Religion or belief

I beg to move amendment 215, in clause 10, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

‘(4) The meaning of religion or belief does not include whether, or the degree to which, a person has one or more of another protected characteristic.’.

This is to make sure that organisations or individuals can not use exemptions based on religion or belief to discriminate on another ground for example against persons whose lifestyle, because they are gay or unmarried, is not consistent with orthodox practice of that religion or belief.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 216, in clause 10, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

‘(4) The meaning of religion or belief does not include the degree of support for matters of public policy or for the policies of a political party.’.

This is to make sure that organisations or individuals which are quasi-political can not benefit from exemptions based on religion or belief.

The amendments cover different issues. They seek to probe the extent to which the Government agree with the case law that has emerged. Amendment 215 would clarify that

“The meaning of religion or belief does not include whether, or the degree to which, a person has one or more of another protected characteristic.”

There are two other amendments on the amendment paper, which were not tabled in time to be selected. They put it in better terms, and are in relation to the protected characteristic of religion or belief, so that a reference to a person’s religion or belief would not include reference to that person’s other protected characteristics.

The point about the amendment is to question whether the Government agree that it is not acceptable for people to seek to use the opportunity, which exists rightly, to discriminate on the grounds of religion in certain matters such as employment where certain conditions are met, on the basis that a criterion is set for religion, which is not met in the definition of religion, because someone is gay, or, less directly—although I think it goes to the heart of what one’s sexual orientation is—because someone is having sexual relations outside marriage. For example, someone may be having sex with someone of the same gender and, by definition, that will always be sex outside marriage.

We have had assertions from people representing religious organisations that they should be entitled to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, although they point out that it is not on the basis of the fact that a person is attracted to someone of the same gender, but on the basis that they act on that attraction and are engaged in otherwise lawful sexual relationships with someone of the same gender.

In case law, we have had a number of judges who were very clear.

I am not trying to pick on the hon. Gentleman, but he said that amendment 215 was not as brilliantly drafted as it might have been. I sat here,  wishing to stop him before he got on to the specifics. Amendment 215 says:

“The meaning of religion or belief does not include whether, or the degree to which, a person has one or more of another protected characteristic.”

It may be that I am particularly dense, but I do not have the faintest idea what it means. Perhaps other members of the Committee do not either. Will the hon. Gentleman explain what he is getting at?

I was going to through the example that I gave. It may be argued by some people that someone cannot be of the religion, criteria having been set on that, if they are gay. That is basically what I am saying. For example, there is a provision in the Bill, which I think we all support, whereby a religious test could be required for some employment. The definition of religion is given in the Bill. Prospective and actual employers might be under the impression that they can say, “This person does not practise the right sort of religion.” I do not want to name any particular religions, because it gets invidious, but I fear that I may have to.

Let us take Catholicism as an example—I do not say that this occurs, but one can see how it might. Such an employer would say that someone has to be a Catholic in order to work for them. That person might indeed be a Catholic but, if they are gay, it could be the view of the employer that they do not fulfil a religious criterion because orthodoxy in that religion—Catholicism might not be a good example—cannot include someone who is gay or, more frequently, expresses a sexual orientation that by definition leads them to be outside the religion. An amendment that we will come to later deals with that. So a potential employer will say, as they have in briefings to this Committee, that they do not seek to discriminate against people who are gay, but that they want to be able to discriminate against people who have gay sex.

John Masonrose—

rose—

I will give way in a moment, if I may, to the hon. Gentleman who asked the original question. I want to ask him whether he understands the point that I am making.

Employers want to be able to discriminate on the basis of religion, not on the basis of sexual orientation, where they have less scope, for reasons that we will come on to discuss. The person may not fulfil the religious criteria that they are laying down, because their lifestyle may be incompatible with religious orthodoxy. May I ask the hon. Gentleman if he understands the point that I am making?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that explanation. I am clear about the point that he made and, now that he has made it more clearly, I can see that I do not agree with it. The example that he chose was a particularly poor one. As a Roman Catholic, I should declare an interest, but I do not think his point was well made. I do not know of any mainstream religion that actually discriminates, or says that someone cannot be a believer in that religion because of one of the protected  characteristics. There is nothing in Catholic teaching that says someone cannot be a Roman Catholic if they are gay.

On the hon. Gentleman’s particular point about employment, which we will come on to later, the teaching does say that if, for example, someone wants to be employed in a particular role within that Church, their behaviour—what they do, not what they are—has to meet certain standards. Those are two very different things. That is why I was having trouble following the meaning of his amendment 215, which talks about someone having protected characteristics and not being able to be part of a religion, rather than carrying out certain behaviours, which do not necessarily follow from that protected characteristic.

First, I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman understands my point. I accept that one can make the differentiation. I just seek to make it clear that a test on conduct has to be argued on that basis and not on the basis of religious criteria. The point I am making is that we will see exceptions, based on sexual orientation or conduct issues, that are entirely separate and, in respect of discrimination allowed in employment by religious organisations on the basis of sexual orientation, far narrower than those allowed on the basis of religion or belief.

