Let me consider first the age discrimination element in respect of children under amendments 10 and 196. Amendment 10 would extend the ban on age discrimination by those providing services  and public functions to include children under the age of 18. It would, therefore, generally require service providers and those exercising public functions to treat children of different ages in the same way as each other and in the same way as adults. Different treatment could only avoid being unlawful discrimination if it was covered by an exception or if it was objectively justified as a proportionate means of meeting a legitimate aim.

Amendment 196 is more narrow. The scope of the ban would extend to children only in respect of goods and services provided by, and on behalf of, public bodies. Overall, the purpose of the Bill is to provide protection against discrimination and ensure equal opportunities. Children will be protected extensively, and it is important to make it clear that they will be protected against discrimination on the grounds of race, disability, sex, religion or belief, sexual orientation and gender reassignment, and against harassment because of disability, race and sex.

The Government have clearly put a lot of effort into considering whether they should extend age discrimination, particularly in services and public functions, to the under-18s. We concluded that there are better ways in which to tackle problems that children and young people face. Children’s organisations have presented a lot of examples of services in which the needs of particular children or groups of children do not always seem to be recognised or prioritised. For example, they say that young carers might be overlooked, when their needs are being considered, or young people’s access to public space not given enough weight in planning decisions. There are also a lot of anecdotal examples of children not being treated well.

We take such problems very seriously, but we do not consider that age discrimination legislation is the best way to deal with them. Discrimination law is not an appropriate way to resolve priorities of resource allocation or better ways of using the resources in children’s services.

Although no one has asked me to, I should like to take the opportunity to pay particular attention to children who are carers. Clause 26(1)(a)—this seems almost like an exception, but it is how the Bill works and it is a good thing—has the effect that children who are carers will benefit from the association protection by reference to the person for whom they are caring. When an under-18 is caring for a disabled person, he or she will be equally entitled to protection in respect of access to, and supply of, goods, facilities and services on account of association with that disabled person, as any adult carer. A child who is caring for an older person will also be protected from discrimination by association with that older person, despite the child not coming within the age discrimination ban. That is an important point, and will reassure the carer community. Whether or not they had already thought about the problem, I am sure that they would have done so in due course. I hope that that is clear.

Returning to the generality of younger people, we feel that extending age discrimination to children as children could have negative consequences. The analogy made by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean about age discrimination at the top end, makes that point. Broadly speaking, no age discrimination should be allowed at the top end. However, there will be a need for an exception, so that pensioners in Redcar can continue to have cheap fish and chips from private providers, for  example, or so that they can continue to have their equivalent of the freedom pass from public service providers. I am sure that there will be exceptions in due course of the kind that the hon. Gentleman mentioned in relation to insurance. Sometimes, there will be an actuarial justification for an increase in premium or whatever. We will have a body of outlawed discrimination with some exceptions.

With children, it works the other way round. Nobody would see any need to distinguish between the way they treat a 72-year-old and a 77-year-old, but they would want to treat a two-year-old and a seven-year-old quite differently. They would not want to have to objectively justify that treatment on each occasion because it was unlawful age discrimination. Obviously there would be differences. If one was providing play for those two age groups, there would be differences in levels of supervision, kinds of play, educational inputs, health protection and so on.

In a sense, the emphasis goes the other way with young people. There are more exceptions, rather than a core of age discrimination legislation that one is able to point to in order to say that something should be banned. Justifiable different age-based treatment of children is widespread, and is fundamental to the provision of services to meet children’s needs at all ages. It would be fabulously complex to try to provide exceptions in the law to ensure that all that kind of treatment was exempted with clarity, and the provisions of those exceptions would be very important.

One can defend the different treatment of children of different ages on the grounds that it is objectively justified. That is fine, but it is a long process to have to go through, and the fear is that it would be massively complex, with the negative possibilities that I have mentioned. Certainly in the private sector, having to go through that entire process would be likely to have a chilling effect on the provision of services for children.

Such a law could also undermine the equality duty, which we will come to in due course. As everyone knows, public bodies will consider and address the age-specific needs of young people under that duty. A playground for toddlers, an adventure playground for older children or a reserved area for teenagers to congregate in, could all be part of a plan to meet the needs of young people under the equality duty. The concern that such things might have to be justified against a challenge by those who fall above the age limit for the toddler park or below the age limit for the teenage place, might discourage authorities from providing such facilities. We do not want them to be discouraged; we want them to be actively encouraged and that is what the public sector duty is about. If the measure is applied only to public bodies, clearly it would not have the same chilling effect on the private sector. Amendment 196 is narrower, but we still do not think that it would be an effective way to improve children’s lives. We still fear that public provision might be chilled.

We do not believe such a proposal to be the way forward, although we do not slight children or treat them as less valuable than adults. The Bill has an important contribution to make to the quality of children’s lives and it generally protects children from discrimination in the same way as adults. The new equality duty will support a better understanding of the services that are needed by children of all ages. That sets out as best I can why the Government decided against the amendment.

I turn now to amendment 156, which concerns extending protection from discrimination to marriage and civil partnerships with regard to the provision of services and the exercise of public functions. The same argument—that there is no evidence that such protection is needed—applies. I have already said several times that there is not much evidence that any protection is needed on the grounds of marriage or civil partnership. Although there is still some residual discrimination to be challenged in the employment field, we found no evidence of it anywhere else. We shall outlaw only what we need to, and no more.

Amendment 197 is clearly not intended at face value, because it would limit the application of part 3 of the Bill—on services provided by, or on behalf of, public authorities—in so far as it relates to sex. Private sector organisations would therefore be free to discriminate against women, men, or whatever, which has been unlawful since 1975—talk about regression. I know that the amendment has been put forward to test the points that the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare has raised and that it will not be pressed.

Amendment 197 is a probing amendment to draw out debate on how the Bill deals with services that are justifiably delivered on a restricted basis to people who have a particular protected characteristic. The starting point must be that limiting access to particular goods or services on the basis of a protected characteristic—for example, sex—is, as a general rule, unlawful. However, there are situations in which businesses and public sector organisations might legitimately wish to restrict access to a service to people of a particular sex, and the Bill provides for that in a number of ways. First, only women, or only men, might need the service. For instance, it is obviously not discriminatory for the NHS to provide cervical cancer screening to women. That is expressly provided for in paragraph 24 of schedule 3.

It is also acceptable for a service provider to continue to provide a service in such a way that is commonly used only by people with a particular characteristic. That is addressed in paragraph 27 of schedule 3. For example, men usually use barbers, while women usually use hairdressers, although I think that is rather an old-fashioned example. Unisex salons are increasingly common—it says “unisex saloons” on my note, which is an encouraging thought for a drink later on. Barbers are not required to offer female hairdressing services. However, if a woman were to ask for a grade 2 haircut, which I assume is very short, the barber could not refuse to do that for her, unless there was some reason, or it was impractical to do so.

Secondly, a business can apply a restriction which adversely impacts on those of a particular sex and so is potentially indirectly discriminatory, but which can objectively be justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. For instance, if a baby group met only during the daytime, on a weekday, fathers, who have limited paternity leave and who, statistically, are more likely to be working full time, would be likely to find it more difficult to go to that group with their children. That would put them at a disadvantage compared with mothers. However, such a practice could be justified for various reasons, including demand, need, staffing and costs. Accordingly, the limited access for men, so long as it was justified objectively, would not amount to indirect discrimination.