I beg to move amendment No. 909, in

clause 219, page 121, line 10, leave out subsection (5).

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 910, in

clause 219, page 121, line 14, leave out subsection (6).

This is an opportunity for the Government to be absolutely clear about their intentions towards the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stafford and compatibility with human rights legislation, and towards the House of

Lords in the case of Anderson. There was a clear indication that the Home Secretary's immediate reaction to those judgments was to seek to reintroduce the Home Secretary's role in dealing with the Parole Board on early release. It is not explicit in the Bill that it will do that job. There is fuzziness in the Government's approach as to whether the Bill is the vehicle that they have chosen—as they would say—to rectify that omission. We would say that an anomaly in the present situation will continue. It is entirely sensible to ask the Minister whether he believes that this is the vehicle to rectify the omission. If it is not, when does he intend to rectify it? Moreover, why has he not used the Bill to do so, given the clear intention that the Home Secretary expressed after the judgments in question were made?

Subsections (5) and (6) would give the Home Secretary a degree of control over the Parole Board. It is at least debatable that that degree of control would be in excess of that which is compatible with human rights legislation. The clause might be subject to further challenge if it were found that that power had been used inappropriately.

First, the Minister must satisfy the Committee that what he is doing deals—or does not deal—with the situation. Secondly, if it is not intended to deal with it, does it not give the Home Secretary an inappropriately strong role in the Parole Board's proceedings? If the Minister does not believe that to be the case, why does he believe that? Why does he believe that for the Home Secretary to exercise that power in future would not fall foul of precisely the same legal findings of incompatibility as his previous intervention?

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated after the Stafford judgment that he intends to review the directions on the release of prisoners serving life sentences, with a view to strengthening them. The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is that there is no legal impediment to the Home Secretary setting down directions, as long as they are compliant. I should point out that the Home Secretary is responsible for criminal justice policy, and is accountable to Parliament for all aspects of that policy. He is also, ultimately, responsible for the supervision of all offenders on licence and answerable to Parliament in respect of their release arrangements. It is therefore wholly reasonable that he should be able to set down the considerations that are to be taken into account when determining whether to grant early release.

However, that does not give the Home Secretary unfettered discretion to set down excessive or unreasonable criteria that must be met before release can be granted. All directions must be compliant with article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The rules that the Home Secretary may make have no influence on the determination of applications for early release. They offer a procedural framework within which the Parole Board works when it sits in a quasi-judicial capacity in the form of oral hearings. Although the Home Office draws up the rules, the Parole Board is always fully consulted.

Therefore we accept entirely that directions, in order to be lawful, must be compliant with article 6.

That was not an entirely convincing argument.

It was not bad.

I was listening carefully, and I hoped that the Minister was going to make a more clinching point than simply saying that the proposal was not necessary. I remain to be convinced, as, I suspect, does my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), that the Government are addressing the issues raised by the judgments, or that the power to intervene is necessary bearing in mind the need for the independence of the Parole Board in exercising its functions. Having said that, we are likely to return to the matter. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 219 ordered to stand part of the Bill.