Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 27—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: honour-based violence and abuse—

“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—

‘(h) the fact that the offender inflicted honour-based violence or abuse on the victim.’”

A new clause to instate honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

New clause 28—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—

“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—

‘(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.’”

A new clause to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

New clause 29—Infidelity of victim not to be used as part of a defence to murder—

“When considering a charge of murder, the court may not take into account as part of the defendant’s defence an allegation that the victim was at any time or in any way, physical or verbal, sexually unfaithful to the defendant.”

This new clause would ensure sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence to murder.

Clause 24 sets out the new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected with the end of a relationship. This provision is one of four that the Government are taking forward in response to the independent review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide that was undertaken by Clare Wade KC. Together they will ensure that the seriousness of murder committed in a domestic context is reflected in our sentencing framework. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic. In other words, the perpetrator is a partner or former partner of the victim.[This section has been corrected on 1 March 2024, column 6MC — read correction] (Correction) The vast majority of these homicides are committed by men against women and usually follow a pattern of years of abuse prior to the homicide.

The legal framework for murder sentencing is contained in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 20 years ago. While every case of murder carries a mandatory life sentence, this framework sets out the principles to guide the court in determining the minimum custodial term. It is a non-exhaustive list. It is always open to judges to consider aggravating and mitigating factors not contained in schedule 21.

Until now, schedule 21 has contained no express recognition of the seriousness of domestic murders, but over the past 20 years—I would argue particularly in the past five—our understanding of offending committed in a domestic context has improved. As Clare Wade highlighted in her review, our sentencing framework needs to be updated to reflect that. On the overall measures, last year, a statutory instrument was laid before Parliament to introduce both a statutory aggravating factor and a statutory mitigating factor for murder in relation to controlling or coercive behaviour, in line with the recommendations. Where an abusive partner has killed their victim, in recognition of the seriousness of the preceding abuse of coercive control and the experience of the victim before death, the coercive control will constitute an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.

A new mitigating factor will apply in cases where the victim of an abusive partner or family member has killed their abuser, in recognition of their experience as a victim of abuse preceding the killing, which is exactly what happened in the Sally Challen case. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal—it is essentially taking the court’s conclusion and making it a statutory mitigating factor.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction)

We have also introduced new statutory aggravating factor for murders involving gratuitous and excessive force, sometimes referred to as overkill. That is something that Clare Wade found to be strikingly prevalent in not only domestic murders,[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) but all the cases she assessed. The perpetrator in cases of overkill—to use that shorthand—was male in all but one case.

Clause 24 introduces the fourth legislative measure that the Government committed to take forward in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations. This provision will make murders connected to the end of a relationship, or the victim’s stated intention to end a relationship, a statutory aggravating factor. In 40% of the murder cases analysed by Clare Wade as part of her review, the murder occurred at the end, or perceived end—an important qualification—of the relationship. The perpetrator was male in all those cases, and, in over two thirds of them, a history of coercive or controlling behaviour was also identified.

Killing in those circumstances is often the final controlling act of an abusive partner. As Clare Wade put it in her report, when the perpetrator learns he no longer has control over his partner because she is going to leave, the final act is homicide—the last way he can control her. The old shorthand used in court is: “If I can’t have you, no one will.” It is striking how often it twins with overkill—the use of gratuitous and excessive violence—at that moment. They often occur at the same time.

While it is for the judge to determine the appropriate weight given to the aggravating factors in each case, we expect that this change, along with the other statutory aggravating factors we have introduced in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations, will have a significant impact on the minimum custodial terms. It will also get the court to consider the nature and context of domestic homicides specifically, which has never happened before. These changes mark a step change in the way our sentencing framework responds to and understands cases of domestic murder. For the first time, the nature of these murders and the unique harms underpinning them will be recognised expressly in our sentencing framework. The perpetrators must serve sentences that truly reflect the severity of their crimes.

