I imagine what the hon. Member for Glasgow, East is looking for is legitimisation or conscientious objection, but the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has put his finger on the point that clause 18 allows justification for something like that in some circumstances.

What the hon. Member for Glasgow, East seeks to say is that a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory if it requires somebody of a religion or belief to act in a way that contravenes the stated doctrinal or ethical teachings of the religion or belief. From the point of view of protecting the religious, we do not think that that is necessary. It would be potentially unlawful under the Bill for a provision, criterion or practice to require an orthodox Jew to work on a Saturday, for example. The question would be whether such a requirement could be justified under clause 18(2)(d) in particular circumstances.

Specifying that one form of behaviour which is clearly covered by the definition is to be regarded as indirectly discriminatory is an odd thing to do, because it is already covered. As we rehearsed on an earlier provision, it may raise questions about others and it might be unclear whether a provision would be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it contravened beliefs which are not doctrinally or ethically linked to a religion, but which are nevertheless commonly held. I think the hon. Gentleman is familiar with that argument. Putting it in a nutshell, this would muddy the waters, and it would not give any enhanced protection to the religious. The best way to deal with it is to put in the unamended definition of indirect discrimination, make it applicable to religion or belief as we do already, and that is that.