I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 11, page 10, line 5, after “person” add “or persons”.

This amendment aims to ensure that, where there has been a collective failure to act, a whole trustee board should be held accountable.

We support clause 11 in principle, but we seek to make some amendments to it. At present, the Charity Commission has no general power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee on the basis of unsuitable conduct. It can remove a trustee only if it has instituted a statutory inquiry into the charity, it is satisfied of both misconduct and mismanagement in relation to the charity, and there is a need to protect the charity’s property or secure the proper application of that property. In those circumstances, the trustee who is removed is automatically disqualified. Clause 11 will provide the Charity Commission with a new power to disqualify a person from a charity trusteeship in relation to all charities, specified charities or classes of charity.

Amendment 7 would provide that the Charity Commission could take such action in regard to more than one trustee. If the conditions applied to more than one trustee—they could not be ascribed to one individual but were part of a collective failure—the amendment would allow the Charity Commission to act, particularly under conditions D, E and F. The amendment would enable action to be taken where there had been a collective failure on the part of the board to take any reasonable step to oppose misconduct or mismanagement of which the trustees were collectively aware. In the case of a serious child protection issue, for example, if a board is collectively aware of allegations of misconduct, or of misconduct itself, there is an argument for holding the board collectively responsible rather than singling out individuals. We believe that that could be important in situations where a conspiracy of silence may have led to behaviour being tolerated for fear of challenging it. That is why we have tabled the amendment, which would broaden out the clause so that it applied collectively to trustees rather than to specific individuals.

I hope it will help the Committee if I explain the purpose of clause 11 before I respond to amendment 7. The clause gives the Charity Commission a new power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee or senior manager on a case by case basis. Most unfit individuals will be caught by the existing automatic disqualification criteria, which will be extended by the Bill, but the commission needs a power to act in cases where individuals are not excluded by automatic disqualification. The new power in clause 11 will enable the Charity Commission to disqualify an individual whose conduct clearly makes them unfit to be a charity trustee or senior manager, where, if the commission were not to act, there would be a real risk to charities or to public trust and confidence in charities.

There is no doubt that that is a tough new power for the regulator, but we made several changes to the provision as a result of pre-legislative scrutiny. More detail about the operation of the provision has been included in the Bill, and the commission must now apply a three-limbed test under the proposed power. First, one of conditions A to F must be satisfied. Secondly, the commission must consider that the person’s conduct makes them unfit to be a charity trustee. The commission has published draft guidance alongside the Bill on how it would operate that test, and it will formally consult on its guidance before the relevant provisions are commenced. Thirdly, it must consider that exercising the power is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities.

Although the power may be drawn relatively widely, its use would be targeted, and there are several safeguards. The commission has said that it expects to exercise the power on a relatively small number of occasions each year. In addition to meeting the three-limbed test, the commission will have to give notice of its intention to disqualify and give a period for representations to be made, which it must take into account before any decision is made. If a decision is made to disqualify, disqualification will take effect only after a period of 42 days has elapsed, during which the individual will be able to lodge an appeal with the tribunal. If the decision is appealed to the tribunal, the tribunal will determine the outcome. In making its decision it will consider the case entirely afresh, on the basis of all the evidence before it. It will not simply review the Charity Commission’s original decision. As I will not tire of reminding the Committee, in all its actions in the process the Charity Commission will have to abide by section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which requires it to act proportionately.

A real case provides an example of when the disqualification power might be used. The police investigated concerns that a trustee had falsified charity invoices to claim public funding for their own personal use. The trustee accepted two police cautions for offences involving dishonesty or deception. The criteria for automatic disqualification refer only to convictions for such offences. Cautions are not considered to be convictions, so they do not result in disqualification. In the case in question the person resigned as a trustee but was free to take up trustee roles in other charities, and the commission is currently powerless to stop that. The disqualification power would enable the Charity Commission to consider disqualification of the individual on the ground that their conduct made them unfit to be a trustee.

Another example would be if a person had no relevant unspent conviction but had undergone a serious event such as being disqualified from a professional organisation while they were a trustee of a related charity, or if they had been subject to a judgment in the employment tribunal for repeated bullying of or racism towards staff members. That might mean that the person was unfit to be a trustee. Individuals often use the charity brand to reinforce their public status at the expense of the charity’s interest.