I will speak to new clauses 27 to 29. I do not disagree on the issue. I worked very closely with the families to get Clare Wade’s review up and running under the then Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland—who I believe was just speaking in the Chamber, making a nuisance of himself today as well. While we are making these changes, I think that Clare Wade has herself said, as have many of the families involved, that making these limited and piecemeal changes is not good enough. I will place some of my own thoughts on record for the sake of showing the many ways in which the aggravating factors for cases of domestic homicide need to be updated.

Even though I am about to speak to minor changes grouped under a clause that is itself a minor, piecemeal change, my actual view is that schedule 21, which, as the Minister outlined, is nearly 21 years old, needs an entire and wholescale review. In my view, schedule 21 is no longer fit for purpose under a number of grounds. That is not just my view: it is certainly the view of Clare Wade; it is the view of the Centre for Women’s Justice; and it is the view of the families that I work with.

However, failing that proper systematic review, which is not on offer to me—I imagine that there will be some more of this chatter in the Sentencing Bill, although not from me, unless I get on that Committee as well—

It can be arranged.

A girl can dream! I will speak to a number of changes because, if we are going to make a point about the end of a relationship, we have to also think about some of the other aggravating factors to try and level the playing field regarding sentencing. I have a list of case studies here of murderers and how long they went away for: 15 years, twelve and a half years—brutally murdering women—16 years, 15 years for a man who then went on to murder somebody else on his release. So, the level of time that we give for this particular crime is woeful.

New clause 27 would make honour-based abuse an aggravating factor in murder cases. Banaz Mahmod was killed in a so-called honour killing in 2006 by her father—not somebody she was ending a relationship with—her uncle, and five other men. She was murdered for leaving her abusive husband, for desiring a divorce and for meeting a new boyfriend who those men disapproved of. She was murdered because she was accused of bringing dishonour and shame on her family and the community.

The men that killed Banaz had boasted and joked about the murder, and were supported by other members of the extended family, who made investigations and prosecution as difficult as possible. The police estimated that there were about 50 men involved in her murder and related crimes.

Before her death, Banaz suffered greatly, reporting rape and violence, threats to kill and an attempt on her life. She went to the police five times. She named the suspects who would eventually kill her. The police did not hear; they did not act. In 2008, a commissioner for the then Independent Police Complaints Commission found serious failings in the police handling of the case.

For many years, Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who I consider a friend, has campaigned alongside Southall Black Sisters for a law that recognises the horror of honour-based killing explicitly in sentencing. New clause 27 would do that. It would introduce honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

Such a new clause will increase confidence in the criminal justice system, sending a strong message that this violence can never be accepted, excused or ignored. As the Women and Equalities Committee stated, an explicit reference “would strengthen the understanding that honour-based abuse is taken seriously by the criminal justice system and only ever as an aggravating factor.” That would have an impact upstream, too, ensuring that agencies do not misunderstand, ignore or turn a blind eye to honour-based abuse due to ignorance or to fear of being seen as culturally insensitive or racist.

Those women must be protected. We must reach them before it is too late. That is particularly important, as honour-based abuse is a high-risk crime that involves multiple perpetrators and colluders and sometimes multiple victims, because of shared codes of honour. Too many victims are at risk for us not to act.

New clause 28 argues that strangulation should be classified as an aggravating factor in sentencing murders. From previous times that I have worked on this issue with the Minister present, I know that she cares deeply about strangulation, and the arguments for the new clause seem unquestionable. First, the nature of the violence: strangulation is a gendered form of killing. That is how men brutally and callously kill women. The 10-year femicide census showed that strangulation was the second most common method for men who kill women, and Clare Wade’s review demonstrated its prevalence.

It is hard to find words to reflect the horror of killing someone by strangulation—the vulnerability of the victim, the intimacy of being eye to eye, the length of time that it would take to kill someone in that way, and the fear that the victim must experience in their final moments. Many bereaved families I work with speak to me about how that haunts them. That must be reflected in the sentencing framework.

