I beg to move amendment No. 684, in

clause 205, page 114, line 25, leave out from 'a' to end of line 27 and insert

'substantial risk of his committing further specified offences involving a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public.'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 712, in

clause 205, page 114, line 25, leave out 'significant' and insert 'substantial'.

No. 713, in

clause 205, page 114, line 27, leave out 'specified' and insert 'serious'.

No. 714, in

clause 206, page 115, line 8, leave out 'significant' and insert 'substantial'.

No. 715, in

clause 206, page 115, line 10, leave out 'specified' and insert 'serious'.

No. 716, in

clause 207, page 115, line 36, leave out 'significant' and insert 'substantial'.

No. 717, in

clause 207, page 115, line 38, leave out 'specified' and insert 'serious'.

No. 718, in

clause 208, page 116, line 25, leave out 'significant' and insert 'substantial'.

No. 719, in

clause 208, page 116, line 27, leave out 'specified' and insert 'serious'.

No. 720, in

clause 209, page 117, line 10, leave out 'significant' and insert 'substantial'.

We have moved to an important clause. We have dealt with the definitions clause and the schedule, and we now see how those provisions bite in practice. I express a distinct unease at the prospect of sentences being issued perhaps more than hitherto for both the offence before the court and what might happen in future. The significant risk of a future offence is a subjective judgment, and there might be some variety in the way in which such matters are assessed.

It is as well to focus on the current wording of subsection (1)(b), which says that the provisions apply if

''the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences.''

It is vital that we understand what that means in plain English, because there is an ambiguity. Does that passage mean, on one hand, that there would be a serious risk of harm if the offender committed the specified offences again? The answer to that would almost certainly be yes. Or, on the other hand, do those words mean that there would be a significant risk of the offender committing further offences? Furthermore, would those offences pose a significant risk of harm to members of the public? There is a difference. If it means the latter—I think it should, hence my amendment—rather than the former, it is the risk of further offending that triggers the concern rather than the risk of harm if further offences are committed.

It is worth focusing for a moment longer on that point. If the court puts subsection (1)(b) into different language it means the same thing. Subsection (1)(b) says that the clause will apply if the court thinks that

''there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences.''

Would there be a significant risk of serious harm if the defendant, by chance, commits any further specified offences? Of course there would be. However, that should not be the question. The question should be whether there is a serious risk that he will commit further specified offences. However, the actual wording more or less implies, and this is the plain English of it, that if, by chance, the defendant commits any further offences there will be a risk of serious harm. I urge hon. Members to read the subsection, because the more I read it, the more I read into it my interpretation.

Paragraph (b) does not say whether there is a significant risk of the defendant committing the offences; it just asks what the chance of significant damage is if he commits them. What is a judge to answer? As night follows day, if a judge is asked whether there will be serious harm to the public if a defendant commits further specified offences, the answer will almost certainly be yes. However, the judge is asking himself the wrong question. The judge does not have to ask himself whether the risk of damage to the public is pretty nasty if the offender commits further offences, because anyone in the courtroom can say, ''Of course it is.'' The judge should be asking himself a different question.

My hon. Friend is making some excellent points. We all want to protect the public from serious harm, but at the same time we want provisions that are workable for the courts. Will my hon. Friend, using his experience, reflect on the question of how judges will arrive at that opinion for someone who is appearing before the court for a minor offence? How will the court come to such opinions? How will that work in practice?

My hon. Friend raises a very interesting question on just what procedure a judge will go through. There was an indication earlier in the Bill of the prosecution becoming slightly more involved in the process in terms of their looking at pre-sentence reports. I shall pose some rhetorical questions to my hon. Friend and to the Committee. Will the prosecution make representations about sentences from now on? Will the pre-sentence report contain a specific measure to deal with that? Will the defence be entitled to make representations?

My hon. Friend rightly draws attention to the process that must be followed. However, that must not take our eyes away from the central issue of what clause 205 says, as opposed to what the Government want it to say. We know that they want subsection (2)(b) to ask, ''Is there is a significant risk that he will commit further offences, and will they pose a problem?'' The Government want to know what is the risk of someone committing further specified offences. That is the critical point, but I really do not think that it says that. I think that it asks quite plainly, ''Does the court think that there is a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public occasioned by the commission of any further offences?'' The answer to that would be yes, but it should not be the question.

