Clause 7 - Risk assessments

Children and Adoption Bill [Lords] – in a Public Bill Committee am 10:30 am ar 21 Mawrth 2006.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education) 10:30, 21 Mawrth 2006

I beg to move amendment No. 45, in clause 7, page 12, line 14, leave out ‘cause’ and insert ‘reasonable grounds’.

Photo of Jimmy Hood Jimmy Hood Chair, European Scrutiny Committee, Chair, European Scrutiny Committee

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 36, in clause 7, page 12, line 15, after ‘harm’, insert

‘at any time during proceedings,’.

No. 53, in clause 7, page 12, line 20, at end add—

‘(4)All risk assessments undertaken pursuant to subsection (2) shall proceed on the presumption that the child’s interests are best served through reasonable contact with both his parents unless a good reason to the contrary is shown.

(5)When deciding whether there is reason to suspect that a child is at risk of harm, an Officer of the Service or a Welsh proceedings officer may only make a risk assessment where he has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a significant risk of significant harm.

(6)An officer of the service or a Welsh proceedings office may only make a risk assessment where he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the significant risk involves a risk—

(a)to the child’s physical safety, or

(b)of sexual abuse.

(7)In all other circumstances than those outlined in subsections (5) and (6), the Officer of the Service or a Welsh proceedings officer shall not undertake a risk assessment except where directed to do so by a court.

(8)In any risk assessment based upon the likelihood of recurrence of previous events or previous risks it shall be a requirement that no reliance is placed upon previous events or previous risks in the absence of a finding of fact that those events or risks actually occurred.’.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I apologise in advance for my state of disrepair this morning; the bugs are migrating from one side of the Committee to the other—although in my case I fear that a four-year-old child may have more to do with it. Perhaps we should all be very British and blame it on the weather.

The amendments deal with the inclusion of risk assessment in the Bill, an addition made, I believe, in the Lords. When the amendment was discussed in the other place, it was stressed—and I agree—that it was a useful and important addition to the Bill to ensure that domestic violence and child abuse could be properly assessed as soon as they were raised as issues during the relevant processes.

In many ways, the inclusion of the clause provides a balance to the enforcement elements of the Bill. We want to ensure that the Bill is enacted in the best interests of the child. We have already debated the role of risk assessments. When we debated amendment   No. 34, the Minister for Children and Families agreed with some of our arguments that risk assessments would not always be helpful; we had asserted that risk assessments would not always be in the best interests of the child.

Amendment No. 34 was tabled so that risk assessments would be put in place whenever an enforcement order was required. In response to that amendment, the Minister said:

“it would be too onerous on the court and would constitute considerable delay to require a risk assessment every time the court seeks to make an enforcement order, as many contact orders will be breached for reasons that have nothing to do with the safety implications of the order.”—[Official Report, Standing Committee B,16 March 2006; c. 95.]

Risk assessments are not always a useful tool but are they are an important tool to have at our disposal for those instances when we believe that the child is at risk.

We have to put risk assessments in place carefully because they have direct implications for the welfare of the child; delaying contact with a non-resident parent has obvious emotional consequences, so we should have to the fore of our minds the idea that risk assessments should be used only when it is in the best interests of the child. We support the amendments under discussion precisely because they have the welfare of the child at their heart.

Amendment No. 36 is simple and straightforward.

Photo of Ann Coffey Ann Coffey PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Scotland Office, PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Department for Transport

Before the hon. Lady moves on to the next amendment, will she tell me what she thinks the difference is between the phrases “reasonable grounds to suspect” and “given cause to suspect”?

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I was going to cover that point after discussing amendment No. 36, which I think is more straightforward. Amendment No. 45 requires quite a bit of thought.

Amendment No. 36 is a useful addition; it clarifies that a child can be at risk at any point in time. As we have discussed before, it is important that the child’s welfare is of paramount concern at all times during the proceedings. Although we would never feel it appropriate to use compulsory risk assessments, which was suggested in amendment No. 34, we believe that amendment No. 36 offers a degree of clarity. Perhaps the Minister could offer her thoughts on that as well.

