I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 53, page 47, line 12, after “Kingdom” insert

“for a minimum 12 months”.

This amendment would give modern slavery victims in England and Wales with a positive conclusive grounds decision leave to remain for a minimum of 12 months.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 53, page 47, line 14, leave out from “recovery” to the end of line 16 and insert “personal situation,”.

This amendment would define the criteria of providing leave to remain in line with Article 14 of the European Convention Against Human Trafficking 2005.

Amendment 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.

Amendment 6, in clause 53, page 47, line 22, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

This amendment would remove the criteria of not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country.

Amendments 7, 5 and 6 concern the provisions to provide leave to remain for survivors of trafficking. Similar to our amendments to clause 52, amendment 5 seeks to bring the provisions in line with article 14 of ECAT by changing the criterion for providing leave to remain from “recovery” to “personal situation”. The reference to “personal situation” recognises that leave is necessary for a range of reasons. The explanatory report to ECAT states:

“The personal situation requirement takes in a range of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.”

Amendment 6 would remove the criterion for not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country. It is not clear why the Government introduced that criterion, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in his response how he could possibly envisage that working in practice.

Amendment 7 provides a clear minimum timeframe for granting leave to remain, thereby creating more certainty for victims. Under the Home Office’s current guidance on assessing discretionary leave for survivors of modern slavery, leave to remain is granted for a mixture of different time periods—sometimes as little as six months. Those timeframes are short, and the inconsistency can set back recovery.

In 2017, the UK Government issued figures on grants of leave to confirmed modern slavery victims. Some 21% of confirmed victims who were neither UK nor EU nationals were granted asylum in 2015. A group of more than 13 frontline charities that are expert practitioners in providing support to victims of slavery highlighted the problem, stating that:

“The support currently provided to survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery is not meeting recovery needs. Government funded support ends abruptly and too early and there is little information or data as to what happens to survivors in the longer term. The current situation leaves survivors with little realistic opportunity to rebuild their lives, with some ending up destitute, vulnerable to further harm or even being re-exploited.”

The Government may argue that they are already providing support for confirmed victims in England and Wales through the recovery needs assessment. However, under the RNA, victims are not guaranteed long-term support. Victims will receive a minimum of 45 days of move-on support, with the RNA determining how much—if any—extra support is required under the modern slavery victim care contract; that extra support will be for a maximum of six months at time, and may be only a few days or weeks.

Furthermore, Labour believes that victims’ needs are not fully addressed in the RNA. In the 2020 annual report on modern slavery, the support recommended by victim support workers was agreed to in full by the Home Office in only 53% of cases, which raises questions as to whether the process genuinely responds to victims’ needs or is, instead, focused on moving victims out of the service. In summary, amendments 7, 5 and 6 are necessary to address the fundamental challenge facing victims and provide them with far greater certainty.

Amendment 189 is necessary because all child victims must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance. The amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims as per article 14 of ECAT into primary legislation. It will specify that if the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the national referral mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests, giving due consideration to a victim’s need for support and care and a sustainable arrangement.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has echoed concerns on the lack of clarity around what the clause would mean in practice for children, with this having been acknowledged in the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation. Dame Sara Thornton states

“it is disappointing that this detail was not included as part of the Bill”,

and we share that frustration. There is no consistent public data available on the outcomes for potential child victims of trafficking, but evidence shows that our current policies are not being implemented adequately.

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking requested data through the Freedom of Information Act on the immigration outcomes for those exploited as children, the response to which showed alarming results in the data. It found that only about 5% of child-related considerations resulted in a positive decision for discretionary leave. The data indicates that discretionary leave is not being granted to children as victims of trafficking, and that in the small number of cases where it is, the average length of grant is short, suggesting that decisions are not being taken with their best interests as a primary consideration, providing minimal stability.

How many child victims of trafficking were subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain under the policy is unknown but, based on those figures, we can estimate that they are few. That is despite the explicit current policy that states the need to consider the length of leave, including a grant of indefinite leave to remain in line with the child’s best interests. That requirement is set out to fulfil the Secretary of State’s statutory obligation under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the wellbeing of children. All child victims of trafficking must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as only standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance.

I want to say a few words in support of the amendments, which have the SNP’s full support. Currently, while someone might be in limbo for a long time, they are more secure the day after their referral into the NRM than they are the day after they receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, and that is not right. If they have been accepted as a survivor of trafficking, it makes them less secure. We should move towards a period of automatic leave to remain. The provision of leave is often an absolute prerequisite for meaningful recovery. With some security of status, the ability to seek employment or education and participate in the community builds confidence and stability, and the amendments broaden the number who will achieve that stability.

We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.

The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.

Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.

The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.

In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—

The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.

The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.

But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?

As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.

Shall I try it the other way round?

You can try it whichever way you like.

Order. I have been trying not to interrupt the Minister, but “you” is me.

Sorry, Sir Roger.

Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?

As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.

The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.

Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.

I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.

The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.

Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as

“the person’s wishes and feelings”,

which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.

We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.

I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.

I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.

For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.

I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.

With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.

(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—

(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;

(b) the person’s need for support and care; and

(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”

This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.

I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.

I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.

As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,

“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”

Sadly, cases such as these are representative of many of the systemic issues that currently exist that leave victims in limbo and vulnerable to further exploitation. I ask the Minister, have the Government considered a different course of action in light of that ruling, and might clauses 52 and 53 be revised at a later stage?

Another area of concern is subsection (3) of the clause, that states that there is no obligation to provide leave to remain on the grounds of a victim’s need for support in their recovery if the victim could receive support in their own country, or a third country, although there is no requirement for there to be evidence that the victim will receive that support—I very much hope there is good news in the note being passed along the Front Bench to the Minister. Therefore, the clause risks imposing a blanket rule for inadmissibility. I ask the Minister to set out how the UK will know what support can be provided in another country and how the impact on the victim of going to potentially a third country could possibly be assessed.

We have already discussed at length the importance of adopting a trauma-led approach, and the same must be applied here. It must be recognised that victims will very rarely be able to work with law enforcement agencies, even those that will be investigating their cases, if they have the fear of removal hanging over them. The Government acknowledged that in their new plan for immigration, which states that certainty over their immigration status is for many victims a

“crucial enabler to their recovery and assisting the police in prosecuting their exploiters”.

I ask the Minster, where is certainty provided in the clause?

As mentioned in my previous remarks, this is an area where there is considerable cross-party support. I am sure the Minister will be aware of concerns raised by Sir Iain Duncan Smith, who has stated:

“The ability of a victim to remain in the UK is unchanged by the Bill, and one would therefore expect that the proportion of confirmed victims in receipt of leave to remain would remain low…this Bill would perpetuate rather than address the current arrangements in which the vast majority of confirmed victims are denied leave to remain in the UK to help their recovery.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 746.]

I do hope the Minister reflects carefully on these remarks and applies the same enthusiasm that his colleague the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Corby, expressed last week in working with the sector to simply start again in light of the High Court judgment made since the Bill was first published.

Clause 53, as it stands, shows that the Government are only cherry-picking at parts of ECAT to satisfy their agenda, rather than adopting article 14 in its entirety. On that basis we cannot support the clause.

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—

The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?

I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.

I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.

The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?

I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.

There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Opposition have indicated that when we return this afternoon they wish to make brief remarks on clause 54 and 55 taken together and then discuss clause 56 separately. We will then take clause 57 without debate. I hope that is clear.

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No.88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.