I apologise to the Committee that the amendment paper was printed incorrectly. I apologise especially to Mr. Heath, because his and Mr. Hughes's amendments were omitted.

I beg to move amendment No. 1002, in

schedule 3, page 159, line 35, leave out paragraph (a).

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 983, in

schedule 3, page 160, line 19, leave out 'Great Britain' and insert 'the United Kingdom'.

No. 984, in

schedule 3, page 160, leave out lines 25 to 30.

I am most grateful. I do not think that the omission was quite as discriminatory as was suggested, because several amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield were also omitted. It is a general downer on the Opposition, rather than discrimination against my excellent amendments.

Amendment No. 1002 is designed to probe the Minister about why the provision for disclosure of previous convictions has been included at such a stage of proceedings. It is not clear to me that there is an immediate benefit; indeed, there is a potential disbenefit owing to the potential privileges on magistrates who consider cases. Why are previous convictions relevant in determining whether a case is tried as a summary offence or on indictment? I am not clear that they can be relevant. Obviously, the Minister thinks differently, and I want to give him the opportunity to say why. I shall perhaps respond when he has done so, as clearly there is some reason why he thinks that previous convictions should be considered by magistrates when determining the place of trial for an either way offence, although it is not immediately obvious.

I find myself in disagreement with the hon. Gentleman on his amendment. If I have understood how schedule 3 is intended to work, it is axiomatic that the previous convictions of a defendant will be a relevant consideration in deciding where trial should take place. As I understand the principle behind the regime that we are setting up, normally—although there are some slightly odd exceptions, to which I shall refer under a later amendment—if a magistrates court, having tried a defendant, concluded that its powers of punishment were insufficient, it could commit that defendant to the Crown court for sentence. The new principle is that the magistrates court will not do that, and must decide where the trial will take place at the outset, helped by the prosecution. When a trial has taken place, a magistrates court cannot send the defendant to the Crown court.

In such circumstances, it seems absolutely clear that the court must know about the previous convictions of a defendant when deciding on mode of trial, because unless it does so, it will not know whether there are offences of a kind that fall outside its jurisdiction in terms of the punishment that it can reasonably impose. Although I disagree with the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome on his amendment, there are some oddities in the wording of the schedule that I wanted to pick up with my amendments.

My amendment No. 983 concerns subsection (5)(a) of proposed new section 19 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, which says that

''any reference to a previous conviction is to be read as a reference to a previous conviction by a court in Great Britain''.

I find that odd, because it excludes a conviction by a court in Northern Ireland. I cannot for the life of me think why we should use the expression ''Great Britain'', and why a defendant's conviction or series of convictions in Northern Ireland for, say, theft offences should not be taken into consideration if he comes to appear before a court in London for trial on a similar offence. The amendment would replace the words Great Britain with United Kingdom, which would include all the territorial jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. I should be glad to hear why the Minister thinks that the amendment should not be made, because I cannot think of a good reason.

My second amendment, No. 984, concerns subsection (5)(c) and conditional and absolute discharges. The inclusion of conditional and absolute discharges as a relevant previous conviction that magistrates courts should to take into account is bizarre. The principle of an absolute discharge is that although a person is technically guilty of an offence, he is morally blameless. I can only think of two or three occasions in my professional career when I have seen an absolute discharge given, but they are cases in which the point is that no moral blame should attach to the person concerned. Again, I cannot for the life of me think why absolute discharges should feature at all.

Conditional discharges are perhaps in a slightly different category, because such a discharge relates to a period of time, and provided that the person does not commit an offence during that period, the discharge effectively becomes absolute. There may be an argument that such a discharge is sometimes given in cases where a person is seen to be morally blameworthy but it is felt that no real action should be taken. That could be seen to be slightly different, but the principle set out in the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is that they are not treated as previous convictions. I am a little concerned because, for reasons that I do not understand, the Government seem to have decided that they should be treated as previous convictions. Quite apart from anything else, and looking at the practical reality, I cannot see that they are relevant. How can a magistrates court, knowing that someone has an absolute discharge or a conditional discharge, do anything other than treat that person as of good character? If it does not, there will be complaints, and we shall end up with cases going to some sort of judicial review on the basis that there were no grounds on which a committal to the Crown court could properly be made.