Amendment 7 would empower the Charity Commission to disqualify an entire trustee board if it was guilty of a collective failure. The commission already has the power to act and has done so, in cases of collective failure by trustees and systemic governance issues. The powers in sections 79 and 80 of the Charities Act 2011 to remove trustees do not explicitly or implicitly contain any restriction on removing trustees where that would leave one or none in place, nor does the proposed disqualification power in clause 11. There is therefore no reason why the commission would not take action against all of a charity’s trustees where that would be appropriate and proportionate and in accordance with the principles of best regulatory practice.

In most cases, however—I think the hon. Member for Redcar recognised this in her comments—the commission is likely to focus on the individuals who have been most responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. That is in line with its much mentioned duty to act proportionately, which means that it would need to consider whether it would be fair and proportionate to hold all a charity’s trustees collectively and equally responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. Often, in practice, some trustees are more directly responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement than others who may not have been directly involved, but who may have failed to identify it or act to stop it. Each case needs to be considered on its merits, but in most cases either there would be insufficient evidence or it would not be proportionate for the commission to take action against the entire trustee board on the basis of collective responsibility.

There is a secondary, practical point. Removing all a charity’s trustees would leave it with none, which would effectively create another quite different problem of finding and appointing appropriate new trustees. Often that is no easy task. It can take months or even years to find people who are willing to become trustees of a charity whose name has been tarnished through serious misconduct or mismanagement. We should remember that it is estimated that at any one time half of all charities have at least one trustee vacancy on their board.

Trustees who are directly responsible for misconduct must be held to account, but if there are trustees who were not directly involved in it and who are willing and able to help to get the charity back on track, it would be right for the commission to take that into account. In circumstances where there is an impact on the charity’s beneficiaries, the commission has tended to appoint an interim manager under section 76 of the Charities Act 2011, to ensure that the charity continues to operate and to get it back on track before new trustees can be appointed and take over full time. However, that can be a costly solution for the charity, as the costs of the interim manager are usually paid from the charity’s own funds, so in most cases, where there are trustees who are willing and capable of putting things right and who have not been directly involved in the misconduct or mismanagement, it is right that they be supported in getting the charity back on its feet.

The hon. Lady asked me about what I think she described as a conspiracy of silence among trustees. By definition, a conspiracy of silence is difficult to prove evidentially, so it could be subject to a high risk of legal challenge. In practice, the commission focuses on evidence on a case by case basis in accordance with the regulatory requirement to act proportionately.

Despite the commission’s usual practice of not removing all the trustees, there was a recent case—I will not name the charity concerned—in which the commission removed all 10 trustees on the board for serious collective governance failings. It is possible to remove all trustees for a collective failure under current legislation, and it will also possible to disqualify collectively under clause 11. However, the bar for doing so fairly and proportionately is rightly high, and it is for the commission as regulator to take the proper course of action depending on the circumstances of each case. Removing or disqualifying the entire trustee board is not something that we would expect the commission to do on a regular basis, but it can be done if necessary. I hope that the hon. Lady will accept my explanation and decide not to press the amendment.

I am indeed reassured by the Minister’s comments, and I look forward to working with the Charity Commission to ensure that we clarify some of the issues involved. I take his point about the ability to dismiss entire boards for systemic governance failures. It is an important power for the commission to have, and I want to ensure that it goes far enough. Conditions D, E and F raise issues such as whether people knew about misconduct and whether their conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. Those are important contributing factors, and more than one individual could be capable of them. Whether or not a situation fits the strict criteria for systematic governance issues, we need to resolve it.

I look forward to working with the Charity Commission to clarify things and ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place for difficult and damaging situations in which several members of a board are guilty of misconduct or knew about the misconduct, so that action can be taken against them. I am reassured by the Minister’s example of a board that was dismissed in its entirety; that is helpful to know. I am also reassured to know that the Charity Commission will take each case on its merits.

The Minister made the point that it is difficult to get trustees. I totally accept that, but it is not a reason to dismiss the amendment out of hand. If a whole board were dismissed due to systemic governance issues, a difficult overhaul of the entire board would still need to be undertaken, and there would be all the expenses of having an interim manager. Although those are obviously difficult parts of the process, in the case of some circumstances that we have discussed, particularly those involving child protection, we think the issue remains. We will seek to take it forward with the Charity Commission to ensure that action can be taken against more than one individual where we believe that they knew of the misconduct, or where their conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 11, page 10, line 31, leave out

“(either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order)” and insert,

“, as defined by the Commission in a specific document to be published after consultation and renewed every five years”.