On amendment No. 45, as I said, the role of risk assessments is important and always—[Interruption.]

Photo of Jimmy Hood Jimmy Hood Chair, European Scrutiny Committee, Chair, European Scrutiny Committee

Order. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) would assist me in chairing the Committee by allowing me to listen to the hon. Lady moving her amendment.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education) 10:45, 21 Mawrth 2006

Thank you, Mr. Hood.

As drafted, proposed new section 16A(2) of the 1989 Act reads:

“If, in carrying out any function to which this section applies, an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer is given cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm”.

“Cause” is a vague term. We have to consider how the Bills that we debate will be implemented by those who have the practical job of implementing the law that we pass. I am not sure how helpful it would be to a CAFCASS officer or a Welsh family proceedings officer in trying to look after the best interests of the child if he has to assess whether he is given cause to feel that the child’s safety is at risk. Perhaps when the Minister responds to this discussion—it is a useful discussion, because “cause” is a vague term—she will say what the threshold is for cause. We have had long debates about the word “reasonable”, so it would be useful if the Minister could give us her thoughts on the word “cause”.

To give the Minister an idea of where I am coming from, it might be useful to explain by way of example. For instance, if a mother decided not to wash her children’s toys in disinfectant every week, it could be argued that there was cause to believe that she was putting her children at risk, as we all know that cleanliness is important, particularly for young children. Although I would not for a moment say that that was an important element in the safety of a child, it is a cause to believe that the child’s safety is at risk. Will the Minister help us to understand better how the word “cause” can be prevented from leading to some perverse outcomes when CAFCASS officers have to use it as a threshold for deciding whether a risk assessment is required?

The amendment calls for the phrase “reasonable grounds” to be inserted—I debated whether “grounds” was an important addition, but “reasonable grounds” is a term in legalese, so the amendment was tabled in that form. The most important feature is the word “reasonable”. To return to my example, it is not at all reasonable to think that a mother would be putting her child at risk if she did not disinfect her child’s toys every week, but it would be a cause to believe that the child had been put at risk. We may be putting CAFCASS officers in a difficult situation. Perhaps the Minister will help us to understand the thinking behind the use of the word “cause” rather than “reasonable grounds”, which might be clearer for all concerned.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

May I suggest that there are two processes in the clause? One is the trigger for a risk assessment and the second is the risk assessment itself. Would it not be more appropriate for the reasonable grounds to be part of the risk assessment and for the trigger to be something lower?

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I am not sure that I agree. I am talking about the trigger for a risk assessment. As I said, it is important that we should not put risk assessments in place when they are not required. In this instance, we might put ourselves in the shoes of the person who is charged with the safety of the child. If a vague term such as “cause” is given as the trigger or threshold in judging whether a risk assessment should be put in place, I suggest that risk assessment will be undertaken more regularly than necessary and, indeed, more regularly than would be in the best interest of the child.

Photo of Ann Coffey Ann Coffey PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Scotland Office, PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Department for Transport

Does the hon. Lady accept that social workers who work every day of their lives with legislation designed to protect children, and who have the principle of their welfare at heart, make judgments every day about when or when not to intervene? She is perhaps being slightly over-cautious, because in the end the decision about when to take certain action must be left to the professional judgment of the workers who are involved. We cannot legislate for each action by a social worker, and when it should happen.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I appreciate that the hon. Lady has far more practical experience than I do, and her point is right: we must leave it to people on the ground, in many instances, to use their expertise in this context. I thoroughly endorse what she says. I suppose the point I am raising, to which I hope the Minister will respond positively, is that we do not want to put those people into a difficult situation, in which they are not allowed to use their judgment because the threshold for the use of a risk assessment is set so low that they feel compelled to put one in place when it is not needed. Perhaps someone with fewer years of relevant experience than the hon. Lady would require more guidance and help.

