I beg to move amendment No. 707, in

clause 139, page 78, line 11, after 'and', insert

'subject to the restrictions on the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences set out in section (Limits on the reduction of custodial sentences by the Court of Appeal)'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 12—Limits on the reduction of custodial sentences by the Court of Appeal—

'Where—

(a) a custodial sentence of four years or less has been passed in a Crown court or a magistrates court; and

(b) where that sentence is appealed against to the Court of Appeal; and

(c) the Court of Appeal determines that the sentence should be reduced,

the maximum reduction that may be made by the Court of Appeal is 10 per cent. of the original sentence.'.

I support the clause. I am a great believer in the lay magistracy—it does a good job—and I am in favour of the Government increasing its sentencing powers. New clause 12 is the first of three new clauses that I have tabled, but it may not be obvious why I believe it to be necessary. I shall try to explain why.

The proposal may result in howls of anguish from those at the top of the judiciary, but it could cause some delight in the Crown courts and magistrates courts. The new clause would limit the Court of Appeal's power to reduce short sentences dramatically. It applies to sentences of four years or less, and the Court of Appeal would be able to reduce them by only a small amount—I suggest 10 per cent.

There are two logical positions to take on sentencing policy. First, one can take the view that Parliament should set maximums for each offence, that the courts should have freedom within those maximums to set appropriate sentences and that the Court of Appeal should allow some leeway for local decisions and local justice. Secondly, one could suggest that Parliament sets maximums for each offence and that detailed guidance should be published about the appropriate sentence for particular cases. Those publishing that guidance should be accountable to Parliament, so that the decisions can be debated.

We are in neither situation. There is an awful lot of guidance about what sentences should be set by the courts, but it is not understood by the public, and those giving it are not accountable to Parliament. In many cases, sentences of four years or less are radically cut by the Court of Appeal. I am sure that many hon. Members have received letters from constituents who do not understand why sentences are reduced so radically. The situation is made worse because people do not understand why those sentenced to two years' imprisonment often serve only one year, and sometimes even less. I shall give an example from my constituency.

Mrs. Smith lives in Church road in Long Hanborough. On 1 December 2001, her husband was killed on the A40 near Cassington in my constituency while driving his car. The driver of the car that caused the death was unlicensed and uninsured. He was accompanied by his 19-year-old brother; he, too, was uninsured, and being only 19, was not old enough to accompany a learner driver. They had fallen asleep at the wheel. At Oxford Crown court, they were found guilty of causing death by dangerous driving, and were given three years and nine months. I have written to the Minister about the case.

The brothers appealed, and the Court of Appeal cut their sentence in half to two years—a radical cut. Because people sentenced to two years' imprisonment serve only half the sentence, they are automatically released after one year. However, the early release provisions introduced by the Government mean that

they are likely to be released after only nine months. Mrs. Smith thought that her husband's killers had been sentenced to three years and nine months, but she eventually found out that they would serve only nine months.

My hon. Friend will no doubt agree that motoring offences can be difficult. Cases such as the one that he describes, showing extreme recklessness and a reluctance or refusal to follow required procedures, are the very cases that the public regard as being so wrong. Those involved in sentencing should give attention to such cases, because people feel that many offenders do not receive the sentences that they deserve.

That is precisely the point that I am making. Mrs. Smith and her family have suffered a double disappointment. Disappointment No. 1 was the cut in the sentence made by the Court of Appeal. Disappointment No. 2 was finding out that the new sentence of two years meant that the brothers would serve only nine months. Long Hanborough is a small village in my constituency, and people there have gathered more than 700 signatures on a petition. There was real anger locally when people found out about those disappointments. There are two ways to try to deal with that.

