I beg to move amendment No. 319, in

clause 73, page 45, line 22, leave out 'superintendent or above' and insert 'chief constable'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 323, in

clause 74, page 46, line 15, leave out 'superintendent or above' and insert 'chief constable'.

I am grateful to those members of the Committee who decided that it was worth while to stay the course and enable us to conclude our proceedings. The clause provides a mechanism that enables an officer, without having to go the DPP for his authorisation, to take any action for the purposes of an investigation when each of a series of conditions is met. It states:

''The first condition is that the investigation is authorised by an officer of the rank of superintendent or above . . . Such an authorisation may be given before or after the start of the investigation . . . The second condition is that—(a) new evidence which would be relevant to an application . . . in respect of the qualifying offence to which the investigation relates is available or known to the officer authorising the investigation, or (b) that officer has reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence is likely as a result of the investigation to become available or known to him

. . . The third condition is that the action is necessary as a matter of urgency—(a) to prevent the investigation being substantially and irrevocably prejudiced, or (b) to prevent death or serious personal injury.''

I found the clause rather difficult. I tried to think of circumstances in which it would be necessary for such steps to be taken in a reinvestigation in this fashion. After all, the whole nature of the reinvestigation and retrial process is that it is the revisiting of a previous case in which someone has been acquitted. It would hardly have the flavour of the police having to intervene as an emergency, because the crime to which it relates was committed prior to the first trial, yet here we are going one stage further than the DPP's administrative scrutiny.

We are saying that a police officer can take emergency action, which may involve interference with someone's liberty, in respect of an offence of which he has previously been acquitted, when, by its very nature, one would not expect the reinvestigation process to be an emergency process at all. It strongly suggests that there will be a preliminary investigation by the police before the DPP is asked to look into the matter. While I can understand that happening in respect of outsiders or areas that do not concern the defendant, I find it difficult to see why the defendant would have, or need to have, any contact with the police at that preliminary stage.

This is a fairly draconian step, and I cannot but think that a chief constable, not simply someone of the rank of superintendent, is the right person to give such authorisation. Otherwise, there is a serious danger that such interference could become routine. That is the key issue in both amendments, but there is another issue concerning death and serious personal injury, to which I shall return.

Will the Minister clarify in what circumstances the clause would be invoked and consider whether it might not be more sensible for a chief constable to give the authorisation, because the clause provides for the authorisation of actions that would otherwise be unlawful? If it is a matter of intervening to protect a witness who might be engaged at the retrial—not because he is being threatened by the acquitted defendant to prevent him from co-operating with the police—the clause is unnecessary, because the ordinary powers of the police to protect a citizen from the actions of another person would be quite sufficient.

The hon. Gentleman has helpfully outlined the difficulties with the clause. Under what circumstances would it be appropriate to use clause 73, rather than clause 72? It is hard to envisage circumstances that would not constitute the commission of a new offence, in which case no authorisation would be needed for the police to take action.

That part of me that relates back to my involvement with the police thinks that, were such a situation to arise, it would be rank inflation to require authorisation by someone of the rank of chief constable. If urgent action was needed, the superintendent would be the appropriate district commander and available officer of sufficient

seniority to authorise the investigation. My problem is that I cannot envisage circumstances in which it could or should be used, given that this is an exceptional process in every way, which Parliament may or may not be prepared to sanction under limited terms and with sufficient safeguards.

The clause effectively overrides that process and introduces a further exception to the exception. The Minister may have clear examples in mind of the circumstances in which the police would be unable to make appropriate investigations in relation to the current offence, especially to prevent death or serious personal injury. I would have thought that there were clear grounds in such a case for a police officer to take action, irrespective of whether someone had been acquitted in a previous trial. The Minister may have examples in mind of the circumstances in which the police should be able to take action without following the proper procedures in clause 72.

I am not sure whether I entirely support the amendments in their present form, but they provide a helpful vehicle for investigating the Minister's thinking on the subject. My inclination is to reject the entire clause, unless he has a sufficiently compelling and reliable argument in support of it.