Photo of Ann Coffey Ann Coffey PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Scotland Office, PPS (Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Secretary of State), Department for Transport

I am sorry to go on about this, but there is a system in which officers’ work is overseen by more experienced officers, and it is within a body of expertise that such decisions are made. I want to reassure the hon. Lady that CAFCASS officers have the experience to enable them to take appropriate action.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I thank the hon. Lady, but it is the role of the legislature and our role as a Committee, to ensure that the threshold for a risk assessment is set at an appropriate level. My point is that the word “cause” may not be helpful in assessing that level, although I appreciate that in reality those charged with the practical implementation of the law could, in one way, put it to one side. However, I should hope that the wording would be as helpful as possible and would not be a hindrance. I want to press the Minister on that point and obtain reassurance about it.

Photo of Sally Keeble Sally Keeble Llafur, Northampton North

Does the hon. Lady think that her example is a trigger for a possible cause for concern; if not, what does she think might be a trigger? I am concerned that the level she has identified is a very slight one. What does she think would be a realistic trigger for cause for concern?

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

The provisions that we are considering are about triggers to risk assessments, and the example that I gave dealt with what would trigger an assessment. As “cause” is such a loose and general term, the example was intended to show that a situation that really posed no risk to a child could in theory trigger a risk assessment—although, as the hon. Member for Stockport said, the professional expertise of those on the ground would in practical reality come into play.

Nevertheless, I do not think that there is any room for legislation that is not tight and well thought through. The word “cause” may have been well   thought through, and I am sure the Minister will elaborate on that, but to me it seems a very loose term. As to the question asked by the hon. Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) about what would constitute a cause for the purposes of a risk assessment, I would always defer to those with professional expertise about what was happening on the ground in a given situation, because a risk in one situation may not be a risk in another. It is a moveable feast. We want to ensure that there is no reason for spurious reasons to be given for risk assessment to take place. That is at the core of the amendment. In maintaining the paramountcy of the welfare of the child we must strike a balance, and it would not be in the child’s best interests if risk assessments were called for too readily.

Although amendment No. 53 is in this group, I do not wish to incur the Committee’s wrath or displeasure by any further discussions on the subject because we exhausted debate on it in our deliberations last week, although the Minister was not here. Probably the discussions stand, although I reiterate that the amendment is entirely in line with the paramountcy of the welfare of the child as discussed last week. However, we have rehearsed those arguments to their fullest.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair for our proceedings, Mr. Hood. My name is on amendment No. 36, together with those of my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). I am grateful to the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs. Miller) for her support for the aim behind the amendment, which is simply to make the important clarification that a risk assessment is not a single-point exercise.

I heard one of our generals in Iraq on the radio this morning saying that withdrawal from Iraq was not a singular-event process. His turn of phrase and mine are both intended to show that in some circumstances events are dynamic and change over time. It is important to keep a finger on the pulse and to see whether the change requires a new approach. There may be times in proceedings when there has been a previous risk assessment and it has been decided that no action is needed, but later in the proceedings new information or circumstances come to light that make it appropriate to carry out a further risk assessment. Alternatively, there may be a case in which there is initially nothing to suggest that there is any cause for concern—and a risk assessment has not therefore been carried out—during the course of which something comes to light that suggests that it is now appropriate to carry out a risk assessment. Therefore, in relation to the phrase in proposed new subsection (2),

“cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm”,

the cause to suspect might arise at a later stage than the beginning of the proceedings.

As the hon. Lady said, the clause was added in the House of Lords, and it is desirable to consider whether the Committee can improve the wording. Risk assessments could become an important part of court proceedings relating to family and children, if we get   the design right at the beginning. It could be a significant development, so it is important to get it right. The amendment simply makes it clear that cause to suspect can arise at any time in the proceedings and not at one point somewhere near the beginning.

Photo of Mark Williams Mark Williams Shadow Minister (Wales)

As I think it is customary to say, I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Hood. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Annette Brooke) is unavoidably absent. She is in Sweden.

