I beg to move amendment No. 725, in

clause 220, page 122, line 3, leave out subsection (5).

This deals with periods of remand in custody. I want to probe the Minister on the point. When it comes to sentencing, courts sometimes have huge difficulties in assessing whether remand periods in custody should be taken into account. Subsection (5) requires it to be stated in open court the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody and the number of days in relation to which the direction is given. There are problems with that in practice.

It is not uncommon for a defendant to come before the court remanded in custody from different courts in connection with four or five different matters at once, and for the court to be totally unable to unravel the true position. A sentence of a certain number of months might be passed, but it be difficult for the court to comment in public on what account it took of time spent on remand in custody, because the court cannot be aware of all the custodial provisions that have applied to a defendant before, or even of those current at the time of sentence. There is a real nuts and bolts, practical problem, and if the Minister knows a simple way of calculating periods of remand, I should be grateful to hear it.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. The problem seems to lie in the fact that subsection (5)(a) is expressed in such absolute terms. It is not wrong for the court to make clear the process of calculation that it used to make the direction. It is not inappropriate, therefore, that it should indicate the number of days in custody that it has considered in making its recommendations, but whether it is an absolute term or the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody for that particular offence is a totally different matter. It seems that it must be possible to find a common course between the intention of the clause and the difficulties highlighted by the hon. Gentleman. Perhaps the Minister would consider a slight variation in the terms of subsection (5)(a).

The clause re-enacts, with some amendments, provisions in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. It provides for time spent in custody on remand to count towards time that would otherwise be spent in custody post sentence. I accept the point made by the hon. Member for Woking, but the clause aims to simplify provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for calculating remand time because, as we have heard, the current framework has caused difficulties in translating the sentence of the court into a period of custody.

Subsection (3) requires the court to direct that the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody will count as time served by him as part of his sentence, subject to the exceptions listed in subsection (4). Subsection (4) enables the court to

disregard the provisions in the clause where the Secretary of State has made rules regarding specific situations or where the court believes that it is just in all the circumstances to do so. Where a direction is not given, or is given but falls short of the full period spent on remand, subsection (6) requires the court to state openly its justification. I hope that, in those circumstances, the clause will go some way towards meeting the problems to which hon. Gentlemen have referred.

I hope so. I do not want the matter to slip through because we have not properly scrutinised the clause. I take it that the Minister is saying that, when the court decides not to state the number of days for which the defendant was remanded in custody that will count towards his sentence, it will have absolute discretion not to come out with this diatribe if it does not wish to do so. I hope that that is the case and that the court will have the fullest possible discretion, because, otherwise, impossible situations could arise.

For example, someone is arrested for an offence on 7 October and kept in custody for seven days—or even for one day. He then goes before the court and is remanded in custody for a week. A week later, there is a successful bail application, and the defendant is released on terms. Then, as often happens, he commits three different offences in the jurisdiction of three different courts. He is brought back to court and pleads guilty forthwith at the court at which he had hitherto appeared and, through his lawyers, tells the court that he is appearing at another court next Tuesday and has not decided which way to plead, and at another on the Wednesday, where he thinks that he will be remanded in custody, although he is not sure. The sentencer then puts off the case for pre-sentence reports. By the time another tribunal has heard the case, a further month later, it is the devil's own job to unravel which periods of custody are relevant. Such matters are much better dealt with outside the court. However, if the court has the discretion to which the Minister has referred, I am pleased to hear it.

I am happy to confirm that the court has such discretion. That is the purpose of subsection (4)(b).

In that case, I am surprised that it says that the court must pronounce, subject to a discretion that it does not want to pronounce because it does not feel like it. There seems to be an inconsistency: either it should pronounce or it should not—in which case the clause would be unnecessary. The point has been made, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 220 ordered to stand part of the Bill.