I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 38, page 39, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) any interference with the person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or places of worship.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 139, in clause 38, page 39, line 36, at end insert—

“(10) The Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions introduced by this section.”

Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Robert.

Clause 38 brings us to the provisions that concern nuisance begging. This clause, and subsequent clauses on homelessness, are closely tied to the repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The 2022 Act will repeal the Vagrancy Act once the relevant provisions have been commenced, but the Government have said that they will commence those provisions only when replacement legislation is in place. For better or for worse, the clauses in front of us are that replacement legislation.

The repeal of the Vagrancy Act was a momentous victory for campaigners, because it effectively decriminalised rough sleeping and begging. The repeal had cross-party support, and many in the House shared the view that those who are destitute and living on the street should not be criminalised or threatened but offered support and assistance. Subsequently, the Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act and set out new offences and powers regarding, for example, the prohibition of organised begging, which is what we are discussing and which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, and the prohibition of begging where it causes a public nuisance, such as next to cashpoints or in shop doorways.

Clause 38 gives effect to some of the Government’s proposals by introducing the power for a constable or local authority to issue a move-on direction to a person if they are engaging in, have engaged in or are likely to engage in nuisance begging. In this context, it is important that we differentiate between nuisance begging and nuisance homelessness, which we will come to. We strongly object to the provisions on nuisance homelessness, but the issue of nuisance begging is more nuanced. We know that some organised criminal gangs use begging for their own ends. They often use begging strategies that are aggressive and antisocial, and they often exploit challenged people to gain illicit private profit off the back of the characteristic kindness of the British people. That is wrong, and we therefore support powers that can tackle organised nuisance begging, but we think the provisions require greater humanity to protect those who are being exploited and those who are genuinely destitute.

The risk is that clause 38 and related clauses will target anyone, regardless of the nature of the harm. As Crisis has said, an effective blanket ban on begging risks pushing vulnerable people into dangerous places where they may be subject to greater abuse or violence. Someone simply sat alongside a cap or a cup could fall foul of the definition. That would be a mistake and risk harming some of the most vulnerable people in society. Many people become homeless and resort to begging through no fault of their own but because of situations such as trauma or family breakdown. They should not be doubly punished for falling through the cracks of a welfare system that is creaking under the strain of widespread poverty in our society. We are concerned that the Government have not quite landed the provision right.

Clause 38 allows for an authorised person—in this case, a constable or someone from the relevant local authority, which is defined in clause 64—to give a nuisance begging direction to someone over 18 who they think is engaging, has engaged or will engage in nuisance begging. The written direction will require the person to leave a certain place and not return for up to 72 hours. We do not, in principle, object to the police or local authority having tools to disrupt highly organised nuisance begging operations, which we know are active, but we fear that the provision will sweep up others along the way.

Amendments 139 and 140 seek to introduce safeguards. Amendment 140 seeks to ensure that, where nuisance begging directions are used, they should not interfere with a person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or their place of worship. Clause 38(5) states that a direction cannot interfere with a person’s work, their education or a court order. That is wise, but adding substance abuse support services, health services and someone’s place of worship would complete the picture. The amendment is straightforward and reasonable. Its intention is to protect the support and assistance provided to people who might be forced into begging, and to ensure that the Government’s nuisance begging directions do not cut across or undermine that support.

The nuisance begging powers are significant and could have unintended consequences, and amendment 139 is an attempt to maintain some parliamentary oversight. It would require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions in clause 38, which we think would be an important check to ensure that they are not causing unintended harms, to give Members a mechanism to raise concerns, and to give a degree of parliamentary accountability. I do not think the amendment is particularly onerous. I would like to think—I would be concerned if this was not the case—that the Government will be monitoring the application of the powers and have a sense of how they work and whether they are dealing with the problem that they want them to deal with.