I hope that the Minister can answer those two points. As I say, I am fairly persuaded that the point argued by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is not valid because I can see the reason for knowing about previous convictions, but some of the detail on which I have sought to probe does appear to be a bit odd.

The hon. Gentleman has largely done my job for me. I can therefore be mercifully brief. The argument that he advanced in opposition to the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome was exactly right; it described perfectly the reason for the change. For that reason I, too, would resist the amendment. In order to make the new arrangements work successfully, it is necessary to ensure that magistrates have the power to make the appropriate sentence, and one must obviously have regard to previous convictions in doing so.

Secondly, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for pointing out the question of convictions by a court in the UK and not only in Great Britain. He is absolutely right. Indeed, there are one or two other places where we need finally to track down the relevant changes. I accept the spirit of his amendment, and shall return to it. On reflection, we shall also want to complete what I might describe as a realignment of the boundaries, by adding findings of guilt in service disciplinary proceedings and by removing the now redundant paragraph (b).

Finally, in answer to the last point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, I accept that in practice it is very unlikely to be relevant, but the justification for including conditional discharges is merely to reflect the sentencing provisions. I do not think that it will involve a great deal of harm. There might just be circumstances in which a conditional discharge was relevant and needed to be taken into account. I take the point made by the hon. Gentleman, but I do not think that we lose a great deal by including the provisions in order to cover that extremely unlikely eventuality. However, should it arise it would probably be more sensible to include the provisions than not.

This is one of those odd situations when I find myself drawn to one of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield's amendments rather than mine. He is absolutely right about the absolute and conditional discharge. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that further. I find it difficult to think of circumstances in which that might be relevant to a court when considering a decision on committal—other than in a way that was inappropriate. Having heard the arguments on the other point, I happily beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 977, in

schedule 3, page 161, leave out lines 3 to 9.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 978, in

schedule 3, page 164, leave out lines 3 to 8.

The principle that we were discussing a moment ago is that once the decision has been taken by the magistrates that trial should take place summarily, or that they would least accept jurisdiction, and provided that the defendant has consented to the acceptance of jurisdiction by the magistrates, they cannot change their mind subsequent to conviction. I had understood that the reasoning

behind the proposal was to encourage people to be willing to be tried in the magistrates court. I was, therefore, puzzled when I saw that new section 20(2)(c), which concerns procedure where summary trial appears more suitable, says that

''in the case of a specified offence (within the meaning of section 204 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) . . . if he is tried summarily and is convicted by the court, he may be committed for sentence to the Crown Court under section 3A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 if the committing court is of such opinion as is mentioned in subsection (2) of that section.''

That, effectively, says that in the case of the specified offences in section 204, the power of the magistrates to commit for sentence after trial would remain. That appears elsewhere. My next amendment, No. 978, would omit subsection (5)(b) of new section 24A, which deals with a child or young person indicating intention as to plea in certain cases.

Section 204 describes specified offences for dangerous offenders. It says:

''An offence is a ''serious offence'' for the purposes of this Chapter if and only if it is a specified offence, and it is, apart from section 205, punishable in the case of a person aged 18 or over by imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a determinate period of ten years or more.''

I am at a loss. Many of those offences are only going to be triable by indictment, so the issue of the magistrates having a discretion to commit does not arise. There might be one or two—I shall be interested to hear from the Minister what they are—that are either way offences. If they are either way, I simply do not see why the justices should not take the decision at the outset that is in conformity with the principles that the Minister is trying to establish in the whole of schedule 3. To allow those convicted of such offences to be still capable of being committed to the Crown court after conviction seems to negate the intention of the schedule completely.

I may have misunderstood what is intended. It is a difficult schedule to read, and it is difficult to make the various cross-references. Perhaps the Minister will tell me that I have the wrong end of the stick. However, if I have understood it correctly, it is a bit of a nonsense. Can the Minister tell me why the residual power has been retained when the purpose of schedule 3 was to prevent it from happening?

