Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I continue the campaign for honest sentencing. Subsection (3)(a) seems to contradict itself. In defining ''the requisite custodial period'', the provision says that

''in relation to a person serving a sentence of imprisonment for a term of twelve months or more'',

that means one half of his sentence. Rather than stating that there will be a 12-month sentence and then that the person will serve only six months, why are we not honest? Why do we not say that they will serve six months? If the other six months were served under the licence provisions, people would not say that those sentenced to 12 months were being let out after six, but would instead realise that they had served their sentence, that they would be constrained under licence for a further six months, and that if they broke its conditions they would go back into custody. Then we would genuinely have custody plus rather than imprisonment minus.

We all agree that that is the right way to proceed but the public perceive that we are somehow letting people out early. Instead, we should impose onerous constraints on such people once they have served an appropriate sentence. I think that we would all agree that, in those circumstances, that should honestly and actually be six months.

I am very keen that statements should be made in court that people can understand. I look at it slightly differently from the hon. Gentleman, but wish for the same effect. I have said before that the

benefit of the Government's policy is that, in effect, sentences will have two halves—an inside half and an outside half. We need to make it clear what judges should say.

There should be a formula, so that whatever else they might say about the crime and the trial, judges will have to say something that makes it clear that the sentence is in two halves—for instance, they may say, ''You will be sentenced by the court to three years. Half of that time will be spent inside, and the second half will be spend outside on licence; you will therefore expect to be released on such and such a date. If you reoffend after that, you can expect to go back inside.''

I do not think that there is very much between the hon. Member for Nottingham, North and me, but I am equally clear that sentencing has been thoroughly confusing for some years, and it is not helpful.

We shall soon come to discuss home detention curfews, a subject that raises separate but perfectly proper and important issues. The Government know that we are generally supportive. I am keen that the Minister should let judges know, if he has not done so already, that he is willing to talk to them about a formula that makes clear what the sentence is, the minimum time inside and the fact that coming out again is not the end of the sentence, but part 2 of the sentence.

The Minister knows well that the logic of doing that is strengthened because it would also allow judges to say, with more credibility, ''You will get a sentence of custody, plus a sentence that will be served in the community. Conditions will be attached to the sentence, and if those conditions are breached, you will lose your liberty.'' That would be consistent for non-custodial and custodial sentences.

I have sympathy with what was said by the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and for Nottingham, North. My new clause 10, which was not discussed, would have been honesty in sentencing writ large. It would have said that someone sentenced to one, two or three years in prison would have to serve that time—but with a little time off for good behaviour because prison governors need that incentive so that they can keep order. Although that is the ultimate in honesty in sentencing, it has the disadvantage that it takes no account of the importance of post-release supervision and probation.

A case can be made for what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey proposed, which is that when sentencing a prisoner, the judge should tell him, ''You will be sentenced to two years in prison. That means that you cannot be released until two years have passed, less a little time off for good behaviour. In addition, you will be sentenced to a certain time of probation and supervision.'' It should be made clear in court. I do not see why we cannot achieve that.

If there is one thing that undermines people's confidence in the criminal justice system, it is the feeling that time after time sentences are handed down but people are released halfway through them. It would be a huge breakthrough if the sentence read out

in court was accurate and took account of time off for good behaviour and the community sentence.

In response, the Government will advance two arguments, which I shall try to pre-empt. First, they will ask what would happen if judges gave sentences of two years, and two years meant two years, not one year. They will say that a huge cost would be incurred because people might be kept inside for longer, but I do not think that that would happen. Once we have honesty in sentencing, sentencers will think clearly and mean what they say.

One role of the sentencing council could be to bring that issue to the party. It could make it clear to judges that the middle range of sentences is right and appropriate, and that they need not pitch sentences too high in the belief that the real sentence will end up in the middle range. The council could help us bring clarity to the issue.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I have read the comments that my hon. Friend the Member for Woking made when the issue was debated at length in an earlier sitting. He said that sentencers were sometimes quite confused about whether four years meant two years or four years. If sentencers are confused, what about the general public and victims of crime?

The second argument that will be gnawing away at the Government is that sentencers who react logically to the proposals and set sentences that are half as long will look weak, but I do not buy that argument either. The public will be much more convinced by real sentences. If judges sentence someone in open court to two years in prison plus two years probation, and two years in prison means two years—less a little time off for good behaviour—that will be an enormous breakthrough.

The hon. Members for Nottingham, North and for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and I are not asking the world—we are asking for a logical, sensible addition to custody plus. If the Minister could deliver that, it would be hugely worth while.

I agree entirely about the need to explain how the Bill's sentencing provisions will work. Understandably, the hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) took the opportunity to advance the arguments that he would have advanced had he been able to speak to his new clause, which dealt with a different sentencing framework. He and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North spoke of the need for clarity, and we are at one on that. That is precisely why clause 157, which is headed

''Duty to give reasons for, and explain effect of, sentence''

says that the court

''must explain to the offender in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence''.

In passing, I wonder whether the words ''ordinary language'' have ever appeared in statute before—that would be an interesting test to set ourselves. We agreed to include the phrase in statute for what I think is the first time precisely to address the argument made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North and others. With great persistence, application and

dedication, he argued that the courts should explain what they mean when they pass sentence. That said, the custodial period of the sentence may resume after release at the halfway point if someone fails to abide by the licence conditions that are placed on him. He will go back into custody and could serve the rest of the period in prison.

