It is exactly on that point that I want to talk about special measures. I hope that it is acceptable to the Chair for me to mention some matters on clause 59 as well, because these things will interact. I will not then rise to speak on clause 59. Much of this is to do with the lack of communication between jurisdictions and the experience of victims and survivors as a result. I welcome the opportunity to speak now because, in December 2017, I brought forward a private Member’s Bill on courts and the abuse of process. From the point of view of the victim’s experience, special measures and cross-examination—those two things—are inter-merged.

Back in 2017, my office carried out research into 122 victims of stalking and domestic abuse, which gave us a snapshot of those individuals’ experiences when they went to court. I understand that this was a self-selecting study, but 55% of those people had had court proceedings taken against them by their abusers. It should be noted that all those victims had restraining orders in place. None the less, that was their experience—court proceedings were brought against them. Two thirds of them then had to appear in court, and a third were personally cross-examined by their perpetrator. In only a quarter of those cases did the police view the court proceeding as a breach of the restraining orders on the perpetrators.

At that time, I was trying to limit the capacity of perpetrators, primarily of domestic abuse, stalking and harassment, to use—indeed, to misuse or abuse—the family and civil courts in a deliberate, calculated effort to continue to distress their victims and manipulate their behaviour to exercise deliberate control over their actions.

At the time, what needed to be sought was the means for the court to have the power to dismiss any meritless applications where it was apparent that the purpose of the application by the perpetrator was specifically to distress or harass the victim, in the guise of an appeal to justice in matters relating to civil or family court jurisdiction. Many of us will have come across instances of repeat applications, particularly in the civil court, but also, from the point of view of the perpetrator, to again be able to hold the victim under their control and, within that cross-examination, gain the satisfaction of that aspect of the relationship again.

I will mention what was proposed at the time, because it was felt to be suitable then. The proposal was that the applicant would be obliged to declare any unspent convictions or restrictions in relation to the respondent, or similar convictions against other victims; the respondent would be given the power to inform the court of any relevant convictions or restraining orders in respect of the applicant; and the court then would have a duty to investigate the claims. In such circumstances, if proceedings were permitted to continue, the respondent would be able to request special measures, such as the provision of screens or video links, and of course there would be a possibility of other special measures in relation to cross-examination.

I will just touch on a couple of examples. I do not want to go on forever with case studies, but they do give some colour as to why this point is relevant. One instance that became apparent to us from our research was of a man who had been a victim of stalking for over six years. His stalker had repeatedly brought baseless, vexatious claims against him through the civil court, and he had no option but to represent himself because of lack of funds. Despite the fact that the stalker was subject to a restraining order, he was allowed to continue to cross-examine the victim in the civil court, and neither the police nor the Crown Prosecution Service recognised those vexatious claims to be in breach of the restraining order. It was difficult to come to any conclusion other than that the court procedures themselves were at that time colluding with the applicant and his continued abuse of the respondent.

I will give a second example, just to give a sense of the costs. It involves another respondent to our research. This woman’s ex-partner had also had a restraining order, having been charged also with stalking her. He had taken the woman to court 15 times, in both civil and family courts. That had cost her about £25,000 because, like many people, she was not eligible for legal aid in those circumstances.

I will not rise to speak to clause 59, because I think this discussion does lead us on and there are a few specific points that I would like to make about clause 59, which is where the concerns are.