I believe that my hon. Friend is on to a very good point. I should like to probe the Minister more generally. The aspect of the schedule that we are dealing with mentions a specified offence. Of course, such offences are dealt with in section 204 and again in schedule 11. Will the Minister clarify whether, by specified offence, we mean the entire list in part 1 of schedule 11—the 62 offences of violence, ranging from common assault to much more serious offences—or only those within that schedule that carry the sentence that my hon. Friend referred to? If it is the latter, I should be most intrigued to know whether the Minister thinks that nearly all of those offences are indictable only, so the issue would not arise. On my first reading of the provision, it seemed to me that the court had to go through a difficult exercise because the provision seemed to be establishing the power in relation to certain offences only.

The court has a job to do when the defendant appears before it. It must undertake cross-checking or cross-referencing to ascertain whether the offence that the person is being tried for is part of the schedule. Is there committal for sentence simply because the offence is so serious that the powers of the court are not sufficient? That cannot be right because that would have been decided in the first place and the court would not have accepted jurisdiction. Is the court committing to the Crown court for sentence because of the defendant's previous record? I should like to know whether that is the case. The matter is not clear and, like my hon. Friend, I should appreciate an explanation.

The practical effect of amendment No. 977 would be to remove the requirement for the court to explain to an adult defendant offered summary trial under new section 20 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 that, if he agrees to summary trial, he may nevertheless, if convicted, be sent to the Crown court for sentence under the dangerous offender provisions in new section 3A of the 2000 Act. Amendment No. 978 would do likewise when a juvenile defendant is asked to indicate a plea under the plea before venue procedure. New section 24A(5)(b) now requires a similar, though more extensive, warning to be given about the consequences of a guilty plea.

The reason for such provisions is that, when a defendant is required to make a choice—in the one case between summary trial and trial on indictment and, in the other, between offering a guilty plea, a plea of not guilty, and no plea—he should be given as clear an idea as possible about the implications. Such offences are brought about by the dangerous offender sentence provisions, which are triable either way. It is possible that the need for such a sentence to be considered might be recognised only after the allocation decision is taken—hence the preservation for the offences in the circumstances of the power to commit for sentence. That being so, it is necessary for the position to be explained.

Did the Minister say that it might only be possible to reach a conclusion about whether or not to commit after the trial, when certain matters became clearer? I simply do not know what that means. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could explain it to me.

I shall repeat it—[Interruption.] Well, I said that it is possible that the need for such a sentence to be considered might be recognised only after the allocation decision was taken. That is why it is necessary to preserve it.

I remain puzzled by the provisions. The purpose of schedule 3 and the White Paper, which ties in with the original intention, is to remove the process of committal for sentence after trial at the magistrates court. The reason for that was that it was thought undesirable that a situation should exist where a defendant, having been told that he could have trial at the magistrates court if he so wished, did not avail himself of that opportunity because he said to himself, ''Oh well, I will be committed for sentence anyway the

moment that they hear about my antecedents afterwards.'' So the principle, which I wholly support, was that the court should hear about the antecedents and previous convictions beforehand, take a decision and be fixed with that decision. After all, with the prosecutor's involvement in the process, it could hardly be said subsequently that all the matters could not be brought before the court to allow it to take an informed decision at the outset. However, what we have is a system under which the court will now hear about previous convictions before trial; on top of that, the Government have chosen to preserve the power to commit to sentence after trial. I was totally unaware of that until I started to scrutinise the detail of schedule 3 last week.

I am very unhappy because that choice goes against the Government's stated intention to simplify the procedure and to encourage people to be tried in the magistrates court. One of the Government's anxieties was that in the past there were far too many instances of people being committed to the Crown court for sentence only to receive there a sentence that would have been well within the tariff that the magistrates court could impose. One of the provisions of the Bill that I support completely is the extension of the sentencing powers of magistrates to reduce the clogging up of the Crown court.

I appreciate the Minister's point that the amendments would remove the need to warn a defendant beforehand that he could be committed. However, that relates to an Act of 2000 under the old system. It should no longer be necessary to provide such a warning because it should no longer be possible for a person to be committed to a Crown court after being convicted in a magistrates court. The magistrates should be required to take the decision on whether they accept jurisdiction at the outset. We could create a situation in which the defendant could argue that he has been misled or in which the intention to encourage people to be tried in magistrates courts is negated because the old regime will still apply.

