I beg to move amendment No. 111, in

clause 265, page 147, line 31, at end add

'and—

(c) may be exercised for the purpose of improving incentives for the collection of fines.'.

The amendment is self-explanatory.

We have discussed fine enforcement several times in Committee. As my hon. Friend will have gathered, the Government are interested in the issue and take it seriously. That is the reason for the provisions that we are including in the Courts Bill. I shall remind my hon. Friend of those and ask him to withdraw his amendment on the basis that it concerns something that we are already doing.

The Lord Chancellor's Department has the lead responsibility for fine enforcement. Provisions for improving the collection of fines are already being dealt with in clauses 31, 89 and 90 and in schedule 2 of the Courts Bill. Those measures will establish a new framework for fine enforcement, including ways to obtain prompt payment, more severe sanctions for those who try to play the system, and a dedicated fines officer managing the collection of fines. The system will provide for discounts for prompt payers and increases for those who delay payment. I hope that the fact that the Government already have this matter in hand by virtue of the Courts Bill will encourage my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.

At the risk of prolonging proceedings, I want to mention that I was interested in the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen), which seems very pertinent. A problem is that although we have touched, peripherally, on the issue of fines, we have not succeeded in holding a discrete debate, although it may be possible to do that on new clause 8. The amendment, which is designed to facilitate fine collection, raises the question of sanctions. It is interesting that we are moving towards a much more liberal regime of sanctions which will arguably make fine enforcement less easy. Equally, there are arguments for alternatives to the ultimate sanction of locking people up, and those should be tried as much as possible.

I hope that the Government have this interesting and important issue in mind. I hope also that we shall consider it in more detail when we consider new clause 8. We want fines to work and we want the Home

Secretary to be able to make enforcement work. However, I fear that the issue has not been fully addressed yet.

My apologies, Mr. Illsley, for not paying you the normal courtesy of welcoming you to the Chair.

The Minister will be aware of the National Audit Office's reports on the poor level of fine collection in magistrates courts and I know that he takes it extremely seriously, as does Parliament. I have written to him about the possibility of incentivising courts to pick up additional fines. If they can do better than they do now, a percentage of the revenue should be kept within the purview of that court for use for local matters, many of which we have discussed, such as publicising its activities and making itself more user-friendly. I hope that the Minister will consider that.

Finally, as both Conservative and Labour Governments have looked at the impact of general management on education and on the health service, does the Minister feel that it is now time to have general managers for courts? They would not have a direct interest in the process of the courts, or the cases before them, but would be accountable either to the Minister or to the Lord Chancellor's Department. I do not expect a reply to that now, but I hope that the Minister will take it on board when he considers the pathetic number of fines that are paid appropriately to courts. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 937, in

clause 265, page 147, line 32, leave out subsection (4).

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 938, in

clause 265, page 148, line 4, leave out ', or' and insert ', Section 268(1), or'.

These amendments revisit familiar territory, so I shall not detain the Committee for long. They make a point and enable us to ask a couple of questions about the Government's intentions.

Clause 265 is a general clause that gives Ministers the power to make rules by statutory instrument. That is normal and understandable. We are all used to it, and we have just debated an amendment that would have added a further opportunity to the two set out in clause 265(3). The first allows variations; it says that the power

''may be exercised so as to make different provision for different purposes or different areas'',

and the second, slightly delphically—perhaps it is a drafting convention—says that it

''may be exercised either for all the purposes to which the power extends or for those purposes subject to specified exceptions, or only for specified purposes'',

which covers all bases. Basically, it says that there is a wide-ranging set of alternatives available to Ministers, and there is nothing new about that. The question is how widespread or limited and tied to the Bill they should be. There is always a danger of clauses starting off too widely drawn. Happily, in the case of Home Office Bills in which I have been involved on behalf of

my party, we have managed, if not in this House then in the other place, to restrict such provisions. The object of amendment No. 937 is to probe whether the scope of subsection (4) can be reduced. At the moment it includes power to make

''(a) any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision''—

any. Supplementary provisions are, by definition, further down a waterfall than the main proposal and ''incidental'' allows one to get a bit further away, but ''consequential'' could be widely interpreted.

