Ms Harman, and spoken to by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, would create a power to create regulations that “may provide”—not must—for automatic dismissal for certain criminal offences. As I said, we will provide for that in regulations this spring; conviction of certain offences will automatically constitute gross misconduct, and there is a presumption that when gross misconduct occurs, dismissal follows. That will be taken forward in regulations, as I set out.

New clause 7 would introduce automatic suspension for officers in certain circumstances, which is covered by regulation 11 in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. I will undertake to come back to colleagues on or before Report with confirmation of whether there should be—I mention this for illustrative purposes—automatic suspension when an officer is charged with an indictable offence, or a presumption of suspension if an officer is charged with an either-way offence. Those measures would be implemented via an amendment to regulation 11 in the 2020 regulations, but members of the Committee will discern the likely direction of travel from my comments.

I spoke to new clause 8, on the requirement to vet, in my introductory remarks. The College of Policing’s code of practice was issued in July under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, which already sets out this requirement, and we will nail it home with a cast-iron hammer—I am struggling to find the right metaphor here.

Would the Minister know which way to use the hammer?

I can confirm to the hon. Member that I will definitely use the hammer in the right way. In the Prime Minister’s defence, it was suggested that he had been told to use the hammer in that way, but I do not know. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest has confirmed that the Prime Minister was told to use the hammer in that way. With a cast-iron hammer, we will make sure that the requirement sticks, by enshrining the change through the regulation changes we make in the spring.

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement on police officers to hand over their personal mobile phones where there is suspicion that they have behaved in a way that could amount to gross misconduct. This is a little more problematic, because it says that someone who is not accused of a criminal offence, but is simply suspected of having committed misconduct, has to hand over their personal phone. That is quite intrusive, and there are possible issues with regard to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. I noticed that the shadow Minister moved and voted for an amendment earlier despite my saying that it would infringe the ECHR. Some of my colleagues would no doubt find common cause with him on that.

It is slightly challenging for the Minister to impugn my commitment to the ECHR based on legal advice that he has seen, but which he has never proffered to me.

I did make that point in our exchange, and the hon. Gentleman did not press me on it. He did not contradict my legal analysis.

There are some ECHR article 8 concerns about compelling somebody to hand over their personal mobile phone simply on suspicion of a workplace issue. I think we would be a bit concerned if a constituent’s employer could make them hand over their mobile phone because of an employment-related issue.

Some of the most worrying conduct that we have encountered among the police involves inappropriate messages on WhatsApp groups at Charing Cross police station and elsewhere. In some cases, such behaviour might amount to a criminal offence. I should make it clear that I am not making any allegation about that incident, but in general terms, sharing inappropriate content could amount to an offence—for example, under the Malicious Communications Act 1998 or, indeed, to the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. Where there is criminality, the usual Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1994 power to seize mobile phones would apply.

It is also worth saying that if the Independent Office for Police Conduct is investigating for misconduct, is lawfully on premises and has reasonable grounds for believing that misconduct has occurred, it has some powers to seize mobile phones in those circumstances. It is a good question to ask, but creating a general power to seize an officer’s personal mobile phone strays a little too far into the rights enshrined in article 8 of the ECHR, which I know is very close to the shadow Minister’s heart—or so he tells us.

Moving on to new clauses 33 and 34, the Home Office has previously accepted recommendations to do essentially what clause 34 proposes. However, there are quite a few details one would have to think about. Although I do not think quite enough work has been done to add the new clauses to the Bill today, in principle what is being proposed is reasonable. There have been a number of reports on the subject; there is also, for example, the super-complaint and work by the inspectorate, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, has referred to. Indeed, in one case we have, in principle, accepted a recommendation already.

The Government understand and broadly accept what is being proposed. I will ask officials in the Home Office to do some work to see what can be done. I suspect that that will not be in time for Report, because that is not very far away, but the Bill will pass to the Lords afterwards, and I will look into what we can do, given that, in principle, the Government have expressed support. I do not want to make an absolutely firm commitment, just to avoid making a commitment I cannot keep, but the spirit of what is proposed is understood, and we will do some more work as quickly as possible in this area.

New clause 43 on the referral of complaints to the IOPC relates particularly to the referral of domestic abuse matters. There is a set of mandatory referral criteria already, which include serious assault, serious sexual assault, serious corruption and

“a criminal offence or behaviour which is liable to lead to disciplinary proceedings and which, in either case, is aggravated by discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of a person’s race, sex, religion or other status”.

Also, there are

“complaints or conduct matters arising from the same incident as one where conduct falling within the above criteria is alleged”.