I hope that I have not laboured the point too much, and I hope that the Minister will take it on board. It is a matter of plain English, which is why I think that amendment No. 684 is vital. I see several foreheads that are slightly furrowed by my point. I think that I am right to say that subsection (2)(b) says what the Government want it to say. My amendment, which, in effect, sets out the proposition that the court has to believe that there is a significant risk that he will commit the further offences and that further serious damage will follow. That is the point. At the risk of labouring the point, the answer to the question, ''Will some jolly rotten things happen if he commits a further offence?'' is yes. However, the important question,

''Do I have to consider what the odds are of his committing further offences?'' is not spelled out.

The rest of my amendments concern omitting the word ''significant'' in several parts of this and subsequent clauses, and substituting the word ''substantial'', and, ditto, leaving out on a number of occasions in clauses 205, 206, 207 and 208 the word ''specified'' and inserting ''serious''. The object is to bring clarity to the language and to up the threshold—if I may put it in that neutral way.

Under clauses 205 onwards, if the offender has committed a serious offence or the court considers that there is a significant risk, the court must impose a life sentence or an extra period of imprisonment. The consequence is that a life sentence will be imposed on the basis that the offender may commit offences in future. That is a very serious sanction. The court should therefore have a substantial belief that a danger to the public exists. Despite my earlier point, which this one complements, the word should be ''substantial''. The requirement that the risk should be ''significant'' is difficult to quantify. What is significant risk? The fact that the defendant has already committed one of the offences in the schedule could, on its own, give rise to a belief that there is a significant risk that he will commit another. However, I am trying to increase the requirement to a substantial risk. That would ensure that the court had to have some sort of substantive belief in the existence of such a risk before it could apply the enhanced sentencing provisions.

Substantial or significant? Is there a difference and does it matter? When in doubt, go to a dictionary. We are dealing with important words. The best distinction that I can find is in the Collins dictionary—the word significant means meaningful or indicative and the word substantial means great, weighty or full of substance. I sense, therefore, that substantial is a stronger word than significant.

Mr. Illsley, you were not with the Home Affairs Committee two years ago, when it toured Europe to consider asylum issues. The hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) was there when, one day in Hungary, we were talking about the choice of words. We were told that the Hungarian language has four times as many words as ours, including more than 150 words meaning house and more than 50 words meaning laughter. We had a competition—how many words could we think of in English to mean laughter or laugh? It was serious, and the hon. Gentleman did very well. However, I challenge the Committee to think of 10 such words—there are 10. I offer merely guffaw, chuckle and chortle; there are more. Let the Minister think about it.

Meanwhile, I draw the Committee back to the difference, if there is one, between ''significant'' and ''substantial''. It is not an unimportant distinction; it might matter. The word significant, as used in clause 205 and subsequently, is not precise enough in view of the grave consequences of the findings that could be

made as a result of it. What is the approximate level of probability, on a scale of one to 100, of ''significant''? Would not it be preferable and more clearly in tune with human rights legislation if we used ''substantial''? As well as checking in the dictionary, I spent half an hour looking at the thesaurus, that magnificent tome on words and the English language, and concluded that substantial is a stronger word than significant. There is some merit in it.

The Prison Reform Trust is another group that does not like ''significant''. It said that it was not sufficiently precise, in view of the grave consequences of the courts making such a finding. I ask the Minister to ponder on that point, not least because there is a good precedent for ''substantial''. The trust points out that that word would be consistent with the text of clause 6(4)(a) of the draft Mental Health Bill, which refers to the

''substantial risk of causing serious harm to other persons''

being a condition of detention. The word ''substantial'' is used a lot in the criminal law, and it would be preferable to use it in the Bill.

My other amendments would remove the word ''specified'' and insert the word ''serious''. Doing so would be upping the standard, which we need to do.

I hope that my colleagues will contribute to the debate. I have cut short what I might have said, because we have other important business this morning. There are good reasons for using the word ''substantial'' rather than ''significant''. There is an even more telling reason for amendment No. 684. There can be no doubt about the literal interpretation of the clause; it is that the court has only to ask—on the off-chance that further offences will be committed—whether the damage that we are concerned about will result. That is not the question that the Government should want the court to ask; the court should be asking the question posed in the amendment, which I hope carries some support.

