I beg to move amendment No. 953, in

clause 59, page 35, line 33, at end insert 'or'.

This is a simple drafting amendment. As it stands, the clause could be interpreted to mean that the judge can only make an exemption that covers both paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) simultaneously. The amendment makes it clear that the judge can make an exemption for the matters described in subsection (2)(a) or (b), or both.

Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

I have a minor point to make that is relevant to the clause, but also relates to other matters that we have debated elsewhere in the Bill and to which we shall doubtless return. There is real concern about the way in which arrests, charges and criminal trials are reported and we have discussed that in Committee. The matter relates to periods before proceedings in the courts and to those proceedings. I know that the Solicitor-General and her colleagues are alert to that and there has been a frank and perfectly reasonable discussion with Lord Falconer and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn).

I want to make a constructive suggestion. In Committee, the matter has come into focus in the context of the double jeopardy debate, but it is also hugely relevant elsewhere. To put it bluntly, people increasingly feel that there is trial by media rather than trial by the courts. My suggestion is that, if the Government were minded to help us, we might have an opportunity for a discussion between the parties represented on the Committee—obviously, I include the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) in that—of the ways in which Government thinking has developed since the White Paper, so that better management of reporting might be achieved. Perhaps we could do that outside the Committee and before Report.

I do not have a final or theological view that there needs to be further legislation. As a Liberal, I instinctively react against laws restricting the freedom of the press. However, there has been abuse that prejudices fair trials. Such abuse could prejudice them in various directions and could relate as much to this type of proceeding as any other. Perhaps we might reflect on the reporting of proceedings and the restrictions on that in general and in the round, rather than compartmentally. I want to flag up the point that that would be a helpful discussion. I am sure that the issue will not go away during the passage of the Bill through this place and the House of Lords. The sooner we see whether there can be consensus and we can move the management of the issue on in the advancement of justice, the better.

The hon. Gentleman raises what, as he acknowledges, has been a recurrent theme in Committee. As he rightly says, the issue relates to what happens before proceedings, as well as during them, which is what we are addressing. I think that we all agree that nothing must be done that interferes with the administration of justice, but we also all agree that we want to defend the freedom of the press. The difficulty lies in balancing those two things. I know that any Department bringing forward proposals for change in law or practice would carry out a wide consultation and consult the Liberal Democrats and the official Opposition. The issue is difficult, but it is certainly not party political.

At this stage, I cannot say anything beyond that in relation to the hon. Gentleman's points. As he has identified, the clause deals with the issue of reporting restrictions. It sets out very simply what can and cannot be reported. Obviously, alarm bells go off whenever any possible limitation on the press's right of freedom of expression is mentioned. Perhaps I can explain why the restrictions in the Bill are necessary. We had a long discussion about double jeopardy. The principles are the same, but the considerations in practice are slightly different.

The purpose of the restrictions is to prevent juries from learning of matters that may bias them for or against a defendant. In short, the restrictions are necessary to uphold the integrity of the trial process. Of course, as we have discussed, it might well be the case that that jury is actually waiting for the case to come back. There are particular reasons why reporting restrictions are required in the context of the prosecutor's right of appeal.

It is important that a jury, or a future jury, do not learn about the substance of a ruling or the appeal against it. The reasons for that are obvious. If the judge rules, for example, that the trial should be brought to an end as an abuse of process, it would be prejudicial to the prosecution case for the jury to learn of the reasons for that ruling. Conversely, if the prosecution wins its appeal, it would be prejudicial to the defendant for the jury to learn why the terminating ruling has been thrown out by the Court of Appeal.

The reporting restrictions are particularly necessary in that they cover an interlocutory appeal, made under circumstances where a resumption of the trial may be ordered before those very jurors. It is not just a matter of potential future jurors, but those still empanelled. We want the trial to remain fresh in the jury's mind, but we do not want them to be prejudiced by reading reports in the newspapers about what has happened in the Court of Appeal.

The detailed approach taken in the clause is based closely on the precedent of the reporting restrictions applied to preparatory hearings under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. We are unaware of any suggestion that those restrictions have worked other than very well in practice.

To sketch in the main features of the scheme, the restrictions are not complete. They do not prevent the reporting of the basic facts of the case, including

details of the court, judge, defendant and lawyers involved, and the offences at issue, and they are automatically lifted at the conclusion of the trial.

The clause allows the judge, the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords to lift the restrictions, either in part or completely. In addition, subsection (6) allows the defendant to make representations against such an order. In such circumstances the Court would then have to consider whether lifting the restrictions was in the interests of justice.

The clause also deals with potential conflicts of interest relating to reporting restrictions in cases where there are a number of defendants. Subsection (8) deals with the issues that may be reported, and sets them out in detail. The attempt is to be as open as possible, to allow as much to go on the record as possible, not to throw a cloak over the process to the point of being mysterious and to protect the situation until the end of the trial as far as the current—or any future—jury are concerned.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.