I know that my hon. Friend always tries to help the Committee and that she has done a great deal to ensure that safeguarding children, particularly in situations of domestic violence, is taken seriously by the Government when formulating legislation and policy. She is very knowledgeable on that matter.

We have had a good debate in which the concerns on both sides of the argument have been aired in one way or another. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the court takes full account of safety considerations for both the child and anyone with whom the child is living when making an enforcement order. When determining whether a person has reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a contact order, it would require the court to consider any objections the child may make to the contact arrangements and the behaviour of the non-resident parent. The amendment would prevent the court from making an enforcement order unless it has considered a risk assessment in respect of the child and any person with whom the child lives, and is satisfied that the safety of the child and any person with whom the child lives will not be compromised by such an order.

The amendment raises the question of at what point the court must consider those serious issues relating to contact. The aim of the enforcement provisions is to ensure that the contact that the court has already judged to be in the best interests of the child takes place. Clause 1 requires the court to take into account the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings and any harm that they are at risk of suffering before it makes a contact order. As well as the new provisions to enable risk assessments to take place, additional measures, such as the new gateway forms and the case law requirement that courts hold finding-of-fact hearings if there are allegations of harm, will ensure that safety can be addressed at any point before contact is ordered. The main problem with the amendment is that it would reopen the welfare issues that will have been fully considered when the contact order was made.

There are numerous ways in which the views of the child may come before the court. When the contact order is made, the court will have ample opportunity to address the wishes and feelings of the child and any safety concerns. We expect that contact orders will fully take into account all those issues. The question then becomes what happens if the court’s carefully considered and constructed contact order, which was decided in the best interests of the child’s welfare, is breached. At that point, it would not be right automatically to open up some of the issues that the court will already have addressed in making the contact order, which is what the amendment would do.

Notwithstanding that, and as a safety measure, the Bill provides that an enforcement order may be made, but only if there was no reasonable excuse for breaching the contact order. The amendment would impose on the court specific factors that it must consider when deciding whether there was a reasonable excuse. As I said, the child’s wishes and feelings about contact will already have been addressed. The behaviour of the non-resident parent may or may not be relevant to the case. If it is relevant, the court will consider it, but it will not be relevant in many cases. For example, the resident parent could argue that the car broke down, or that the child was ill and could not attend, and would have a reasonable excuse, but such excuses would not have anything to do with safety issues. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require the court to consider the behaviour of the non-resident parent in every circumstance.

Proposed new subsection (3B) would require the court always to consider a risk assessment before making an enforcement order, and to be satisfied that the enforcement order would not compromise the safety of the child. However, it would be too onerous on the court and would constitute considerable delay to require a risk assessment every time the court seeks to make an enforcement order, as many contact orders will be breached for reasons that have nothing to do with the safety implications of the order.

The Bill provides sufficient protection for those cases where safety issues arise. First, the requirement that the court cannot make an enforcement order if there is a reasonable excuse for breaching the contact order means that the court is bound to take into account the resident parent’s concerns for her safety or the safety of the child.

Secondly, the court is required to consider the likely effect of an enforcement order on the person against whom it is made, including considerations of that person’s safety. Thirdly, the court must ensure that the enforcement order is proportionate to the seriousness of the breach and that it will make contact work. Those requirements would not be met if the enforcement order forced one parent, or the child, into a dangerous situation.

Fourthly, the court must take into account the welfare of the child when making an enforcement order. My hon. Friends the Members for Luton, South   and for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) believe that at this point the welfare of the child should be of paramount importance, whereas in case law judges have taken the position that the welfare of the child is a material consideration but should not be paramount. I cannot explain the reason for that better than my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) did. The issue for the court is to make enforcement work.

Everyone is agreed that the orders give the courts a range of responses to non-compliance short of those available through contempt that they are more likely to be able to use, because fines and imprisonment are not used routinely but for good and understandable reasons. There is a danger that if we make the welfare principle paramount in relation to a child’s short-term distress, for example—a matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport—the courts might feel constrained in implementing the very orders that we want to be at their disposal.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stafford said that the welfare of the child is paramount in all parts of the Children Act 1989, and it is certainly the pervading principle of that Act, but it actually states that welfare is paramount in any question relating to the child’s upbringing. The clause is concerned about the enforcement of contact that the court has said is in the child’s interests, but it is not predominantly and in a paramount way about upbringing.

Finally, and most importantly, the effect of clause 7, which was added to the Bill in the other place, places a duty on CAFCASS to undertake a risk assessment whenever it has cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm. That duty must be exercised at any point in the process, including when enforcement orders are under consideration.

My hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South referred to section 122 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which provides for the representation of children in public law proceedings. I appreciate that there is a strong wish for the rules to be made under that rule-making power. We intend to proceed in that direction but we need to consider the outcome of research into the operation of rule 9.5 of the family proceedings laws to inform our consideration.

I hope that I have reassured my hon. Friend that I do not dismiss the serious matters she has raised. However, at this point in the process it is important, first, to allow enforcement orders to proceed, and, secondly, to ensure that there are sufficient levers in the provision for the court to consider safety considerations fully at that point if necessary. I therefore hope that my hon. Friend will ask leave to withdraw the amendment.