Those are not the worst aspects of the subsection, although they come within the famous Henry VIII definition. I have never checked those powers. It is one of those terms of art that have been used for a long time. It is entirely likely that Henry VIII did have such powers. He used extreme powers in his public and private life at every opportunity. A monarch who was willing to behead his wives and break with the Pope strikes me as being likely to push the powers to the limit. [Interruption.] I will be good, and not repeat the exchange that has just taken place.

Subsection (4)(b) is understandable as it refers to ''transitory, transitional or saving'' provisions. However, we then get the wide sweep provision, which is that the Minister making the order must consider it ''necessary or expedient''. Ministers sometimes consider things necessary or expedient in a way that may not command the unanimous support of the House, let alone of their party.

We had an important debate yesterday about certain Government policies that Ministers considered to be necessary and expedient, but the Government did not carry a substantial number of their own party with them, and they certainly did not have the support of the Liberal Democrats. I raise the matter because it strikes me that the provision gives Ministers too much power. I shall give an example.

If the Home Secretary of the day thought that a judge's interpretation of a provision in what will become the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was something that he did not wish for, he could, if he thought it necessary or expedient, bring forward an order to clarify the legislation. He could argue that it would be exercised in a way that was ''supplementary, incidental or consequential'' upon the Act, but that could go a long way.

I heard of an exchange in the House of Lords yesterday that included criticism of the Home Secretary's remarks on a High Court judgment in a case brought under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 about changes to the benefits law. The Home Secretary had suggested that the judge should not have behaved as he did; yet I have read the whole of the judgment given by Lord Justice Collins, and he was absolutely clear that his judgment was based on the law as he understood it and on what he thought Parliament meant by it, taking into account the other obligations imposed on him by other legislation, including the Human Rights Act 1998.

The danger is that the provision in subsection (4)(b) may be far too wide. The words ''or expedient'' are by

definition subjective, not objective; they are too wide and potentially dangerous. We should avoid such provisions unless they are tidying-up operations, or make a de minimis change—the sort of thing that comes to light when Ministers realise that an inconsistency in the drafting had not been spotted in Committee, an incompatibility between clauses or a repeal that had not been spotted. Such things are fine—a proper procedure is needed, but it should not detain Parliament—but there should not be such a wide sweep.

That is the reason for amendment No. 937. My instinct is to seek to divide the Committee, unless the Minister can reassure me, because we would resist such a wide definition.

Amendment No. 938 would simply add the provision that a statutory instrument made under the clause should go through only if it is approved by both Houses under the affirmative resolution procedure. That would give us the best control. That would add clause 268(1), the general sweep-up provisions, to the list in subsection (6) that should be dealt with under the affirmative resolution procedure. For those who are not Members or close followers of procedure, I should explain the importance of that. If the Government want to bring in something important, and if the Bill allows for secondary legislation, our view is that Parliament should none the less automatically have the chance to consider it. However, that does not mean that we detain Parliament unnecessarily. The reality is that if subsequent provisions are uncontroversial, they go through on the nod—they are on the Order Paper and no one objects to them. Ministers know well that a Committee can consider several uncontroversial statutory instruments together. We do not have an over-laborious, over-complicated and time-consuming system, so there is not a danger to parliamentary business management or other things.

We usually consider such important matters and the proper role of Parliament at the end of a Committee. However, I should be grateful to hear the Minister's general response and what things he envisages would be governed by the provisions both in the clause, in particular in subsection (4), and in clause 268(1).

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. I do not want to repeat his arguments, but it is worth while for the Committee to pause to consider for a moment how the system that is projected by the provisions in their unamended form works in practice.

In the last Parliament, it was my interesting lot—some would say unhappy lot—to serve on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which is one of those Committees that most people who join want to get off as quickly as possible. They are probably mistaken, because seeing how Henry VIII clauses and statutory instruments are generally managed is an educational experience.

The key question—the hon. Gentleman mentioned this—is whether the power that the Minister is being granted is used in one of two ways that are objectionable. The first way would be for the power

to be used more widely than anticipated, although I expect that the Minister will reassure us that he intends the provision to have quite a narrow scope. The second way covers those instances in which the Minister seeks to use powers wider than those that are in fact conferred. When I served on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments there were quite a few occasions on which Speaker's Counsel came along to advise the Committee and said that he had anxieties about the vires of a proposed statutory instrument, because he had read the enabling legislation and the SI, and had found the two difficult to reconcile.