I could go into where that is in the schedules but the hon. Gentleman should take it from me that there is more scope—there are fewer qualifying conditions to be met—in order for an employment exemption to be made on the basis of religion than sexual orientation. I think one can understand why, and I am not opposing those per se. It is important that the religious criteria, which can be used in more cases, are not used as a proxy for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, or sexual practice, which is closely linked to sexual orientation.

I rise to follow on from the point made by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon would accept that, for most religions, including Christianity, Islam and Judaism, sexual behaviour is dealt with within the religion. There are certain standards that are expected. The religion also goes into people’s attitudes, but the main point is that sexual behaviour is dealt with and is a concern to the major religions.

Indeed. I do not think that we can change the fact that it is a concern. However, we are talking about the law of the land, and I am clear that what I want to be confirmed is that, if people want to discriminate against others in a post or in a religion, on the grounds of sexual orientation, they need to do so on the basis of the framework set out in the schedules for sexual orientation and not seek to do it on the basis of religion—I will go into why that is in a moment.

The issue that the hon. Gentleman has just raised underlines the point that many religious people hold the view that one cannot, in some orthodoxies, for example, be a Muslim if one is gay or is having gay sex. I am not  seeking to castigate them for doing that—they are entitled to their view—but we have to make sure that people do not suffer in employment and other areas from the pursuance of that view. That should not be provided for.

Can the hon. Gentleman clarify, to me at least, whether he is prepared to consider that sexual behaviour, as opposed to sexual orientation, could, in certain circumstances, be a legitimate interest for religion? If he is saying that the religious hierarchies are unable to make judgments, on the basis of their moral view, about what is, or is not permitted by way of behaviour, as opposed to orientation, we should know that that is his position, which I do not share.

I refer the hon. Gentleman to schedule 9, if I may, because it is important to understand what exemptions exist. I am not arguing against them. I am arguing that the exemptions should be used in the right way, dealing with the right thing. Paragraph 2 of schedule 9, on page 181 of volume II of the Bill, is headed, “Religious requirements relating to sex, marriage etc., sexual orientation.” In sub-paragraphs (1) to (8)— sub-paragraph (8) has been mentioned previously— paragraph 2 sets out the basis upon which sexual orientation can be used as a basis for discriminating in employment and it is a good example. One can see that that is limited—an issue that we dealt with in Committee—by sub-paragraph (8), which states that employment, where allowed,

“is for the purposes of an organised religion only if the employment wholly or mainly involves—

(a) leading or assisting in the observation of liturgical or ritualistic practices of the religion, or

(b) promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion (whether to followers of the religion or to others).”

My view is that the Government are right to put in statute the narrow definition of that exemption that is allowed for in the original directive and stems from the Amicus judgment. The Government won that in a positive way for the people making the claim because the view was that the provision in the original employment discrimination regulations in 2003 had to be interpreted narrowly.

I draw the attention of the hon. Member for Daventry to paragraph 3 over the page, where there is a separate exemption headed, “Other requirements relating to religion or belief.” It is a short paragraph, where there is not that restriction on what can be done. Therefore, an organisation with an ethos can put down “ an occupational requirement” which is

“a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” or similar wording, as that itself is subject to amendment. Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (c) states that

“the person to whom A applies the requirement does not meet it (or A has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets it).”

That is broader. My point is that, if someone wants to discriminate against a person on the grounds of sexual orientation, they need to fit within paragraph 2, rather than paragraph 3.

The reason that I raise that concern is that in evidence to us—both oral and written—the Catholic Bishops Conference states, for example, in written evidence E14 that it wants to be able

“to exclude from a Parish position dealing with young people a candidate who had”— and it goes on to describe something to do with behaviour. A parish position goes wider than someone dealing just with liturgy, as set out in sub-paragraph (8). The Catholic Bishops Conference is saying that it wants more room for manoeuvre. It gave the example of someone

“who had divorced their spouse, civilly re-married and created two broken families within the same Parish community.”

We do not necessarily need to go into that example, although that is a rather subjective way of looking at someone’s circumstances. However, in its oral evidence, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference says that it might wish to exclude from employment someone who is having sex outside marriage. My point is that it should not be able to do that on the grounds of the religious exemption.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it would be strange if, for example, a youth worker for a religious organisation such as a Church were teaching that organisation’s teachings to young people, but living a life that was the opposite of what they were teaching? Surely, the way in which they were teaching would lose credibility.

For obvious reasons, I do not want to go too far into the wording of the schedule, but that is dealt with in sub-paragraph (8), which says that if the employment

“wholly or mainly involves...promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion (whether to followers of the religion or to others” the person is entitled not simply to apply an indirect condition saying, “Don’t have gay sex,” but to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, where it is otherwise justified. Sub-paragraph (8) is what should be relied on. The hon. Gentleman’s example could fit that, and that is what the organisation should use. However, one could not apply that to any youth worker doing anything, because that would not necessarily “wholly or mainly” involve

“promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion”.

Youth workers employed, for example, by the Catholics do a great a job. It will come as no surprise when I say that that is not simply because they promote or explain the doctrine of their religion, but because of the important wider work that they do, which is pastoral and not necessarily religious—indeed, many of their clientele will not be religious at all, but will appreciate their intervention.