New clause 10, which I shall not speak to now, because I hope that it will be discussed later, would solve the second of the problems—that of sentences amounting to only half of what was pronounced. It states that people should serve the sentence that they are given, less 10 per cent. for good behaviour, to keep order in the court. If by some miracle the Government accept that, half of the disappointment will be resolved. Perhaps, if the Sentencing Guidelines Council—which I hope we shall improve with amendments—really works, and we get the sentences for the relevant offences right first time, there will be less need for the Court of Appeal to cut sentences, as in the case that I cited.

I still have a real problem about this matter, however, because I believe that, to some extent, justice should be local. On occasion, a sentencer, be it the magistrate or a judge in the Crown court, will see a case that has caused real public concern and disquiet, and will pass a tough sentence. I was discussing the issue outside this Room with my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, who has huge relevant experience. Sometimes a sentencer will know what has happened, for example with respect to a local drug dealer who has caused havoc in a community, and will pass a slightly stiffer sentence than usual. The sentencer might decide to make an example of someone who has committed a hideous street crime, in which a much-loved elderly resident was knocked over and robbed. That has happened. Home Office research has been done on whether that can be a deterrent.

Are tougher sentences of that kind sometimes right? My answer is a wholehearted yes, because they can work in the interest of public confidence in the criminal justice system and deterrence. I do not believe that in every case the same sentence should

be passed for the same crime everywhere in the country. No two crimes are precisely the same.

I do not want to undermine the hon. Gentleman's argument. I wonder whether he is aware of one of the strong reasons for the current battle in many counties of England and Wales to keep magistrates courts and Crown courts open locally. In the old days, the assize judge would go to a small town such as Brecon, as I remember from my youth, to deal with cases. That was effective, because the message went out locally and the sentence was known locally.

Absolutely. Many hon. Members who represent rural constituencies have a real battle to keep magistrates courts open. What the hon. Gentleman described is very important. It is not just a question of the trial happening in the middle of Witney; it is also in the Witney and West Oxfordshire Gazette, the Oxford Mail and The Oxford Times, and people know what sentence is given. The reason for variation between sentences is not only that no two crimes are exactly the same, but that no two sets of circumstances in which crimes are committed are exactly the same.

Those who argue in favour of the Court of Appeal and against my new clause will say that the strength of a system in which the Court of Appeal can reduce sentences lies in the court's ability to study sentences in the cold light of day, free from the emotion of the earlier trial; it can ensure that the sentence is fair and appropriate. My response would be that that is fine for the rights of the defendant—the criminal. However, it is not so fine for the victim, or for the community in which the victim lives. They face a double disappointment of knowing that the sentence has been cut, and that the offender will be released quickly.

Again, I do not want to undermine the hon. Gentleman's case. However, there is one aspect of what he says that surprises me. He opened his contribution by saying that he fully supports the clause. Does he not agree that, whatever the merits of being able to increase magistrates' sentencing powers, Parliament has some locus in that, and that it should not simply happen through the order of the Secretary of State? I think that that is what bothers many of us about the clause.

I take the point. I am nervous about the Home Secretary having too much power to do things through orders. I was trying to say that I should certainly support the concept of greater sentencing powers for magistrates, but the hon. Gentleman is probably right: it should be brought about in primary legislation.

I want to return to the argument about why we punish people, why the criminal justice system works as it does and why we send people to prison for causing death by dangerous driving. Yes, we do it as a deterrent, but also because we believe in punishment and in just deserts.

I have said before in Committee that, in a civilised society, we give up our right to take vengeance for wrongs that are done to us, and vest it in the state. Mrs. Smith and her family have given up their rights, so they expect the state to act properly. However, they

feel that the Court of Appeal has let them down badly. When we debate the details of Bills it is important to remember the effect that they have on people in our constituencies. We have all received letters like the one that I shall share with the Committee from Mr. Smith's sister-in-law. She writes:

''My brother-in-law died in intensive care later that night from massive head injuries. He was on his way to work on a Saturday morning and was dead on the Saturday night. He left behind a loving wife and daughter, not to mention two brothers and a sister, all of whom are finding it very difficult to come to terms with, along with the rest of his family and friends.