By the way, hon. Members may not have been listening to me on the question of ''substantial'' versus ''significant'', but will have discovered instead that there are at least a dozen effective words meaning ''to laugh''. I illustrate the argument by saying that words are important, and that the word in my amendment is better than that in the Bill.

These are important matters, and I hope that we can persuade the Minister to accept the burden of the argument. That is why I and my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) put our names to the amendments.

I share the views of the hon. Member for Woking on the interpretation of the clause as drafted. All that the court has to do to trigger what could be a life sentence is to be of the opinion that there is a risk that the defendant might commit any of the specified offences. The answer will inevitably be yes if the person before the court is aged 18 or over and is convicted in that court of a serious offence. The second trigger means nothing. One is home with a life sentence after the first. That seems to me the inevitable implication.

We are talking about triggering the most serious action that a court can take—giving a life sentence. We should allow that sentence to be triggered extremely rarely, and only if it is entirely justified against the sweep of criminal justice legislation. We need to reflect on the need to avoid far-reaching and unexpected effects on future sentencing policy.

There is obviously a difference between the terms ''significant'' and ''substantial''. Anything that is recognisable or identifiable can become significant. In the words of Professor Ashworth, who has been referred to before,

''the term 'significant' used in clauses 205–209 is not sufficiently precise in view of the grave consequences of a finding. What approximate level of probability, on a scale from 1 to 100, is 'significant'?''

That strikes me as a good question. It would be helpful to know the Government's thinking. I consider that the word is entirely the wrong one. It suggests a lesser threshold, a smaller qualification and a less serious matter. We should be considering probability—the more likely outcome.

Lastly, we need the amendments because otherwise the court could give an extended or life sentence even if the offence that the person might commit later would not itself even attract a custodial sentence. For example, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, a section 20 offence, would not normally bring a custodial sentence, but in the context of the clause it would trigger stage 2 and put the defendant into a life sentence category. I stand to be corrected but I believe that putting people in fear of violence does not, again, normally bring a custodial sentence. However, in the context that we are discussing it would trigger the most severe consequences. As to the example that we mentioned before—soliciting by men—I am not aware of its ever bringing a custodial sentence. It may happen occasionally. That would automatically, if it was thought to be a possibility, trigger the most severe sentences.

The consequence of the wording is that if the court believed that there was a risk of any offence defined in the list as sexual or violent—and being on the list would be sufficient—the enhanced sentence would have to be imposed. We shall come to the question of the must/may option. However, at present the word is ''must''. There is no choice. Therefore either the clause will have unintended consequences or, if those consequences are meant, they are entirely the wrong ones.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that under clause 205(1)(b) the court does not have to believe that there will be any further offences—merely that if there were, by chance, the consequences would be nasty?

That is certainly my reading. All that the court must assess is what the consequence of a particular offence would be.

I appreciate the argument, but how can it be right? There would be no risk of harm if there were no risk of a further offence.

Because of the drafting of subsection (1)(b). The drafting presupposes that an offence would be committed and that it would entail a significant risk to members of the public. However, it is not phrased in that way. It does not state: ''A person aged 18 or over, if convicted of a serious offence, will trigger a further serious extended penalty if the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk that he or she will commit one of the further offences which would be a significant risk to members of the public.'' Whether the public will be at risk is a perfectly proper consideration. The court should have to take a view about whether there is a risk of an offence being committed and the public put at risk. That is not what the clause states.

The furrowing of the brows referred to by the hon. Member for Woking resulted from the fact that I was having difficulty applying the hon. Gentleman's construction to clause 205(1)(b). Not for the first time in our proceedings, I entirely agree with the helpful intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough because I do not see how the possibility of significant risk to the public can arise if there is no risk of a further specified offence being committed. I cannot read the clause in the way that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey does. The key question is whether further offending will cause serious harm, but as my hon. Friend rightly says, there must be a risk of further offending before one can consider whether it would cause harm. One cannot divide the two, which is why I do not follow the hon. Gentleman's argument. For the avoidance of doubt, there must be a risk of further offending for clause 205(1)(b) to apply.