I am prepared to concede that there might be cases in which I have some sympathy for what the hon. Gentleman is arguing. Nevertheless, will he at least consider the possibility that if conduct that is scandalous or an affront to the teachings of the religion becomes public knowledge, that is likely to make it difficult for a youth worker or somebody else in a pastoral position to discharge their responsibilities, even if those are not within the rubric of wholly, mainly or primarily

“promoting or explaining the doctrine of the religion”?

Something that is clearly contrary to what is taught is, by itself, offensive and may be subversive of the organisation’s teaching.

The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on the nub of the whole question of sexual orientation discrimination in the Bill as regards religious organisations.

The hon. Gentleman says that this is the nub, but he also used the words “sexual orientation”. Much of the concern of the organised Churches and others relates to sexual practice, rather than orientation. I just wanted correct him.

It is important that I deal briefly with this question now because it comes up in the definition of sexual orientation in another group of amendments, and I do not want to queer the pitch, if hon. Members will excuse the expression.

At paragraph 29 of the Amicus judgment, the judge, the honourable Mr. Justice Richards, said:

“Part of the background to the wording of regulation 7(3),” which was at stake,

“and one of the matters that will need to be considered in examining the challenge to that provision, is a distinction drawn between sexual orientation and sexual behaviour”— he italicised the words “orientation” and “behaviour”. He continues:

“As regards the protection conferred by the Convention, however, I do not consider there to be any material difference between them. Sexual orientation and its manifestation in sexual behaviour are both inextricably connected with a person’s private life and identity.”

That is the subject of a later amendment, but it needs to be understood that I, and more importantly case law, do not recognise that distinction in discrimination law, as opposed to people’s opinions. Whether the Government agree is critical, and we will deal with that when we debate another group of amendments.

The hon. Gentleman is basically saying that sexual orientation and sexual practice are so closely linked that they cannot be separated in reality. Does he also accept that religious belief and religious practice are so closely linked that they too cannot be separated?

It is not what I think, but what judges who have interpreted employment regulations, the EU directive and the human rights convention think. I quoted a judge. Judges have recognised that sexual orientation and its manifestation—not any sexual conduct—are inextricably connected with a person’s private life and identity such that one cannot draw a distinction.

Case law may not show that judges have taken a similar view on religion. We could head down a series of paths had they done so. We will deal with that question separately.

The reason why I have tried to probe the hon. Gentleman on what amendment 215 meant is this: given the nub of his argument about the nature of discrimination and employment and that we are going to spend quite a lot of time talking about schedule 9, would it not be better to deal with the issue there, rather than trying to introduce a sweeping amendment about the definition of religion? I am not aware of any mainstream  individual who is outwith a religion because of one of the protected characteristics, as opposed to their practice and conduct.

First, I concede the point that the amendment may not be the best drafted—I refer the hon. Gentleman to others on the amendment paper that were not selected. The debate may well be better placed or dealt with by a parliamentary agreement on the intention of the measure.

On the second point, I think that the hon. Gentleman has made a concession. He said that some people believe that sexual practice is a fundamental tenet of religion that has to be followed. My point was that convention law, and I believe our discrimination case law, make it clear that the manifestation of sexual orientation, whether heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual, is inextricably connected with sexual orientation. We are saying that in law, religious organisations are not entitled to justify religious discrimination to make a distinction between sexual orientation and sexual practice.

Although I accept that many organised religions do not accept homosexual sexual behaviour as being within their doctrine, it is contested, and many Christians do not agree with that position. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland has recently voted to endorse a Church of Scotland minister who is currently living in a gay relationship and it is looking at the general issue. What would be the implication of a Church of Scotland decision to accept that position generally?

On the narrow issue, I welcome that, but I am saying that what religions should believe is not my business. I am interested in protecting people under discrimination law from the potential impact of such beliefs. I have enough arguments with people of religion to seek new ones. I understand that some people sincerely feel that a person cannot be gay and be a priest.

However, paragraph 2(8) makes it clear that a religion is entitled when it selects priests to apply discrimination based on sexual orientation. I do not have a problem with Churches doing that. Whether or not I support the view of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, it is its business, as it should be. It should use the exception in paragraph 2(8) if it does not wish to take such decisions. The fact that the assembly has decided that it does not need to use paragraph 2(8)(a), even in a proselytising role, is of interest, but it is not my main point. My main point is that religions should not be able to use sexual orientation or its lawful manifestation as a basis for religious discrimination.

I will be brief. First, the hon. Gentleman said that it was not his business to tell religions what to believe, but amendment 215 does exactly that. It says that the meaning of religion or belief has something to do with protected characteristics and what they can or cannot believe. Secondly, given that he has such a problem with schedule 9 and some of its contents, why has he not tabled any amendments to it?

I did not believe that we were dealing with schedule 9 this week. [Interruption.] I think it is useful to have the debate on this clause before deciding how to handle schedule 9. I support it in its current form. It would be bizarre to table amendments to something that I agree with, other than to probe the background. I do not think that saying in discrimination law that religion does not include sexual orientation in its definition is in any way telling religions what to believe. Under article 9.1 of the convention they have an absolute right to believe what they wish, as we all do. What they believe is a matter for them. The state has an interest and Parliament has an interest in protecting people from discrimination.

The hon. Gentleman emphasises the link between sexual orientation and sexual practice. Would he accept that there is a link between religious belief and religious practice and that it could be discrimination against religious belief if we criticise and try to tell religious people not only what they have to believe but what they can put into practice?