Photo of Mark Williams Mark Williams Shadow Minister (Wales)

That is debatable.

My hon. Friend has left me holding the proverbial baby, which is not without risk itself, so we will wait to see what happens.

A poor risk assessment could be much worse than none at all. While I understand the sincere motives of the hon. Member for Basingstoke in attempting to define so tightly the situations in which a risk assessment is produced, we run the risk of placing too heavy a set of constraints on those charged with undertaking them, as the hon. Member for Stockport outlined.

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on cause or reasonable grounds, but by any stretch of the imagination it is a hardening of the language, which would make it more difficult for CAFCASS to undertake such risk assessments. Although I support amendment No. 36, tabled by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), I feel strongly that it should be for the trade officer to assess whether there is a risk. I see no justification for accepting amendment No. 45.

Photo of Maria Eagle Maria Eagle Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education and Skills) (Children and Families) 11:00, 21 Mawrth 2006

I shall try to deal with some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Basingstoke.

Clause 7, which was placed in the Bill in the other place, seeks to change CAFCASS’s current power to make a risk assessment into a duty to make a risk assessment in appropriate cases. That has led to a debate on what is meant by appropriate cases. The amendments come from slightly different positions, but they all deal with that aspect. I note that she shied away from amendment No. 53, but I shall say something about the effect of the amendments on the capacity and ability of CAFCASS to undertake risk assessment in appropriate cases.

The meaning of cause in this context is reason to suspect or believe. It might be information that the officer garners from within or beyond his professional contact with the family—things that become known to the officer. The hon. Member for Basingstoke was right, as was the hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mark Williams), to suggest that the current wording presents a lower threshold on whether risk assessment might be undertaken than “reasonable grounds”, as suggested in the amendment.

The hon. Lady asked what the threshold was of cause for concern. No specific threshold can be included in the Bill. The phrasing leaves it to the professional judgment of the CAFCASS officer to come to a view, with training and appropriate guidance, on whether there is cause to suspect risk of harm. There is no doubt that a court would be pretty critical were a risk assessment to be done for no sensible cause or reason, and rightly so. However, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, and, to be fair, with the hon. Member for Basingstoke, that the professionals who work every day in the field obviously have a feeling for when the circumstances are right. We should not constrain them too much.

The hon. Lady expressed the fear that a trivial situation might trigger a risk assessment. Cause for concern is explicitly linked to the risk of harm. The 1989 Act specifically defines what harm means in the context of ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development, including impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another. That threshold is understood in case law, and the officer concerned will bear that in mind when making his judgment, which he will obviously do with guidance and appropriate training in professional practice.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

On the question of the threshold, does my hon. Friend agree with what I said to the hon. Member for Basingstoke—that there are two thresholds, one to trigger an alert and one for the risk assessment? National Family Mediation sent us a good briefing, which says that many people might tick the gateway form to say that they fear domestic violence, but that does not mean that mediation should never take place.

Photo of Maria Eagle Maria Eagle Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education and Skills) (Children and Families)

My hon. Friend is correct. I should have responded to his points, and I am grateful that he has reminded me to do so.

The hon. Lady’s amendment would have an impact on the intention of the clause as drafted. It would effectively undermine the power of CAFCASS officers to protect children’s best interests by raising to too high a level the hurdle for carrying out a risk assessment. In contrast, amendment No. 36 would ensure that it is clear in the Bill that risk assessments can be conducted at any point in the court process.

Amendments Nos. 45 and 53 would make it more difficult for CAFCASS to undertake risk assessments. That is different from the aim discussed in the other place, where the new clause was supported by all parties when it was explained that it would place a duty on CAFCASS to undertake a risk assessment whenever it has cause to believe that the child concerned is at risk of harm.