The second point that I want to make about the amendments is that we must remember that we are talking about significant risk. On the issue of ''significant'' versus ''substantial'', when I first read the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking, I asked myself what the difference was. Although I can understand the argument that ''substantial'' might be slightly stronger than ''significant'', there is not a big difference for the purposes of interpretation.

To put that aspect aside for a moment, the key is to reduce the risk of serious harm to members of the public. What does serious harm mean? It means significant risk to members of the public of death or serious personal injury, whether physical or psychological. Therefore, many of the arguments that we have heard fall by the wayside because the court must apply that test, which is, rightly, a very high test. It deals with the fears that have been expressed by Opposition Members that this part of the Bill ranges so widely that the courts will say to offenders, ''We think that you might commit one of the offences listed in the schedule, so we will lock you away for a very long time and not let you out.'' That is not the case because the provision is tightly worded. If the court were to decide that there was a significant risk that a member or members of the public would suffer death or serious personal injury, whether physical or psychological, the public would say,

''Hang on; if that is the court's judgment, working on the basis of risk assessment, surely it is right in those circumstances for the court to hand out a sentence that protects me or some other member of the public from death or serious injury.''

But can the Minister tell us why the word ''significant'' is thought to be more appropriate today for this Bill, but the word ''substantial'' was thought to be more appropriate in the case of the draft Mental Health Bill, which deals with exactly the same issue?

I cannot answer the question in relation to the draft Mental Health Bill. All that I can say is that, having considered the argument in the round, significant risk is the right test, in so far as ''substantial'' would apply a higher test. However, I do not share hon. Members' perception of the difference.

It was the dictionary.

Well, my view is that ''significant risk'' is a perfectly reasonable test to ask the court to apply in deciding whether serious consequences are likely. It is reasonable to require the court to weigh the issue and to decide whether, in lay person's terms, there is a significant risk.

I am sure that the Minister accepts that there is no argument about the dangerous offenders provisions being triggered where the court decides that the defendant is likely or highly likely—I am avoiding the two adjectives for the moment—to commit an offence that would result in serious harm, which is defined as

''death or serious personal injury, whether physical or psychological''.

There is no difficulty about that. The question is whether that is what the syntax of subsection (1)(b) means, so there is an argument about the drafting.

On the substantive point, however, the Minister surely accepts that ''significant'' is not as high a threshold as ''substantial''. Will he answer my Professor Ashworth question? How high, on a scale from one to 100, must the probability be for the risk to be significant? It could be one out of 100.

The honest answer is that there is no answer on a scale from one to 100. As is the case with many provisions in the Bill, and in the criminal justice system generally, one trusts the court to use its judgment in making an assessment. It would not be helpful to determine where ''significant'' fell on a scale from one to 100, any more than it would be to determine where ''substantial'' fell. That would not greatly assist the court in carrying out its responsibilities under the Bill. However, the phrase ''substantial risk'' is sufficiently clear when allied with the phrase ''serious harm''—that is defined in clause 204, which we have agreed—to give the court the guidance that it needs to operate the provisions. For reasons that the Committee understands, there is a weakness in the current system as regards dealing with those who remain very dangerous even though they have come to the end of a determinate sentence.

I am sure that the intentions are good, and we all want to protect the public. However, we also want to ensure that the provisions work, and I want to put two substantial points to the Minister as briefly as I can. First, the evidence before the court will, as the Minister knows, relate to the current offence, which could be any of the offences in the schedules, so how will the court reach an opinion about risk? Secondly, what opportunities will the defendant have to make representations when the court does reach an opinion? Will he be given any warning of the court's deliberations? Will there be a further hearing?

The answer is in clause 209, which deals with the assessment of dangerousness. As the hon. Gentleman will see, the court will need to take account of

''all such information as is available to it about the nature and circumstances of each of the offences . . . any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of which any of the offences forms part, and . . . any information about the offender which is before it''.

The court must therefore have regard to a very wide range of considerations in assessing dangerousness, and that is sensible.

I am grateful to the Minister, but the evidence before the court will relate to the present offence. Where will this other information come from? Will the offender be warned that the court is thinking of passing a particular sentence and be given the opportunity to make representations and to test the evidence?