We are all free to criticise everything. It would be a huge restraint on freedom of expression if we were not free to criticise anyone’s views, especially if they are contentious. As the hon. Gentleman knows, I fundamentally support the right of religious organisations to contend with each other as much as possible. That is why I have supported free speech initiatives in this House for a long time.

Case law’s view is this:

“Sexual orientation and its manifestation in sexual behaviour are both inextricably connected with a person’s private life and identity” and so cannot be dealt with separately. We will come on to deal with whether a manifestation of religious belief is part of the definition and can be subject to a direct discrimination claim. The ruling in the Ladele case by the Employment Appeal Tribunal was very clear. If a service provider such as a council discriminates against a person who believes it is wrong to provide a service to gay people, it is not direct discrimination to subject them to detriment. It is indirect discrimination, clearly, and in the Ladele case it was found to be objectively justified. We can go into that when we get to that part of the Bill.

I need to deal with the point made by the hon. Member for Daventry. He talked about scandalous behaviour. It will not be sufficient—that is the whole point about anti-discrimination law—for gay people to be sacked on the basis that their lawful behaviour is deemed by their employer to be scandalous, whether that is a religious employer or someone else, unless the religious employer can cite the exemption given in paragraph 2 to schedule 9. The requirements need to be met. If it is a priest, it is not material whether they think it is just because the Bible says it is wrong, they think it is scandalous, or there is some other reason. The justification is not required as long as those conditions are met, but if it is clearly random it will make it more difficult to fulfil some of the conditions.

Simply saying that something is scandalous tends to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. That could enable someone to set a criterion in employment that someone who is gay cannot—or would not—meet  if they act out their sexual orientation in their private life in a normal manifestation, which is their absolute right. It means that there will be no protection in employment law from discrimination based on sexual orientation. That is why the amendment, or a version of it, is needed somewhere, preferably in statute. I believe that it exists in case law to protect individuals from such discrimination, but I would be interested in the Minister’s view as to whether that is the case.

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s elucidation of my point. He says that it is necessary to produce a justification under paragraph 2 of schedule 9. As currently drafted, paragraph 3, which deals with “Other requirements relating to religion or belief” refers to

“a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.

Is he saying that that is not, or could not, be relevant in this context of behaviour? For this purpose, I draw a distinction between orientation and behaviour.

In my view, the distinction that the hon. Gentleman makes between a lawful manifestation of sexual orientation and sexual orientation is not valid, and I am backed up in that by the judgment that I read out. That issue will be dealt with later. I accept that we will have a shorter debate on the subject, Mr. Benton, as we have covered much of the issue now. However, I do not accept part of that premise.

Paragraph 3 of schedule 9 cites

“a requirement to be of a particular religion or belief”.

That requirement cannot refer to sexual orientation, or its manifestation in the terms that I have described—its own manifestation, not any manifestation or an unlawful one. That is what the probing amendment seeks to clarify. I think that I have got that point across.

A person can, however, seek to make that distinction in paragraph 2. In sub-paragraph (5), the application of a requirement on sexual orientation—which covers orientation or behaviour—engages the compliance principle, or the non-conflict principle in sub-paragraph (6), which is to comply with doctrine. That means that for proselytising or representative roles as set out in sub-paragraph (8), the distinction can be made.

I am trying to ensure that people are clear that they cannot make that distinction under the lower threshold in paragraph 3. The hon. Member for Daventry nods, and I think that he understands the distinction that I make, even if he does not necessarily agree with it. I hope that he will agree with it, as there is clearly an option that allows religions to do what he would wish them to do, if it can be justified under sub-paragraph (2), regardless of whether something is considered scandalous or simply non-doctrinal.

For the avoidance of doubt, and so as not to weary the Committee with a long speech, I agree with the hon. Gentleman regarding the prevention of employment to somebody on the grounds of a characteristic that one does not like, which may not be under the person’s control. However, notwithstanding the strictures that he has brought about, I feel that we must have regard to a situation where the conduct of the person in practice, or their commitment to refrain from that conduct, is not sufficient to satisfy the authorities that it  will not give rise to a scandalous situation. I do not think that it is sufficient to put that in terms of the representative activities that are adumbrated in paragraph 2 of schedule 9. However, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that that is the area in which we need to look for relief.

I regret that the hon. Gentleman has put it in that way and I hope that we can discuss what he is saying outside the Committee. We are going back to the ’50s. If being gay is scandalous— [Interruption.] I am not saying that the hon. Gentleman thinks that, but there are some religions that think it is scandalous. Those religions should not be able to use that as a basis for dismissing someone, or not employing them, unless they comply with the role set out in paragraph 2(8), which regards priesthood, or activities that are wholly or mainly involved in representative or religious promotion or work. I defend the right to make that distinction, but when it comes to a caretaker or a teacher in a faith school, lawful private behaviour associated with a person’s sexual orientation cannot be used as a basis—in my view, under the schedule—for their dismissal and the wrecking of their life and career. That is why we have modern anti-discrimination legislation. I do not seek to persuade religious people that it is not scandalous; I only seek to ensure that the law protects people from employers who hold that view about them either on the basis of their sexual orientation or because they are divorced.

