I beg to move amendment No. 604, in

clause 128, page 74, line 25, after ''guilty'', insert

''or made a full admission to the police''.

There is provision in this part of the Bill for reduction in sentences for guilty pleas. It is a well-established procedure that has been further refined in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. There is, however, an issue that we should discuss. Under the clause, the earliest indication of an intention to plead guilty, and I assume that it must also work under 2000 Act, as it is worded in the same way, would be at the first appearance in the magistrates court. A person may vigorously deny an offence when interviewed by the police—indeed, he may tell a cock and bull story—but he may change his mind at the magistrates court and say that he intends to plead guilty at the first opportunity. Under the clause, he would receive the maximum discount for such a plea. However, his denial of the offence when interviewed by the police may have cost the investigating and prosecuting authority a great deal of time, trouble and

expense before his first appearance at the magistrates court.

My experience is that that happens frequently in health and safety at work cases. At first, there is huge denial before finally at prosecution stage someone will declare an intention to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. Should we not differentiate between the person or corporation denying the offence when interviewed but pleading guilty at the earliest opportunity at court, and those admitting guilt at interview and giving the earliest possible indication of an intention to plead guilty when the case gets to court? I should have thought from a public policy point of view that it might be worth while favouring the person who does the latter rather than the former.

I wonder why the hon. Gentleman does not think that the matter is already covered by subsection (1)(a), which tells us to take into account the stage of the proceedings at which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty.

That may be the case, but my reading of the clause does not suggest that it is. The proceedings are after charge, not before. Quite a lot of expense and time may have been spent before charge investigating the offence because of the denial of guilt. It is a minor point, but from a public policy angle, we should be giving every incentive to people to co-operate, admit guilt and enter a plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity. If that means differentiating by a further category those who do not co-operate, but give such an indication when brought to court, it might be worth doing.

I am still trying to reflect on the hon. Gentleman's point. Since subsection (1)(a) refers to the stage in the proceedings, I am not clear on the implication of his amendment. The issue that he raises is difficult, but I entirely understand the sentiment behind it.

I wanted to acknowledge that, as worded, the amendment does present a difficulty, because it would not achieve the desired result. I shall not go into details, but I think that the Minister understands what I am trying to get at.

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman thinks that I have understood what he is trying to get at. If one were to add the provision, the first question that arises is whether there would be consideration of a greater discount if an admission was made to the police, as opposed to entering a plea of guilty when the case comes to court. If that is the intention, it raises an issue about those deciding to plead guilty after having the benefit of legal advice. That stage may not come until after they have had a conversation with the police. One would have to be slightly careful that one did not end up with a perverse incentive. I am concerned about his proposal for that reason. I also wonder whether the fine gradations in question would be worth the effort.

I see the problem. I do not think that the amendment is perfectly worded. My hon. Friend seeks to give greater credit to someone—a street

robber, for example—who says, ''Okay, I did it,'' immediately after the police pick him up. Someone who immediately confesses involvement ought to get some extra credit from the judge later in the proceedings, as opposed to someone who does not plead until he gets to court. I appreciate the difficulty with the wording, though.

Let me add two thoughts in support of the general proposition. First, people effectively face such circumstances in the world of motoring offences, with fixed penalty notices and so on. One gets 14 days, within which, if one pays, one is able to pay at a reduced rate. If one contests the penalty, one risks the higher rate, and further penalties.

There is also an issue prompted by the point that concerns the summary, and non-summary, offence time limits. At the moment, one cannot charge someone for an offence that can be tried only in a magistrates court, unless they are charged within six months. I shall give as an example the case of a constituent who came to me claiming that his employer was in breach of health and safety legislation in a car scrapyard and did not have insurance covering employer's liability. It is an offence not to have employer's liability insurance, but it is a summary offence that can be prosecuted only in a magistrates court, so if the investigations are not completed in time, it cannot be prosecuted at all.

This provision seems to be about ensuring that we give people incentives to accept their guilt in time and do not impose artificial barriers if investigations take longer, and that such a period should run from the time when the charge is put. I ask the Minister to consider the related, but separate, issue of the time limits for charging offences that are triable summarily only. Sometimes, injustice is clearly done in court in matters of significant public policy.

Is it possible for a smart-aleck lawyer—I know that such people are a small minority—to see how a case goes in terms of charges being dropped and other offences being tried and then, at an appropriate point, to get his client to plead guilty, with the result that, effectively, he gets off because the sentence for the guilty plea is such that it is below the threshold for him to be committed to a young offenders institution or prison? Will the Minister take into account the repercussions in terms of the public perception of the credibility of the criminal justice system when an offender can plead in that way? I am thinking of somebody who is 17 years old and has committed 115 offences that have gone to court.