Furthermore, new clause 28 follows new laws on non-fatal strangulation—the Minister may remember them her time on the Back Benches—which were introduced under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. How we understand the role of strangulation in domestic abuse is changing. It is now understood as a form of coercive control and an accurate red-flag predicter of homicide. If someone is strangled, they are much more likely to go on to be murdered. We must change how it is considered in sentencing.

A judge can recognise strangulation as serious or sadistic under schedule 21—I say again that that needs review—but strangulation is not being recognised. It is simply not being recognised for the horror that it is. In 59% of the strangulation cases looked at by Clare Wade’s review, the method of killing was not seen as an aggravating factor. Significantly, in 73% of the remaining cases where the offence was said to be aggravated by the nature of the killing, the strangulation was accompanied by either an assault or an attack with a weapon. That suggests that the seriousness of the violence denoted by strangulation in and of itself is not being acknowledged.

In law, we place a lot of emphasis on weapons, but as we see in many gendered murders, many male perpetrators do not need a weapon. Such a perpetrator carries his weapon everywhere he goes, and that is his strength, his arms, his physical power. He does not need a weapon, so his culpability should not be decreased because he did not use one; he did use one. That is not a point in law that has gone unrecognised in other crimes; our bodily differences are recognised. For example, for the crime of rape, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 explicitly states that it can be done only with a penis. That recognises that a man’s body can be a weapon. I am not asking for anything beyond what exists in current law.

A three-year study of 204 adult cases of non-fatal strangulation showed that one in six had been strangled to the point where the victim lost consciousness. Symptoms of such violence include strokes, depression, memory loss, seizures, motor and speech disorders, and paralysis. Studies have shown that victims of non-fatal strangulation are seven times more likely to be murdered by their partner. The true nature of strangulation must be understood, as must its relationship with misogyny. Strangulation is about silencing. It is about exerting power, fear and control. As the member of a focus group who attended for Clare Wade’s review explained:

“It is almost always about the perpetrators wanting the last word but if you work with the perpetrators, you hear this over and over again—like I wanted her to shut up I wanted her to be quiet but I wanted to win you have to have the last word. That is what the whole kind of attacking the throat and putting the hands over the mouth—it is all about silencing.”

I very much hope that the understanding of an aggravation in the use of strangulation in a killing can be considered.

On a slightly different note, new clause 29 would ensure that infidelity can never be used as a defence to murder. The Minister said earlier when commenting on perpetrators attending court that common law practice sometimes needs writing into primary legislation. I very much agree with her, which is why I am seeking for this amendment to be made. While it is still written in our legislation that someone can use infidelity as a defence for murder, it is not used in common law.

Currently, infidelity cannot be used as a defence or mitigation. However, the latter is common-law principle rather than in statute. Section 55(6)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides that sexual infidelity cannot be relied upon in a defence of a loss of control. That was passed following the wrath about “crime of passion” defences going through the criminal justice system in response to domestic murders, and it revoked previous laws on provocation. The legislative change was brought about due to the incredible work of domestic abuse campaigners.

However, the legislation did not concurrently prevent sexual infidelity being a mitigating factor in sentencing in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020—I feel like I am really attacking schedule 21 today, but I am not keen on it if I am honest—thereby creating an inconsistency in the law. The law on provocation changed, but the sentencing principle that surrounded it did not. Common-law principles on the whole prevent this inconsistency from playing out. I will spend the entirety of the Committee stage saying, “In real life, that does not really happen.” Well, in real life this does not happen. It is not something that I am mortally frightened of. It no longer happens that someone is allowed to say that because their wife cheated on them it is fine that they killed her. A million other defences are made, but not that one anymore.

The defence still exists in law; however, it is not used, on the basis that precedent allows for factual scenarios to be disregarded in mitigation where they run contrary to the policy behind existing legislation, even where there may not be a statutory bar. Despite that, it is important to regularise common-law principles in statute for the avoidance of confusion and to fill lacunas in the law. New clause 29 ensures that no judge could ever stray and use it as a mitigating factor.