CAFCASS officers are professionals and experienced in picking up signs of domestic violence or abuse, and they are well qualified to judge when a risk assessment is warranted. They will not be making them in every case. The hon. Lady said that her party does not support that, and nor do the Government. If we raise the hurdle for a risk assessment and say that it can be carried out only when there are reasonable grounds, which is a higher hurdle, we are effectively saying that   a court needs to assess whether there is a risk of harm before a risk assessment can be made, which is putting the cart before the horse—or, perhaps I should say, the court before the horse. It creates a danger that there may be cases of low-level or fairly well-hidden abuse that would be more likely to slip through.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

In defining cause, the Minister said that it would be based on risk of harm. Perhaps she inadvertently argued against herself in saying that “reasonable grounds” would mean that a risk of harm would need to be established. Perhaps she could help me understand the difference between the two things. She said, in respect of one measure, that a risk of harm would need to be established for “reasonable grounds”, but earlier she said that in establishing cause, the risk of harm would need to be established. I think she said that the two things are similar.

Photo of Maria Eagle Maria Eagle Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education and Skills) (Children and Families)

I misled the hon. Lady if I said that, because they are not similar. There is a clear difference between the hurdle that would be established by the use of “cause”, and the one established by “reasonable grounds”, which is a higher hurdle. Perhaps that is what she and her colleagues are aiming to create—I suspect it is—because amendment No. 53 goes even further and proposes a trigger for a risk assessment based on

“reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a significant risk of significant harm.”

She did not dwell on that for the understandable reason of not going through a load of arguments made in a previous debate. However, “significant harm” is well understood in the 1989 Act; it is the threshold that justifies compulsory intervention in family life. That is quite a high threshold, because the state does not just bust into family life as soon as there is any slight concern. The words “significant harm” provide for a significantly higher threshold.

I fear that if the wording in amendment No. 53 were put in the Bill, it would force CAFCASS officers to accept a lower level of abuse that does not noticeably impair the child’s development or is not significant. Therefore, the officer would not even be able to conduct the risk assessment and would, basically, be ignoring the provisions on risk assessment, which are meant to increase child safeguarding.

The phrase “significant risk”, which is also in amendment No. 53, is much less well understood. It implies that there is a point at which there is a risk to the child, but it is acceptable not to make an assessment of that risk because it has to be significant. Presumably, anything below that threshold could be safely ignored on the basis of the wording that the hon. Lady proposes. I do not accept that and do not believe that it would be in line with the paramountcy of the child’s welfare for those words to be included. We want a risk assessment to be made when there is any sensible professional judgment that there is a probability of the child being harmed. The clause as drafted does that.

There is another problem with amendment No. 53. Proposed subsection (6) says:

“the child’s physical safety, or” safety from

“sexual abuse” are to be the only grounds for risk assessment. That is a backwards step from the welfare checklist and the protections that currently exist for the child. By clarifying the definition of harm in the 1989 Act, the Adoption and Children Act 2002 recognises that it should include impairment suffered as a result of witnessing violence to another. Amendment No. 53 would remove the recognition that it constitutes harm for the purposes of deciding whether there should be a risk assessment.

Opposition Members are anxious that we should not assume parents are bad or dangerous simply because they have separated. We do not do that and we do not intend to do that, but domestic violence is raised in a significant proportion of contact disputes. It is therefore right to give CAFCASS the duty to get to the bottom of those issues and to let the court know whether fears are well founded and, if so, how they can be addressed so that parents can get on with the job of parenting.

Amendment No. 36 would place a duty on CAFCASS officers and Welsh family proceedings officers to conduct a risk assessment whenever they are involved in private law Children Act proceedings and have cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm. I have sympathy with the motivation behind the amendment. It is right that at any time during proceedings, if risk of harm is suspected, a risk assessment should be done and provided to the court.

The clause requires CAFCASS or a Welsh family proceedings officer to carry out a risk assessment if, in the course of carrying out any function in private law proceedings under the 1989 Act,

“the officer is given cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm”.

That can be at any stage of proceedings and so the amendment is not necessary because it is already covered by the clause. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford will accept that. For those different reasons, I resist the amendments and ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the lead amendment.