The last point ranges slightly wider than the provisions of the clause. I see difficulties in the operation of the clause, but I should like to write to the hon. Gentlemen who have raised specific points. I do not know the answer to question posed by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey but I shall find out and respond. On the other points, I remain principally concerned about disadvantaging certain defendants. Some people have access to legal advice in time to understand the implications of pleading guilty or otherwise. They can decide whether to say to the police ''Okay, I did it,'' or to enter an early guilty plea before the court. Others

might receive advice in insufficient time to have a choice about how and when to plead.

I apologise to the Minister. In order to be fair to him, perhaps I could turn the tables and write to him with an explanation of the case. Then he can undertake, as he always does, to respond to that.

Who could resist such an invitation?

I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to consider the matter further. It is not entirely without difficulty, and I understand that he does not want to be unfair to somebody who is waiting for legal advice. My concern is the other way round. I can envisage circumstances in which the wording of clause 128 would be used by a lawyer to argue on behalf of his client that he should receive the maximum discount, even though he was wholly unco-operative with police inquiries and availed himself of the opportunity to indicate guilt only when proceedings began. That could lead to substantial extra public expenditure.

Such a case could be clearly differentiated in the mind of any sensible person from that of someone who the moment he is arrested or surrenders himself at the police station says, ''Look, I did this. I am very sorry and, of course, I shall plead guilty,'' is then charged, goes to magistrates court and gives an indication of plea immediately. I do not know how the previous rules operated, but clause 128 may cause problems. One can logically differentiate between the two examples that I have given.

We must also consider the need to reduce significantly the trauma to victims and witnesses who might have to give many more statements and be interviewed much more often if there was a delay before someone pleaded guilty in the expectation that they would be rewarded, or not penalised. Therefore, not just cost and time would be saved, but trauma and aggravation as well.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman entirely. Against that, the Minister may go away and conclude that the discretion in clause 128 is sufficient for judges to differentiate between the two situations. However, a problem with setting out rules in statutory form is that lawyers use them in court ad nauseam as a justification for their client receiving the maximum discount in particular circumstances. I would be grateful if the Minister considered the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I wish to raise with the Minister a policy issue that was touched on by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North. I very much favour clear rules that connect an early plea with a potential sentence discount. I have always been uncomfortable with plea bargaining arrangements, particularly those to which the hon. Gentleman referred, in which a charge for a more substantial offence is dropped as the trial nears in exchange for the accused pleading guilty to a lesser

offence only to walk away after conviction on a charge that, in the public eye, falls far short of appropriate.

Two aspects must be considered. First, no charges should have been made until the Crown Prosecution Service was of the view that it was in the public interest to charge and there was a more than 50 per cent. chance of a conviction. Secondly, I am aware that a change of practice is intended whereby charges will be brought only after the CPS has been involved in the process. It is hoped that the police will not make the mistake at the beginning of overcharging, which results in cases that cannot be backed up by the evidence.

I am also aware that cases that look good on day one may look less good on day 101. Obvious examples are a key witness who is well on day one but ill on day 101, or who is compos mentis on day one but not particularly compos mentis by day 101. Thus, the strength of a prosecution case could diminish.

I would be grateful for an indication from the Minister as to whether it is Government policy that the legislation will effectively do away with the process that leaves plea bargaining and charge disappearance to negotiation. Furthermore, can we expect the police charge laid at the beginning, on the advice of the CPS, to be the one that goes to court, so that the defendant will know what he will be convicted of if he pleads guilty and does not think that by spinning it out he will be convicted of a lesser offence?

The case may be made that it is in the public interest to secure many more guilty pleas to lesser offences—I am aware of marginal cases, such as section 18 and section 20 wounding cases, where the most serious wounding is a very serious offence and lesser wounding a lesser offence—but the public feel aggrieved when criminals are seen as getting off too lightly. I have a constituency case, and have had them in the past, where people are worried that the charge will be inappropriate to the circumstances. A plea is being negotiated for a lesser charge that will allow everyone to go home ''comfortably''. No one has had a chance to argue that this was an attempted murder, for example, which should, if proven, result in an appropriate sentence.

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point with some bearing on the clause, though he ranges more widely. He partly answered his own question. Self-evidently, a range of considerations must be taken into account and he referred to circumstances in which everyone can go home, but sometimes sparing a witness or a victim from having to give evidence is the right thing for justice and genuinely in everybody's interest. The change in charging arrangements should ensure that more groundwork is done, making the charges better prepared and more likely to stick.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.