New clauses 27, 28 and 29 speak to the larger issue of how we see and respond to the killing of women. How we sentence crimes reflects how seriously we take them. At the heart of these debates is how seriously we take the violent deaths of women and the stealing of their lives. I am afraid to say that at the moment, and we do not take it as seriously as we take other crimes. Several years ago, two mothers walked into my office, Carole Gould and Julie Devey. Their relentless campaigning, at personal cost, has hugely elevated the issue of how we should hold the people who kill women to account. Their daughters were both murdered in brutal, violent attacks by their ex-partners. Ellie was 17 and Poppy was 24. They had their futures stolen from them by two men who had decided, as Julie once described, that

“if they couldn’t have them no one else could either”.

Their mothers began campaigning to challenge the discrepancy in the sentences given in cases where the victim, often a woman, is killed in the home and in other homicides where the victim is killed in public spaces. The distinction commonly turns on the fact that if a perpetrator brought a weapon to the scene of a crime, the starting point for sentencing is 25 years. If, however, the weapon is not brought but found, as with a kitchen knife—my kitchen knife comes back into play from earlier—the starting point is only 15 years. That is 10 years’ difference.

The example that is repeatedly given to demonstrate that inequality is that if someone brings a knife with them and kills their victim with a single stab, they will receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years; but if the victim is suffocated, strangled, beaten, or stabbed hundreds of times to the point of mutilation with a knife found at the scene, the starting point is 15 years. With the discretion of the judge and the mitigating and aggravating factors, Clare Wade’s research suggested that on average that resulted in a six-and-a-half-year difference between the two sorts of crimes. That cannot be right.

Carole and Julie are not alone in the anguish they feel at the current system. A recent report from the campaign group Killed Women found that 90% of relatives felt that the prison sentences given to the perpetrators that killed their loved ones were too short. The report goes on and on, citing terrible cases. These are crimes that are often committed in front of children, and there is no aggravating factor for that.

This is not only about justice; it is also about risk and safety. What about the risk that perpetrators would pose to society, and particularly to the women in their lives, if let out of prison after 12 years? Some of these dangerous men go on to kill again. I am in contact with one brave family member, Chiv Shannan, whose sister Cherylee was murdered in March 2014. The perpetrator had just been released after serving 15 years for killing another woman. Cherylee would be alive if this discrepancy had not existed and he had still been in prison. He attacked Cherylee with a hammer, as well as two police officers who were there. He chased her out on to the street, where he stabbed her to death.

I could stand for days listing the violent ways women are murdered and all the families who have their last moments playing on their minds forever. I know that the Government introduced several new laws to make “overkill” an aggravating factor, as the Minister described, but the then Justice Secretary, Dominic Raab, said afterwards that that would only really add two years to a sentence. I do not think that two years seems an adequate response from the state to the 300 stab wounds inflicted on Paula Leather, who was killed in 2021. Three hundred.

The Clare Wade review highlights a litany of failures and an array of recommendations. So far, the Government have picked and chosen from them. All the voices in this debate are united in their criticism and their end goal. We all believe that laws that govern our sentencing currently are not working. They result in gross miscarriages of justice that diminish the lives of women killed and put the future lives of other women at risk. They do not reflect or respond to harms done by gendered violence. Frankly, the nation’s women deserve much more.

Follow that!

Clause 24 would insert a new aggravating factor into paragraph 9 of schedule 21 to the sentencing code, to be considered when determining the minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It would apply where the offence was connected with the end of the offender’s intimate personal relationship with the victim; the victim intending to bring about the end of that intimate personal relationship; or a belief by the offender that the intimate personal relationship had ended or that the victim intended to bring about the end of the personal relationship. The new statutory aggravating factor would apply to offences committed on or after the date the relevant provision comes into force.