My last point is that the example used by the Church in its written evidence—it did use the gay example in its oral evidence, which was appropriately honest—would also be unfair. If someone has a role not otherwise covered by paragraph (2)(8) of schedule 9, the fact that they get divorced—which might happen for all sorts of reasons, including domestic abuse—should not be a basis for losing their job unless they do a job where that is incompatible under paragraph (2)(8), which is itself an expression of the European directive to which we have signed up and essentially a treaty obligation to which we are committed, as well as being compliant with the European convention on human rights. It is only right that at some point we should meet the lobbying of Church and other religious organisations four-square, as I have sought to do. Not to do so would mean that they were wasting their time in urging us to address such points.

The hon. Gentleman is beginning to draw out a sensitive argument. Does he not agree that in cases where the Church authorities have legitimate concerns, as opposed to cases involving a blatant attempt simply to pay somebody off because of their orientation, given that there is an interaction between religion and belief and other rights, it would be much more appropriate to seek some kind of mediation or resolution of any dispute rather than simply reaching for the litigation revolver and pursuing the matter through the court? It is a prudential issue. It would be possible for the Church authorities, for example, to explain the nature of their concern and the likely pastoral impact of the situation that might arise: in other words, an implied justification under paragraph (2) of the schedule.

We are all in favour of mediation, but in the end, minorities who are discriminated against—there is no doubt that they are, and I know the hon. Gentleman’s  personal commitment to ensuring that we eliminate such discrimination—must have recourse to the law, and the law should be clear. If it says clearly that paragraph (3) of schedule 9 cannot be used to say to someone who is gay or having gay sex, “You are not an orthodox member of X religion if you are sexually active according to your sexual orientation,” it would be helpful. Then the organisations will know that they must be able to defend their actions under some other provision.

I have been biting my tongue for some time now. Can the hon. Gentleman understand the problem that some of us will have with it? If someone is dismissed, for whatever reason, they might immediately come back to the organisation that employed them and allege religious discrimination. Is that not a real and ongoing problem? We need to be assured that that is not what lies behind his amendment. We might wish to have this debate later in consideration of the Bill, when it might be more appropriate. That is what is at the root of the problem: religious discrimination could be alleged, regardless of the original reason for the dismissal.

I think that the hon. Gentleman means that one could allege sexual orientation discrimination regardless of the trigger for the dismissal. There is not a huge number of such cases, thank goodness. The Reaney case in the diocese of Chester went to an employment tribunal, which at first gave a ruling that did not satisfy either side as to the scope of the conditions in which sexual orientation can be used as a criteria. That is why, when we come to it, paragraph (2)(8) of schedule 9 is very useful, because it puts things clearly in a way that does not exist at the moment.

However, there are not that many cases. We want there not to be that many cases. It would be helpful if the law were clear that if someone has gay sex, it is a sexual orientation matter, not a religious matter. Regardless of what our views are, I hope that that need not divide the Committee on the grounds of individual religious belief. I shall deal with the second amendment in the group more briefly, but I hope that hon. Members will recognise that my contribution has been so long mainly because I have taken interventions.

Amendment 216 would, again, clarify the fact that the definition of religion or belief for the purposes of the Bill should not include support for matters of public policy or the policies of a political party. That is also restated in amendment 236, which was not selected because it was tabled after the deadline for selection. Amendment 216 makes the point that it is important that, for example, religious employers—although it extends beyond employment—cannot say that someone will not fulfil a religious criterion if they are, for example, pro-choice. It is certainly the case that orthodox Catholic doctrine is not pro-choice; it is anti-abortion. However, that issue should not be the basis on which a religious criterion should be judged to be met, because it goes too far away from doctrine and theology towards matters of public policy. In a sense, we would be allowing a political  test—not necessarily a party political test—that should not otherwise exist, to benefit from the wider exemption that exists for religion or belief. It may well be the case that employers require—as we do in Parliament—a political test, and that is lawful. However, that should not be dressed up as part of the definition of religion or belief.

This is the second amendment in this group in relation to which the hon. Gentleman is attempting to define what is or is not a religious belief. The point that he just made goes to the heart of the issue. For religions that take a pro-life position and have a particular view of when life starts, such opinions are a fundamental part of their belief. Indeed, that is recognised as such in our present law—I think that he acknowledged this during the evidence sessions—given that we allow professionals involved in medical services not to be involved in delivering and procuring abortions if that is something that offends against their conscience. I think that he did not disagree with that, because he recognised it was the law. In relation to this part of the Bill, why is he again trying to define what religions are or are not allowed to believe?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his useful intervention. One of the reasons why I am seeking to clarify the matter is that I believe that exemptions such as those that exist in the Abortion Act 1967 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 should be statutory. They should be set out in statute—as, indeed, they are—and in so far as that legislation goes, I support such measures. However, I am seeking to clarify the fact that I do not believe that such provisions should be applied generally. In other words, people should not be able to look to non-discrimination on the basis of religion and belief and seek protection from discrimination when they are, for example, a doctor who says that it is their religion or belief that unmarried women should not be prescribed the contraceptive pill. If their medical employer or the General Medical Council seeks to insist that they do what I would consider to be their job as a doctor and says that they should provide the appropriate clinical care—including providing a prescription or a supply of contraception to women who are entitled to have it whether they are unmarried or not—they cannot rely on a claim of direct discrimination. It would be helpful to make that clear, which is why the hon. Gentleman has done us a service by making that point.

