I beg to move amendment No. 413, in

clause 104, page 62, line 24, leave out subsection (4).

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 414, in

clause 104, page 62, line 30, leave out subsection (5).

No. 415, in

clause 104, page 62, line 32, leave out subsection (6).

No. 416, in

clause 104, page 62, line 36, leave out subsection (7).

No. 417, in

clause 104, page 63, line 3, leave out subsection (8).

I do not want to take up much of the Committee's time because these are probing amendments designed to elicit a little more information from the Minister about this important clause. It is unclear to me how subsection (4) would operate in practice. That might be simply to do with the wording, although I have read the explanatory notes. Without more ado, I leave it to the Minister to explain how the clause would operate.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to set out why we have taken the approach set out in the Bill. The amendments, which I accept are probing amendments, would limit the circumstances in which previous consistent statements could be used to supplement or support the oral testimony of a witness. The present rule against previous consistent statements was described by the Law Commission as illogical, inconsistent, prejudicial to the accused and arbitrary in scope, so one can take it that it is dissatisfied with the current position. It felt that there was no case for retaining the present law.

The Government believe that the tradition that witnesses must give evidence in person is highly important, but so is the principle that relevant evidence should not be arbitrarily excluded in the search for truth. Ironically, previous statements may be used against a witness but cannot be used in confirmation of their evidence, even when it might help to give the court a better picture of events. We accept that it would alter the character of our criminal trials if too much documentary evidence were used. The attraction of the Law Commission scheme is that it provides that a statement will be admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents in cases in which it is likely to be helpful to supplement the witness's oral testimony. In other words, the statement will be admitted because there is a special reason to justify its admittance as evidence.

We believe that the main focus of the trial should remain on the oral evidence given by the witness, but we also agree that it would help witnesses to give better evidence if their earlier statements were made more widely admissible to supplement the evidence that they give at the trial. The witness will, of course, be available to be cross-examined on both the earlier statement and the oral evidence in chief.

The principle that earlier statements can be directly relevant to establishing the truth is recognised in most other common law jurisdictions, where the rules preventing their use have either been restricted or

abolished. For example, in Scotland, a witness's prior statement is admitted as evidence of any matter stated in it, if he adopts it as his evidence. The categories of admissibility in clause 104 were recommended by the Law Commission. They reflect the circumstances in which it is likely to be helpful to juries and magistrates to be able to take statements into account.

I shall take each amendment in turn to clarify our intentions. Amendment No. 414, on subsection (5), would enable a previous statement identifying or describing a person, object or place to go in as evidence of the facts stated in it. The current law is inconsistent in that it allows evidence to be admitted of the identification of the defendant by a witness out of court—for example, at an identity parade—but prevents the admission of evidence of a previous identification of an object such as a car number plate. Another anomaly is that a picture or sketch of a person may go in as evidence, but not the words used to describe that person. The Law Commission considered that that limitation might reek of serious injustice. We agree that it is not possible to justify allowing a witness to give evidence of prior identification, but not a prior description. Subsection (5) address those inadequacies. The law in Scotland has been amended so that evidence of previous description can be given, and most of those who responded to the commission's consultation favour a similar change here.

Amendment No. 416 deals with subsection (6). Out of court statements would be available to supplement oral evidence given by a witness if he or she could not reasonably be expected to remember a matter well enough to give evidence of it. That reform recognises the difficulties that many witnesses face in remembering details. It is sometimes unreasonable to expect them to recall all the detail that is involved by the time of the trial. As a result, the best evidence may be lost to the court entirely—for example, where a statement was written down by someone other than the witness and not checked by the witness. As Professor Spencer has said, the weakness in relying solely on oral testimony is that it requires us:

''to accept two remarkable scientific propositions: first that memory improves with time; and secondly, that stress enhances a person's powers of recall.''

He makes the point graphically—what a witness said soon after events is likely to be at least as reliable as evidence given at trial, and in some cases, more so. We acknowledge that there might be exceptions—perhaps the witness was in shock when he or she reported events. However, if there is any discrepancy between accounts, it is bound to help the courts to have both accounts before them as evidence.

There are other safeguards in subsection (4). First, the statement must have been made while events were fresh in the witness's memory. Secondly, the witness must have indicated to the best of his or her ability that the statement is true. Contradictory evidence could also be led about matters dealt with in the statement, just as it could with oral testimony. In cases in which the trial takes place some time after the events

in question, the statement might be crucial in providing details that the witness can no longer recall. Without the reforms, the courts in such cases would be deprived of any evidence at all. Similar provision exists in the United States' federal rules. The consultation that was conducted by the Law Commission favoured the reforms by a large majority.

Turning to amendments Nos. 416 and 417, we have already discussed our proposals for reforming the common law on recent complaints, so I shall not dwell long on them. The rationale for subsections (7) and (8) is that it will generally be helpful to the courts to know what the alleged victim said when he first made his complaint. The benefits apply to all cases in which there is a complaint; they are not limited to sexual allegations. If the complaint goes in as evidence, it should be admissible as to the truth of its content and challengeable in the same way as the complainant's oral evidence.

We believe that the changes will help witnesses to give their best evidence in court. As with all reforms to the criminal justice system, we need to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place. I hope that I have reassured hon. Members. Where the witness is available to testify, the previous statements will add to the oral evidence and will not replace it, and it will be possible to cross-examine the witness on both the earlier statements and the evidence in chief. Other safeguards include the court's power to exclude superfluous evidence and prosecution evidence that is unfair or prejudicial. Finally, the jury will not be able to take the statement with them when they retire to consider their verdict, unless the judge or all the parties agree.

In proposing the reforms, we are endeavouring to strike a balance between maintaining an exclusive emphasis on oral evidence and preventing relevant evidence from being kept from the fact finders. The reforms reflect the fact that it is wrong in principle for evidence to be kept from the court when it is of better quality than the oral evidence available at the time of the trial. The proposals would allow the court to see the full picture, and in doing so would reduce the risk of injustice. The reforms are widely supported, and bring the law in England and Wales in line with that of most other common law jurisdictions. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

I am very grateful to the Minister. The topic is quite complicated, and I am especially grateful for the way in which he encapsulated it quite briefly. I wholly support the thrust of the clause, particularly in relation to what he said about the nonsensical idea that memory improves with time or that stress improves recollection. One has seen only too often in a court setting witnesses who are genuinely trying to tell the truth, but who are seriously handicapped by the problems of recollection in a stressful environment, even though the evidence is there from what they said to the police much earlier. I therefore have no difficulty in wholly welcoming the clause.

The Minister has reassured me, so I do not need to go into the points that I had jotted down, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.