Part of Inquiries Bill [Lords] – in a Public Bill Committee am 11:15 am ar 22 Mawrth 2005.
There are specific reasons and circumstances in which the Minister can remove panel members, which I will come to in a minute. The hon. Gentleman suggests that any reasons could be given, which is not the case. He also talks as if Ministers operate in a vacuum, which they do not. There are many pressures and constraints on Ministers—not just public opinion, and, ultimately, Parliament. That is our constitutional position; Parliament has ultimate scrutiny and control over Ministers, which is not to be underestimated. In our constitution, we must recognise that Ministers establish the inquiries and, as a consequence, they must be involved in the way those inquiries continue.
Of course, the chairman should be consulted about the removal of a panel member and the Minister will have to take the chairman’s views into account. The Bill sets out the process for panel members to make representations and request wider consultation with the panel to ensure that they are treated fairly. However, at the end of the day the Minister has to take responsibility for the decisions and defend them, and the chairman has to be free to get on with the inquiry. If we accepted the amendments and the matter was left to the chairman, who is not accountable to Parliament, there is no ultimate sanction or way of dealing with his decision.
The hon. Member for Huntingdon suggested that Ministers could remove the panel members for any reason, which is not quite the case, as clause 13 sets out reasons why panel members can be removed. The first is that they can no longer carry out their duties, because of illness, for example. The second is that there is a conflict of interest. The third is a failure to comply with the duty under the Bill. The fourth is misconduct.
Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 deal with the circumstances in which the chairman’s concurrence might be sought for the suspension, or early ending, of an inquiry. Clauses 14 and 15 are designed as safeguards in case unexpected situations arise. If a Minister suspends an inquiry or ends it early, he has to set out his reasons for so doing and inform Parliament of them. Any improper or unreasonable decision to suspend an inquiry could be challenged in the courts through judicial review because Ministers are always obliged to act reasonably, and it would also be open to question in Parliament, where the Minister, not the chairman, would be held to account.
The Minister is already required to consult the chairman about suspending an inquiry or ending it early, and the Minister would have to think carefully before going against the chairman’s wishes, not least because the chairman has the powerful option of making his objections public. In certain circumstances, there can be good reasons to suspend an inquiry and a statutory requirement for the chairman to consent is not appropriate. For example, clause 14 allows an inquiry to be suspended to allow for the completion of civil or criminal proceedings, which is very important. If an inquiry was ongoing at the same time as a criminal trial, it could prejudice the trial. The Government must protect the public interest in the interests of the effective administration of justice. As a public authority, they are bound to protect individual rights to a fair trial under the European convention on human rights. It is not appropriate potentially to prevent Ministers from performing those duties by giving the chairman a veto in such circumstances.
The Minister also has a duty to safeguard public funds. If it is clear that it is no longer in the public interest to continue the inquiry, the Minister has to be able to bring it to an end; otherwise, public money could be wasted. In the vast majority of cases, there are sensible reasons for ending an inquiry with which the chairman might agree, but I am not convinced that the chairman should have the right of veto, for the reasons that I have given. The amendment would mean that in very rare situations in which a chairman weighed up the factors differently, he could insist that an inquiry continued. Taxpayer’s money could be spent wastefully on continuing the inquiry, but, unlike the Minister, the chairman could not be held accountable to Parliament for his actions in the way that our constitution currently sets out.
Ministers do not operate in a vacuum. They are accountable to Parliament and ultimately Parliament has sanctions over them. I therefore believe that this is the best way to proceed with the Bill. I understand that there was widespread debate in the other place about the nature of the powers that might be given to the chairman. Indeed, the shadow Lord Chancellor when moving his amendment on the different powers that the chairman might have, including a veto over terms of reference, acknowledged that it would give a chairman a power
“which I think in the circumstances is inappropriate”. [Official Report, House of Lords, 18 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC232.]
Lord Kingsland recognised that the Government were putting forward serious issues and that we needed to protect in our constitution the power of Parliament to hold Ministers to account. For those reasons, I hope that the amendments will be rejected.