I beg to move amendment No. 989, in

clause 53, page 33, line 37, leave out 'may' and insert 'must'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 990, in

clause 53, page 33, line 39, leave out 'may' and insert 'must'.

We are moving to the issue of expedited and non-expedited appeals. My amendments would replace the word ''may'' with ''must''. Let us briefly consider the context. The prosecution may, for example, some time later—possibly a long time later—have told the court that it intends to appeal against a ruling and the judge may be called on to decide whether the appeal should be expedited; we shall assume that he decides that it should. According to subsection (2), the next thing that the judge may do is order an adjournment. It seems to me that he would have to order an adjournment. I am trying to get to the simple language of the provision. If the judge may grant an adjournment, he does not have to; if he does not have to grant an adjournment, I do not understand what is going on. The court will not be seized of the matter because the case would then go to the Court of

Appeal, where the counsel would disappear to conduct it. It strikes me that the judge must—not may—order an adjournment; ditto if the judge decided that the appeal should not be expedited. He must order the adjournment or discharge the jury. If he will not do either thing, I am at a loss to know what he is actually doing. I hope that I have not misunderstood the position.

Would the provision enable account to be taken of multiple proceedings or multiple defendants where other proceedings, except those that are held up by the process of appeal, will continue with the same jury and court?

The hon. Gentleman raises the point that I thought the provision referred to; a sort of multiple proceedings case. I still find myself reading the clause and trying to understand what it means in plain English. I am convinced that it means that if the judge decides that there should be an appeal and that it should be expedited, he may order an adjournment. What is to happen if the judge declines to order an adjournment, because he does not have to?

My assumption is that the measure would accommodate multiple counts where not all proceedings have to be adjourned on the basis of the specific appeal against a ruling. However, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is not clear from the clause that that is what the Government intend. It is equally clear to me, as it is to the hon. Gentleman, that in the circumstances in which that particular ruling is being appealed against, proceedings on that count must be adjourned or the jury discharged if that is the only count. Therefore, proceedings effectively fall to be terminated pro tem until the result of such an appeal is known. At the least, the Minister might consider the wording and bring back something more appropriate.

With your permission, Mr. Cran, and in order to avoid having to make any contribution on clause stand part, I wonder whether I might deal with a related issue that I mentioned earlier, which is hat directly associated with the power of the judge to order an adjournment.

I am of the opinion that such propositions seldom work. I think that we should deal with that point when we come to it.

I am grateful, Mr. Cran. I am happy to deal with that point later.

Fundamentally, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is right that we need to give the judge flexibility and discretion, because a lot of different things could be going on.

Where the prosecutor indicates an intention to appeal, both amendments would replace the judge's discretion to order an adjournment with the obligation to do so. The first amendment applies to cases where the judge considers that the appeal should be expedited. The second applies to cases where the judge considers that the appeal should not be expedited. As I said, the procedures will be operated as I set out in the chart. The detail will be set out in

rules of court and, if necessary, in practice directions or other guidance issued by the Court of Appeal.

The idea is that following the prosecutor's oral indication of an intention to appeal, the judge will express an initial view in open court as to which of the two appeal procedures is appropriate; expedited or non-expedited. Normally there will be an overnight adjournment as provided for under clauses 51 and 52, and where that happens, the opportunity will also be taken by the court authorities to ask the Court of Appeal whether, in the light of the judge's views on the preferred appeal route, an expedited appeal is realistic in the circumstances. That point can be seen on the chart.

To help the Committee, is there a list of examples of cases where the judge might think it more appropriate to have a non-expedited appeal? How long does the right hon. and learned Lady think that it would take to conclude a non-expedited appeal?

It might be that a non-expedited appeal arose on an appeal from a ruling made before a jury had been sworn in; it might be needed quickly, but the jury would not be standing by.

On the following day, there will be another hearing before the Crown court, when the prosecution will make it clear whether it wishes to appeal. The clerk of the court will also inform the judge of the results of the deliberations with the Court of Appeal authorities, and the judge will indicate in open court which appeal route should be followed.

Turning to the amendments, the judge's decision may be accompanied by a decision to adjourn, but that will not always be the case. For example, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome pointed out, when there is a trial of several co-defendants, the trial of some defendants will continue. They may not be affected by the appeal, or a defendant may be on trial for several offences and the appeal may affect only one. In those circumstances, the trial of any offences not caught by the appeal could continue.

I am not sure that I have an immediate answer to the question about how long an unexpedited appeal would take, but it would take place promptly. I am not sure whether there has been any practical discussion about that and I shall let the hon. Member for Woking know.

