I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 16, page 12, line 12, after “satisfied”, insert “beyond reasonable doubt”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 77, in clause 20, page 15, line 24, after “satisfied”, insert “beyond reasonable doubt”

Amendment 81, in clause 24, page 18, line 30, after “satisfied”, insert “beyond reasonable doubt”

This a device to tease out from the Minister what the level of proof should be on the prevention orders. The amendments would simply add the words “beyond reasonable doubt” to various parts of the Bill. As the Minister will be aware, the report on the draft Bill looked at the prevention orders and other things that fall into part 2 of the Bill. There was concern about the level of the threshold and how the legal threshold would be determined. Concern was expressed that prevention and risk orders, including interim orders, would cause a range of problems because of the level of evidence required to impose them. I want to give the Minister an opportunity to clarify the matter. In their response to the Joint Committee’s report on the draft Bill, the Government essentially said that they were sticking to their original position on the orders. On page 9 of their response, the Government stated that they had

“reviewed the Committee’s arguments about legal certainty and safeguards with care. The Government will be writing to the Joint Committee on Human Rights to set out in detail why we believe our approach is fully compliant with our human rights obligations. We believe we have set substantial and appropriate safeguards to ensure that the Orders will only be used in appropriate circumstances”.

As we consider the orders in Committee, it is appropriate for the Minister to reflect on those concerns. I have used the words “beyond reasonable doubt” to try to get some indication from her of the evidential threshold that she envisages for application of the orders, given that concern has been expressed by the Magistrates Association and  the Joint Committee that considered the draft Bill. There is still a debate about the matter, on which we have received representations from Liberty and others. I do not want to prolong my contribution; the purpose of the amendments is simply to encourage the Minister to set out what the evidential test will be.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members for tabling the amendments and providing the opportunity to discuss the standard of proof required to impose a slavery and trafficking prevention or risk order, or an interim order. The purpose of those orders is to ensure that law enforcement bodies and the courts have appropriate powers to restrict the behaviour of persons who are likely to commit a slavery and trafficking offence. Although the protection of potential victims is paramount, we are also conscious of the fact that orders must be necessary and proportionate in their interference with a defendant’s personal life. We believe that we have already built in effective safeguards to ensure that the orders will be used only in appropriate circumstances. When a court considers whether to impose an order, it must be satisfied of the necessity of that order.

The amendments suggest that a court should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in criminal courts. Although the orders will be obtained through civil proceedings, the Government accept that that threshold will be akin to the criminal standard in line with relevant case law. We can go through that, if Members of the Committee wish to do so. The amendments are not needed, because the clause already meets the evidential threshold that hon. Members seek to include. Given that assurance, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will withdraw amendment 76.

That satisfies the point that I wanted to put on record. Given that we are talking about a magistrates court test, rather than that of a higher court, the Minister’s comments are important. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 16, page 12, line 26, at end add

“or

(c) who the chief officer believes has been to it previously or had connections with the area.”

Clause 16(4) gives a chief officer the power to make an application for a prevention order in two cases, and states:

“A chief officer of police may make an application under this section only in respect of a person—

(a) who lives in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.”

In amendment 68, I have suggested a third category for the Minister to consider, which is someone

“who the chief officer believes has been to it previously or had connections with the area.”

I hope that the amendment will help to provide additional certainty. I can envisage a chief officer wanting to impose a slavery and trafficking prevention order to reduce the level of people trafficking or slavery in his or her police area. Under the clause, they may do that only  if the person lives in their police area or if they believe that that person is in their area or intending to come to it. However, that does not cover, which I propose in my amendment, those who have been to the area previously or those who have connections to that area.

I will give an example. At present, it is possible for the chief constable of North Wales police to apply for a trafficking prevention order for someone who lives in my area. He could also do that if he thinks that they are in, or will come to, the area. There might be individuals who were previously involved in trafficking in my area who are not currently resident in the area or intending to return there, but they might have connections with it through their family or business or in other ways. I tabled the amendment because subsection (4)(a) and (b) does not cover every base. The amendment—the Minister may want to take it away, reflect on it and come back with words to similar effect—could mean that the police have full powers.

To use my area of north Wales again, it is quite possible that an individual could conduct activity that should be covered under a slavery and trafficking prevention order, but the chief of police would not be able to make an application for an order, because that individual does not live in the area, is not in the area and does not intend to come to the area, but they have been to it previously or have connections to it. I want to test whether the Minister feels that all the bases are covered in applications for orders under the clause.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment and for providing me with the opportunity to explain the rationale behind the provision of powers to chief officers of police to make applications for slavery and trafficking prevention orders. The orders have been designed to manage the risk of harm that would be caused by an individual committing a modern slavery offence. Because the orders relate to risk of future harm, the relevant police areas are those that the individual is believed to be in or intending to come to for the purposes of triggering an application.

As the right hon. Gentleman said, cases in which an individual no longer lives in an area but the chief officer of police has reason to believe they are likely to return there, would be covered by the existing provision. In the few cases in which an individual posing a risk is unlikely to return to an area, it would be appropriate for the police to inform the National Crime Agency or the police force where the individual resides so that it could take steps to manage the risk. I see another role for the anti-slavery commissioner, which we will be debating later, in ensuring that police forces throughout the country talk to each other and to the National Crime Agency to gather all possible intelligence and information.

Given that the force that is best able to manage the risk is the one in which the future harm is likely to take place—the one where the suspected offender is residing or likely to reside—we believe that the chief officer of police for that force is the right person to make the decision about the order. For that reason, the clause as drafted provides appropriate powers for police in relation to slavery and trafficking prevention orders.

Given that that is the Minister’s view, what would happen if, in an appeal under clause 22, I, as the recipient of an order said, “I don’t live in the area  any more, I am not in the area now and I do not intend to come back again”? We would then be reliant on one police force telling others to look at that person and then there are further potential defences. I am trying to box this off: the addition of amendment 68 would not water down subsection (4)(a) and (b), but give further potential, because that chief officer of police would have the most local knowledge.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that comment. The National Crime Agency will have the power to apply for these orders for the whole of the United Kingdom, so it could do that in such cases. However, I will consider the points he has made and confirm that we are happy that there are no gaps. I do not consider that there are, but I do understand the point that he makes. I apologise, as earlier I should have said “England and Wales”, not “UK”. I wish to put on the record the fact that that is what we are talking about. Given that clarification, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

I do not wish to be difficult and press this to a vote. However, I do want a commitment from the Minister that she will take away amendment 68 and look at it. The Minister told the Committee that if a chief officer of police believes the conditions under subsection (4)(a) and (b) have been met, he or she may apply for a slavery and trafficking prevention order. If paragraphs (a) and (b) do not apply, but the officer thinks that the person might be away and working elsewhere, he or she can tell another police force or ask the National Crime Agency to act.

That is how things slip through the net. The National Crime Agency operates on a national basis. Another police force can operate as it so wishes. I genuinely do not see the harm in giving an extra power to the local police officer who has suspicions that are not covered by the provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b). It is for officials to look at whether that is legally the right wording. The principle is that there is still a gap. I would welcome the Minister’s commitment to look at that and write to me as to whether she thinks that is a real gap, rather than my withdrawing the amendment today.

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. I still believe that the right police force to manage the risk in its local area is the local force. I take his points and, as with all discussions in Committee, I will reflect on them and ensure that we test and check that any points of concern raised are clarified and confirmed, and that we are confident that the Bill covers all gaps.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.