We do not oppose the clause, but I hope that the Minister will clearly define what is meant by “intimate personal relationship”. We will discuss clause 30 later, but it refers to

“controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.

Does clause 24, then, refer only to that of a partner or ex-partner?

We know the context surrounding this measure. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic—that is, they are committed by the partner, ex-partner or relative of the victim. They represent an average of nearly 160 homicides per year, with almost 90 being committed by a partner or ex-partner, over the last 10 years. I join others in commending the excellent work of Clare Wade KC, who utilised her expertise in this field to conduct the independent domestic homicide sentencing review, published on 17 March 2023.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the review coincided with an ongoing campaign by the families of two women who were murdered by their male partners: Ellie Gould, who was 17 at the time of her murder by Thomas Griffiths, and Poppy Devey Waterhouse, who was 24 when she was murdered by Joe Atkinson. In her report, Clare makes the important argument that not only are women wronged by a breach of trust, which is an integral part of domestic abuse, but the harms to them often extend to further harm to secondary victims in the form of families, many of whom are the children—we have heard that before—and friends of the victim. There is also the harm to society in general, which, to date, may not have been sufficiently considered.

Clare made it clear to Committee members in her oral evidence session that the proposals in the Bill fall well short of what she set out in her report. In her evidence, Clare said, of clause 24:

“I have to say that it looks a little odd in the Bill because it is, as it were, stand-alone. The intent behind the policy is to have a coherent legislative policy that addresses all the harms, and addresses the particular harms in these cases. We now have in the secondary legislation the aggravating factor of coercive control as something that has happened in terms of the history of the relationship by a perpetrator towards a victim, and vice versa—it is a mitigating factor as well.”

Does the Minister understand why the clause looks a little odd? Perhaps she needs to do some work to make it fit for purpose and able to capture more of Clare’s recommendations.

I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has tabled new clauses 27, 28 and 29 in respect of these matters, which we will come on to. I am pleased that the Government are accepting the recommendation to make a murder that takes place at the end of a relationship a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for murder. In 48% of murder cases looked at in the Wade report, the sentencing remarks disclosed that there were reports of either jealousy or resentment on the part of the perpetrator at the breakdown of the relationship. In the majority of cases, that appeared to be the catalyst for the murder.

The perpetrator was male in all but one of those 43 cases. A history of controlling or coercive behaviour was identified within the case sample. Clare also said in her oral evidence that

“these killings nearly always happen within the context or confines of domestic abuse and, in the cases we looked at, we found that there was frequently an escalation in domestic abuse when the victim—in the majority of cases, a woman who is killed by her male partner—wants to leave the relationship. That particular recommendation was made because not only is that a real harm, and that represents the real danger, but the policy underlying the other recommendations is one that places the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour at the forefront of the thinking.

The real harm in terms of coercive control, which the law does not yet recognise, is entrapment. It is not fear, as in being continually afraid, and it is not necessarily physical injury. It is entrapment, which is what prevents people who are being abused from leaving relationships. Putting that into legislation as an aggravating factor that can be taken into account by the courts would make it clear that that is one of the harms, but it would also, I suppose, bring to our consciousness the real harm in domestic abuse.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 114-115, Q64.]

In the Government’s response to the Wade report, they proposed four legislative measures to give domestic homicide specialist consideration in the sentencing framework for murder for the first time. Clause 24 is the final one of these measures, with three already laid before Parliament as draft statutory instruments. I will not rehearse again the issues around grooming, which have been covered previously, but does the Minister recognise that she may have lost an opportunity to bring forward more of the recommendations from Clare’s review?

Although we certainly do not oppose the clause, we must consider the practical implications at this stage. In the Government’s impact assessment, they state that the impacts of the clause

“fall beyond the 10-year period” of measurement. However, in the longer term, the impact assessment states that the measure

“is estimated to require a further 42 additional prison places in steady state, reached around 2065, at a 40-year net present cost” of £19.2 million. To reaffirm what I said in reference to clause 23, without the Government getting on with tackling the crisis in our prisons, any measures that impact on capacity are a cause for a degree of concern.