Photo of Maria Miller Maria Miller Shadow Minister (Education)

I thank the Minister for taking the time to clarify the Government’s position on those aspects of the Bill. Before I address her points, I should like to say that at all points in our discussions we are all agreed that the welfare of the child is paramount.

I beg to differ with the Minister about the purpose of the amendments, particularly on setting the threshold for a risk assessment. They were intended to clarify, not to change the threshold. Clarity is vital in all legislation, but all too often it is lacking. Perhaps her comments will help those who have to interpret the Bill in practice to do so in the spirit of the Committee.

The hon. Member for Ceredigion, making his cameo appearance in Committee, said that a poor risk assessment is better than no risk assessment at all. I categorically disagree with that and perhaps we will come on to that. It is vital that risk assessments are undertaken professionally and accurately. As I said, they are not isolated from the welfare of the child, but are fundamentally linked to it.

I am glad that we have had this debate. It will be useful to those who have to implement what we are simply talking about. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

I beg to move amendment No. 37, in clause 7, page 12, line 20, after ‘child’, insert

‘and undertaken in accordance with the Code of Practice issued under section 8B’.

Photo of Jimmy Hood Jimmy Hood Chair, European Scrutiny Committee, Chair, European Scrutiny Committee

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 38, in clause 7, page 12, line 20, at end insert—

‘(4)A court shall not make an order under section 8 until it has considered the results of the risk assessment required by subsection (1) and is satisfied that the arrangements will be safe for the child.’.

New clause 21—Risk assessments: screening—

‘(1)After section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—

“8APre-court checks

(1)On receipt of any application under section 8 of the court shall direct that the relevant pre-court checks are undertaken to screen for indicators of risk to the child’s safety and well-being.

(2)The court may ask an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer to undertake any checks for the screening required by subsection (1).

(3)It shall be the duty of an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer to comply with a request from the court under subsection (2).

(4)A court shall not make an order under section 8 until it has considered the results of the screening required by subsection (1) and is satisfied that the arrangements will be safe for the child.

(5)Pre-court checks to screen for indicators of risk required by subsection (1) and any subsequent risk assessments under section 16A shall be undertaken in accordance with the Code of Practice issued under section 8B.

8BCode of Practice

(1)The Secretary of State shall prepare, and from time to time revise, a Code of Practice regarding screening for indicators of risk and regarding risk assessment as required by section 16A.

(2)Before preparing the Code of Practice or making any alteration in it the Secretary of State shall consult such bodies as appear to him to be concerned.

(3)The Secretary of State shall lay copies of the Code and of any alteration in the Code before Parliament; and if either House of Parliament passes a resolution requiring the Code or any alteration to be withdrawn the Secretary of State shall withdraw the Code, and where he withdraws the Code, shall prepare a Code in substitution for the Code which was withdrawn.

(4)No resolution shall be passed above in respect of a Code or any alteration after the expiration of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the Code or alteration was laid before that House; but for the purpose of this subsection no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

(5)The Secretary of State shall publish the Code as for the time being in force.”’.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 11:15, 21 Mawrth 2006

The two amendments are in my name and those of two of my hon. Friends. New clause 21 is in my name and that of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, who we established last week is not a member of this Committee. Amendment No. 37   would introduce into the clause the need to carry out risk assessments in accordance with a code of practice. Risk assessments will be a new formal process in the children’s and family proceedings covered by the Bill.

I am sure that CAFCASS officers and Welsh family proceedings officers and their predecessors, the court welfare officers, would tell us that they have always considered risk in the course of their duties in family proceedings. However, the Bill is introducing a new, formal requirement of risk assessment.

It is worth reminding ourselves of the October 2005 report from HM inspectorate of court administration, “Domestic Violence, Safety and Family Proceedings”, which established that the courts already operated an informal presumption of contact. Paragraph 3.9 says:

“The presumption of contact was evident in all the practice sessions observed during this inspection and there was consistent evidence that inappropriate assumptions about contact were made, rather than assessments about whether there was any risk associated with domestic abuse cases.”