If that is not the Government’s approach, I hope that the Minister will talk a little about what assessment has been made of the possible risks, particularly for those who are facing genuine destitution and may fall foul of the legislation. For example, what will be the impact of imposing a one-month prison sentence or a £2,500 fine on someone in breach of these provisions, when they are already almost certainly in severe financial difficulties? We will get to appeal provisions, but will those who are facing these challenges be likely to be able to use those provisions? Is there not a risk of rather unequal justice? Further, having made such an assessment, what steps will the Government take to introduce mitigation?

My amendments suggest a way to put in some safe-guarding. I hope that the Minister can give us assurances, at least, about the Government’s understanding of how they will differentiate between the genuine, criminal, organised nuisance operations and people who are just in a dire personal situation. It is important that the Committee is mindful of that.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert—I think for the first time, though I hope it is the first of many. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for explaining his two amendments to clause 38, which provides for nuisance begging directions. Before I respond to his amendments, let me provide a little wider context for clauses 38 to 64, which the Committee will be relieved to hear I do not propose to repeat at the beginning of our debate on each clause.

These clauses will replace the Vagrancy Act 1824, which was prospectively repealed by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, as the shadow Minister said. The hon. Member for Stockton North and I fondly remember our extensive debates on that subject some years ago. This package includes directions, notices and orders where someone is nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping; offences for nuisance begging and for facilitating organised begging; and a replacement offence for being found on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose.

The Government and, I think, the House as a whole take the view that nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, using regulation-making powers under the PCSC Act—a Henry VIII power to which I presume the shadow Minister does not object. We have put in place a substantial package of support for people who are genuinely homeless, sleeping rough or at risk of doing so. Engagement and offers of support must continue to be the starting point in helping those who are begging genuinely or sleeping rough to move away from a life on the streets and into accommodation. However, we have heard from frontline local authority partners and police that there is still a role for enforcement where that engagement does not work.

It is important not to conflate begging and rough sleeping—although of course the two can be linked—which is why we treat them separately in the Bill. The Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act in 2022 and the majority of respondents were in favour of introducing replacement begging offences, recognising the harm that it causes. We set out our plans in more detail in the antisocial behaviour action plan, published in March 2023.

Accordingly, clause 38 provides that where an authorised person, defined in subsection (7) as a police constable or the relevant local authority, is

“satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage, in nuisance begging”,

they can issue a direction to move on. We will come on to the definition of nuisance begging, which is set out in clause 49. Such a direction will require the person to leave the specified location and not to return for up to a maximum of 72 hours, giving respite to those who are negatively impacted by the nuisance. It can also include a requirement for the person to take their belongings, and any litter they have been responsible for, with them. The direction must be given in writing, and it is an offence not to comply with it. The penalty for failing to comply is up to one month’s imprisonment or a level 4 fine, which is up to £2,500, or both.

Can the Minister tell me how somebody looks likely to beg?

That is a facts-specific determination, but it might, for example, be that someone is carrying a sign soliciting funds, has positioned themselves in a particular location with a receptacle for collecting money, or is positioned near an ATM. It might be that someone has been begging and, although they have not been observed doing so by a police officer, there is a reasonable suspicion that they might do so in the future.

The meaning of nuisance begging is not any begging; it is quite precisely defined in clause 49, which we will come to. Begging in general is not being criminalised. That was the purpose of repealing the 1824 Act, which was very wide in its scope. We are defining nuisance begging in this Bill to be quite precise and targeted. Obviously, we will discuss that in detail, probably in the next hour or so.

I note that clause 38(9) refers to one month’s imprisonment. Can the Minister explain how he reconciles that new sentence with the Sentencing Bill’s presumption against short sentences? These people may never go to prison.

The hon. Gentleman asks an excellent question. There is in the Sentencing Bill a presumption against short sentences, defined as under 12 months. However—as he knows, as a shadow Justice Minister—that presumption does not apply where the offender is already subject to an order of the court. For a first offence, where the offender is not subject to an order of the court, he is quite right: there would be a statutory presumption—a strong presumption—against a sentence of less than 12 months. If some other kind of court order has been issued for a first offence, the provisions of the Sentencing Bill—in particular the presumption against short sentences—will not apply on any subsequent appearance that the offender makes before the magistrate for a later offence, for so long as that order of the court is in force. That is how the two provisions interact, but that was a very good and fair question. I trust that my answer deals with the point that he raised.

