I beg to move amendment No. 386, in

clause 77, page 49, line 2, at end add—

'(b) in the event of the acquittal of the defendant on any retrial, he should be entitled to compensation for any period he has spent in custody prior to and during any proceedings under this Part of the Act.'.

This is a simple issue. It is a principle of our law that if a person is held in custody pending trial, there is ordinarily no remedy, unless there are exceptional circumstances relating to subsequent action for malicious prosecution. Usually, there is no compensation for that. I think that it is generally accepted that the administration of justice would be difficult if compensation was provided for. However, under the procedure in question, such a rule should apply. If someone has been acquitted of an offence by a jury, and the police subsequently, with the DPP's approval, decide to reopen the investigation, in the course of which they re-arrest the person and detain him, and it is decided that he should be deprived of his liberty during the investigation and trial, which lasts several months, it seems to me that that person is entitled to be compensated by the state if the outcome of the process is a second acquittal. If the person is convicted, the issue of course does not arise.

We cannot get away from the fact that the process that we are considering, which has been proposed for understandable reasons, is a massive change to the principle of our liberties in this country. In view of that, a new compensation regime should apply to it. It can be clearly distinguished from other examples of the same kind, and it would be proper to ensure that someone who is put in jeopardy in this way twice, and inconvenienced and deprived of his liberty as a result, should, if acquitted a second time, be compensated for what he has been put through by the state.

Presumably, if the person were found guilty he should have an additional period added to the sentence because of the fact that he had enjoyed perhaps many years' liberty, having evaded justice in the first place.

That is an interesting observation, but I do not think that there is any equivalence between the two concepts. I accept that if a person is acquitted on the second time round, he might count himself fortunate—or perhaps unfortunate; I do not know. It would depend on his circumstances at the time. He might consider that he would have been happier starting his sentence earlier, but then I suppose he should have pleaded guilty. It is probable in cases of the kind that we are considering that the person would be in prison for a very long time, because they involve serious offences.

There is an issue to be dealt with. I fully accept the basic principle that being deprived of liberty for a trial process is something that a person might have to endure. However, if it happens a second time, and the jury again return a verdict of not guilty, compensation should be paid.

There may be people other than the offender whom we could think about, such as the victim—perhaps a murder victim or the victim's family, or people affected by some other horrendous crime. They, too, might consider that if someone had got away with something for two or three years there should be an additional sentence for the anguish and hurt caused. It might be difficult for a lawyer to see it in those terms, but from a victim's point of view it could be a painful and protracted experience.

I accept entirely that the victims of crime suffer very much. Indeed, in certain instances, a victim—if he is alive—is entitled to compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. The state has provided for that, even though a personal injury claim might not be possible. I fully accept that many people suffer very much through the criminal justice system. However, we are concerned with a decision taken by Parliament that, contrary to our normal rules and practices, and for reasons that we think are justified by public policy, it may be necessary for someone to be put through the trial process twice, even though his first acquittal was, on the face of it, completely regular, and could not be quashed for any reason of procedural irregularity.

We are not talking about cases in which someone is tried twice because the jury could not return a verdict. That is covered by the ordinary rules of procedure, and sometimes must be borne. We are considering a completely new regime, and I am bound to say that if the state does not succeed on the second occasion in achieving the result that it has thought right, and the jury acquit, it will be a bold man who maintains that the person is guilty, so he must be entitled to the protections that his acquitted status gives him, one of which is to be compensated for being put through the process again. Compensation should be reasonable, not punitive, and should reflect the inconvenience that the person has suffered, and doubtless his loss of income for that period.

Parliament must send out an important message that it does not embark on this process lightly. It is simply saying that people can be retried as a matter of routine when the state thinks that they should because it believes that they have committed serious offences. There is a need for a compensatory mechanism. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

May I pick up on a phrase that the hon. Gentleman used at the end of his contribution? He talked about people being retried ''as a matter of routine''. We have spent three sittings debating anything but matters of routine. We have been debating—whether or not we all agree—carefully constructed clauses.

I am grateful to the Minister. The point that I was trying to make was that this is not a routine procedure but an extraordinary procedure that we have accepted. It should not be embarked on lightly by the state, precisely because of the civil liberties implications. Surely compensation is justified if the state is found by a jury to have got it wrong.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I did not mean to misrepresent him in any way. The Government feel that this is the right change to make, and that is why we are having this debate. Although I understand the argument behind the amendment, a person who faces a retrial for a serious offence under clause 77 is subject to the same safeguards as anyone else who faces a criminal charge, as is set out in the Bail Act 1976. For example, decisions on bail or on remanding in custody are for the courts to take. We have, in particular, made the initial bail decision in retrial cases a matter for the Crown court, in recognition of the nature of the offences and the provisions.