Far from being able to intervene in that process, Parliament finds that what I describe is the end of the matter. One writes off to the Department concerned and says, ''We question whether in fact this statutory instrument is within the powers conferred by the legislation,'' and the departmental advisers to the Minister write back and say, ''We disagree with you.'' At that point Parliament's role is effectively at an end, and it is left to the judiciary to pick up the pieces of any subsequent dispute and decide whether the Minister has acted within his powers. That is why, as a matter of principle, I, like the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), am always worried by the conferring of wide powers to amend legislation. I appreciate that there is provision to attempt to reverse such things through a negative resolution—not an affirmative provision. However, negative resolutions do not attract much attention or publicity, and they tend to be a foregone conclusion, despite one or two rare exceptions. The matter always causes me anxiety.

I should be interested to hear from the Minister, for Hansard purposes, exactly what he anticipates that the scope of the provisions will be, and examples of incidents in which he expects them to be applied. That would be very helpful, and it is one reason why the matter must be dealt with by a probing amendment so that we have a record of the intention behind the clause. I worry about the word ''expedient'', although it may simply be a standard phrase. However, ''expediency'' in ordinary English usage has a rather nasty connotation. It would seem to allow a very wide use of powers. I hope that the Minister can reassure us on the meaning of the word. I accept that it would be impossible to govern the country without statutory instruments; however, it was possible to do so in the 1960s when 30 were introduced per annum. I do not know the latest figure, but I believe that when I left the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments at the last election we were nudging the 4,000 mark. That is the extent to which this country is now governed by subordinate orders and legislation.

As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, being familiar territory does not make this unimportant territory. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to the points that were raised. First, I understand that the word ''expedient'' is the standard phrase used in such drafting; it has no hidden meanings. It is also applied elsewhere.

Of course I recognise that the power is wide. There is a balance to be struck between effective parliamentary scrutiny and the best use of parliamentary time. I am sure that all hon. Members recognise that, and indeed the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) recognised it in his remarks. In this instance, we believe that such a degree of parliamentary scrutiny would be disproportionate, given the nature of the likely supplementary, incidental and consequential provisions required. All hon. Members would accept that in a Bill of such scale and complexity there is a need for, in the words of clause 265(4)(b), a

''transitory, transitional or saving provision''.

That applies particularly to those provisions in the Bill that would need to be piloted and phased in.

The Committee that considers such matters has taken a particular interest in the issue, and hon. Members will, I am sure, be aware of the third special report of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the current session. They are called ''Henry VIII powers'' in common parlance, but given the description that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey gave the Committee of how that monarch used his powers, anything that Ministers might seek to do under these provisions would be modest in comparison.

Does the Minister recognise the possibility of the Henry VIII in Queen Anne's gate colliding with the self-proclaimed Cardinal Wolsey on the Woolsack on the matter?

I can only say that I know of no such Henry VIII in Queen Anne's gate. We shall move on.

The report said:

''We have no doubt, however, that there are occasions when Henry VIII powers to make incidental, consequential and similar provision are justified: for example, when the number of incidental, consequential etc. amendments would cause a disproportionate increase in the length of a bill or when, as a matter of practicality, it would be difficult to anticipate the full extent of such amendments during the passage of a bill.''

That, in essence, is why the provisions are included. The truth, as hon. Members will be aware, is that, given the scale and complexity of the Bill and the process that we went through in Committee, we may miss some things in order to give effect to the principles and to the clauses. Therefore it is sensible to have this provision.

It is also worth saying that the report found:

''We recognise that in some instances the negative procedure provides a sufficient level of Parliamentary scrutiny.''

Clause 265(5) sets out clearly the powers that must be exercised by statutory instrument by the affirmative resolution procedure; all others are set out in subsection (6), subject to the provisions of subsection (7).

It may reassure members of the Committee if I give an example of what those references in the Bill refer to where neither the affirmative nor negative resolution procedure applies. For example, clause 195(3) would enable description of a person responsible for monitoring where a relevant order includes an electronic monitoring requirement. A change of that

description is one example where we think that it is appropriate to deal with statutory instruments in the way in which it is set out here.