It doesn’t.

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it does not, but it does. I explained how if the offender is subject to an order of the court following a first offence, then the presumption against a short sentence does not apply for a second or subsequent offence. That is how the two interact. The disapplication would apply only on the first occasion; if a court order is made, the disapplication will not apply to subsequent offences for so long as that court order is in force. I think that is a relatively clear and coherent position.

Clause 38(5) provides that a direction must, so far as is practicable, avoid interfering with a person’s attendance at work or education, or with any requirements of a court order—as I have just mentioned—to which the person is subject. Amendment 140 seeks to augment that provision to avoid a direction interfering with the person’s attendance at a substance abuse support service centre, mental or physical health services or a place of worship.

On the face of it, those things sound broadly reasonable, because there are numerous circumstances in which a person subject to a nuisance begging direction may want to enter an area to access those services. It is worth saying that a direction will have a maximum duration of 72 hours, so we are not talking about long periods. Directions must also be proportionate and reasonable. We expect those exercising these powers—a constable or the relevant local authority—to take a joined-up approach and consider their exercise on a case-by-case basis. There is a lot of good practice in multi-agency working to build on, to ensure that people can access appropriate support services.

All of us would want our fellow citizens, whatever condition they find themselves in, to be able to access mental health services, substance abuse services and so on. However, the right place for this level of detail—which is reasonable in spirit—is the guidance underpinning these provisions. There are other things, which are not in the amendment, that we might also want authorities to take into account. Domestic abuse counselling might be another example—we would not want to interfere with that—along with probably other things that we will not think of this morning.

Once we get beyond the fundamental basics of employment and education and into these other, important but more detailed points, such as access to health services, DA counselling and so on, we get into a level of detail and nuance that is better placed in the guidance. When drafted, the guidance will reflect the spirit of what the shadow Minister has set out in his amendment, and probably some other things that he has not—I am sure for reasonable reasons—but which might be equally important.

Amendment 139 is a relatively standard Opposition amendment asking for an annual report. I will give the relatively standard reply, which I have given probably 40 or 50 times over the last few years during the passage of various Bills.

There are another six to come.

I am looking forward to repeating it.

There are many parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of Bills, not least parliamentary questions, scrutiny by Select Committees and, critically, the normal process of post-legislative review, which takes place between three and five years after Royal Assent. I hope on that basis that the shadow Minister will forbear from pressing amendments 140 and 139. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and for saying that the Government believe that, for nuisance begging and nuisance rough sleeping, support is the starting point. That is an important message. I also share his view that they are not the same thing, and our treatment of the two are different for that reason. I also agree that there is a place for enforcement, particularly for nuisance begging, although I think the case is weaker for rough sleeping. However, he also said that this is not about just any begging. Although I do not want to pre-empt our discussion of clause 49, which we will debate in due course, the way it is drawn up means that there will not be much left, frankly.

One theme that I will return to—particularly when we come to the homelessness provisions and the point my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether someone looks “likely”—is that this will be in the eye of the beholder. That will be a challenge, particularly for rough sleeping, but also in this area, so it is right that there should be anxieties.

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 140. As he says, the list is probably not comprehensive, but I am glad that he said it was reasonable in spirit, which is definitely the kindest thing he has said to me in our four months together so far—I will take that as the strongest affirmation that I am likely to get. He has committed to address this issue through guidance, which is perhaps a better way to do it, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.

Similarly, on amendment 139 and this point about post-legislative reviews, that is obviously not something we feel in this place. I suspect it is something that is more internal to Departments. There is a point here about how well we do or do not monitor the impact of legislation three or five years after we have passed it. We do not—we move on and do not really learn anything from it. However, we have had that argument on previous clauses, and I will not rehearse it again. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.