As I think that the Minister acknowledged, I find it very difficult to think of instances when there will be either way offences that fall into clause 204's definition of specified offences and dangerous offenders. However, I recognise that there may be one or two. None the less, when magistrates first consider a case, they will be told something about the facts and the defendant's antecedents. They will be able to see that the offence is one for which a long sentence is likely and will decide whether the case must go to the Crown court. Nevertheless, the Government are anxious to retain that residual power, and they should not be allowed to for it goes completely against the intention in the White Paper on how the Government wanted to see magistrates court jurisdiction develop.

I should like the Minister to assure me that he will reconsider the matter; if he will not, I think that I will put it to the vote. It is an issue of principle, and I am unpersuaded by his argument that the Government must retain that power.

I am completely confused, as, I believe, is the Minister about the purpose of this paragraph.

Can he give me one example of when it would operate in practice?

Gladly. The truth is that this is a very narrow derogation from the principle in the Bill that a defendant tried summarily should be dealt with by the magistrates. There are two sets of circumstances in which it might arise. First, it might arise if, after a defendant pleads guilty and reports are ordered, it becomes apparent that a sentence as a dangerous offender is required. The second set of circumstances is that the defendant agrees to a summary trial, but facts emerge during the trial that show that a sentence for a specified offence is appropriate. Those two sets of circumstances are the reason for the narrow derogation from the broad principle.

The second example given by the Minister is bad. If it were right, the intention behind schedule 3 must be wrong as a matter of principle, and we ought to retain the old system.

I wonder whether my hon. Friend heard the first point of the Minister's argument, which was that the pre-sentence report might reveal factors that would encourage the court's change of mind. That surely is sentencing based on a pre-sentence report, not on the case before the court.

Yes. I agree with my hon. Friend about that as well, and I was about to address the first point. I thought that the second one was so glaring because it went against the whole thrust of the previous argument advanced by the Government, but my hon. Friend is right that the first example given by the Minister is equally unsatisfactory. It should not be necessary for the sentencing report to guide the court. The intention behind schedule 3 is that the prosecutor could say to the court, ''This is a case where you can accept jurisdiction or not.'' The court would know about the previous convictions and be able to make an informed decision.

I do not know where the civil service has been in all this, but up in the upper recesses or garrets of the Home Office, somebody got it into his head that he must not allow this power to slip away entirely. As a result, he wanted to keep it and tried to slip it into schedule 3 in such a way. That is not satisfactory. The Government must come up with a better explanation.

I am worried, too, but if we go back to clause 205 and dangerous offenders, which lays out how an extended sentence might come to be passed, it states that the court must be satisfied or

''of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences.''

On most occasions, a magistrate deciding on jurisdiction by himself or in the Crown court might spot such people with the help of the Crown Prosecution Service, but is the hon. Gentleman really saying that he is certain that a magistrate would never miss it at that stage and that it would not arise later on in a trial or in a perusal of reports? The risk that would be taken is that some people would then not get the extended sentences that they should receive for the protection of the public.

The hon. Gentleman makes—

A good point.

It is a very good point—I accept that—but at the same time I think that it is slightly unreal. Let us suppose that a defendant is brought before the magistrates court who has a record, for instance, of frequent violence against other people, possibly of quite a low grade, but who is well known to the local police as, to put it bluntly, somebody who seems to have a pathological personality—very unpleasant and a constant worry to them.

If the police are doing their job properly, they will pass that information to the prosecutor. The previous behaviour has been recorded in respect of the previous convictions of the defendant. Although they have attracted only short sentences, the prosecutor can say that, despite the sentences, he should point out the facts relating to the cases. The prosecutor could say that if the case goes to the Crown court, he may well apply for an extended sentence. That will be the end of it, will it not? The magistrates then say that the case must be committed to the Crown court for trial.

It occurs to me that either the prosecution or the magistrates in certain cases would be guilty of astonishing dereliction if they allowed a case to be presented that proposed a genuine and serious risk of substantial harm to the community without presenting that information to the magistrates so that they took account of that in their initial assessment. That is really clutching at straws. I am inclined to agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a spare part that the Home Office is determined to have in its Bill, just in case. I do not think that it is appropriate.

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. The anxiety is that for some reason that system will break down, but at least at the end of the trial somebody will realise that that is the case. At that point, somebody will be able to save the day by saying, ''Look, we have discovered all these terrible things about this defendant.'' The proposition advanced by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) is unreal. If that is the cause of their anxiety, the Government should never have embarked on the schedule 3 procedure. On that basis, it would always be necessary to wait until the end of the summary trial for the magistrates to make the informed decision, based on the report, on whether to accept jurisdiction over anything.