In response to what the third special report said about the balance between the affirmative and the negative resolution procedures, it may be helpful to say that the Committee said that

''reasons for any departure from affirmative procedure should be set out in full in the Explanatory Notes accompanying a bill and in the memorandum submitted to this Committee.''

As the Bill passes to the other place, a memorandum will need to be submitted to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee setting out the delegated powers sought in the Bill and the justification for seeking them. It is intended that the memorandum should set out where we think that the negative resolution procedure offers an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny for those orders. The report was issued during the passage of the Bill, and we are keen to respond to it when we have had a chance to consider it.

First, I should be grateful if the Minister would deal specifically with amendment No. 938. Rather than dealing with the generality, it seeks to bring into clause 265(5) the list of the sections where supplementary legislation would require affirmative procedure under clause 268(1). I appreciate that the Minister touched on that point incidentally.

There is a point about drafting that I would like explained now to save us debating it when we come to clause stand part. I do not understand the interrelationship of subsections (5), (6) and (7). I understand that subsection (5)(a) and (b) set out those statutory instruments that require affirmative resolution. I also understand that subsection (6) effectively provides that any other statutory instrument shall be subject to negative resolution procedure.

Then, slightly confusingly, the clause provides that anything else that has a negative procedure does not apply to a statutory instrument containing only an order made under one of the five sections on the list. A simple reading of the clause did not tell me, and will not tell the reader, whether that means that a statutory instrument goes back to being subject to affirmative resolution or does not have any requirement at all. I presume that it is the latter; that there are a few statutory instruments that do not have to go back to Parliament and that are effectively opted out of further parliamentary scrutiny. I should be grateful for further clarification on that.

The Minister quoted the Joint Committee report. I was conscious that that Committee had been asked to consider that issue, but I own up to not having read the report. I was unaware that it had been published, which was a failure on my part and one to which I plead guilty.

At the end of the last Session, the House of Lords was debating Home Office business. There was considerable concern about that issue, which partly

triggered the wider reference back to the Joint Committee for specific deliberation. I have not been able to check this, but the Minister may be able to tell us whether the House of Lords has had a chance to debate the report to which he referred. Although we reflected the concerns in our House—as the Conservatives did equally—it is clearly in the Lords where the combined power of our parties is greater, relative to the Government's, leading to a greater ability to require that the matter be reconsidered. There was general concern in the Lords, not limited to our parties but stretching also across the Cross Benches into the Labour party, that it was necessary to get a grip on the wording and not to presume that the formulation that had always been used was all right. Different wording might be necessary and care would be needed to avoid subjectivity. I think that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and I agree about that and have made the point in our different ways.

I should like the Minister to clarify his view of amendment No. 938, and to confirm whether my understanding of subsection (7) is right. Is it normal for big Bills to allow a few instances of a supplementary legislative process that does not require a return to Parliament? Could the Minister also bring us up to speed on whether anyone other than the Committee—particularly in the House of Lords—has examined and approved the general view of the Joint Committee about whether safeguards exist?

I appreciate that this is not entirely a matter for the Minister's Department, but do the Government have a view, given that this will be relevant whoever is in government, on whether consensus may be sought between the parties on an acceptable wording—and possibly a different one, depending on what we intend to provide for, and in what piece of legislation? Agreement on that issue, which arises in relation to all major Bills, would be worth achieving.

I hope that I did address the central argument of amendment No. 938 when I said that in the Government's view there was a balance to be struck between affirmative and negative procedures, and what I shall describe not as the third way procedure—

The non-procedure.

That is one way of putting it. I can confirm that subsection (7) refers to a statutory instrument being laid without further procedure; I think that that is probably the best description. However, I hope that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey will be reassured when I tell him that that approach is closely confined to the provisions listed in subsection (7). I provided an example earlier. The relevant circumstances are very limited ones in which it would not, frankly, be sensible to use either of the two aforementioned procedures to make the changes.

In fairness to the Minister, I think that he is right to say that such an order would still go before the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. We used to spend a great deal of time examining them, although I am not sure to what purpose. Nevertheless,

procedure was involved to the extent that they passed before our eyes and were occasionally commented on.

I am deeply reassured to hear that that is so.

