I beg to move amendment No. 940, in

clause 49, page 31, line 37, leave out from 'termination' to end of line 41 and insert

'or stay of proceedings for the offence, or one or more of the offences, included in the indictment'.

This is one of my cameo appearances, which is how I believe they are described at the Oscars. The Government and the Opposition have tabled several amendments to part 9, which comprises clauses 49 to 61. The clauses have a very simple objective: to give the prosecution an opportunity to appeal against judges' terminating rulings. It is a simple objective, but, as I expected, the diligent and experienced Opposition team have smoked out the matters of concern in these clauses.

First, there are issues of principle, secondly there is the issue of whether the measures will work in practice, and thirdly there is an issue surrounding which rulings

should be covered. I hope that that indication about the themes that we will deal with will be helpful at the outset.

Like the other Government amendments, amendment No. 940 has a technical flavour, but it does not alter the fundamentals of the scheme. We will discuss those matters later. As hon. Members will be aware, part 9 will provide prosecutors with a new interlocutory right of appeal against terminal rulings made by a judge. The amendment will ensure that the definition is sufficiently wide to cover rulings that are envisaged. Such rulings may either be what one might describe as formally terminating, in the sense that the judge might bring the proceedings to a close without any intervention on the part of the prosecutor, or they may be de facto terminating—terminating in practice—in the sense that the prosecutor might regard a ruling as fatal and would, but for the right of appeal, abandon the proceedings by offering no evidence or no further evidence. Although such proceedings might not in themselves be terminal, they might be described as fatally weakening.

The first category of rulings is defined in clause 49, which explains that a terminating ruling would bring the proceedings to a close without any intervention on the part of the prosecutor. We had to define a terminating ruling in that way because judges may make a wide range of terminating rulings and we did not wish inadvertently to miss any out. The amendment fine-tunes the definition, and it addresses our concern that the current definition of a terminating ruling might be interpreted as excluding rulings that stay the proceedings. That is something about which the Opposition are concerned. The amendment makes it clear that stays are included in the definition and can therefore be appealed against.

I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for her introductory remarks. Some of the Opposition amendments that we will deal with in due course are principally probing amendments. However, the first point that she made clarified the position that a stay is now, without doubt, defined as a terminal ruling for the purposes of the relevant clauses. We may now be bringing a stay in as one of the rulings that could terminate proceedings, and I want to question her about that.

There are various rulings that a judge can make that would bring a case to an immediate conclusion without further intervention of any kind from the prosecution. A typical example, which I suspect that we would all agree is the most usual, is a ruling of no case to answer. Perhaps we will move on to that matter in later debates. Of course, when there is no case to answer, the case is over, the prosecution does no more—indeed it can do no more—and that is the end of the matter. Another example is a stay on the grounds of an abuse of process. Such a ruling would bring a case to a conclusion. Those are less frequent than successful submissions of no case to answer, but they are none the less important.

Committee members may not know what is a stay of process or an abuse of process. I have come across one example where the prosecution's principle evidence was a videotape taken at the scene of the crime. The offence was violent and took place in the street. It became apparent only at the trial that there was a video of the whole event. The prosecution had not produced the video for the defence and at least one witness said that the defendant was not involved but was an innocent bystander who watched, but did not participate in, the punch-up. It was plain to the court, and admitted by the Crown, that the prosecution had been negligent because it had not sought out the video. In a similar case, the prosecution had sought out the video, found that it was helpful to the defence but lost it and did not hand it to the defence. In such a case, the court will hear a submission from the defence that an abuse argument should take place and that proceedings should be stayed.

My initial point for the Minister is that we should be careful not to interfere too much with judicial discretion because judges will otherwise make a series of rulings that will be increasingly subject to a challenge by the Crown as legislation develops over the years, which would lead to practical difficulties and consequences. I tell the Minister—cautiously at this stage because there will be further debates on the subject later in the day—that the abuse argument is an important tool at judges' discretion to stay proceedings for various reasons that generally reflect on the credit of the prosecution. The introduction of a measure that can be appealed against is bold, but I hope that he understands that I have the gentlest of worries, at this stage at least, about widening too much the different terminating rulings that can go to appeal. I do no more than lay the ground for later discussions.

I am sure that I am stepping into a field that contains technicalities of which I am unaware. As a non-practitioner, it is almost certain that I shall be told that I am misdirecting the information that I have.

I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for her letter of 20 February that gave examples of possible rights of appeal if a case is terminated. Will the examples be considered? A couple of the examples involved a judge who required disclosure of identity after which the prosecution felt unable to proceed with evidence either on the basis of a public interest immunity defence or because an individual might be put at risk.

I examined the clause carefully and I read the words

''without any further action by the prosecution''.

In that instance, it is the prosecution's decision that they can no longer provide evidence, rather than a judge's decision. A decision by a judge does not inevitably lead to the prosecution concluding that they can no longer give evidence—I hope that I make myself clear. I am not sure whether that would be defined as a terminating ruling, because there is a two-stage process.

It is not inevitable that the identity of an informant or evidence that the prosecution believe to be covered by public interest immunity cannot be disclosed because the prosecution decide whether they can no

longer provide evidence. I ask, in ignorance, whether that would come within the meaning of a terminating ruling as it applies in the clause, given that the prosecution decide whether they are prepared to continue with the case after a judge's ruling.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.