Well, an obvious answer to the first question is that information will be contained in pre-sentence reports, which we touched on earlier. That information may range very widely over the circumstances of the defendant's previous offending behaviour, and all the other information referred to in subsections (2) or (3). Elsewhere in the Bill we agreed on arrangements for ensuring that such matters are disclosed. In such circumstances, if there are representations before sentence is passed, as is normal, the court will take them into account in deciding how it will exercise the powers that we are debating in relation to the clause.

I have listened carefully to the Minister and would ask him to think carefully about the mechanics. We should remember that the defendant is before the court for one of the offences from the wide range of those contained in schedule 11, such as actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm. The court might come to the opinion that a much longer sentence can be passed on the basis of the

''significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences'',

which is a quantum leap from some of the offences that appear on that schedule, and for which the offender has been convicted. The Minister should think carefully about the basis on which that quantum leap will be made, as regards evidence.

The Minister referred to the social inquiry report, which courts often have in addition to the evidence relating to the offence. However, the probation officer

prepares the social inquiry report and examines the background and history of the person concerned that relate to the offence in question. Courts sometimes take such reports into account in order to mitigate offences. The Minister is saying that information contained in the social inquiry report can seriously aggravate the position of the offender and take him from within the bounds of the offence in question into a much more serious category. He is turning the social inquiry report into evidence on the basis of which the offender might receive a much more serious sentence. Has the Minister discussed the matter with representatives of the probation service? I seek further information on that, because my intentions are the same as those of the Minister: I want to protect the public. If there is a risk of people causing serious harm to the public, let us protect the public. However, we should ensure that the mechanics are right and that they are workable.

On the information that would be available, under clause 209 the court will take into account all the information that is to hand about the nature and the circumstances of the offence, and other information about the pattern of behaviour, of which the offence forms part. That would include relevant previous convictions and any information about the offender. Pre-sentence reports would be the main source of information available to the courts. We have discussed the matter with the probation service.

The court might also refer to specialist assessment tools, such as risk matrix 2000 for sex offenders and the violence risk assessment guide for violent offenders. The probation service is developing the new offender assessment system, OASys—

It is a pop group.

—which is widely regarded as a leading development in trying to assess the basis of the risk. It is not the Oasis to which the hon. Gentleman referred from a sedentary position, and to which many of us are very partial. OASys is currently being rolled out across the probation service and assists in the process. We should be honest about the matter: the task is difficult, and I do not underestimate the argument that the hon. Member for Hertsmere makes about trying to make an assessment about the degree of risk that an individual poses.

The court will have to have regard to all those circumstances in deciding whether it is appropriate to apply the sentence for public protection, bearing in mind that the offender must have been convicted of a serious offence and that the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of death or serious personal injury—[Interruption.] I am just taking us through this because I think that it is helpful. I do not want any hon. Member to leave the Committee with the impression that a court can decide to give somebody a sentence for public protection for a relatively insubstantial offence because it decides that that person may at some time in future commit one of the offences in the schedule. That is not the case. That is why we were careful to build into the process the trigger, the assessment of significant risk, and the safeguards in clause 205(1)(b). There are also the other circumstances that I have just described and the

sources of information that the hon. Gentleman has helpfully given me.

I understand the mechanics, but the evidence before the court will relate to the specified offence, and that could be any one of the specified offences in the schedule, including assault occasioning actual bodily harm. That is why we must look carefully at the evidence on which somebody will receive a much more serious sentence because it is felt that there is a need to protect the public. Will an offender in such a position be given a warning that a court is considering passing such a sentence, so that he can test the evidence and make representations?

I am sure that that would have to happen, although if I am wrong I will write to the hon. Gentleman. The court will have to make an assessment, and I am sure that the offender will have an opportunity to make representations. The court will have to go through quite a process. It includes the information that will be disclosed to the offender in the pre-sentence report, which under the provisions of the Bill will be sent to the offender and to his or her legal representative. If there are representations to be made, there is an opportunity in the courts to do that.

Nevertheless, there appears to be no warning to an offender before he appears in court for the specified offence that the court is thinking of passing a much more serious sentence on him. There is nothing in the clause to tell the offender that that could happen.