I turn briefly to the new clauses that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley spoke about so comprehensively. Again, I find it difficult to add value to what she had to say. New clauses 27 and 28 would introduce aggravating factors for honour-based abuse and strangulation respectively. New clause 29 would ensure that sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence for murder. I cannot add much to what my hon. Friend said in her well-illustrated speech, and I take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to her. She has many years of working in this space. From what I have seen, heard and read, I know my hon. Friend has been not just a leading voice fighting for change, but a driving force in supporting both organisations and individuals.

We on the Opposition side recognise the importance of tightening up sentencing in this area. As outlined in my speech on clause 23, that will form a vital part of the wholesale review that Labour has committed to, so we can consider all the measures necessary to ensure that the criminal justice system works for victims. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I align myself with the shadow Minister’s comments about the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I would like to pick up where the shadow Minister left off, in talking about sentencing more broadly. That will bring me on, quite naturally, to the new clause concerning strangulation.

I agree with the reservation about the gendered aspect of strangulation throughout domestic abuse and particularly in domestic homicide. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the problem with the law at the moment, where if someone takes a weapon to the scene of the crime, they get longer than if they use a weapon that, for example, comes out of the kitchen drawer. It is well known that this is the Ben Kinsella amendment, which Jack Straw introduced in 2007 in response to a campaign fought very passionately by Ben’s sister, Brooke, and his family.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) Ben was a young man killed in gang violence, and his sister campaigned very passionately for a 25-year starting point for anybody who takes a weapon to the scene of the crime. Clare Wade dealt with that issue quite extensively in her report. I am not expressing a view of the Government here; I am just reflecting what Clare Wade said. She was critical of the starting point. In fact, she was quite critical of starting points in general.

The Government are conducting a murder sentencing consultation at the moment. It is on the Government website, and it remains open until March this year. It addresses all these points, including where sentences do not look like they are quite right—where some are too low or too high; I am not saying that they are necessarily too high, but it is about whether starting points are right. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will forgive me, I will say no to the new cause about strangulation, but I encourage her—particularly given her background and expertise—and all Members to contribute to that consultation, because we are looking at this blend of issues at the moment.

Another important concern that Clare Wade recognised in her report was about ranking methods of murder. A well-known example is that a 25-year starting point applies to any convicted offender who has taken a weapon to the scene of the crime, but a victim of domestic abuse—what we might in the old language call “the battered wife”—is almost always going to use a weapon. That is the only way a woman is likely to kill a man, and a woman has very often taken one to the scene of the crime. We did not actually intend to capture that category of offender, but the law currently does.

We think it is important that we are not, at this point, setting one category of offence above another, and that we conduct this consultation and consider this area of the law carefully. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley effectively acknowledged, and as I think Clare Wade also did, some issues need to be looked at in the round. I hope the hon. Lady will understand why, on that basis, I will say no to her new clause, with all due deference and respect for how she made the case so powerfully put in Clare Wade’s report. All Governments should consider it carefully. That is my first point.

The second point was about honour-based abuse, which again the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley articulated well. We are clear that we will not allow political or cultural sensitivities to get in the way of tackling it. There is no specific offence for such abuse; the term is used to encompass various offences, including not only the usual range of domestic abuse, but some of the psychological pressure that the hon. Lady described. Forced marriage can fall within that, with elements of family shame. She talked about a case with a large number of participants who were part of the abusive ring.

Honour-based abuse was considered by Clare Wade in her review, in particular in its interface with coercive and controlling behaviour. For now, the Government are taking a view and accepting Clare Wade’s recommendation; she did not make a recommendation on anything to do with honour-based abuse, but she said that we should make coercive and controlling behaviour a statutory aggravating factor. We think that honour-based abuse falls naturally within that anyway, so we are content that that aggravating factor captures what she had in mind.