While it may be argued that we already have an informal system of risk assessments and people who are very experienced at doing them, we are now importing risk assessments formally into the law. I would not like to import with them defective risk assessments, as described in that HMI report. Establishing from the outset some standards for carrying out those risk assessments is important.

I would like to give one other illustration of why guidance would be helpful, from the latest briefing from National Family Mediation, which I mentioned to the Minister a few minutes ago. “The role of accredited mediators in risk assessments” describes how mediators already have their own, well-attested risk assessment protocol for when they are giving mediation.

My example to the Minister was this. In the context of court proceedings started before mediation was undertaken, the mediator might see the gateway form from the court with a tick in the box asking whether there were any concerns about domestic violence. The mediator would carry out a risk assessment to determine whether or not mediation should go ahead, or whether it was too dangerous for either of the parties or for any children involved. Mediators would say that they are already experienced in risk assessments. In the briefing, they ask whether the risk assessments must be carried out by CAFCASS officers alone or whether the Government intend that the expertise of relevant others can be called upon. What they are saying is that people other than CAFCASS officers have something to offer in the process, but only if somebody is going to give guidance that that may be the case.

The briefing tells us that in two recent pilots, in courts at Cambridge and Bromley, mediators worked alongside CAFCASS officers in their duties, which, in Bromley’s case, reduced the need for formal report by 60 per cent.—an enormously successful rate. We need to know whether there will be guidance—a code of practice could give that guidance—as to whether people can assist CAFCASS officers in carrying out risk assessments.

I jump next to new clause 21, because that proposal introduces the idea of a code of practice, inserting a new section 8B into the Children Act 1989 requiring the Secretary of State to prepare and from time to time revise a code of practice for carrying out such an assessment. It is an open process, involving consultation, laying the code or revision before Parliament and an ability for Parliament to vote to have the code or revision withdrawn.

In addition to those two, amendment No. 37 and the new clause, amendment No. 38 is a significant statement of what ought to be the obvious: when a risk assessment has been carried out and provided to the court, the court ought to consider the assessment before making an order.

Nothing in clause 7 says that at the moment. That is of course implied; it would be a foolish court that took no notice of a risk assessment that had been asked for or received—clause 7 does require one to be produced for the court. For completeness we ought to have a chain of a process, which starts with the spotting of the risk, then the carrying out of the risk assessment and the court taking that risk assessment into account before making an order. If we set a firm chain in place, that will make clause 7 a very effective process indeed.

Together, the two amendments and the new clause represent a strengthening of the process for risk assessment, which was first introduced into the Bill in the other place.

Photo of Maria Eagle Maria Eagle Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education and Skills) (Children and Families)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his succinct and, as ever, pertinent points made in moving the amendment standing in his name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, who is not on the Committee.

I hope that I can reassure him. Before answering his questions, I want to say a little about the combined effects of the amendments. One would be that for all applications to the court under section 8—that is, in all residence, contact, prohibited steps and specific issues cases—pre-court checks would have to be undertaken and a risk assessment carried out in line with a code of practice published by the Secretary of State. No order for contact, even indirect contact, could be made before those steps had been taken. If we went through that procedure for all section 8 cases, delays would increase because CAFCASS would have to do a lot of unnecessary work in cases where there was no issue or concern about safety or risk.

The Committee will be aware that the Bill introduces a significant new measure in clause 7, which places a specific duty on CAFCASS to undertake a risk assessment and provide its results to the court whenever it is involved in private law proceedings under the Children Act 1989 and has cause to suspect that a child is at risk of harm, or at any other stage of its involvement.

Amendment No. 38 is of particular concern because it would introduce a presumption of no contact unless it was first proven that such contact would be safe. It would exclude an order for supervised contact or even indirect contact and would require the assessment of safety, even when parents were, for example, seeking a   consent order or there was absolutely no cause or reason to suspect that harm was an issue in the particular circumstances of the case.