At the trial the two brothers were sentenced to three years and nine months in prison each, which we all think for taking a life is nowhere near enough.

Now they have won an appeal and had their sentences halved. I would like to know how and why! We are all serving a life sentence without my brother-in-law. They will both be freed from prison soon to get on with their lives. Tell me, how fair is this and how would you feel if it was a member of your family?''

Amendment No. 707 is about trusting local justice and ensuring that we restore confidence in the criminal justice system. That is, after all, what the Bill is meant to do. It is also about stopping victims of crime feeling cheated. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

The clause raises several problems, and my hon. Friend seeks to widen our discussion to include the scope that the Court of Appeal has to reduce sentences passed by magistrates courts or Crown courts. That is an important topic, and one that I propose to deal with before I turn to the clause's more general issues. By doing so, I hope to avoid the need for a clause stand part debate thereafter.

My hon. Friend raises an important issue. Nothing is more calculated to bring the course of justice into disrepute than the public's perception of a sentence that the court has passed. As he rightly said, a sentence that the victims or their relatives do not consider tough enough is often reduced by the Court of Appeal, which has taken into account the offender's background factors, such as his record and, often, his age. That applies especially in emotive cases, such as causing death by dangerous driving, for which the tariff of the sentence can be difficult to fix.

My hon. Friend makes a powerful case for limiting the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences. His amendment would allow leeway for local justice and for a response to public opinion. I hope that he will forgive me when I say that the difficulty with his amendment—although I am sure that he will acknowledge it—is that it is impossible to disentangle limiting the Court of Appeal's ability to reduce sentences from having to dealing with barmy judges.

The amendment would not only have the desirable result of preventing the Court of Appeal from reducing sentences of less than four years by more than 10 per cent.—it would also fetter the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere if a judge passed a totally unreasonable sentence. I am the first to acknowledge that I suspect that the problem that my hon. Friend identified is a much more frequent one than that of the

judge who passes the completely unreasonable and deranged sentence. However, I regret to have to tell him that during my time as a barrister there were unfortunate occasions on which judges did just that.

Does my hon. Friend know how difficult it is to get the evidential base? I asked the House of Commons Library for the number of cases in which the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence when it was under four years, and I was told that that information is not currently published and collated, which I find strange. That information would be helpful in order to find out whether his point has merit.

It would indeed. The absence of statistics on sentencing has been a persistent problem for as long as I can remember. Inevitably, one must rely wholly on anecdotes. There is a lot of media coverage—one has only to open one's newspaper on virtually any day of the week to read about cases in which people complain about what they think are excessively lenient sentences. That applies particularly to those extremely emotive cases that often involve death on the road. The public feel strongly that there should be a heavier punishment, and traditionally the courts have tended to make a lot of allowances for those who commit such offences. Over the past five or six years the tendency has been for the tariffs to rise. They are much higher today than they were, say, 15 years ago.

However, the statistical base will not help us on the distinct problem. The amendment would inevitably mean that in a case in which the judge, for whatever reason, had simply got things completely wrong, the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere would be limited. I have a difficultly with that. Again, thinking back over anecdotes, I can think of a number of examples from my time at the Bar of occasions on which judges did just what I described—and their reputations went before them. I can think of a particular judge in Chelmsford. One used to have a good, shrewd idea that if one appeared in front of him representing a defendant, he would behave unreasonably during the trial and at the end pass a sentence that bore no relation to the offence. I think that that judge has mercifully retired from the Bench. I had many experiences of appearing in front of him in which I was left speechless at his manner of proceeding and the sentences that he sometimes passed. Mercifully, the Court of Appeal existed to rectify his grosser mistakes.

Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that the amendment deals only with sentences of four years or less? The maximum time that we are talking about as matters stand is two years in prison. How barmy can the judge be to get things badly wrong in such cases?