I am not saying that there should be no statutory exemptions on the grounds of strongly held religious belief—for example, in relation to doctors who do not want to play a part in providing abortion services. I am on the record as supporting the compromise that was fashioned in a room in the basement in 1967 by Lord Steel and others, and I do not seek to remove it. It is a separate statutory exemption, and I believe that it needs to be; we should not allow any creep of protection from religious discrimination to cover it.

The other area that I am concerned about is the increasing politicisation of religion in the form of religious parties, such as the Islamic party of Britain and the Christian Peoples Alliance. I strongly support their right to exist and to run as political parties. I am in favour of free expression and of religious organisations coming directly to the political table, as well as indirectly  through the impressive lobbying work that they do as lobbying organisations. However, when bodies such as the Christian Peoples Alliance are seen as political parties, it is important that they do not think that they uniquely, as a political party, could cite protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief to give them special privileges, in a way that the Conservative party, the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats or the Scottish nationalists could not. For example, if the Christian Peoples Alliance and other smaller parties were not invited to a hustings—although I believe that everyone is entitled to be invited, including the British National party if it has paid its deposit and is standing—such a party could not claim religious discrimination on the basis of who the people signed up to it are.

My final point on this matter is intended to make it clear that the theological basis for believing that life begins at conception is okay. There is nothing wrong with that, or with the political expression of that in public policy. All the amendment says is that one cannot rely only, or at all, on the degree of support for matters of public policy or for the policies of a political party. Therefore, it is fine if someone happens to support the ProLife Alliance and also happens to demonstrate that they are of that religion, but it is the latter limb and not the former that is the important provision. Otherwise, one could have people who are not theologically of that religion but who subscribe to that policy platform to seek the protection of the anti-discrimination legislation that exists for matters of religion or belief but not for maters of political belief. It is therefore important that we recognise that the religion or belief that we are seeking to protect is a theological one and not a matter of public policy. On the basis of probing those two important areas, I commend the amendments to the Committee.

As this is the first time that I have spoken on a matter of religion in this Committee and as I suspect that we will have a lot of discussion on religion in the sittings ahead of us, I want to make it clear that I speak personally and not as a spokesperson for my party.

Among the wider public there is a lot of concern about some of these issues, but I accept that those of us who are seriously involved in religion are probably a minority in society. I guess that the committed Christian population is around 5 per cent. I know that there are people in my party and I guess in other parties here who would question whether we should even be discussing some of these issues, as we try to tie together sexual orientation, sexual behaviour, religious belief and religious behaviour and practice. This can be a difficult area, but the Committee should have the opportunity to discuss the place of religion in our society.

Some people feel that religion is the poor relation of the protected characteristics, and there is some evidence that employers and others will tend to decide against religion if there is a clash of rights. If it is the considered opinion of the Committee and of Parliament as a whole that religion should come last, let us make that clear and accept it. However, the matter should be discussed. I accept that the wider Church has been very intolerant of minorities in the past, and perhaps the rest of society now feels that it is time for the Church to take a bit of a kicking for the next few years. If that is what society feels, it has some right to do it.

I might disagree with the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon on a few things, but I respect his consistency and the fact that we know where he is coming from. I hope that the Committee will not accept the two amendments, which are not necessary and would damage religious freedom. One purpose of the Bill is meant to be protection against anti-religious discrimination, not enshrining it. The explanatory statement accompanying amendment 215 says:

“This is to make sure that organisations or individuals cannot use exemptions based on religion or belief to discriminate on another ground for example against persons whose lifestyle, because they are gay or unmarried, is not consistent with orthodox practice of that religion or belief.”

That recognises that the orthodox teaching of most of the main world religions—Christianity, Islam and Judaism, although there are others—is that sexual activity outside marriage is morally wrong, yet the amendment seeks to dictate to adherents of those religions that they could not apply such teachings in their own affairs. It would tell them that they could not live those teachings out and ensure that certain manifestations of orthodox religious faith were illegal.

I used the words “seeks to” because, as we heard last week in the evidence session relating to schedule 9, there are large question marks over whether the Bill narrows the already fairly limited protections for employment in Churches. All such religious organisations want is to be able to insist on staff whose lifestyle does not contradict the teaching of their religion. It might be that the effect desired under amendment 215 is already achieved under the Bill, but we shall return to that another day.

The views on sexual ethics that amendment 215 targets are mainstream views that religious groups generally hold and have held. Along with views on many other ethical issues untouched by the Bill, those views are very dear to them. They have upheld such beliefs in their churches and places of worship, in their own internal affairs, with little complaint, and it is what they teach from the pulpits and what they try to practise in their own lives.

Whether we agree with those religious groups is not the real issue, and as parliamentarians surely we do not exist to legislate on the beliefs of adherents to any religion. It is hard to see why there should be opposition to the idea that religious groups should regard living in accordance with their teachings on sexual ethics as a necessary part of observance of their faith. There are two sets of employment protections for religious groups—that has already been referred to. One set allows for discrimination based on religion or belief, while another allows discrimination on other grounds, such as sexual orientation. They are referred to under paragraphs 3 and 2 respectively of schedule 9.

