One of the main provisions of the Bill is to increase the power of enforcement, which we all agree is important within the overall context of ensuring children’s safety, but we should also always consider children’s welfare, which is a broader issue.

Proposed new subsection (3A) deals with what constitutes a reasonable excuse. Opposition Members are concerned about whether the court should be given directions on what might constitute such an excuse.   Paragraph (a) of the proposed subsection would involve children in that consideration, but if the court has to look to them to endorse an excuse made by a parent, they may be put at risk or in a difficult situation. We question whether that is in line with the paramount welfare of the child. Is it in the child’s best interests to be in that situation?

Paragraph (b) proposes that the courts should take the behaviour of the parent into consideration, but that is a broad requirement. How will the court do it? Will the expression on the face of a parent be taken into consideration as behaviour? Must the behaviour be toward the child or someone else in court? We think that it is probably best for the court to define what is a reasonable excuse, in the normal way.

Proposed new subsection (3B) suggests that there should be a risk assessment if a court order has been breached and enforcement is required. However, there is a tautology in the amendment. Lord Adonis pointed out in the other place that, in making the original contact order, the court will have undertaken a thorough evaluation of what is in the paramount interests of the child, and in that evaluation safety would be an important issue. Risk assessments are already undertaken if, at any time, a Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service officer has cause to suspect risk of harm to a child.

The hon. Member for Luton, South (Margaret Moran) will say whether I am wrong, but the amendment assumes that when an enforcement order is needed, child safety is always the overwhelming concern. That does not seem to be borne out by the facts, as we have already fully debated. We all agree that the welfare of the child is of paramount importance, and within that safety is a vital element, but a speedy resolution of problems is also in the child’s best interests. It is important that contact with a non-resident parent is put in place speedily when an enforcement order is made; we should not build in delays, as the amendment may do.

Clause 7 already contains adequate provisions on safety, and our view is that the amendment may cause enforcement of contact orders to be erroneously delayed without good reason, which is not in the best interests of the child. For that reason, we do not support the amendment.