I take the view that if, for example, somebody would have received a suspended sentence of imprisonment, as it then was, and ends up receiving three years immediate, despite being of previous good character, the effect on that individual will be severe, even though that is not the same as going to prison for 10 years. I suggest to my hon. Friend that a

mechanism must be available to the Court of Appeal to deal with such cases. The presence of zealots—the judge I mentioned was undoubtedly a zealot in every sense and believed that he was purifying the world in which he moved—requires that the Court of Appeal inject a note of common sense into the sentences passed. I understand exactly what my hon. Friend's intentions are. If the Sentencing Guidelines Council works as intended, the sort of case that understandably caused his constituent to write—we have all received such letters, and felt great sympathy—should, I hope, be less frequent. There ought to be a way in which the judges can be properly directed to the guidelines before passing sentence, so that their margins of operation may be reduced.

I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response, but we should place our confidence in requiring judges to follow guidelines rather than in fettering the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere with sentences. We need to preserve the Court of Appeal's ability to interfere in cases where, for whatever reason, judges have got the sentence not just slightly wrong but completely and utterly wrong. There will be enough of those cases in a year to cause real injustice. Even if there is only one case, real injustice will have been done, and there should be a mechanism for ensuring that it can be reviewed.

I turn to the generality of the clause, on the ability of the Secretary of State, by order, to alter the maximums of sentences that can be passed.

On a point of order, Mr. Cran. I seek your guidance. I understand that the hon. Gentleman is trying to save time, and I am happy to be governed by your ruling. I wonder whether you will be minded to have a clause stand part debate. I do not wish to comment on the amendment or the new clause, but I want to comment on the clause as a whole.

In the light of that intervention, a clause stand part debate will be allowed.

Mindful of that, Mr. Cran, I conclude my remarks on the amendment. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) might properly be addressed.

I rise because I was so impressed by the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Witney. He made two particularly important points. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is right that there must be a way of putting right cases that judges have manifestly got wrong.

The Committee has sympathy with my hon. Friend the Member for Witney on the motoring case that he mentioned. I heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said about motoring cases, and they are indeed sometimes difficult. None the less, such cases are regarded by our constituents as serious—with the most serious of consequences. That is especially so if the offence relates not only to the driving itself but to the recklessness of the person getting behind the steering wheel—for instance, someone who drives knowing that he has had too much to drink. The case cited by my hon. Friend the

Member for Witney was of someone driving without a driving licence and the other necessary formalities. Someone who does that and then drives badly is exhibiting extreme recklessness, but that is not always treated by the courts with the seriousness that it merits.

My hon. Friend the Member for Witney spoke about local justice, a valuable feature of our system, and called for the Court of Appeal to take account of the needs of local justice and the views of local people when sentencing. Sometimes, particular offences need heavier sentences than the generality.

Yesterday evening, I attended evening a meeting of the Hertsmere crime and disorder reduction group. A senior police officer presented a report that made my hair stand on end. He said that the extent of crack cocaine dealing and consumption in Borehamwood would come as a surprise to many. He went on to spell out the extent of the problem, and told us of the effects of dealing in crack cocaine and the techniques used by the peddlers to get people addicted to it. The effects on those people's lives, and the crime and antisocial behaviour problems suffered by the rest of the community, gave me pause for thought. I hope that when such people are brought to justice, they receive heavy sentences.

I would like to join in the interesting conversation between the three Conservative Members. I am sure that the point made by the hon. Member for Witney about the frustration felt by victims and their families when they observe how the criminal system works is well made. A case occurred in my constituency involving a woman who lost her daughter. The charge was driving without due care and attention, for which a custodial penalty is not available. She felt deeply and bitterly resentful of the fact that the man who killed two people when he lost control of his vehicle received, I think, a 12-month ban and a fine of £200. As she put it, publicly, that was £100 for each life lost.

