That is a weird example. If the hon. Gentleman has the brochure for holidays where the booze is all free, we will distribute it among participants in the Committee. I know what he means: if there is some justifiable reason why the whole costing process, the availability of accommodation or, in some cases, the fact that Saga sometimes has clergy going along, is worked out on the basis of an age group, it might be justified. Rather than picking on examples and defining how I think they will play out, it is better to allow the imminent consultation to deal with that.

None the less, let me clarify as best I can, at the hon. Gentleman’s invitation, the other ways in which it is possible to have single-sex services perfectly legitimately. Privacy and decency, or biological differences, might justify single-sex services or facilities. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 specified services such as refuges for victims of domestic violence: generally, women would want to go to a refuge that was women-only if they were escaping from a violent man; men, because there are male victims of domestic violence, would probably want to go to some special provision. But one can see the point of that.

Another example is referral centres for victims of sexual assault—again, such people tend to want to be in their own gender company. Other such services are: health care treatments that affect one sex, such as treatments for ovarian cancer or prostate cancer; the probation service; women offender reduction plans; and projects that provide support for fathers. Since services funded for parents of both sexes are taken up significantly more by mothers than fathers, specific services for fathers could be provided to meet that need.

The exemptions in part 6 of schedule 3, about separate and single-sex services, set out circumstances in which either separate services for the sexes, or single-sex services, can be lawfully provided. In every case, the limited provision of such a service must be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Therefore, such services should meet a legitimate need, and they could be open to challenge if they do not.

Finally, the restriction could be aimed at enabling those of a particular sex to overcome a particular disadvantage, or to rectify their disproportionately low involvement in a particular activity. We will discuss that  later when we come to part 11 of the Bill, but I refer to the positive action provisions. An adult education class about car maintenance that was limited to women—I do not think up these examples—might be lawful, although I would not go on it. Furthermore—this is the weaker example, I think—it would be entirely lawful under positive action provisions to launch a cookery class limited to men, perhaps because there is a disproportionate presence of women in cookery. I am not sure that that is a good example, but I think the hon. Member for Forest of Dean can see the point. I guess that the car maintenance example is the best.

If participation in an activity is disproportionately low, a provider can target a specific group to raise its participation. We will consider that in more detail under part 11 of the Bill, but it is appropriate to mention now as one of a list of ways in which single-sex and single-strand services can be supplied. One can make similar points about restricting services on the basis of other characteristics. For example, a local sports club that did not have many disabled members might want to have an open day aimed exclusively at disabled people.

The other strands have specific exceptions as well. The consultation about age is important in crystallising as best we can—consensually, we hope, among service providers and age campaigners—all the possible exceptions that are likely to be necessary regarding the prohibition of age discrimination in the provision of goods and services under clause 190.