I am sure that it will not be beyond the wit of those involved to agree a recommended form of words to achieve the objective laid down in clause 157. Having set out the sentencing framework, we all agree that that it should be explained in such a way that everyone understands how it will work.

It is welcome that clause 157 refers to ''ordinary language'', but that ordinary language is not in the clause. The sentencer should say how much of the sentence will be served in prison and how much out of prison.

Let me look at the wording. The clause says that the court

''must explain to the offender in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence.''

That is Ronseal wording and is very clear. The court must explain the impact that the sentence will have on him or her. In that way, victims, witnesses, others in court and people who subsequently read about the case will understand exactly what the sentence means. They will understand how much time the offender will spend in custody and on licence, which might be affected by whether he abides by the licence conditions and the impact of home detention curfew.

I hear what the Minister says, but does not clause 157 maintain the fiction of the current situation, that relief is given halfway through the sentence? That is what we should attack. One year should not mean six months, yet that impression will still obtain after the Bill has been passed. That is the missed opportunity that we have been talking about.

It is not a fiction: it is what the statute will provide, if we agree to clause 224, which says that the requisite custodial period means what is set out in subsection (3)(a). I entirely accept, however, that we want the public better to understand how a sentence is made up, because I reiterate that a sentence is not solely a custodial period.

Will the Minister keep the wording under review, and if he feels that it is appropriate, suggest a form of words that makes him even happier than that which is currently in the Bill? The Bill is drafted by excellent, competent officials in the Department and parliamentary counsel. We bring to the party the eye of a constituency Member of Parliament. We know what will play in the constituencies and how best to explain what we are trying to do to our constituents. I ask him to keep an open mind on whether there might be a better form of words than that which he is defending.

I am happy to defend the wording, simply because it achieves the purpose. I am happy with it and hope that, in due course, my hon. Friend will come to share my sense of happiness.

The proof of the effect of clause 157 will be the explanations given in court, as courts carry out the duty imposed on them by statute, and that issue will be dealt with in guidelines and training. I entirely accept the point that we must ensure that the clause works in such a way that people are given proper explanations of what sentences mean.

The Minister will reinforce the words used in clause 157 if the provision is termed, in algebraic terms, not as a = b - c, but as a = b + c. That is the simple equation being put to him by hon. Members.

I rise, but I am unsure whether I have much more to say. I simply reiterate that the requirement to explain the sentence will work only if it is done in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests, namely that the sentence consists of a + b. With respect, it is a matter not of further tweaking the wording in clause 157, but of how the requirement to give an explanation of the sentence works in practice in the court, which is an issue for training and guidance.

I think that the Minister has got the message, but I think that something other than clause 157 may be needed. It describes the method of giving sentence. It sets out the way in which the judge should—and the words are happy in a sense—

''in ordinary language and in general terms''

explain the reasons for the decision. We are asking for something that is more honest to the commentator—the local newspaper reporter—and the family of the victim. Instead of an approach that names the higher figure denoting the length of the sentence, and that may or may not get across the message that the state will have a duty to release the person some way through the sentence, we want things to be expressed the other way round. There should be honesty about the fact that the sentence is in two parts.

The difference would be not only a matter of presentation. The approach would be clear, and would therefore comply with the clause 157 rule, but it would also be consistent. I expect that some advisers on criminal justice policy, penal policy and criminology would say, ''No. It is important that the sentence should be set out together with the duty to release on licence.'' I know the argument, but we need to bite the bullet and say, ''We are changing that. The sentence has two parts: the first part inside and the second outside.'' That would not be a sentence with an option to disappear out of the gates—it would be a two-part sentence.

I accept that, if we could achieve that, the formula might, as the Minister says, not be a matter to be set out in the Bill. However, I think that we would all be satisfied if we could agree on the formula before the Bill is enacted. It is unnecessary for the relevant part of the formula not to be standardised by then. That would not preclude the judge from explaining the implications of sentencing in a particular case, and it would not preclude him or her from explaining, in

ordinary language and general terms, ''I have decided on this sentence because the crime that has been committed is a terrible one, of a sort that has been happening in this village for three years—everyone is doing it.'' Those are different issues. If we agreed on the core formula by the time the Bill was enacted, that would add great clarity, which has not so far been present.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. If we can get the wording that is to be read out in court right, our constituents will be much happier about the sentencing process.

I may be missing something, but I cannot see in clause 157 or elsewhere any requirement for the court to explain—as I think it should—the fact that some people may be released even before the halfway point in their sentence, under the home detention curfew or under provisions for even earlier release. That has caused much disquiet. Often people who are sentenced to a year in prison do not even serve six months, but just a few weeks, because they are sent home on curfew. The provision that the sentencer must explain

''the effect of the sentence''

is very vague. Elsewhere in the Bill there is great detail. Am I right in thinking that there is no provision anywhere requiring the court to explain that a person might be released even earlier than halfway through the sentence?

I do not agree that that clause is vague in requiring the sentencer to

''explain . . . in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence''.

That is crystal clear. However, hon. Members and I are at one in our objective. I undertake happily to reflect on the suggestion that it would be helpful at some point to see sample forms of words that might be used. Clause 157 provides the means to achieve our shared objective and requires the court to explain the effect of the sentence in ordinary language. I can understand the anxiety of hon. Members of all parties to see what that might mean in practice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 224 ordered to stand part of the Bill.