The honest approach is to consider how each of us would feel in those circumstances. Victims' views range from a desire for vengeance, which is the word that the hon. Member for Witney used, to the desire to offer forgiveness. We have seen the full spectrum. A recent case was the murder of the police officer in Manchester, whose father most movingly spoke of his wish to forgive those responsible. The difficult task of the criminal justice system is, on behalf of society—as the hon. Gentleman pointed out—to mediate all the conflicting emotions and to provide a structure that enables people to feel that justice has been done, but to do so having regard to all the circumstances.

The reason why the amendment would not work was eloquently set out by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. I point out in passing that the amendment is defective, because the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction over sentences passed in the magistrates court, but I understand the principle and intention. The role of the Court of Appeal in relation to decisions taken in the Crown court is to provide a safeguard. It cuts both ways, for reasons that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield explained very clearly. A young man came to my surgery on Saturday to report

that his sentence had been cut, and he had been released from a young offenders institution because the judge thought that the original sentence was far in excess of what was appropriate for the offence. I can only concur with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that it would not be appropriate to fetter the discretion of the Court of Appeal in such cases, because in the end its job is to act as a safeguard and a long stop when incorrect sentences have been passed. What I have said is not intended to undermine the argument of the hon. Member for Witney on behalf of those who feel that the system has not met their needs.

In a previous debate we discussed the extent to which sentencing can reflect local circumstances, and I think that it was the hon. Member for Woking who originally raised the point about preponderances of particular types of offence in different localities. We came to recognise that the framework would not prevent that approach, because the desire to crack down on a particular difficulty in any area is an important consideration. I am sure that the Committee is grateful to the hon. Member for Witney for giving us an opportunity to debate the issues in considering his amendment.

I have enjoyed listening to the Minister's response and the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. I accept that there are difficulties in trying to pass into law something that so drastically fetters the ability of the Court of Appeal to reduce sentences. However, I still believe that what I said about the importance of local justice and about respecting the decisions of local sentencers is vital. I hope that we shall, as we proceed with consideration of the Bill, be able to deal with those matters again.

I make a plea to the Minister for more accurate figures showing the sentences that are given and the cuts that are made to sentences as a result of appeals. We should know what is happening and be able to ascertain, offence by offence, what sentences the Court of Appeal cuts. It is essential that after the Bill becomes law we should have proper research and figures on the work of the sentencing council, with a view to establishing proper tariffs for offences such as the dangerous driving offences that we have been discussing. It is essential to get the sentence right first time. If we can do that, Mrs. Smith and many people like her will not experience the terrible disappointment of having what they thought was justice snatched away from them, not once but twice. On the basis that that will happen, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I have no particular objection to the clause in principle, as we should consider the possibility of changing the upper limits of the jurisdiction of magistrates courts, but it allows for no parliamentary input into such proceedings. I would

much rather see that possibility, as it is a legitimate matter for Parliament to consider. The absence of such a possibility is a serious failure in the clause, and I look forward to hearing the Minister's views, as I am sure that he would agree with us. He has stressed the importance of the changes that are taking place and being debated extensively in the Committee, yet we are countenancing the possibility of further changes without the same intense scrutiny.

I join the plea for information on which we can legislate and on which the public can know what is going on. Will the Minister discuss with his colleagues how to deliver measures from which all of us will benefit? It is still extraordinarily difficult at local level to get consistent and comparable statistics. I welcome the Government's decision to bring together the crime figures quarterly, and I welcome the interviews by the British crime survey and the recording of offences. However, I still struggle, not through their ill will or mischief or desire for secrecy, to get through to a borough command unit, which is one of the bits of the Met that looks after my borough. I still struggle to get an answer from officers to a request for comparable figures for this year and last year and for this quarter and last quarter to compare my borough with its two neighbours. I would like figures not just on crimes committed, people arrested and crimes cleared up, but on the subject that the hon. Member for Witney referred to: what happens next?