For the reasons alluded to by the hon. Gentleman, I am not persuaded that the appropriate rank of person to authorise the arrangements under the clause is chief constable. In consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Government have reached the view that a superintendent would have the appropriate seniority and operational experience to take a decision to authorise an urgent reinvestigation. Chief constables are far less readily available to deal personally with such urgent situations than superintendents. What if the chief constable was away?

As for the sort of circumstances to which the provision would apply—what about those in which information is received? I accept that, in the main, the clause 72 route should be used. However, it would be unwise, having gone to all the effort to change the law on double jeopardy, not to provide for urgent circumstances. An example might be an instance in which information is received from an informant that a particular piece of evidence is to be found at a particular place, and that if the acquitted person were to become aware that he was being reinvestigated, he might decide to dispose of it. That is why subsection (5)(a) gives as a condition that meets the test of a matter of urgency

''to prevent the investigation being substantially and irrevocably prejudiced.''

Thus, information that the weapon that was used in a particular murder is to be found in a cupboard would be a good reason for taking urgent investigative steps. Provision has to be made for such situations; otherwise the circumstances described in subsection (5)(a) might come to pass.

I think that that is a bad example. The police would be able to intervene in those circumstances under their existing powers. They would be able to find something on which to hang it as it is. If a revolver was in a top drawer, the police would have no problem in going to the house and searching it for that weapon. What worries me about the clause is that it is an open invitation to the police to carry on, as a matter of routine, investigating offences for which somebody has been acquitted, long after the acquittal has taken effect.

I do not accept that argument. I honestly believe that clause 73 is about providing for those circumstances. The hon. Gentleman says that other powers would apply. In the case of a revolver, that might be so. However, for a knife it would be a different matter. It is sensible that there should be provision to cover the rare eventualities in which urgent steps need to be taken because there is a risk to the evidence that might otherwise come to light, and the investigation into the crime might substantially and irrevocably be prejudiced. I do not put on the provision the construction that other hon. Members have—that this is an instrument for ongoing oppression of people who have been acquitted. That is not what it is about. It is about covering the small number of eventualities that might arise in which urgent action is needed in order to set in train the process to which all the clauses relate, subject to all the tests and requirements including—in relation to this clause—the authorisation of a superintendent.

The Minister has persuaded me on the superintendent issue. I accept that the chief constable's role is rather difficult to justify. Although I am willing to withdraw the amendment, I shall return to the matter on subsequent amendments, because the issue of the powers that we are giving to the police to continue, quite speculatively, investigating acquitted offenders for their original offences on what seems to be a slender basis is important. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 320, in

clause 73, page 45, line 23, leave from 'may' to 'after' and insert 'only be given'.

This is really a matter of clarification of the statement that the authorisation

''may be given before or after the start of the investigation.''

I do not understand the wording of that sentence. If it is after the start of the investigation, the authorisation has already been given by the superintendent. The amendment probes that issue. I took it to mean that an officer could do something even before an investigation had been authorised. If I am wrong, perhaps the Minister will clarify the matter, as the sentence does not appear to make sense.

In the vast majority of circumstances, the authorisation should be given before an investigation. However, for the reason that I gave on the previous clause, there may be circumstances that are so urgent that officers need to act immediately and to seek approval as soon as possible thereafter.

Subsection (3) will apply only if it is necessary to prevent the investigation from being ''substantially and irrevocably prejudiced''. Irrevocably is a pretty strong test: it means that there is a risk of losing something that one can never get back if one does not act in a timely fashion.

I am grateful to the Minister, but the clause seems to contain some drafting gobbledegook. Presumably, the investigation referred to in subsection (3) takes place under clause 72, so the subsection should spell it out. If that is not the case, the subsection is nonsense. Why should it be necessary to be able to make an application after the start of an investigation under clause 72?