Instead of removing this power altogether, this amendment ensures the Commission publicises its definition of “person unfit to be a charity trustee” following a consultation.

As we have discussed at length since the Committee first sat, the Bill gives a raft of new powers to the Charity Commission, on which we are placing a large burden to exercise good judgment in its decision making. I appreciate that the Minister has re-emphasised the word “proportion”, which we heard a lot during the first sitting, but again, it is a subjective word. If the Charity Commission is to be provided with discretionary powers to disqualify someone who is unsuitable, any test of unfitness should be robustly and clearly defined. Safeguards should be provided to prevent such a test from being used inappropriately.

Included in the clause is condition F, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the ground

“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order.”

That is too broad and subjective. In effect it leaves the determination of who can be a charity trustee to the opinion of the Charity Commission’s board and management, rather than any due process. It opens up the possibility that the power may be used in relation to any past or continuing conduct, whether or not in relation to a charity. It seems unlikely that there is any conduct that would meet the alternative conditions A to E that would not also meet condition F. Many in the charity sector, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, have asked to have condition F removed, because in the light of the other conditions in the Bill, it seems unnecessary and open to subjective interpretation.

The Charity Commission, however, has long argued for this power and welcomes its inclusion in the Bill. It says that the power will enable it to protect charities from being run by individuals who are clearly not fit to do so. We therefore believe that rather than being removed entirely, condition F should be amended so that it is subject to more rigorous definition. The amendment would ensure that the Charity Commission publicised its definition of what constitutes conduct that

“is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.

That could then be subject to consultation with the sector, which could help to define the kinds of scenario that could apply and play a role in exploring the word “proportion” and the decision making that we are asking the Charity Commission to undertake.

The Charity Commission has published a policy paper on how it would use the proposed disqualification power, which is a helpful guide. The commission acknowledges that this is a significant new power, and says that it is important to provide reassurance that it will use it only when there is a clear case for doing so and that it should clearly explain what it will take into account before using the power. The amendment is designed to provide that reassurance. We believe that the policy paper is a helpful draft, but it should be made a formal document, as mentioned in the Bill, published after consultation with the sector and revised every five years. For that reason, we hope the Government will accept the amendment.

I do not propose to repeat what I have said about the new disqualification power in clause 11, but I will focus on the specific details of amendment 5. I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s explanation of the amendment, which would give the Charity Commission the job of publishing at least every five years guidance on how it assesses unfitness. I recognise that this is an attempt to narrow the breadth of the commission’s discretion, as the hon. Lady said, but although I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, I simply do not believe that it is necessary.

The Charity Commission has published details of its initial thoughts on how it would exercise the disqualification power, with positive feedback from charities and Members of the other place. It did so when the Bill was introduced in the other place. In the document, the commission recognises that this is a significant new power, provides reassurance that it will use the power only when there is a clear case for doing so, and says that it should explain clearly what it will take into account before using the power.

In the paper, the Charity Commission explains its initial thinking on how it would apply the first limb of the test—criteria A to F. It goes on to explain its initial thinking on how it would apply the second limb of the test—assessing a person’s unfitness to serve as a charity trustee. The commission’s assessment of unfitness, based on its regulatory experience, is that unfitness is likely to be a result of failure in one or more of the following broad categories: honesty and integrity, competence, and credibility. The commission goes on to set out, under each of those headings, the types of conduct that it would consider and examples of the conduct that in its view would demonstrate unfitness.

Under the heading “honesty and integrity”, the commission would consider evidence of abuse of a position of trust. That could be demonstrated by exploiting a position of trust for personal gain, misleading a public body, or other forms of dishonesty, deception or cheating that could give rise to concerns about the individual’s fitness to serve as a charity trustee. Dishonesty is well understood in charity law, and forms part of the 2011 Act, so this is not an entirely new or unfamiliar concept.

Under the competence heading, the commission would consider evidence that the person is incapable of or unwilling to fulfil the duties and responsibilities of a trustee. That could include, for example, failing to act

“in compliance with the governing document and rules of the charity”,

failing to keep proper accounting records for the charity, or showing

“a wilful disregard for management of conflicts of interests”.

Again, competence is a concept widely used by other regulators, so that is not entirely new either. By way of example, under section 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Conduct Authority may grant an application for someone to become an authorised person only if it is satisfied that the candidate

“is a fit and proper person to perform the function” in question.

The Act does not prescribe matters which must be taken into account by the FCA in making the determination, but details are given in the FCA handbook.