The police will often say that they do not know what happened at the end of a case. Some witnesses do not know what happened. I remember once giving evidence at an identity parade on the other side of London. Mercifully, I was led to believe that the person whom I identified was the person the police thought he was. That was all very convenient, although I was slightly nervous at the time. However, I never heard any more about what happened in the case—whether the person was taken to court or convicted. Given that that person appeared on the estate behind my house, I had some interest in knowing whether they were going to break into other vehicles outside my house to steal stuff from them.

If I may introduce a small interlude: the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) and others of us who live in south London—and the Foreign Secretary—share an experience. Occasionally, in south London we are driven to take, at least partly, the law into our own hands. That may not be a commendable characteristic. On one of the two occasions when I ''took the law into my own hands'', the police appeared; they seemed to be slightly surprised to find a Member of Parliament rolling around on the ground trying to hold down somebody who was nicking some tools out of a van. They were rather more surprised when a pub spilled out in a violent incident and there was a running battle on the street outside my house during which I was seeking to protect the dad of a friend of mine from being beaten over the head. Everybody else appeared to have lost their shirt and to be covered in blood; I had lost half my shirt and was covered in blood as well.

I wish to repay an earlier compliment from the hon. Gentleman by saying that as a Member of Parliament from Essex, I am disturbed to hear that things are quite so grim in his part of the world.

Sometimes we try to export our difficulties further east.

The public need to know what happens in the courts and what sentences are given, what are the outcomes of what happens in the probation service and, if there is a custodial institution in a borough, what happens there. I know that the Government have it in mind to make those responsible for the criminal justice system more accountable, but may I suggest something that would transform people's understanding of what is going on? Every few months, the borough or district police chief, the person in charge of the probation service, the person in charge of the court service and, if there is a custodial institution, the person in charge of that, should appear with the leader of the council to answer the public's questions in a way that everybody can understand. They could explain whether things were getting better or worse, whether punishments were fitting crimes, whether more or fewer people were being caught and whether the system was more or less efficient. People should have that information.

I am instinctively unhappy about the clause. We have accepted the doubling of the power of magistrates to sentence—the biggest change in their sentencing power for years. Now we are being asked to contemplate that the Secretary of State, by order alone, should be allowed to add a further 50 per cent., with none of the debate that that would merit and no chance to explore the implications in terms of sentencing policy, actual sentences or knock-on effects. The review of the criminal justice system, which I welcome, was meant to enable us to consider the structure of the courts and sentencing policy, and to ensure that offences are tried in the appropriate places. The Home Secretary keeps on saying that we should have a settled criminal justice system so that we do not have to keep reviewing it.

I am unhappy about the proposal that the Secretary of State, after only a few months—or a new Secretary of State soon after being appointed—should be able to come to both Houses of Parliament and propose to increase magistrates' powers with no explanation of how it would affect custody plus rules, no natural implication that it would make custody plus run up to 18 months or 18 months minus a week, no connection between the two or learning from experience and no opportunity for colleagues in both Houses to have the debate to which they are properly entitled. A few people would be able to speak—three Front Benchers, the Chairman of the Select Committee and a couple of others—and that would be the end of it in the Commons. In the Lords, there would be a chance for one round of discussion and no amendment or alteration.

Those of us who signed up to the 12-month sentencing power did so on the understanding that it was part of a settled, considered, proposal. We would be more comfortable if it were 51 weeks, for the reasons that we argued. However, I urge the Minister

to consider that the clause is inappropriate. In five years' time we are bound to have, or have had, another criminal justice Bill. I predict that, in the course of the Minister's career in Parliament, and in that of everybody in this Room, there will be another piece of Home Office legislation that will give us the opportunity to amend sentencing. I am prepared to take a significant wager on that.

So am I.

The hon. Gentleman, who has been in this place longer than I have, knows the track record in that area. There is no risk that the proposition cannot be brought back again, nor that there cannot be a new proposal. However, it ought to be made on the basis of evidence, in the light of experience—not here, where we have not even considered the effect of phase 1, which is what the major part of the Bill is. I ask the Minister to accept that it is a proposal too far.