The clause also covers situations that could arise if, for example, evidence was found while a suspect was being investigated for another offence. For that reason, and for the reason that I gave in answer to an earlier question, it is necessary to provide for the urgent investigative steps set out in the clause.

In answer to the hon. Gentleman's last point, the process that must be gone through under clause 72 does not prevent an officer from then taking the actions set out in clause 73 for reasons of urgency.

I am confused by what the Minister said. He complained earlier about rank inflation, but there is now rank deflation. It appears that a constable can do anything he likes in certain circumstances, provided he gets the okay from a more senior officer afterwards. If the action is taken on the basis of clause 72, but in circumstances in which the officer cannot immediately obtain authorisation for his investigation, he is required under the fourth condition in clause 73(6) to have the proper consent under clause 72, which involves his seeking the support of an assistant chief constable or a commander to apply to the DPP without undue delay.

What on earth is the point of a subsequent authorisation by a superintendent in between the two events—the officer taking an action and that action being qualified, without undue delay, by the proper procedure under clause 72? What is the function of the superintendent? Is he merely an intermediary between the detective sergeant or the constable who has taken the action to placate his assistant chief constable, who may have to explain it to the DPP? I understand the granting of authorisation before investigation and the system whereby proper authorisation is given by the ACC and DPP, but I do not understand authorisation being given by a superintendent after the event, but before it has been taken to a senior officer for authorisation under clause 72.

The Minister has not made a valid case for the use of clause 72, although he said that it might assist in an investigation while another crime is being investigated. I hope that the safeguards that we are building into the Bill do not prevent investigation of another offence. An acquittal for an offence does not give someone an amnesty from investigation into any future offence, and there is therefore no impediment to a police officer investigating an individual for another offence. If that investigation provides evidence that subsequently

proves to be of use, so be it. I do not understand the difficulty that clause 73 seeks to remedy.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Clause 72 provides a mechanism by which the police can, for example, tell the DPP that they have obtained evidence from someone who came to them privately and re-examined forensic material, all of which can be done without the defendant knowing about it or having to be contacted—the time has come for them to carry out an informal investigation and they want the DPP to give them authorisation. As far as I can tell from the wording of clause 72, once the DPP has given that authorisation, the powers of the police are identical to those that they would have in the course of any criminal investigation against the defendant.

I understand what the Minister says about clause 73, but there might be circumstances in which, before applying for that authorisation, the police discover evidence during another investigation or from what someone has told them, which requires immediate action. There is the question whether we should allow them to do that, but I understand the logic of saying that, in those circumstances, an officer can ask a superintendent if he can carry out a clause 73 investigation, rather than a clause 72 investigation, for the purposes provided for in clause 73.

I also understand that, in those circumstances, the superintendent can give authorisation prior to a clause 72 investigation being authorised, but in view of the fact that clause 72 gives such extensive powers, I do not see how an officer needs a power under clause 73 to take action once a clause 72 investigation is up and running. To that extent, clause 73 appears to be gobbledygook, or a belt-and-braces job that is completely unnecessary as it provides a separate mechanism for issuing authorisation.

I hope that the Minister will reconsider the clause.

An issue that has troubled me greatly about clause 73 is that the DPP and the Court of Appeal have to agree that there is new and compelling evidence to trigger a retrial. Clause 73 is triggered in exceptional circumstances simply by new evidence, but there is no mention of the word ''compelling''. That is an extraordinarily intrusive power to give the police service, when the evidence may not even be compelling.

I agree. It is difficult to see when clause 73 will be legitimately used, although I am afraid that I can think of all sorts of occasions, to which I shall come in a moment, on which clause 73 may be used improperly and contrary to what Parliament and Ministers have in mind. However, I understand that there may be circumstances in which an emergency arises.

For example, an officer could be sitting behind his desk in a police station when someone comes in and says that she wants to talk to him. She says, ''My husband was acquitted 15 years ago of committing a murder, but he was guilty. He keeps a diary that he puts behind a cabinet in the loft, and he has recorded all the things that he did at that time. He coerced me

into silence, and on top of all that the knife he used is in the top drawer of the cupboard downstairs. He takes it out as a souvenir to look at it. The murder weapon was never found, you know.''