That is quite wide-ranging and includes serious assault and serious sexual assault, which would meet the mandatory referral criteria. Given what I have just read out, many allegations of domestic abuse are likely to fall into one of those criteria.

“Likely” is not good enough for me, I am afraid, as I said in my speech. I just do not see why we would not add domestic abuse to the list, given that the Government have themselves made domestic abuse a serious crime. The list might capture it, but in lots of cases does not.

I think that the 2020 regulations refer to this, so if the change were to be made, it could and probably should be made via the regulations, rather than the Bill, so that it was treated the same way as the other items.

While I am not ready to accept the amendment today, I will take away the question of whether there is a case for amending the regulations to include domestic abuse on the list. There will be arguments on both sides, because there is a necessarily high threshold. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady, but just to give the other side of the argument, the IOPC has quite a heavy workload, there are quite long delays, and we need to make sure that we direct the IOPC’s finite resources towards the most serious matters. I know domestic abuse is serious; I am not disputing that. However, we have to make sure that we calibrate that the right way. I will take the matter away and come back to the Committee once I have received further advice. That is a slightly softer commitment than on the other two measures, but it is an undertaking to look at the suggestion seriously in the context of the regulations.

On vetting clearance, I have already made the point that the College of Policing code of practice was updated in July to set out that there should be continuous vetting, and we will put that in regulations, as I said. I also spoke in debate on the last group of measures about the funded policing plan to carry out continuous integrity monitoring, which is basically the data wash I mentioned earlier done on a continuous basis.

It is the case that the full re-vetting is done every number of years. However, the proposed, revised authorised professional practice on vetting, which was published on 10 January—quite recently; it is out for consultation—suggests there should be an annual change-of-circumstance and integrity check, to check in on individuals without having to do the full re-vetting, in addition to the continuous integrity work I mentioned. The APP is out for consultation; it closes in a couple of months’ time. The annual check-up is in the APP. I looked at it earlier, and I warn colleagues that it is about 400 pages long. It is quite a heavy read. I hope that the proposal in the APP and the continuous integrity screening, which I mentioned in the previous debate and which we funded, combined with the code of practice released last July and the regulations that we will lay before Parliament this spring and early summer, will ensure that the required standards are met not just as a one-off today, but on an ongoing basis.

Will the Minister comment specifically on the amendment on evidence that is gathered in the family court?

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for drawing my attention to amendment 134, which I had momentarily overlooked. It is a fair point to raise.

For the Committee’s benefit, evidence placed before the family court is currently not considered when vetting decisions are taken. The family court will consider things such as child custody cases, for example, and it may be that allegations are made in the family court of domestic abuse or even more serious matters such as rape. The family court may, on occasion, make a finding of fact, where it finds on the civil standard of the balance of probability—not the criminal standard, which is beyond reasonable doubt—that a particular thing has happened, which could be a criminal offence. It is not a criminal conviction. It is not beyond a reasonable doubt, but on the balance of probability.

Family court proceedings are closed, and they are not, generally speaking, published, so that information is not available to take into account during vetting. Of course, police doing vetting do not know which officer may or may not have been involved in child custody proceedings. The vast majority will not, of course, but a small number will. Because that information is generally not published, in order to get hold of the information, the police would have to either ask for their officers to self-disclose that they had been subject to proceedings—there is obviously the possibility that the officer would lie, particularly if there was an adverse fact—or make individual applications for each case to the family court to disclose first whether there had been proceedings and secondly, if there had been proceedings, whether the findings of fact could be disclosed. It may be that the family court would not disclose that information, because that is a decision for the family court judge.

Will the Minister give way on that point?

I will in just a moment.

There are considerable practical obstacles to getting hold of that information. Of course, if the matter that is put before the family court in the process of child custody proceedings is criminal in nature and it is then reported to the police, even if there was no conviction, for whatever reason, that would then be on the police national database. The gap would arise if a party to family court proceedings made an allegation to the family court, the family court upheld it on the balance of probability and then the victim did not even allege to the police—let alone get a conviction—that this criminal conduct had occurred. Then the police would not know about it. That is the sort of intersection of the Venn diagram we are talking about.

The main point is that there are some significant practical obstacles, and I cannot immediately think how to overcome them. If there are ideas, I would be happy to hear them.

rose—

rose—

I think the shadow Minister was up first, and then I will give way to the hon. Lady.

The Minister might have gone past this point now, but I merely wanted to see whether he accepts that one way to manage practical hurdles is through primary legislation, so that later on he can consider options that in principle might help to overcome some of those hurdles—or is this, in substance, a bridge too far for him?