The hon. Gentleman describes as unreal my proposition that sometimes events might unfold after the point of the election and the decision on jurisdiction. I would prefer to say that such instances are infrequent. If he accepts that they are infrequent, does that not mean that some people would not get the extended sentence that they should if he were successful in his opposition? That would be detrimental to the protection of the public. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome says that such a case would be an example of bad performance by the Crown Prosecution Service, but I do not accept that that is the only reason why magistrates would not know. However, even if that were the reason, are we saying that the public cannot be protected because the CPS did a bad job one day?

The hon. Gentleman makes the point again, but let us look at it another way. I can think of a number of examples in the course of my professional career in which the antecedents of a defendant proved to be incorrect. One has gone to court—Crown court—and the defendant has stood trial and been convicted and sentenced based upon antecedents that he has accepted, having lied to his own counsel. Although one subsequently learned that there were huge antecedents—that has happened—the case could not be reopened.

There is always the risk that the court might get it wrong. Apart from antecedents, it could be that the court is in ignorance, for example, of the fact that the defendant has been receiving psychiatric medical care and that the psychiatric assessment made elsewhere in the country is that that person is very dangerous. The risk always exists, but at some point one has to bring down the barrier and say that the decision has been made and the sentence has to be based on the available information.

I do not find the fears that are being expressed sufficiently great to drive a large coach and horses through the principle behind the schedule, which is the desirability of encouraging defendants to plead guilty in the magistrates court at the earliest opportunity or to accept summary trial and the jurisdiction of the magistrates court, and not to clog up the Crown court with minor offences.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman to look at the matter differently? This is not a matter of principle, it is a matter of practice. He is saying—and we all agree—that we should not clog up the Crown court. If we do not want to do that through having what he describes as a coach and horses, might it not simply be because of the exceptions of which my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford has spoken? Should we not give magistrates guidance on the exceptional circumstances, so that they do not use the procedure at a point at which it should not be used? It is practice, not principle.

Perhaps it is my fault for having tabled the amendment and not done the research—although the Minister has not been able to help us—but I do not know how many either way offences come into the category within section 204, or what they are. My anxiety is that, because of the way in which we have created specified offences and looking back on our previous consideration of dangerous offenders, they might turn out to comprise rather a wide group. If that happens, it will be an open invitation to magistrates to break their pledge.

We have designed a system to ensure that an individual will be tried and sentenced in the magistrates court, and that there is certainty as to the upper limit of the sentence. However, we shall have magistrates saying, ''Thank you for that guilty plea. We are terribly sorry, but we are now going to send you to the Crown court for sentencing.'' The laudable intention behind the schedule will be negated. I understand the fears expressed by the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford) and by the Minister but I do not think that they are real.

In the circumstances, I do not form the impression that the Minister has been fully briefed on the background intentions of the civil service draftsmen in respect of leaving in the power. I wish to put the amendment to a Division to mark my disagreement, but I remain open to persuasion subsequently. The Minister can write to me.

Question put, That the amendment be made—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes. 12.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move amendment No. 1003, in

schedule 3, page 161, line 14, leave out

'may, but need not,' and insert 'must'.

The amendment is a variation on the usual may-must debates. It raises a serious point. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield talked about driving a coach and horses through schedule 3, but I do not claim that the amendment would do that. It would be along the lines of a pony and a small gig, or perhaps a pig in a barrow. The thrust of schedule 3 is to avoid uncertainty and matters going to the Crown court that need not be dealt with there and that can be dealt with safely in the jurisdiction of the magistrates court. Magistrates will assess at the initial stages whether their powers of sentencing are sufficient and reach a preliminary view about what sentence they are likely to impose on a finding of guilt.

There is provision within the schedule for the defendant to request from the bench an indication whether it is likely to impose a custodial or non-custodial sentence, so that he can decide whether to elect for a Crown court committal, so it is bizarre that the bench will have the ability to say that it has reached a view, but that it will not tell the defendant what it is. That seems perverse. I cannot see the benefit of such a provision. If we are to have clarity in the system, so that everyone knows where they stand and what the likely consequences will be, it is appropriate either that everyone is left in the dark about whether they will receive a custodial or non-custodial sentence, or that their requests are answered.