I can fully understand that, in those circumstances, a power under clause 73 is needed, but if an investigation is already under way, as sanctioned by the DPP under clause 72, there is no conceivable need for the power provided by clause 73(3), which is an authorisation given after the start of the investigation. I believe that the drafting is wrong, unless the Minister can persuade me otherwise. Perhaps I have misunderstood. It is possible that subsection (3) refers to a clause 73 investigation, rather than a clause 72 investigation, but in that case it is even more gobbledegook. For whatever reason, the drafting has gone funny.

I think that I can explain. First, too many investigations are mentioned in clause 73, and subsection (2) should refer to ''the action'' rather than ''the investigation''. Secondly, if the police had no reason to question an acquittal until someone told them something that was vital to deal with straight away, clause 73 would apply. If they had an idea that an acquittal could be challenged and began the work to collect the evidence, but had not got the DPP's authorisation, they would not have the extensive powers in clause 72(3). That is the lacuna that clause 73 fills.

I thank the hon. Gentleman, but I shall take another example. The hon. and learned Member for Redcar referred to a case that is likely to be reopened if the Bill is passed. From that, I assume that various police officers during the past 10 years might have taken witness statements from people and obtained evidence that would enable them to conduct a full investigation if they had the power to do so. The fact that someone has been acquitted does not mean that the police are not allowed to open their ears to the circumstances surrounding the case history. There might be a perjury offence, for example, so I do not see any fetter on the police apart from not being allowed to take the steps provided for in clause 72(3).

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) for providing illumination where darkness was prevailing—I begin to see the glimmer of light—but, in those circumstances, the authorisation provided for in clause 73(2) is otiose. If something is not needed, it should not be in the Bill. As far as I can see, the actions that the police may not currently undertake, which are to listen and take evidence from anyone they like, are what should be authorised in an emergency.

The hon. Member for Stafford has been helpful, and he shares my interpretation of an investigation as meaning actions subject to clause 72(3) in pursuit of an investigation. I lost contact with him when he said that the work might have started before the authorisation, because I would argue that

the police cannot start until the authorisation is given. It certainly would be helpful if the Minister changed the wording so that we are clear as to what we are talking about. Are we are talking about actions in pursuit of an investigation that would otherwise be unlawful under clause 72(3) or the investigation as a whole?

Will the Minister give me an assurance that he will look again at that wording, because even if it represents an attempt to achieve what he wants, it is far from clear? I would be happier if we had clarity about what is being sought in a clause that I find difficult to understand. I question the need for the power to take action after a clause 72 authorisation has been given, if that is what is meant. If the situation is as the hon. Member for Stafford described it, I still do not think that the measure is necessary because the police have those powers anyway. I do not think that it needs to be spelled out in the Bill.

This has generally been a useful discussion. First, it may help the Committee to know that clause 73(3) refers to a clause 73 investigation. Indeed, subsection (1) states:

''Section 72 does not prevent an officer from taking any action for the purposes of an investigation at a time when each of the following conditions is met.''

Subsection (3) states:

''Such an authorisation may be given before or after the start of the investigation.''

That is the investigation referred to in clause 73(1).

Secondly, I was asked why authorisation might be given before or after the start of the investigation. I tried to explain earlier that there might be circumstances in which it is urgent for the officer to act in such a way and then seek the authorisation of a superintendent subsequently. At that point, conceivably, if the superintendent were not persuaded of the reason given by the officer, he could refuse authorisation. He might argue that what is done is done, but that authorisation is not possible because the rest of the considerations in clause 73 have not been met.

That does not answer the question why the officer who has taken such actions in advance of authorisation did not go directly to the ACC for his authorisation through a proper process, but went to a superintendent instead. I understand why a superintendent would give emergency authorisation, but I do not understand why he would need to give retrospective authorisation when there is a procedure under clause 72 for full authorisation. When time is no longer of the essence, because the matter is retrospective, why should he not go through the proper process?