May I reflect on the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised? It is important that offenders are aware of the possible consequences of the sentence that a court is considering. I will reflect on that point and respond to him.

This has been a worthwhile debate. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey was very supportive of my amendments, and I am grateful to him for that. I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere, who has argued clearly and cogently with the Minister for the past few minutes. It is clear that the Minister has a great deal to consider in these amendments. I hope that he will consider them, for there can be no doubt that Opposition Members raised a great many points that should make him reflect very carefully on clause 205. None of us has been convinced by his response to amendment No. 684. It has been pointed out that clause 205(1)(b) is very ambiguous, and that has been reinforced by no less a body than the Bar Council.

Are we to interpret the clause as saying that there would be a serious risk of harm if the offender committed the specified offence again? If the answer is yes, the question of odds or of ''significant'' or ''substantial'' is immaterial. If that is the case, the clause is very badly drafted and should be amended. What about our amendment? Would there be a substantial risk that he would commit further offences, and would they pose a significant risk of harm? That approach is much to be preferred. I hope that the Minister will take it on board. I hope, also, that he will accept that it is not sufficient to say that

the word ''significant'' is as good as the word ''substantial''. A look at the dictionary—to which we should always turn for a definition in times of stress—will tell him that there is a different flavour to the word ''substantial''. It represents a higher threshold and a much better approach.

We are unhappy. I do not think that my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere will be entirely satisfied with what he has heard from the Minister, although the Minister has promised to think carefully about the matters.

I should like to put it on the record that I am grateful to the Minister for offering to write to me. I agree that there is a need to protect the public, but we must get the mechanics right.

I echo my hon. Friend's remarks. The Minister's points were valid, he approached them in a fair way and he has undertaken to consider the matter. There is no doubt that the Committee is determined to proceed on the basis of protecting the public. Let it not be thought—I am sure that it is not—that anything said on these Benches is anything other than supportive of that view. The purpose of a Committee is to consider matters carefully and occasionally to tease from the Government a slightly different approach. That can be important and could improve the Bill.

Undoubtedly, we shall return to these matters on Report—they are important. Given that, for today, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 628, in

clause 205, page 114, line 35, leave out from beginning to 'the' in line 39 and insert

'In a case not falling within subsection (2),'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 896, in

clause 205, page 114, line 39, leave out 'must' and insert 'may'.

Government amendments Nos. 629 and 630.

Amendment No. 897, in

clause 207, page 115, line 44, leave out 'must' and insert 'may'.

Government amendments Nos. 632 to 634, 636 and 637.

May I refer the Committee to the point that I made in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Woking? On reflection, we did not think that the wording was sufficiently tight to achieve our objective. That is why we propose to amend clause 205. If the tests that we have debated at length are met, and there is an assessment of significant risk of serious harm and therefore serious personal injury, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment for public protection. The purpose of amendments Nos. 628 to 630, 632 to 634, 636 and 637 is to ensure that where offenders have committed specified sexual or violent offences and have been

assessed as dangerous, they must be sentenced under the new provisions for dangerous offenders.

As the clause is currently drafted, if an offender is assessed as dangerous and has committed a specified offence, the court must impose one of the new sentences if it considers that no other sentence available would be satisfactory for the purposes of public protection. That still leaves the court with the option to pass a normal sentence. On reflection, that could undermine the purpose of the new provisions, which is to ensure that the public are properly protected against offenders who present a serious risk. In order to ensure that dangerous offenders who are convicted of a specified sexual or violent offence can be sentenced only under the new dangerousness provisions, amendments Nos. 628 to 630, 632 and 633 remove the court's discretion to impose alternative sentences.

Amendment No. 628 requires the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for public protection on an offender who has been assessed as dangerous, and has committed a serious specified offence that is not considered so serious as to justify a discretionary life sentence. Amendment No. 630 requires the court to pass an extended sentence for certain violent and sexual offences for which the offender has been assessed as dangerous and has committed a specified non-serious offence. The essential point is that those amendments ensure that no offenders who are assessed as being dangerous at the point of the sentence, and who have committed a specified offence, may be released before the end of their sentence unless they have had their risk assessed. We are trying to achieve the assessment of risk in the interests of public protection before offenders are released.