It seems perverse to allow people the capacity to make the request, but for there to be no requirement on the court to answer that request. It will have the effect of defendants being advised to opt for a Crown court committal in cases in which they might not otherwise have done so. That is contrary to the intentions of schedule 3 and contrary to the Government's intentions, which we broadly support. I am normally greatly in favour of discretion for

magistrates courts, but it seems odd to leave the decision to the discretion of the court. Perhaps the Minister can explain in which circumstances he would expect the bench not to make such an indication, and whether it would be required to give any reasons for that.

I am hearing two conversations in the Committee. Could the other conversation that is taking place take place out in the Corridor?

I rise to support the amendment, which seeks to insert ''must'' instead of ''may''. It seems silly to have a provision that says:

''If the accused requests an indication of sentence, the court may, but need not, give such an indication.''

There are many court centres in London in which four, five, six or seven courts are sitting at once. Lay magistrates staff some, and district judges others. It would be difficult for a defendant to face a tribunal quite uncertain about whether the court will give an indication as to sentence, given that the practice is bound to vary so much if the discretion is allowed.

Some lay magistrates might always say, ''No, it's not our practice to give an indication as to sentence.'' Some district judges, perhaps with more experience, might always give an indication of sentence because it is their practice to do so. Where is the fairness for the defendant, who might find himself before one tribunal or another, completely by accident, through the listing systems? The contrary may be the case. The lay bench might be prepared to give an indication, but the district judge might not be prepared to do so. However, it is surely silly simply to say:

''If the accused request an indication of sentence, the court may, but need not, give such an indication.''

The question arises of in what circumstances the court should give an indication. Perhaps the Minister can outline those to us. What happens if the court refuses to give an indication and the defendant presses the court through his counsel for a reason why? Is the court obliged to give reasons?

With his experience in such proceedings, which is considerable and valuable, is the hon. Gentleman saying that in every lay magistrates court somebody could reasonably ask that court to give an indication of sentence, and that that would be a satisfactory way of proceeding throughout the country? I submit that it would be a recipe for disaster if every lay magistrate had to give indications for sentence.

I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but surely he accepts the point that making that a power but not a duty is the worst of all worlds. One lay magistrate will say, ''Yes, I'll give an indication,'' and another lay magistrate will say, ''No, I won't give an indication.'' However, the defendant coming into court at the beginning of the day does not know whether he will appear before a lay magistrate of experience, or a lay magistrate of no or relatively little experience. Until he arrives at court and sees the list, the defendant does not know whether he is before a district judge or a deputy district judge. In practice, his counsel will surely say to him, ''Now look, we had our plans today to get an indication of

sentence, but you're in court 3. My judgment is that court 3 aren't going to give an indication of sentence, but we'll get your case slipped into court 2.'' That is quite easy: in practice, one would simply say to the usher, ''Can you move me to court 2? I don't like the look of court 1,'' or, ''I know the magistrate too well.'' Those interchanges do take place.

I tell the Minister that the provision whereby the court might or might not give an indication is unsatisfactory. A court that gives an indication of sentence is doing the defendant a favour because he can then proceed with some certainty. A court that does not is not doing the defendant a favour, and he is not proceeding with any certainty.

What are the criteria to be? On what basis would a court give an indication of sentence, and on what basis would it not? My judgment is that full-time judiciary, district judges, will always give an indication of sentence if they are asked. I cannot think of a situation in which they would not, because their purpose is the smooth administration of justice. However, a lay bench might take a different view. It is not fair to have a situation in which one set of proceedings happens in court 1, another in court 2, another in court 3 and another in court 4. That would be a lottery and not sensible. There are no circumstances in which the court would not be prepared to give such an indication—can I press the Minister on that point?

Looking briefly, although perhaps I should not, at subsection (7),

''If the accused indicates that he would plead guilty''—

I do not think that the word ''would'' is very happy there. ''Intends to plead guilty'' is much better.