Amendment 215 would impose further limits and protections, which already require religious groups to jump through hoops just to maintain their basic freedom of association. It would provide more opportunity for people hostile to the views of religious organisations to try to haul them before employment tribunals in an effort to make them change their beliefs. We have already seen that in cases brought against Christian organisations by the British Humanist Association and by Stonewall.

Churches and other religious organisations—and, I would suggest, non-religious organisations—should have the right not to employ someone with views seriously at  variance with their basic teaching. Surely we should leave such cases well alone and promote diversity and understanding, rather than a uniform greyness in our society.

It is my desire not that the Churches impose their will on everyone else, but that we, as minority groups, should be able to live with each other in society. Do we really want to make it easier for people to sue Churches?

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that it would be illegal, and rightly so, for a gay organisation or a gay bar to sack someone on the basis of their religious belief? Are not the amendment and the Bill, with which he disagrees, just asking for reciprocity and recognising that there are narrow exemptions that get religious organisations and employers out of that duty of reciprocity? Does he accept that religious people benefit from anti-discrimination legislation because they are protected from being dismissed on account of their religious views?

I am totally committed to reciprocity, if that means that we treat each other equally and respect each other’s differences even when we disagree. I am not looking for special protection for religious groups. However, I suggest that a gay organisation should expect, when recruiting, that someone working for it should be committed to its ethos, as I would expect in the Churches. If someone is working for a gay organisation and changes their views to the extent of being opposed to that organisation, the long-term employment relationship would be extremely difficult.

Further to the intervention that the hon. Gentleman is dealing with, before the memory of it fades, would he not agree that one of the concerns for people with religious faith is that some of the protections already in place may not be as strong as previously thought, or may be faltering? I am thinking, for example, of persons of faith and their attitude to Sunday employment.

A number of religious groups—I am not saying that it is all of them—would perceive that there is a move in society broadly against religion. Things that were assumed in the past, such as no ferries in the Western Isles on Sundays and such like, are being challenged or questioned, whereas in the past people accepted them without really thinking about the matter.

I want to bring the hon. Gentleman back to his remarks on ethos—I know he has his notes to hand. Is he saying that one can be correctly perceived as opposing the ethos of an organisation merely on the basis of one’s sexual orientation?

Earlier, the hon. Gentleman was saying that we cannot distinguish between sexual orientation and sexual practice. I am now wondering whether he is suggesting that we are separating the two. I must admit that I am somewhat confused by his position.

I shall ask the question in two parts. Regardless of whether the hon. Gentleman believes that sexual orientation and the manifestation of that sexual orientation in a lawful way are one and the same, does he believe that simply by being of a certain sexual orientation one can be against an ethos of an organisation? Or does he believe that, by practising the manifestation of that sexual orientation within the law, one can be against the ethos of that organisation? Is that his contention?

What I am trying to say is that a religious organisation might perceive its ethos and standards as tighter than, and being of a different level from, what is allowed in society generally. Going back to the example of a youth worker, which is specifically mentioned as an example on page 181 of the explanatory notes, someone who is working for a Church as a youth worker, effectively in a pastoral role with young people and teaching them that the only place that they should have sex is within a committed marriage, it is difficult to consider how that person could themselves believe the exact opposite, whether it be sex outside marriage with the opposite gender or with the same gender. I find it hard in that situation to split between sexual orientation and sexual practice.

Going back to my speech, these are religious matters that are internal to religious organisations. We should tread carefully before legislating on such sensitive issues. People who disagree with the beliefs of religious organisations have the freedom to seek employment elsewhere, but religious organisations have nowhere else to go to exercise their freedom of association if the law forces them to employ people who reject the tenets of their faith. I am happy to accept that it is more difficult once someone is in employment and changes their position. However, the large majority of cases that we are thinking about arise when recruiting staff. Strangely enough, although the explanatory statement mentions the unmarried, it is perfectly legal to dismiss a church youth worker who moves in with a partner of the opposite sex. Nothing in the Bill would change that—it would still be lawful. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon explained a little more about what he meant by amendment 216. I have been left guessing as to what kind of organisation he was referring to.

I am not sure that that is right. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified the situation in her remarks. I am not sure that a heterosexual, having lawful heterosexual sex, is not a manifestation of their sexual orientation. I agree that the issue is trickier, because they are not usually a discriminated-against group. I caution the hon. Gentleman against asserting so solidly that someone can be dismissed on the basis of a lawful relationship in their private life unless they are covered by the narrow provision that deals with those in a proselytising role—if I may describe paragraph 2(8) of schedule 9 in that way—especially under the European convention on human rights.

I stand to be corrected by those with greater legal knowledge, but as a general principle, many associations that have nothing to do with religion have sets of rules that it is possible to break while remaining within the law. An example is having to wear a tie in Committee. There is therefore a distinction.