I am not sure whether this is quite the apposite moment, but I was looking through the provisions listed in subsection (7), which my hon. Friend has said will not return to the Floor of the House, to see whether any of them contained grave and weighty matters. I had reached section 262(6)(i) in the list, but I cannot find it.

My hon. and learned Friend has used her eagle eye. It may help her to know that we, too, had spotted that. We shall correct it this morning or this afternoon, depending on our rate of progress.

Is it supposed to be section 262(7)? That would seem to be the likely alternative.

It should be subsection (6)(h).

In answer to the other point raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, I do not know whether the other place has given the matter further consideration, but I will endeavour to find out.

In a broader sense, this is really a matter for others. That said, we debated the affirmative and negative resolution procedures when we considered amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at the beginning of the Bill—that seems so long ago. As those debates made clear, it makes sense for the House to continue to reflect on how to strike the right balance between ensuring effective parliamentary scrutiny and giving practical effect to provisions that have been debated and agreed. In that way, consequentials and the other bits and pieces that, as all hon. Members recognise, arise from time to time can be dealt with in the most efficient way.

First, congratulations to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). I gave up two lines before her, so I completely failed in my duty to scrutinise every line of the Government's proposals, although I did satisfy myself about the general point before I gave up. We are grateful to her, and we look forward to the opportunities that the Minister has presented.

I understand the Government's position. We are always nervous about such issues, and we have not yet had a chance to ask our colleagues in the House of Lords—it was they who raised particular concerns—whether they are satisfied. I will therefore seek to divide the Committee on the amendment, which would provide a mechanism for protecting Parliament's rights.

I hope that there is a basis for negotiation. In that way, the parties and others may arrive at an agreement that gives us what the Minister seeks—the best balance between impractical politics and the legislative process on the one hand and attempts to hold the Executive to account on the other. I hope that the Committee will understand and that other hon. Members will join us, because this is an important matter. Ultimately, it is about ensuring that Parliament allows through only

those measures that have been dealt with under the proper process.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move amendment No. 676, in

clause 265, page 147, leave out line 40.

In a sense, the amendment is the reverse of what went before. It would remove section 139 from the affirmative resolution procedure. That is not my intention: this is a probing amendment designed to highlight the way in which we propose changes in respect of the sentencing powers of the magistrates court. Although we have already discussed that, I wish to register my continuing anxiety.

Section 139 is the power of the Home Secretary to increase limits for the magistrates court by order at some subsequent date from 12 to 18 months and to substitute for the reference to 65 weeks in section 133 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 a reference to 24 months. We debated that in the context of an earlier part of the Bill, but I cannot let the matter pass without continuing to express my concern about how we are going about it.

We already know that it is the plan to increase the sentencing power to 12 months without there being in place the custody plus and custody minus element, which will be very important in determining the number of people in the prison population. Here, we give the Minister, by order, a power to raise it yet again—not something that I necessarily disagree with—without our having the opportunity to debate the consequences. I do not want to see a negative resolution, but I worry about whether an affirmative procedure is satisfactory for what will be a very important change, if and when he decides to bring it in.

I hope that the Home Affairs Committee will have an opportunity to consider and scrutinise the measure, and that the Government will publish a paper explaining how it will work in practice and how it will affect the prison population. Otherwise, we are in danger of bringing about a substantial change in sentencing procedure at some indeterminate time, by order, on a short debate in the House or in Committee. It bothers me very much that we should leave as a hostage to fortune for a future date something that could have profound consequences for the way in which the prison system is operated.

Will the Minister consider the fact that we do not know whether the power to increase limits might be invoked next year, the year after or in five or 10 years' time? The House has not the slightest idea what the

crime rate will be then, what the prison population and the pressures on it will be, or whether there will have been adequate review of the decision that we have taken to raise sentencing limits for magistrates courts. There is a danger—I say this in all sincerity—that we shall take a decision on insufficient evidence, when a decision of such magnitude probably calls for separate legislation in a short Bill. I have no desire to see this removed into negative procedure, but I am not happy with it where it is. I do not want the Bill to leave the Committee without expressing my deep concern that we should be doing this in this way, and leaving a power to a subsequent Home Secretary—who could be Labour or Conservative—

Could be Liberal Democrat, too.