There is general agreement with the principle that by providing as much information as possible to defendants we can encourage them to make a decision about where they wish to be tried. I have listened with interest to the debate. When Lord Justice Auld considered the issue, he felt that it was not possible to state that there would always be circumstances in which it would be possible to give an indication of sentence. Although I recognise, in relation to the magistrates court, that it is possible to refuse to give the broad indication that the Bill permits, it is certainly the intention to encourage the magistrates to give a sentence indication when it is practical to do so. The only circumstances in which they would decline to do so would be those in which there was insufficient information.

I accept that in practice a refusal to give a broad indication—in the magistrates court, that would mean custody or not—might be interpreted as tantamount to informing the defendant that he faces a custodial sentence.

This brings us back, in an odd way, to our discussion on the earlier amendment about the anxiety that if one commits oneself, one will not subsequently be able to step back. There is a danger that magistrates will take the opportunity not to give indications. The reticence within the system will defeat the laudable objective of the clause.

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. The whole purpose is to encourage magistrates to do precisely that. If the consequence were to be as he describes, it would defeat our objective.

I would like to reflect on this a little further. We all want to achieve the objective, but it is a question of going back to what Lord Justice Auld said in coming to his view. It should not be a duty in all circumstances to provide an indication, because it might not be possible. I undertake to consider further whether there is a way of resolving the matter in the spirit in which the debate has been conducted.

I am grateful to the Minister. I was contemplating pressing the matter to a Division, but he is clearly prepared to reconsider. It is a serious matter. The point made by the hon. Member for Woking about having a consistency of approach and not ending up with a two or three-tier magistrates court system for which different criteria apply is important in itself. In circumstances in which there is insufficient material or information to provide a reply to that question, the magistrates have probably had insufficient information to make their initial assessment, and therefore the one is concomitant with the other.

Equally, if magistrates have been able to make an assessment as to the appropriate place of trial, they will have had sufficient information to give at least an idea of their intention in respect of sentence. If lay magistrates do not feel equipped to do that, they should be given the support and advice to enable them to do so. If that is part of the process envisaged, should not there be one system across the country? There should not be one process for Horseferry Road and another for a place out in the sticks where no one is assumed to be able to make an effective judgment as to what they intend to do.

The Minister has been very helpful in his response. He has undertaken to think about the matter, and we also would do well to reflect on the issue, and perhaps consider it again later. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 1004, in

schedule 3, page 169, line 28, at end insert—

'( ) if it is in the interests of justice to do so'.

The amendment deals with sending cases brought against children or young persons to the Crown court. Under the previous amendment, I was trying to reduce the discretion available to magistrates, but under this one I am trying to widen it. That is my normal intention, except when it is not in the interests of justice to do so. I am specifically asking that magistrates be given the discretion to follow the dictates of the interests of justice in circumstances that are not explicit in the conditions listed in new section 51A(3) in schedule 3 if there is a good judicial reason for a young person's case being sent to the Crown court.

It would be idle to speculate on the circumstances in which such a provision might apply, but I would hate

there to be a fetter on the discretion of magistrates courts that prevented them from, in some circumstances, considering what would be in the interests of justice as it relates to young people and children who, as I think we all agree, require special consideration in relation to judicial processes. If, when all matters are taken into account, a case would be better dealt with at a Crown court, magistrates should have the ability to send it there, irrespective of the general thrust of schedule 3 and the way in which disposals are indicated.

This is the sort of amendment that the Minister has rejected previously on the basis that everything is always done in the interests of justice, and I suspect that his argument will be similar in this case. New section 51A(3) provides for specific conditions, and there is no general condition included. I ask him to consider whether this is a case in which a spare-part provision to allow an overriding discretion to the magistrates might be appropriate.

The hon. Gentleman does indeed anticipate my argument in every respect. First, if we wanted to add references to the interests of justice, the easier thing to do would have been to have a kind of preamble, although I know that there is no legislative provision for doing so. Nothing in the Bill should be interpreted as being other than in the interests of justice. If that had been understood, we would have got many of the debates out of the way right at the start, but I am sure that parliamentary counsel would have told me that it was wholly inappropriate.

When I read the amendment, I was not entirely clear whether the hon. Gentleman intended it to apply to all of subsection (3) or only to subsection (3)(d).

I intended it to be an additional condition that could be applied under subsection (3).