The answer is that we think that a superintendent or above should be the person who gives the authorisation in that circumstance.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that he could not conceive of any circumstance in which there would be a need for urgency once a clause 72 process had started. I can conceive of such circumstances.

The problem is not urgency, but that once a clause 72 investigation were up and running, the police would have the powers anyway. They would not need the powers in this clause.

I was just about to come to that point. One needs to make a distinction here. After many years, an informant may come forward to say that a body is buried in concrete on a farm. That would clearly be important evidence, and an application would be made under clause 72, which must be considered by the DPP. While that were still being weighed, and until the DPP gave a decision, the actions in subsection (3)(a) to (e) could not occur.

At that point, an informant could go to the police to say, ''You know I told you that the body was buried under the concrete. He has bought a jackhammer and he is digging up the ground now''. In those circumstances, there must be a power to enable urgent action to be taken. In that case, it would be necessary to prevent the investigation from being substantially and irrevocably prejudiced. For that reason, and I grant that these will be very limited circumstances, the powers are needed. That is why clause 73 speaks of ''urgent investigative steps''.

The Minister's example is not the best. An informant may come forward to say that a body is encased in concrete on the farm and that the acquitted person is digging it up with a jackhammer, but the police currently have ample power to intervene. They would be investigating a murder committed by a person unknown, and the acquitted individual would be interfering with the course of justice.

The new powers are not required. That illustrates my point that we seem to be bending over backwards to enable officers—that is what clause 72(3) does—to act on their own initiative against an acquitted person in a way that would be unlawful in an investigation. That is not something that an officer could do legitimately, such as preventing the digging up of a body or going on to land because he has been told that there is a body on it. He can do such things and then seek a superintendent's consent. I intend to vote against the clause, because it should be deleted. The subsection is not necessary.

I do not want to labour the point, but we have heard the Minister's example: the body is in the field and the chap is working with his jackhammer. What does Detective Sergeant So-and-so do? He picks up the phone to his super and says, ''I have a real problem. I need to act—give me the authorisation.'' If he acts without a superintendent's authorisation—he might have to if the situation calls for urgent action—what is the point of getting a superintendent's permission afterwards when he could just as easily have gone through the proper process, which allows a full range of investigation? An officer could tell the assistant chief constable what he did and why, and the assistant chief constable could then get permission from the DPP.

Order. This is turning into a speech.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 12

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move amendment No. 321, in

clause 73, page 45, line 30, leave out paragraph (b).

The amendment would delete subsection (4)(b) of the clause and, pursuing the discussion that we have had, give an officer licence to carry out a fishing expedition. That officer would have to have

''reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence is likely as a result of the investigation to become available or known to him.''

If someone gives information to the police, that, I suggest, would be new, or potentially new, evidence. Does the Minister agree?

It is important to establish what category of information in subsection (4)(b) would entitle an officer to act on his own initiative. On the face of it, it seems to me that subsection (4)(b) could justify a police officer, after seeing his superintendent, or even before doing so, in his decision to pop into Mr. Bloggs's house one afternoon on the basis that he could look for evidence on which to base a retrial, and thereby earn brownie points and get rapid promotion to sergeant.

It seems to me that subsection (4)(b) gives extraordinary licence to the police, bearing it in mind, as I said to the Minister, that the powers under clause 73 are not required for the police to carry out background investigative work. Such background work—asking questions of third parties, reconsidering the evidence, mulling things over or sending items for scientific examination—does not involve the defendant and is not an attack on his civil liberties.

As I said to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, I assume that such investigations must already have happened in a large number of cases, without the powers provided for under clause 72. I am concerned that the proposed power is open to abuse. Although I am not trying to wreck the retrial process, I need to be persuaded that the power is needed to make the retrial process work before I will vote for such a clause.