Under the credibility heading, the commission would consider conduct that impacts on the individual’s personal credibility and reputation to such an acute extent

“that it calls into question their fitness to act in the quasi-public role of trustee”.

That could include, for example,

“support for and participation in discredited tax avoidance schemes”,

or

“actions in fundraising that gave them high personal benefits to the detriment of the charity or in which they used high-pressure selling or other discredited methods”.

Reputation is a key part of a charity’s assets under charity law, and a key part of the commission’s work in furtherance of its statutory objective with regards to public trust and confidence. Again, this heading is not an entirely new concept for the commission or the charity sector.

The final limb of the test is that the commission must consider whether exercising the disqualification power is

“in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence” in charities. The commission’s draft paper explains that under this test it would consider whether disqualification

“will protect charities from those who would not carry out the role of trustee with integrity, honesty, capability or credibility in the interests of the charity and its beneficiaries, and ultimately be trusted by the public to do so”.

The commission sets out factors it would consider under this limb of the test, including

“the nature and seriousness of the conduct…the extent of the unfitness and whether it might be temporary or time-specific”.

I hope that hon. Members have had an opportunity to consider the commission’s draft paper, and that they take reassurance from it and from the commission’s commitment to work it up into proper draft guidance, and consult publicly on that guidance before the provision is commenced. Other regulators with similar powers are also given the responsibility, without defining the exact details in statute as this amendment proposes, to work up appropriate, proportionate and detailed guidance with regards to the use of this type of power. In addition, it is important to note that the commission keeps all of its guidance under review to ensure that it remains relevant and up to date.

As I have mentioned in previous sessions, the commission recently consulted on and launched an updated version of “The essential trustee” guidance. It is also consulting on an updated version of fundraising guidance for trustees, and there are other pieces of work under review. The commission can and does ensure that its guidance is relevant and up to date, and it will do so at the appropriate time. The whole Bill will be reviewed after three years, and subsequently every five years. This power will be looked at carefully, and the guidance will no doubt be important in the effective use of the power. On that basis, I do not think that amendment 5 is necessary. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will accept my explanation, and decide not to press her amendment.

rose—

Order. The hon. Member for Cardiff Central has said that she would like to contribute. I would normally call the hon. Lady before the Minister, so I am afraid that we are a bit backward. The Minister may wish to respond, or not, if any questions are asked.

Thank you, Mrs Main. My apologies for not indicating earlier that I wanted to speak. I support the amendment, which stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends. The clause represents a significant new power for the Charity Commission with the discretion to disqualify a person from being a trustee or holding a senior management position provided that the three tests as outlined by the Minister are satisfied. Because the power is discretionary and because it has such significant consequences for the individual concerned, as well as for the charity, those connected to it and those benefiting from its services, it is essential that the tests are clear, unambiguous and properly defined.

Because of the significance of the discretionary power, the charity sector and the public need reassurance from the Government that the commission will use it only when there is a very clear case for doing so. In making that case clear, the definition of “unfit” is essential if we are to have confidence that the commission does not risk finding itself in the situation of misapplying its powers with the consequences that that entails.

Clause 11 is extremely broad. As with any legislation that provides powers that are insufficiently defined, there is a risk of creep to lower the circumstances held to satisfy unfitness and there is an inherent risk of inconsistent or erroneous decision making. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations concluded in its written evidence on 15 December:

“Clause 11 is insufficiently defined and lacks appropriate clarity and safeguards.”

With no definition in the Bill and the commission seeking to define unfitness in the widest possible terms in its policy paper, as we have heard, the test of unfitness lacks any objective criteria by which to measure the reasonableness of the commission’s decision. Our amendment significantly mitigates that risk for the commission and I commend it to the Committee.

I will be brief. I think I failed to answer one of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Redcar which has been raised again by the hon. Member for Cardiff Central. I will try to deal with the two areas.

One concern is that the disqualification power, in particular condition F, is too broad. The hon. Member for Redcar is right to say that it is a significant new power. The intention in clause 11 is not to use those powers frequently, as I said in my opening remarks. However, it is absolutely essential to have the criteria to enable the Charity Commission to address conduct that could seriously damage public trust and confidence in charities but would not be caught by conditions A to F.

The condition therefore needs to be considered in the context of the other criteria for the exercise of the disqualification power, namely the test of fitness and the fact that the disqualification is desirable in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities. It is a tripartite matter: all three things have to be looked at together. The Charity Commission has published draft guidance on how it would exercise the powers. I have been through that in some detail.