I also draw the attention of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to the fact that our Government guidance on coercive and controlling behaviour deals with honour-based abuse. I had a look at the section last night and it is quite comprehensive. It absolutely does identify honour-based abuse as a classic example of coercive and controlling behaviour. The CPS also publishes guidance on honour-based abuse and how it falls within coercive and controlling behaviour. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline requires the court to consider the domestic context of offending behaviour, and it makes it clear that more serious and honour-based abuse is explicitly included in the guideline definition of domestic abuse.

We, too, take honour-based abuse seriously. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows about the national honour-based abuse phone helpline, which is run by Karma Nirvana, and the number of people it has helped under the provisions of the Domestic Abuse Act—more than 2,500 people in the past year. The Home Office funds that. We therefore have a commitment to honour-based abuse, but are for now satisfied that it is captured by the coercive and controlling aggravating factor. For that reason, we will not accept her new clause 27.

Finally, on new clause 29, I did some work on this last night, and it is the only one where I disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. In arguing for her new clause, she said that no defence to murder should be based solely on the infidelity of the victim. I did some research on this—let me just dig out the statute. The issue was dealt with by the last Labour Government under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. I checked that with the Mother of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), because I detected her influence on the provisions. She said that she had some involvement.

The 2009 Act repealed the defence of provocation, and replaced it with the partial defence of loss of control. Within that it removed an act of revenge from being any argument that could be advanced. Section 55(6) removed the possibility of advancing infidelity as a defence in a murder case. On that basis, I was satisfied that it was on the statute book. I also checked with officials whether there was any recent example of such a defence ever being advanced or being successful as such, but we could not find one. We are therefore satisfied that the law as it stands provides sufficient protection.

I appreciate being able to make an intervention. During my contribution, I talked about Clare Wade and the clause being a little odd because it is a stand-alone one. I know that the Minister has addressed the new clauses of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, but will she comment on that? Is there an opportunity to adopt more of the recommendations of the Clare Wade report?

I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. We are thinking hard on that point.

I want to check that I have not missed anything from section 55, where anything

“done or said amounted to sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”

That is still good law. I suggest that the issue of some defendants claiming as a defence that they had killed a victim because she had been unfaithful to them has now been resolved and it is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the loss of control defence.

Clare Wade recommended that sexual infidelity should also be prohibited from being considered as a mitigating factor when it came to sentencing. We published our response to her review in July last year, setting out why we will not take that forward. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline already expressly states that provocation is no mitigation to an offence in a domestic context, except in rare circumstances. No evidence was provided in the review that sexual infidelity was ever being taken into account inappropriately as mitigation. I am therefore satisfied—it is the only point on which I really disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that the law already has sufficient protection in place. I urge the hon. Member not to move the new clauses.

I do not actually move them yet, as we do not do that for new clauses until the end. I was saying to myself, “I don’t think I have to do anything.”

I have, of course, already taken part in the consultation alongside the Killed Women network, which I work with incredibly closely. To the Minister’s final point, I started my remarks by saying that I do not agree with myself, having to do a piecemeal job. Schedule 21 needs an overhaul, but we will all start tinkering with it until it ends up in the place it already is, with bolt-ons and batons hanging off it, when something much more fundamental, in a modern world, needs doing.

On the final point about the defences, it may surprise the Minister to hear that that definitely came to me from some pretty eminent lawyers who work in the field—maybe even Clare Wade. I will take that back and speak to them about what exactly was concerning them with regard to that particular issue. I will bring it back to the Committee when we discuss new clauses at the end, of which there will be loads.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

Adjourned till Thursday 18 January at half-past Eleven o’clock.

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CJB39 The Connection at St Martin-in-the-Fields

CJB40 Fr Michael Puljic

CJB41 Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC)

CJB42 Prison Reform Trust

CJB43 National Police Chiefs’ Council (supplementary)