In relation to subsection (3)(a) and the offence of homicide, I find it hard to conceive of circumstances in which it would be in the interests of justice for such cases not to be sent to the Crown court. However, the rationale behind the new section to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which is added by paragraph 16 of schedule 3, is that it should set out with clarity all the circumstances in which cases involving young defendants should be sent for trial to the Crown court. If we have missed any circumstances, we would certainly wish to add them, but I am not persuaded that a catch-all provision of the sort advanced by the hon. Gentleman would itself be in the interests of justice.

I confess that when first reading the amendment I was slightly unclear—I remain so—whether the words

''if it is in the interests of justice to do so''

are supposed to qualify an offence of homicide so that it must still be in the interests of justice to send it to the Crown court, or whether it would add an extra provision that meant that any offence might be so treated if it was in the interests of justice to do so.

I thought that I had just answered that point. I intended it to be an additional condition under subsection (3), so that if the magistrates believed that

the interests of justice would best be served by a young person being sent to a Crown court they could do so for any offence, outwith the other strict conditions.

I apologise to the hon. Gentleman if I did not properly follow his clarification. Now that I understand, I find myself thinking that he is wrong. The wide power that that would give the magistrates would be completely unnecessary. That brings us back to the question of why we have two potentially different systems of trial in the magistrates court and the Crown court. That is particularly so with children and young persons, where the clearly established principle is that the trial should normally take place in the more informal setting of a juvenile court. The amendment is unnecessary—indeed, it is rather undesirable.

I sense that I do not carry the Committee with me. Under heavy fire, I think it best to retreat and regroup—which I intend to do. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That this schedule be the Third schedule to the Bill.

Notwithstanding the disagreement a few minutes ago over the committal procedure for dangerous offenders who might be the subject of extended sentences, I want to thank the Minister for agreeing eventually to include a provision about magistrates not sending cases to the Crown court for sentencing when they choose to deal with the trial themselves. I promoted something similar in the previous Parliament, when I moved an amendment on Report to the ill-fated Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill. I called it the Scottish amendment, because that has long been the practice in Scotland. At the present rate of committals for sentence, I am certain that such a measure would save the Crown courts from having to deal with thousands more cases a year.

In congratulating the Minister on his move, I point out that some say that his decision, together with giving magistrates extended powers of sentencing, will mean more people being sent to prison rather than fewer. I ask him to confirm that he is very much focused on that not being a perverse outcome of such a welcome measure.

As the Minister understands, we welcome schedule 3 and its intention. I had forgotten the role that the hon. Member for Stafford played in promoting this in the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill. It was unfortunate for him that it was tagged on to such a bad piece of legislation. I remain concerned about the fate of this piece of legislation as it also contains provisions that tinker with jury trial—provisions that will have to pass the scrutiny of their Lordships before the Bill can be enacted. Nevertheless, it has a better chance of getting on the statute book than the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill.

The hon. Gentleman is also right that one of the consequences of such a change, allied to the increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates, may well be a greater tendency to send people to prison. That is not

the intended outcome of the Bill—the original intention was that the magistrates should exercise their jurisdiction more frequently in areas that fall within their competence. That remains a matter of concern, particularly as custody plus and custody minus will not be introduced at the same time as the increase in magistrates' sentencing powers. However, that does not detract from the value of schedule 3, which I hope will work well and will ensure, as the Minister said, that the Crown courts are not clogged up with trivial offences that can properly be dealt with elsewhere.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford for his kind words. I claim no credit whatever for this. Rarely has schedule 3 brought such happiness to a member of the Committee. I, too, am glad that he reminded the Committee of his involvement with the Scottish amendment, which obviously has the support of the whole Committee. We debated the potential effect on the prison population at some length. We have yet to take final decisions on the phasing in of custody plus and custody minus and on the increase in magistrates' sentencing powers. I draw the Committee's attention to the new range of community disposals that form part of the Bill, and to which we are very attached, not least because they have proved successful in reducing reoffending. That is what the Bill is intended to achieve.

An example of that is the figures on juvenile offender reconviction that were published this morning. The figures—the second set that we have had—show that the youth justice reforms have brought about a reduction of 22.5 per cent. in the reconviction rate, building on a 14.5 per cent. reduction in reconvictions that was shown in the first cohort. That demonstrates that by making more imaginative and rigorous disposals available to the criminal justice system, one can reduce reoffending.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.