Amendment No. 629 prevents the court from imposing a standard sentence on a juvenile who has been convicted of a serious specified offence. Together with amendments Nos. 632 and 633, the amendment provides instead that, in a case in which the offender is not liable under clause 206(2) to a sentence of detention for life under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the court must choose between a sentence of detention for public protection or an extended sentence. A sentence of detention for life will be imposed only if the court thinks that the latter is not adequate to protect the public.

As the extended sentence will now be available for serious specified offences, amendment No. 634 removes the restriction on the length of extended sentence that may be imposed up to the adult maximum for the offence. Amendments Nos. 636 and 637 make the necessary changes to the interpretation provisions so as to set out that where a sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection, or an extended sentence, fails to be imposed under the relevant clauses, the court is obliged to pass the relevant sentence.

The Minister spoke to the amendments very professionally. I am not sure whether I grasped all their implications. That may be my weakness. I wonder whether he would be kind

enough to let us have a substitute note on the clause to explain it as it will be if the amendments are made.

Gladly.

We can look at the amended clause and reflect on it.

May I speak to amendments Nos. 896 and 897? They would have a similar effect. The purpose of the amendments is to change the obligatory ''must'' for the discretionary ''may''. They would allow the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment for public protection rather than make such a sentence obligatory.

I need not expand the argument at any length, but those matters are best assessed by the courts. The Minister will know that our view is that mandatory sentences are not a good thing. The court should have discretion. If we take the view that the court should have discretion in all cases, it would be illogical not to have a view that the court should exercise its discretion in this instance. The deterrent effect, if that is regarded as a consideration, would not be reduced, because both the defendant and the public would know that there was a possibility that a life sentence could be triggered. It would equally protect the public. The amendments would avoid life sentences being passed if the court, on the balance of judgment and having weighed up all the options, decided that there was a better and safer disposal. That is a decision that is reasonably left to the courts rather than having to be anticipated by Parliament. I hope that the Minister will at least be sympathetic to the idea. I appreciate that this debate will not conclude here today, but will go on as the Bill proceeds through Parliament.

I was simply going to ask, further to the hon. Gentleman's point, whether the Minister feels that it would be appropriate to let us have full explanatory notes on all Government amendments on the day on which they are tabled, so that the Committee might be fully informed.

A precedent.

I heard the word ''precedent'' muttered. My explanation of the amendments was clearly not sufficiently accessible. I freely confess that. If I may recapitulate, to enable hon. Members to take on board immediately the importance of the amendments, if the tests that we were discussing at great length this morning are met, and in particular if the assessment is that a significant risk of death or serious personal injury is posed to members of the public, the sentence for public protection must be imposed. That is the purpose of chapter 5. On reflection, we do not think that it is sensible to open up the possibility that another sentence might be made available, which subsection (3) currently does. For the same reason, we do not agree with amendments Nos. 896 and 897. They would weaken the fundamental principle behind the clause, which is that if an assessment of dangerousness is made, release should be based on the assessment of the risk, not when somebody happens to come to the end of a determinate sentence.

Does my hon. Friend agree that amendments Nos. 896 and 897 would give a court that had determined that a sentence would be inadequate to protect the safety of the public discretion to impose it none the less?

My hon. Friend is, as ever, absolutely right. The proposal is illogical, which is why I resist it. It also undermines the central purpose of the clauses, on which the Committee is agreed, namely that if an offender is that dangerous, release should be based on assessment of risk and not on the expiry of a determinate sentence. That is what it is all about, and I think that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey will, on reflection, accept that argument; the public would expect nothing less.

Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

This is a very important clause. Obviously, it has to be read with clause 209. It is proper that all those both inside and outside the House with an interest should reflect on all the interlinked sets of debates. There is no difference of objective. We need to provide a mechanism for fair justice and the protection of the public against serious offences. It is a question of how to do it in the most transparent way. No doubt, we shall return to the matter later.

Very briefly, may I ask the Minister to allow us to drop him a very big hint? There is a strong rumour that, next week, we shall find a number of new clauses, particularly relating to gun crime. Can he ensure that the explanatory notes relating to those new clauses are available in good time for members of the Committee to examine, as that would assist our proceedings?

Yes, that is a fair point.

Fair, but out of order.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 205, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.