On the other issue, I would say that there are excellent safeguards to make sure that the powers are not in misused in any way. There are six points to bear in mind that are all safeguards. First, an individual must meet new, tougher criteria to become a trustee in the first place. They are not automatically disqualified under clause 10 because we have broadened the automatic disqualifications, as we discussed in relation to the previous clause.

Secondly, if the Charity Commission then decides to disqualify the trustee, three new criteria have to be met. As I have said, those are conditions A to F. The individual has to be deemed unfit to be a charity trustee, as defined by Charity Commission guidance. Thirdly, the Charity Commission must be satisfied that disqualifying is in the public interest. Those are quite tough criteria, but then the commission has to give notice of its intention to disqualify and give a period for representations to be made, which it then has to take into account before any decision is made.

If the decision is made to disqualify, disqualification only takes effect after a period of time has elapsed, during which the individual can lodge an appeal to the charity tribunal. Another safeguard has therefore been slotted in. If the decision is appealed to the tribunal, the tribunal will be able to confirm or overturn the disqualification. A really important point is that in making the decision, the tribunal would consider the case afresh. It would not just go over what the Charity Commission looked at. It would look at it as a completely blank sheet of paper. I think those safeguards should reassure the hon. Lady that this is not a power that is going to be misused in any way.

School academies are often registered with the Charity Commission and are registered charitable entities and trusts in their own right, so some school governors of academies are also trustees. Both Ofsted and regional school commissioners can remove governors, so that will have implications for removing trustees. Clearly, different regulatory bodies have an impact on the governance arrangements of charities at the moment. Has the Minister had discussions with the Department for Education to see whether there is a conflict from this new set of regulations with other Government Departments, such as Education?

I have not had any direct conversations with the Department for Education, but my officials are in contact with that Department regularly across a number of these areas. I would be slightly surprised if that had not been discussed at some point, but the commission will be looking at all these things and taking them into account—[Interruption.] Ah, a note has appeared on my desk. Apparently, there is no conflict with other regulators’ powers and practices, so I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman.

I am very reassured by all these safeguards. If we come across cases where it seems that the tribunal is regularly in conflict with the decisions of the Charity Commission, will the Government then look at that to see whether there are problems in the interpretation by the Charity Commission or the tribunal about what constitutes good grounds for disqualification?

That certainly has not happened to date—there has not been a conflict between the decisions of the charity tribunal and the Charity Commission—and I do not expect it to happen, because the Charity Commission works on the basis of the trust placed in it by the charitable sector. If the Charity Commission is regularly getting decisions wrong, that will have an impact on its status within the sector. The Charity Commission does all that it can to avoid a downgrade in its status. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend that the Charity Commission would always act in the sector’s best interests, in terms of proportionality and section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which I have constantly mentioned, and that it would always try to get its decisions right, so that it does not come into regular conflict with the charity tribunal.

I thank the Minister for a thorough and helpful explanation of the steps involved and the safeguards that will be in place. To some extent, it sounded like there would be a triple lock through the commission’s criteria and the notice period for the tribunal, which is reassuring.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff Central for her helpful contribution. She made the really important point that the criteria have to be clear, unambiguous and properly defined. We look forward to continuing to work with the Charity Commission as it develops its explanation further. As I mentioned, we recognise the helpfulness of the policy paper that the Charity Commission published on how it would use the disqualification power. I was pleased to hear from the Minister that there will be further consultation with the sector and that the paper will be refined and published in full before implementation. That is reassuring, and we will continue to contribute to that. We look forward to working with the Charity Commission to ensure that it recognises the importance of the power, and we will work actively with the sector to refine it.

I also welcome the Minister’s reminder that the Bill will be reviewed in three years and in five years. We will seek to ensure that the Charity Commission regularly updates its guidance as well, particularly in the light of its experience in using it over the coming months and years. Given the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 11, page 11, line 33, after “conduct” insert, “both relevant and serious”.

To ensure a more narrow and relevant definition of “conduct”.

This amendment builds on the previous one. Although I am reassured by many of the Minister’s explanations, we want to talk through the matter further and set on record our concern about the breadth of condition F. Amendment 6 would limit the definition within that condition, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the grounds

“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.

The inclusion of the words “both relevant and serious” through this amendment is intended to put the onus on the Charity Commission to prove that it has interpreted that definition with sufficient gravity and sufficient evidence to justify the seriousness of the action, as the Minister sought to reassure me it would. We believe that the current definition is too broad and subjective, and that the amendment would help to narrow the definition and give the charity sector some reassurance.