I would be interested to hear, including via an intervention in response to this, how we would craft that—what legislative measure we could pass that would essentially open up what are currently closed proceedings within the ambit of the family courts to the police vetting process. I will happily give way if the hon. Gentleman can suggest that or come back to me later on.

Really, it is unfair on the Minister for me to ask him to do this, because he is absolutely right: it is practically impossible for him to agree to it today, because our family courts system—and, in fact, we do not have a Justice Minister in front of us—[Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Member for Newbury is a Justice Minister; I apologise. Okay then, I am happy to take interventions when I wind up.

We do not record anything that happens in our family courts. Now, we do not need Fujitsu; I could knock up an Excel spreadsheet that a clerk could put the findings in the case into at the end of every day and that was searchable by safeguarding agencies. It is not beyond the wit of man, but it is absolutely beyond the wit of the policing Minister—not because of a lack of skill, but because he literally cannot commit to doing something that the Ministry of Justice should have done a long time ago and that should already exist. The failing, actually, is not on the right hon. Gentleman’s part in not being able to accept it; it is due to the fact that we have allowed a wild west to occur in our family courts. So it is not his fault.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her personal exoneration on this occasion; I will take that while I can. However, it may be that an MOJ colleague will respond. Obviously, the hon. Lady is able to question MOJ Ministers in parliamentary questions, and it may be that it is possible to have a discussion here; I do not know. However, that is obviously, as the hon. Lady said, something that the justice system has to consider. As a Home Office policing and crime Minister, that is not in my ambit. Therefore, as far as I am concerned—as the hon. Lady has acknowledged—it is difficult to say anything further.

However, I will just repeat the point that it is obviously open to a party to family court proceedings—if they are making an allegation of criminality to the family court, I am sure we would all strongly encourage them to also report it to the police, because it should be—[Interruption.] I know that there may in some cases be reasons not to, but they should also report that to the police so that it can be criminally investigated. Were they to do so, that would then appear on the police national database, although I do understand that there are some individual circumstances in which a victim may not want to do that.

There are a lot of new clauses and amendments in this group. I apologise for speaking to them at such length, Sir Robert, but I hope that I have set out that the majority of these things are already being done via regulations. There are two or three areas—new clauses 34 and 43 particularly—where I have undertaken to come back with further thinking, but I hope that that gives the Committee sufficient assurance that the Government are taking this important area very seriously—and, more than just taking it seriously, taking action.

I really appreciate the approach that the Minister has taken on all of the areas. I do not doubt that we are cross-cutting on certain things that have been going on, which many of us in this House have been working on for at least the past two years, since this became such a public issue. I also appreciate the Minister saying that he will come back on various different things.

Some of the amendments that I have tabled are just minor and technical amendments to other bits of—[Interruption.] Yes, apologies; I do not mean to wade into the argument about, “What is a technical amendment?”, because I do not know—or care, to be perfectly honest. That is the truth. I really appreciate those opportunities to discuss this with the Minister.

On the issue of the family courts, I will speak to another amendment on that shortly, later on in this debate. The reason I feel compelled to do that—even though I have admitted that in this instance the Minister’s hands are tied—is that we are three years on since the Ministry of Justice’s harms review. If the Justice Minister here today would like to tell me that I am wrong, she can, but we are three years on from the Ministry of Justice identifying the harms in the family courts—serious harms of child abuse and serious cases of rape—and nothing has changed.

We are no further in using the perfectly good piece of work that was started by myself and the now Justice Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), who was not in that role at the time. Actually, it is really woeful, and so I find myself only able to tag this on to Bills where it is wholly inappropriate to ask the Minister concerned to include it, even though I absolutely want to see this very substantive thing done.

However, it cannot be beyond the Ministry of Justice to ensure that every day, at the end of proceedings in family court, the facts that have been found—albeit below a criminal threshold—are recorded somewhere for agencies, such as our security agencies or our children’s safeguarding agencies. It cannot be beyond the wit of the MOJ to do that; I refuse to believe that it is. That would be helpful to all the police officers who came forward—because they all said, “Yeah, it would be great if I knew that, but I don’t know.”

Craig Guildford’s fingerprints are across much of what the Minister was saying. He is the chief constable of my police force, and is a man I like and work with all the time. In fact, he was previously the chief of police for my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North, the shadow Minister; we like to share things in the east and west midlands. The blood drained from Craig Guildford’s face when I asked, “Do you know how many of your police officers have been found in the family court to have raped someone?”, and he said, “No.”

The point has been made, and I hope heard by the Justice Minister. However, on the basis that it is almost unfair of me to table this amendment and that this issue will be taken away and considered—because it will not go away—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.