I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 42, line 21, after “application” insert “by complaint”.

This amendment provides for applications for nuisance begging prevention orders to be made by complaint.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 44 stand part.

Government amendments 71 to 75.

Amendment 143, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “5 years” and insert “1 year”.

Government amendment 76.

Clauses 45 to 47 stand part.

Clauses 43 to 47 introduce nuisance begging prevention orders. Alongside nuisance begging directions and nuisance begging prevention notices, these orders—the third tier of escalation—are designed to be an additional tool available to local authorities and the police to keep communities safe. They are not about criminalising the vulnerable or the destitute, but rather acknowledge the impact that nuisance begging can have on individuals and communities, and empower local partners to deal with it in the most appropriate way.

Nuisance begging prevention orders allow for court-imposed prohibitions on nuisance begging behaviours and, critically, the ability to direct an individual to do positive things, such as follow a programme of support, where a court feels that is reasonable to prevent or stop the person from engaging in nuisance begging. I mentioned before that we wondered if we could give police or local authority officers the power to do that themselves, and we concluded that we could not. This is a court making those directions, which is obviously very different from a police officer or local authority officer acting spontaneously.

A person may be directed to take up a drug treatment offer to prevent them from nuisance begging, if the court is satisfied that drug misuse has driven their behaviour. The orders are issued by magistrates courts on application by an authorised person, which is a local authority or the police. An order can be made if a person has engaged in nuisance begging or has not complied with a nuisance begging direction or a nuisance begging prevention notice. Partnership working is required to seek an order containing positive requirements, as the local authority or police applicant will need evidence that the necessary support is available and suitable. Given the judicial role in the making of an order and the protections that go along with that, the court may set more onerous conditions than those that may be in a notice. That is the point that I was making when I commented on the Government’s policy development.

Government amendments 70 to 76 make various changes to the provisions relating to nuisance begging prevention orders. Amendment 70 provides that applications for these orders will be made by complaint, which ensures that the magistrates court civil jurisdiction procedure, as provided for in part 2 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, is applicable to those proceedings. Amendment 71 provides that the orders are to take effect from the beginning of the day after the day on which the order is made. Amendments 72, 74 and 76 provide that, where applicable, an order is to take effect following a person’s release from custody, rather than from the day the order is made. Amendment 75 is a clarificatory—dare I say technical?—amendment making it clear that the specified period for any orders made must be a fixed period. Finally, amendment 73 makes drafting changes for readability. I will respond to amendment 143 from the hon. Member for Nottingham North once he has explained his thinking on it.

I will not repeat a lot of what I have said so far. Clause 43 concerns nuisance begging prevention orders, the most severe of the three tiers of powers that the Bill covers. I think it makes sense to align these tiers, as the Minister said in a previous debate, with other civil-type powers, so that they are easy to understand. As defined in clause 43, an authorised person can obtain the order on application to a magistrates court. If the court is satisfied that someone aged 18 or over has engaged in nuisance begging, and has failed to comply with the move-on direction and a notice, this seems like a reasonable escalation of the process for them to face.

My concern is mainly with the duration of such orders; clause 45(4) states that their duration may not exceed five years. That is quite a long period. Is that a proportionate response to the challenge that we are trying to tackle, which is serious and organised nuisance begging and aggressive and antisocial nuisance begging? Is a five-year exclusion the right thing to do, or, again, will it harm vulnerable people? We know that gangs will move on to new people, and the others will be left with the consequences.

There is a degree of comfort in the fact that we are talking about magistrates courts, so I have less anxiety about the measures than I did about the previous provisions, in which case I really think that three years will become a magnet. We can have confidence that a magistrates court will look at the full picture when considering an order of up to five years, but I am keen to know why the five years is being written in sand. Through amendment 143, I seek to reduce the period to one year, as a way of finding a balance between protecting vulnerable people and disrupting organised activity. An appeals process is set out in these clauses, and although this issue is of greater concern in the next part of the Bill, I think there is an access to justice issue for the people we are talking about. How well will they be able to use the legal processes that are there to protect them, and what support will they get to do so? I will stop there, but I am particularly keen to know why five years was the chosen duration of the orders.

Briefly, five years was chosen—an increase from the three years in the previous provisions—because, as the shadow Minister said, the order is supervised by a court. That duration is a maximum, rather than a target. Courts are very well used to dealing with maximum durations, particularly in the context of sentencing. For example, the prison sentences handed down are often a great deal shorter than the maximum set out. As a matter of evidence and practice, courts often go a long way below the maximum—although we in Parliament might wish they went closer to the maximum in some cases. The duration is set at five years because courts have discretion and are used to working with maximum durations; but the court does have to look at all the relevant information and evidence before deciding.

Finally, in relation to the positive requirements imposed, we have offered further safeguards, in that nuisance begging prevention orders can be varied or discharged, should circumstances change during the period. I hope the shadow Minister accepts that giving a court that flexibility is reasonable. We do it the whole time with criminal sentencing, and there is evidence that courts use that power with a great deal of restraint sometimes. I hope that explains the Government’s thinking on the issue.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.