That, I have to say to the hon. Gentleman, is very wild speculation. Nevertheless, whoever the Home Secretary might be and of whatever party he—[Hon. Members: ''Or she'']—or she might be, I am reluctant to see him or her entrusted with such a power, because I do not think that Parliament will be able to exercise its proper scrutiny and to have an influence if it thinks that that is the wrong time to make such an order, or that the order should not be made at all. Those are my objections.

I support the hon. Gentleman's contention, and I do so in the context of our rapidly growing prison population. Figures released by the Home Office yesterday show that the UK now jails a higher proportion of its citizens than any other country in western Europe. We have now overtaken Portugal in that respect, and even jail more of our citizens than Libya or Malaysia. Some 72,144 of our citizens are in prison this week. The average sentence for adults has increased by five months to two years and two months. We have a burgeoning prison population. However, in clauses 137 and 138 the Government have already provided for the biggest increase in sentencing powers for magistrates courts that we have seen for a long time. Clause 139 goes beyond that and provides for powers to give further increases, without recourse to a proper debate or any satisfactory analysis of the consequences of the implementation of clauses 137 and 138.

I have to agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield: I do not think that that is a satisfactory arrangement. We are, to an extent, debating the matter after the horse has bolted. We have already touched on the matter, and this point in the Bill is our last chance in the Committee to raise a serious concern. I agree that the amendment is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the matter, in that it would take things further away from parliamentary scrutiny, but it underlines, I hope, a serious point, which is that the matter should not be dealt with by order or with only casual consideration either by Ministers or by the House. It merits detailed and considered debate on the basis of evidence. We talk so often about evidence-based law making, but I am not satisfied that the process envisaged under the Bill will provide for that.

I do not think that the Bill is satisfactory as it stands, and I suspect that colleagues in another place will find it even more unsatisfactory. I hope that the Minister will at least try to satisfy the Committee of the rightness of the path that he has chosen. However, it would be better still to reconsider the matter and perhaps find an alternative way of introducing further proposals at a later stage if he feels that those would be necessary, rather than renewing primary legislation. We all feel that that would be the most appropriate way of dealing with the issue.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for pointing out the technical deficiency in the amendment. However, that does not detract from the force of the point that he made, which we have debated at some length before. I have reflected on those debates, and although I recognise that some members of the Committee felt strongly about the matter, I do not recollect strong objections to the principle of revisiting the upper limits. That is an important consideration to bear in mind.

I shall quickly recap the argument. There is no evidence that magistrates' sentences are more severe than those of the Crown court. It is important that we hold on to that fact. I would not want anyone to have the impression that making use of the power contained in the clause to increase magistrates' sentencing powers further—to 18 months' custody in respect of one offence and 24 months' custody in respect of two or more offences to be served consecutively—would be done in a casual manner.

I accept entirely the argument about the need to reflect on the impact of the changes that the Bill would make, and the fact that we should consider all the issues referred to by the hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), before the Home Secretary can decide whether it would be sensible to use the powers in the Bill further to increase those sentencing powers. In other words, we will have to evaluate it properly and consider the evidence in order to see what the impact it will have before a future Home Secretary can decide whether it is sensible to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates.

Once that has been done, it should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure—although some may take a different view. In the light of our debate about the principle, and the fact that there has been no objection to the possibility of further extension—I think that I am right in saying that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield indicated assent to that argument—I do not think that the affirmative resolution procedure is an inappropriate way to do it. However, I acknowledge that it will be a significant step and that it will have to be done on the basis of evidence and proper evaluation.

For the avoidance of doubt, and because I do not think that the Minister was trying to misrepresent the points put earlier in the debate, we have indicated that we are prepared to accept the provision for 12 months. However, we have not said at any stage that we would accept an extension of that

without the most rigorous examination. We believe that it would take some time to adduce the necessary evidence, and among other things we would need to consider it in the context of the criminal justice and penal system as a whole. That will take years, not months, so we are talking about some distance in the future.

I shall have doubts then about making a further substantial change to sentencing policy by order rather than primary legislation. It may be 10 years ahead from the Bill's enactment, but it is a significant change in sentencing powers. It is something that should be properly considered by the House. The right way of doing that is through primary legislation, not by slipping in a provision of this kind into the Bill, as a sort of delayed-action power that can be invoked at some stage in the future. We clearly disagree with the Government. I suspect that we agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, but he can speak for himself.