I take the point that an adjournment would be appropriate in relation to a ruling and an offence subject to appeal, particularly when the appeal is not to be expedited, but the amendments do not take account of the possible complexities that we discussed on previous amendments. Rather than trying to deal with all the possible situations that may arise, it is better to adopt our approach in the Bill and to give the judge discretion to grant an adjournment.

I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment. We do not need to try to envisage all the possible scenarios because we can leave that to the judge in the first instance. The judge will have a grip on the case and can decide what should be done.

I do not feel that I have had a full answer, although the Solicitor-General helpfully did

her best to give me one. The amendments are probing and it has emerged from our discussion that quite a lot of information must be laid down clearly in rules to be drawn up subsequently and probably in practice directions from the Court of Appeal. If we cannot have the information in the Bill, it must be set out clearly elsewhere so that those affected will understand where it is and that they should abide by it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I shall now return to the subject that I incorrectly tried to introduce earlier. There is provision for a judge to order an adjournment or to discharge a jury. One of the factors to be taken into account is the time scale of any prospective appeal and whether it is sensible for a jury to wait, or more sensible to have a fresh trial if the decision is reversed and the case is subject to trial proceedings.

Clause 53(4) relates specifically to the trial judge or the Court of Appeal. If it has been decided that an appeal should be expedited and then that it should not be expedited, for reasons that I am not clear about—I can imagine circumstances in which that would be the case—the clause allows the judge or the Court of Appeal to restart the process in terms of deciding whether adjournment or discharge of the jury is more appropriate. I am not clear how that relates to clause 56, which refers to an appeal to the House of Lords. If an appeal has gone to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to the House of Lords, there seems to be no provision for the poor old trial judge and the even poorer body of men and women who comprise the jury to have any respite from their prolonged period of confinement, or to allow for the discharge of those who are subject to an adjournment. That seems to be an omission.

The circumstances would not arise often, but I do not see any discretion—if it is found necessary under clause 53(4) for explicit provision to be made—for the judge to revisit the decision on whether to discharge the jury in the case of an appeal that has not been expedited. There is no similar provision to cover the circumstances in which a decision of the Court of Appeal is appealed to the House of Lords. That would, inevitably, take place over a longer time and it would be sensible for the jury to be discharged. I do not see explicit provision for the original trial judge to make that decision. Can the Solicitor-General explain whether that decision is available to the trial judge or would the process be in a state of suspended animation until the conclusion of the consideration by the House of Lords?

Clause 53(4) is designed to meet that eventuality. One of the circumstances that might change might be that the story does not end in the Court of Appeal. The matter might go to the House of Lords. Therefore,

''If he decides that the appeal should be expedited, he or the Court of Appeal may subsequently reverse that decision and, if it is reversed, the judge may act as mentioned in subsection (3)(a) or (b)'',

So, it can start expedited. That means that the judge has three options. He can decide to adjourn the case, to continue with it, or to discharge the jury even on an expedited case. If the case goes to the Court of Appeal and—where the original decision was to adjourn—it is not realistic to go back because it is then to go to the House of Lords, subsection (4) allows a reversal. It might be that the Court of Appeal rules against the prosecution. The prosecution might then indicate that it intends to appeal, at which point the Court of Appeal can rule that it will not then be expedited. That is how it will operate.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is looking puzzled. However, this matter is straightforward. The judge at first instance decides whether it is expedited or non-expedited. However, we do not want that decision to be frozen because it might become inappropriate if circumstances change, or the argument turns out to be more complicated. Therefore, subsection (4) allows for its reversal.

The Solicitor-General has correctly divined that I am puzzled. I have not followed her argument, because she seems to be stretching the definition of an expedited appeal in the Court of Appeal to encompass proceedings in the House of Lords subsequent to that appeal's having been determined—unless we are discussing an expedited appeal process that includes the House of Lords. The wording of the Bill makes no provision for that decision to be taken by the House of Lords, only for the Court of Appeal to act under clause 53(4). I hope that I am not being pedantic in saying that the construction put by the right hon. Lady on that subsection cannot really be held to deal with the specific circumstances that I have described. It deals with a set of circumstances, but not those in which, at the end of the expedited appeal, it is appealed to the House of Lords, where it is not a matter of being expedited or unexpedited, it is simply an appeal to the House of Lords on a point of law. There needs to be provision for the trial judge, in the first instance, to be able to discharge the jury under such circumstances. If the Committee is satisfied that that is encompassed by clause 53(4), I am prepared to accept it, but it does not seem to me to be the case.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.