I appreciate that my hon. Friends are concerned that we should ensure that courts not only receive risk assessments—the results of which clause 7 requires CAFCASS to give to them—but consider them when making their decision. I can offer some reassurance on that. The 1989 Act already provides in section 1(1) that when making a decision as to the child’s upbringing, the child’s welfare must be the court’s paramount consideration. In so doing, the court must consider the issues covered by the welfare checklist in section 1(3). As a result, the court would be failing in its duty if it did not consider the risk assessment provided to it by CAFCASS. That would be very strange and would amount to a court behaving unreasonably, which almost never happens.

Courts should also have regard to the Children Act sub-committee guidelines for good practice in parental contact cases when there is domestic violence. Those guidelines make it clear that the court should make an order for contact only if it is satisfied that the safety of the resident parent and the child can be secured during and after contact.

The guidelines were recently reinforced by a Court of Appeal judgment in the case re H in which Lord Justice Wall stated clearly what courts must do when faced with a contact application when domestic violence has been alleged.

I am aware that there have been arguments that CAFCASS needs greater powers to undertake standard pre-court checks—for example, to find out whether a party in a contact case has any criminal record relating to violence against children—and I agree that it is entirely right that the courts must have all the relevant information available to them when making their decisions. It is certainly the aim of CAFCASS to carry out pre-court checks in every case for which they are appropriate. I can reassure my hon. friend that CAFCASS has the power to carry out those checks as part of their functions set out in section 12 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. Section 13 of that Act enables CAFCASS to make arrangements with other agencies—this relates to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford made—to obtain the necessary information. There is no reason why, because the Bill places the duty on CAFCASS, it should be precluded from calling on relevant experts in fulfilling that duty, and we would expect them to do so. I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend.

New clause 21 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice and to lay it before Parliament for approval. There is nothing wrong with codes of practice. The Department for Education and Skills produces reams of codes of practice and there is absolutely nothing wrong with them per se. My concerns about the new clause are more about the presumption of no contact that would flow from the arrangements taken together, to which I do not believe the Government could agree.

If we are to make changes to primary legislation, it is important that they are strictly necessary. It is normal and usual for codes of practice and good guidance to be outwith the primary legislation.

CAFCASS now has sufficient and expert guidance in its domestic violence toolkit, which is part of its strategy to improve practice in domestic violence cases. It is professional, technical guidance for all its professional staff and I hope that my hon. Friend accepts that that is an appropriate place for guidance and good practice. It is a task best handled by those with experience in the field rather than it being set in a code of practice in statute.

Ensuring that risk assessment is carried out in conformity with guidance, too, is a professional matter. Practitioners will be required to comply with risk assessment standards, which will be demonstrated under appraisal and supervision. It should be possible to ensure that standards of risk assessment and the way in which it is undertaken can be relied upon as being of the highest level.

I assure my hon. Friend that we will put in place a system to monitor adherence to that policy, and CAFCASS intends to ensure that it is properly done. I hope that I have demonstrated not only how seriously we view the risk of harm to children, but that we are not ignoring the problems that have arisen in respect of current practice. We have taken measures to deal with those issues, as has CAFCASS. We are taking further steps, but they do not all have to be included in legislation. I hope that my hon. Friend is persuaded to withdraw his amendment.

Photo of David Kidney David Kidney PPS (Mr Elliot Morley, Minister of State), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her powerful explanation of why amendment No. 38 could have the unintended consequence of getting in the way of contact. As for the code of practice, Parliament must always weigh up which organisations we can trust to devise their own codes—in the case of CAFCASS, it would be subject to scrutiny by the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs—and those over which we should have a more direct influence, through the laying of codes of practice before the House so that Members can express an opinion.

I shall withdraw the amendment for two reasons. First, the code in the new clause ranges slightly too widely because of the screening element, which is no longer part of our discussions. Secondly, as I said in another context, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar would like to express her view on the matter. I shall keep my powder dry for her benefit. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 8 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.