Once again I find that I have a great deal of sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, but once again I do not think it is necessary, and I believe it could have unintended consequences.

Let me explain first why I do not think the amendment is necessary. I agree that the commission should only consider conduct that is “relevant and serious”; in fact, so does the commission itself. The commission has said that under clause 11, it would provide the individual involved with an explanation identifying the conduct in question and why it thought that conduct met condition F. If the commission took account of conduct that was not relevant to the person’s ability to act as a charity trustee or senior manager, I would expect that any such disqualification order would be thrown out by the charity tribunal on appeal. As I have just discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, the Charity Commission would not want that to happen on a regular basis.

As I have said many times, the commission would need to act in line with the duty set out in section 16(4) of the 2011 Act, under which its regulatory activities

“should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed”.

As a public body, the commission would also have to consider general human rights and equality duties.

The commission’s draft paper on its initial thoughts about how it would exercise its disqualification power provides some useful guidance. The commission recognises that condition F is widely drawn, but it gives examples of the types of conduct that it could take into account. For instance, if the conduct in question was by a trustee of a charity, it could consider whether it was misconduct or mismanagement, and whether it would put the charity’s property or reputation at undue risk. It could also take into account misconduct in another position of trust and responsibility; convictions relevant to the charity’s purposes, for example a conviction for animal cruelty by a trustee of an animal welfare charity; regulatory breaches that have been penalised by another authority, for example legal breaches on tax matters; a finding of misconduct by a professional body or regulator; or an adverse finding by a charity self-regulatory body or umbrella body.

I think the Committee will agree that those examples show the sorts of conduct that the regulator should consider. Whatever the conduct, which must be both relevant and serious, the commission would also have to meet the other two limbs of the test for disqualification: first, that the person is unfit to serve as a charity trustee; and, secondly, that making the disqualification order is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities. Under the disqualification power in clause 11, the commission would already need to consider conduct that was both relevant and serious.

The Minister has already been helpful, but I would just like to get some clarification from him. Would somebody who has not yet served as a trustee of a charity be liable to be placed on the disqualification register, so that they would not be able to serve as a trustee of a charity, or does the register apply only to people who are already trustees or who have served as trustees? In other words, will the clause prevent people from becoming trustees in the future, or will it only apply to people who are either trustees now or who have been trustees in the past?

I think the answer to that question is “possibly”, and I would like to take some advice before I give a fuller answer. Hopefully I can get that advice fairly quickly, while I am going through the second half of my response.

I turn to the potential unintended consequence of including the words “relevant and serious” in condition F in clause 11, namely that it would cast doubt on other commission powers for which those words do not exist. At the moment, the exercise of other powers, such as the power to remove a charity trustee, depends on conduct that is both relevant and serious, even though those words are not included in the criteria for exercising the relevant powers.

I am very sympathetic to the aims of amendment 6, and hopefully, I can manage to answer the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford asked. [Interruption.] Ah, yes. That is good news. The order could apply to people who are not trustees, but it would depend on the individual’s conduct. My original answer was right—“possibly”—but my hon. Friend asked a sensible and important question, and I will write to him in detail about it.

I am most grateful for that. I am concerned that the provision will potentially give the commission an excuse for trawling to discover all sorts of people who commit offences and allow it to say, “Let’s get them disqualified as trustees, even though they have no desire to become a trustee.” That would cause a great deal of unnecessary work.

I see and understand the point that my hon. Friend makes. The best way for me to deal with it, as we have a period of time before Report in which we can consider the matter further, is to write to him in detail. If people were able to conduct trawling, as he calls it, that would be a worrying scenario.

I hope the Committee will understand why I believe the amendment is not necessary and could be counterproductive. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will withdraw it.

I thank the Minister for his response and other members of the Committee for their interesting and thought-provoking questions, which help us and set out the benefit of going through a Bill line by line in Committee. It allows us to set out some of the issues that still need clarification.

In light of the Minister’s answer, and particularly the reassurance that he gave at some length on the steps that the Charity Commission will undertake to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards, we will withdraw the amendment. I am reassured to some extent, but we look forward to working with the commission in the coming months to ensure that the safeguards are sufficiently clear and agreed by the sector prior to implementation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Given that we have had such a wide-ranging debate on the clause, I do not intend to have a stand part debate.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Sarah Newton.)

Adjourned till this day at Seven o’clock.