I was about to say that not only do we not know the effect of phase 1, we do not even know when we will know it, because of the absence of the linkage between custody plus and the changes in the sentencing powers.

Neither do we know the timing of the obvious thing that was intended to link with phase 1: custody plus. The Minister has told us that he does not know. He is the Minister, and if he does not know, the rest of us cannot know. I hope that he accepts the force of the argument. We are generally resistant to granting Home Secretaries ''by order'' powers. We can sometimes be persuaded that they are a good idea, but this is not a good idea and we will resist it.

I concur with the point about the need for more information at local level. The questions that hon. Members have asked bring to public light the information that is available, but we need to improve on that. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey suggested that commanders of the BCU should appear before constituents to answer questions about trends. That certainly happens in my constituency in several community forums, and I am sure that it is the practice around the country. I see that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) is nodding. It is certainly good practice. I was interested by the hon. Gentleman's description of his own have-a-go experience. If that is what he can do on his own, heaven knows what he could achieve were he to combine with the right hon. Member for West Dorset and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I would not mess about with the three of them if they were in the vicinity at the same time.

Turning to the substance of the clause, the procedure—affirmative resolution—that would allow for the extension of sentencing powers is provided for in clause 265(5)(a). Clearly, the Government will want to reflect on the outcome of the operation of the 12-month sentencing power. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that any further increase would not affect the structure of custody plus.

Just looking at what we have been doing in Committee today and what took place on Second Reading, I am sure that the Minister would

agree that what we have achieved is very different from what could be achieved in a debate on an affirmative resolution. Does that not highlight why the affirmative resolution procedure is unsatisfactory? A change of such magnitude would have to be made on the basis of carefully considered debate about its impact.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman's second proposition that the powers provided for in clause 139 would have to be exercised only after extremely careful consideration. I do not accept his first point that the procedure is defective, but I can reassure him that any further increases would have to be carefully considered and weighed in the light of the evidence and of experience of the operation of the increased sentencing powers provided for in the Bill. I am sure that we shall return to that matter, should my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary decide to exercise the permissive power under affirmative order to increase sentencing powers.

I want to come back on that point. I appreciate the Minister's points, but I still think that he underestimates the importance of any decision further to increase magistrates' sentencing powers. After all, their current sentencing powers have not been tinkered around with lightly or without a great deal of debate. Many issues surrounding the limitations on their powers have had to be considered. It is also necessary to consider whether any changes would undermine the system of Crown court trial, although I have been reassured on that point, and whether they would be desirable for the administration of justice. Could the lay magistracy handle it? Is this the thin end of the wedge, leading to the introduction of differential sentencing powers for lay and stipendiary magistrates without any review of the totality of sentences?

A host of issues arise that—I say this frankly to the Minister—require scrutiny through primary legislation. Given the spirit of co-operation that the Committee has enjoyed, he will be aware that such change would require only a one-clause Bill. Second Reading would last only a short time, and the Committee proceedings would probably last one day, or two at most. The usual mechanism for scrutiny would also be available to those in the other place who wanted to provide some input. Dealing with such a Bill would not be an onerous task and would not take up too much time, but Parliament could do its job.

The issues could all too easily be bypassed if we simply stick to the affirmative resolution procedure. Let us suppose for a moment that the implementation of magistrates' greater sentencing powers, which we and the Minister welcome, does not proceed according to plan. Let us suppose also that the Treasury puts pressure on a future Home Secretary, saying that serious cost savings could be made by increasing the power further. In those circumstances, there will be irresistible pressure to say, ''All we have to do is pass an affirmative order. It will be easy enough to whip the House and the Committee through.'' Allowing changes of such magnitude to be dealt with under

the affirmative resolution procedure will not do justice to those who will be affected by them or to Parliament's role.

The Committee has enjoyed a period of great co-operation, so it is with reluctance that I say that we must part company from the Minister and vote against the clause.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 8.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 139 ordered to stand part of the Bill.