I do indeed agree with the hon. Gentleman. Our position has always been that we would be prepared to consider it. We certainly did not stand in the way of the increase to 12 months—indeed, we welcomed it, accepting that it should be open to review. However, it is vastly premature to decide now that it would be correct to go for a further extension, although the Minister has reassured me to an extent by acknowledging that no such step could be taken without a great deal of consultation and scrutiny. The difficulty is that the proper mechanism for scrutiny is the passing of legislation by the House—even a short Bill. Second Reading would give hon. Members the opportunity to express their views on the principle, and in Committee and on Report, they might come up with alternative figures—for example, 15 months rather than 18 months. There are all sorts of possibilities, but they are not included in the Bill, although there appears to be at least an intention by the Government that they wish to do that at some point in the future.

I find the situation profoundly unsatisfactory.

It is not as though the Home Office normally has a lack of legislative opportunities. Not many years go by without a Criminal Justice Bill or something similar being passed as a vehicle for such change. The Home Office does not have the difficulty that some Departments might have of finding an appropriate legislative principle; they happen all the time, like a queue of buses.

I know that the Home Secretary hopes that this defining Criminal Justice Bill will lessen the need for future such Bills. However, if I were a betting man, I would speculate that we will have another such Bill in some form or other within the next two years.

Exactly.

I cannot wait.

I am glad to hear that, but I am not sure that I put myself into the same category as my hon. Friend. I seem to have been very absorbed in Bills of a criminal nature over the past two years, and a short break might be quite in order. The fact is that the

clause is unsatisfactory, but I will not press the amendment to a vote. I do not know what will be done there about this, but if I were in the other place I would take out clause 139. I do not think that it should be in the Bill in its current form. The Government should be willing to accept that such a further change should be introduced only through primary legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 753, in

clause 265, page 148, line 3, at end insert—

'section (Fine defaulters: driving disqualification)(5),'.

No. 754, in

clause 265, page 148, line 4, after '262(7),' insert—

'paragraph 5 of Schedule (Default orders: modification of provisions relating to community orders),'.—[Hilary Benn.]

I beg to move amendment No. 965, in

clause 265, page 148, line 16, leave out 'section 262(6)(i)' and insert 'section 262(6)(h)'.

This is indeed the amendment that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) spotted in her contribution. I am therefore sure that the Committee will pass it with acclaim.

I do not wish to be too contrary, but it was a subject of intrigued speculation for me as to how clause 262(6)(i) got muddled up with clause 262(6)(h). Someone may have typed the wrong key or it may have been originally intended to have a clause 262(6)(i), which was deleted at some point. Can the Minister enlighten us as to what actually happened?

Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

We have indicated our concerns about this clause and clause 268. I want to make one constructive suggestion and then confirm our position, which is that I anticipate that we will not win an argument today to amend the clause in a way in that we would be happy with. I will flag up opposition without seeking to divide the Committee further on that point. It is a matter that we may want to come back to downstairs, and we may want to pursue it even more vigorously in the House of Lords. I do not think that it is a secret that I, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and others will work to get an agreed position. If we can agree it with the Government, so much the better; if we cannot, we may have to defeat them.

On the constructive suggestion, will the Minister be so kind as to ask those responsible for drafting to look at whether the separation of clause 265 and 268 is as logical as they think, as 265 is the general power and 268 the power that deals with amendments necessary to bring other legislation into line? There may be a tidier arrangement than having two separate places with cross-references to clauses all over the place.

I see that we are about to discuss amendments Nos. 1005 to 1017; I do not remember being on a Committee in which the amendments ran into four figures. I do not object to so many amendments—Bills are here to be amended and improved, and that is a

good thing. However, if we can make them as short as possible we shall have improved them. There must be a shorter and tidier way of doing this. Some of us on the Committee will not be happy to let the Bill go through with this clause unamended, and we will take the appropriate action.

The hon. Gentleman is right. The fact that I did not vote on amendment No. 937 did not mean that I was not concerned. I was unsure whether it was sensible to divide the Committee at that point. It did not denote indifference to an extremely important issue.

I am happy to reflect on the point that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey made about the relationship between clauses 265 and 268.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 265, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 266 ordered to stand part of the Bill.