However, I am not persuaded that we should set a precedent for compensation in retrial cases, as it would not be available to any other person remanded in custody who is subsequently found not guilty. The circumstances about which the hon. Gentleman is concerned are indeed a consequence of the change in the law. We think that a change should be made, but his concerns are not sufficient to persuade me that we should not follow the logic of the change that we are making.

We must not prejudge the issues that will join the defendant and the Crown in that second trial. We must avoid the assumption that the man was guilty, was lucky to get off the first time, and if he has been acquitted the second time he is even luckier.

One would rather hope, in view of the procedures on which we embark, that the conviction rate on retrial for such offences, if we are doing our job properly, should be 99.999 per cent., but strange things always happen in the criminal justice system. In the past 30 years we have treated with the maximum opprobrium individuals who have been convicted of committing appalling offences, yet we have had to accept 19, 20, 25 or 27 years down the road that, having heaped invective on them, it appears that they are not guilty, or at least that their convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory.

I do not rule out in this funny old world that, some time in the next 20 years, we could end up retrying someone under these provisions, only for the Court of Appeal to overturn the decision 15 years later. That is the human world that we live in. Human justice is fallible, and we must accept that.

As citizens, we must accept our rights and obligations. One of those is that one is not compensated if one has the misfortune, as an innocent person, to be put on trial and acquitted, even though the disruption to one's life might be considerable. In some cases, people's lives are destroyed, despite acquittals that the whole of society fully accepts thereafter as justified. We accept that as part of the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune that are visited on people. With the provisions, however, we are quite deliberately doing that twice over, because of the certainty that the correct, guilty verdict will result. Heaven knows, we have been discussing the matter for the past few days. It troubles me that when someone is acquitted again we do not say sorry in some tangible form for the disruption caused.

The hon. Gentleman said that we should compensate a person because the state has got it wrong twice—

No, because he would have been detained.

What has the state done to justify compensation if a person is acquitted the first time around, there is then new and compelling evidence, the state goes through all the proper procedures that we are instituting and gives him another fair trial, and he is then acquitted?

That brings me back to my original point that many people—some in the Committee and some outside—take different views. We think that the principle of double jeopardy should not be interfered with, as we are planning to do, because it is a serious attack on an individual's certainties and civil liberties. We have chosen to do it, however. As the hon. and learned Lady knows, I have explained that there are divisions in all political parties. I am willing to co-operate to make the provisions work. I am not voting against these measures—I support them. I can see that there are public policy grounds for them, whereby the public demand that under certain circumstances it would be an offence against all the principles of justice for a person not to be tried again. That is despite all the perfectly good arguments that the Liberal Democrats, the hon. Member for North Down, and others—some in the Conservative party and some outside—have urged, that whatever the issues, Parliament should not embark on such a course at all. I simply say that the amendments would perhaps soften the blow. Parliament should perhaps recognise the issue, by providing for a compensatory mechanism to somebody who has been put through the process twice over, because of Parliament's decision on public policy grounds.

I have the impression that I do not have the Committee's support, so I shall press the matter to a vote, although I regret doing so. I think that in such exceptional circumstances compensation should be paid.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and have great respect for his views. I do not in any way take lightly what he advocates. However, those who argue against that step say that there is a danger of harassment. If the provisions were used improperly, and resulted in harassment, there would certainly be an action for compensation.

I accept that, and that there might be grounds for claiming malicious prosecution. However, I take my view quite independently of that. Above all, the point is that the person has been detained in custody—the hon. and learned Lady will see that that is provided for—and that there has been a deprivation of liberty in the trial process. There might be circumstances in which trials take place without the person's being detained in custody at all. I also suspect that the judiciary might bend over backwards to avoid custody, unless the risk of absconding or interfering with the course of justice is thought to be so great that someone should be locked up. If someone is not already inside for another offence when the procedure

is carried out, which might often be the case, or if he is at liberty and has been leading a normal life for some time, the judiciary might be loth to deprive him of his liberty. If so, I would certainly not seek compensation for him.

There is a powerful argument—it is no more than an argument, and I shall not press the amendment to a vote—for recognising that we are taking a grave step in public policy terms. If the retrial turned out not be justified, and the jury opted for acquittal, it would be right to pay compensation to the defendant, who would have been detained in custody for an offence of which he had previously been acquitted and who would have been put through the trial process again.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 78 and 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.