We received clarification earlier on the kind of organisations at which amendment 216. For example, political parties with a religious bent should not receive special treatment. I am happy to agree with the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon on that point. I am probably less sympathetic to religious parties than him because I would rather see people of religion in all parties. However, the proposal could damage religious organisations whose beliefs overlap incidentally with certain public policy positions. For example, a requirement that an employee believes in good stewardship of the environment would be a natural outworking of the faith of many religious bodies. However, it appears that amendment 216 would allow somebody who rejects that belief to claim that they are being unlawfully discriminated against if they are turned down for a job. Similarly, religious groups that believe that marriage should be promoted in public policy could be sued, even though a belief in that view is an obvious requirement for them to make of a new employee.

Many religious bodies are also registered charities. They cannot advocate support for political parties, but the Charity Commission recognises their freedom to advocate positions that overlap with those of political parties. The commission’s guidance document, CC9, “Speaking out: Guidance on Campaigning and Political Activity by Charities”, states under the heading, “Support for policies”:

“It is acceptable for a charity to advocate support for a particular policy advocated by a political party or candidate, provided that the policy supports the charity’s purposes. However a charity must not support a political party or candidate.”

Clearly, if a charity advocates a policy and is recruiting a worker to promote it, the charity must be able to insist that he or she supports that policy. The fact that the charity is religious should not deprive it of that freedom.

If amendment 216 achieved its goal, it would create an obvious injustice, because we as political parties can impose requirements about supporting policy positions on our staff, yet religious groups would be deprived of that freedom. As it happens, some politics is not protected ground. Any employer, religious or not, could require support for a political party as a pre-condition of employment and nobody could sue them. I do not advocate that, but I simply point out that one cannot sue for political discrimination—and rightly so, because that would create a minefield.

Finally, it is ironic that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon tabled amendments 215 and 216, as well as amendment 217 in the next group. I do not intend to speak to it, but it is worth pointing out that although amendments 215 and 216 would impose new limits on the manifestation of religion, amendment 217 would widen the legal right to manifest sexual orientation. That would mean religion being further relegated within equality law and more narrowly defined than other strands. I hope that the Minister and the Committee will not give religious bodies further cause for concern about the impact of the new legislation and will oppose the two amendments.

The intention behind amendment 215 is to ensure that organisations or individuals do not misuse the various exceptions available to religious organisations to discriminate against people unlawfully because aspects of their lifestyle, such as sexual orientation,  are not in keeping with the tenets of the religion or belief in question. My note says that that fails entirely to understand the construction of the Bill, but I will not read it out.

The Bill identifies each of the nine characteristics that we are seeking to protect and gives precise definitions of what constitutes each of them. As such, it is clear what each characteristic is and what level of protection is afforded to it. Although I appreciate that a person’s religious belief should not be used to justify unlawful discrimination, I consider that the Bill makes it entirely clear that that is not permitted.

Where discrimination takes place, the protected characteristic is the ground on which the discrimination takes place. Any protected characteristic that the perpetrator of the discrimination may possess is not relevant. For instance, the exception available to religious organisations in schedule 23 sets out exactly what such organisations can and cannot do in relation to other protected characteristics.

Where a person is discriminated against because of his or her sexual orientation, the reason for that discrimination is because of their sexual orientation, irrespective of the motive of the person actually causing the discrimination. It would not matter that a person claimed that they were acting in a particular way because of their religions beliefs. The discrimination would still be because of the characteristic of sexual orientation, so any exception that could be considered applicable because of religion or belief would not come into play.

I pause just to appreciate and acknowledge the concerns of the hon. Member for Glasgow, East, were the Government to accept the amendments—which they will not do. He knows that there are some religious exceptions. Indeed, Committee members have debated those a little bit this afternoon, even though we have yet to reach them because they are in schedule 9. However, we do not think that those exceptions have narrowed. We have no intentions of facilitating a kicking for religion in any way at all. The religious exceptions have been carried forward in the way that they were before. The hon. Gentleman made a number of significant points, but, with respect to him, I will not rehearse them in detail, because we will not accept the amendments. Therefore his worries can, I hope, be set aside.

On amendment 216, the same answer that I have given on the question of sexual orientation applies to public policy. Adhering to a particular aspect of public policy is not a protected strand, but if there were some way in which it was discriminatory to deal with somebody for holding a particular belief, somehow, within one of the protected characteristics, then the reasoning why it was done and the religious position that gave rise to that discrimination would not facilitate the actions of the person who, none the less, discriminated, because, as I have already said, the discrimination would be because of the characteristic protected. Despite there being a religious motivation, that does not save anyone from being guilty of discrimination.

The Bill makes it clear—I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon thought it did not—that a person’s political beliefs are not captured by any of the provisions that apply to religion or belief. There is abundant case law showing that political beliefs are not covered by the current legislation, which the Bill mirrors, pretty well precisely, and that  case law will still apply. The explanatory notes reiterate that point. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has read those notes and seen that that is so.

It is pretty clear already that a person’s political beliefs would not be captured in the way that amendment 216 seeks to prevent. I hope that I have dealt with the point regarding public policy and I have said all that the Government wish to say about amendment 215. I respectfully urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendment 215. It has been a most interesting debate.

I will withdraw the amendment. I am grateful that the Minister asked me respectfully and I am glad that we are back to civil exchanges. She made some valuable points about the motivation not being a factor. I will reflect on that. I think that we will be able to have shorter debates on other parts of the Bill, because we have rehearsed some of the arguments. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.