Will the hon. Gentleman not accept that the point is the reverse of the one that he makes? Subsection (4)(b) is included so that the officer cannot go on a fishing expedition. He must come to a genuine conclusion that there is something on which to base his actions. If the subsection was not included, the officer could go on a fishing expedition on the merest whim, without having come to any prior conclusion.

I am not sure that I entirely agree. At present, under subsection (4)(a), the condition for initiating an investigation under clause 73 would be that some evidence

''is available or known to the officer authorising the investigation.''

However, under subsection (4)(b), that condition is no more than

''reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence is likely as a result of the investigation to become available or known to him.''

I believe that that condition is not really a fetter on his actions, although I see the hon. Gentleman's point. The subsection does mean that a purely arbitrary exercise of power could not be justified without the officer having to give some grounds for it, but it gives him a pretty free rein to carry out such action. We should bear it in mind that what is under discussion is not the officer talking to a third party—unless I have misunderstood it—but his carrying out the actions provided for under clause 72(3).

I understand the argument that the hon. Gentleman makes, but I should point out to him that there are four conditions that must be met for the provisions of clause 73 to operate. He focuses on subsection (4)(a) and (b), but in addition, the action must be

''necessary as a matter of urgency''

to fulfil the requirements of subsections (5)(a) or (b), and the fourth condition must also be met, that given

''the urgency of the situation it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that consent before taking the action.''

That is a very hard test.

I understand the provisions of clause 73(5) and (6), and will return to that in a moment. I also understand that those provisions would be an extra fetter. However, will the Minister clarify for me the circumstances in which subsection (4)(b) would be needed to justify the officer doing the things listed in clause 72(3)? That is what we are talking about; it is not just calling in to speak to a third party who, he has heard from somebody else, might be able to cast light on the offence. If that is the power that is required, then I understand what is being talked about. However, that power already exists. I keep making the point, but the Minister has not said whether he agrees with me. There is nothing to prevent the police from acting if they are approached by somebody who says that they should speak to Mrs. Bloggins, who might tell them something that would help with their reinvestigation. Is the Minister seriously saying that the police cannot do that now? If he is, I understand why we need subsection (4)(b), but I do not think that that is what its aim is.

Subsection (4)(b) is there to enable a police officer to go and do the things provided for in clause 72(3). It is extraordinary that we should be legislating for that to be allowed on what is little more than a hunch. If we give officers the power to interfere in that way with an acquitted person, we provide what is potentially a powerful tool for police oppression. I am happy to be persuaded out of that view. However, it is a genuine concern. If the Minister cannot answer it today, perhaps he can write to me detailing exactly why

that provision is there in that form. I shall be very happy to hear from him. For the moment, I am unconvinced.

I do not want to repeat the arguments that have been put by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. However, I, too, have difficulties. I suspect that the provision is lifted from clause 72, where it is relevant. There is a symmetry between clauses 72 and 73, but that does not necessarily make it equally applicable to both.

I should like to make two points. The first is to pick up the observation of the hon. Member for North Down that the clause refers to new evidence, without attaching any weight to whether it is likely to be compelling evidence. The second is that it applies to the officer, not to the authorising officer. The authorising officer has a remarkably free hand. The superintendent or above who authorises action under clause 73 does not have the same requirements for consideration as does the officer who takes the action. That seems bizarre. In the previous clause, the requirement is that the assistant chief constable, who is the officer making the application, has to have regard to those things. In this clause, it applies simply to the constable, sergeant, inspector or whatever who is taking the action and who has to seek the authorisation of a superintendent or senior rank, either in advance—which I would hope—or retrospectively, which is pointless, but let us not cover that ground again.

It seems anomalous that it is not clear what considerations the superintendent has to make in granting the authorisation—the clause is silent on the matter. It might be implicit in the considerations that the officer has to take in seeking the authorisation, but it is not explicit in terms of what the authorising officer has to take into account when agreeing the application. Will the Minister consider that?

Let me give an example, which I hope will be helpful. Subsection (4)(b) is emphatically not about permitting fishing expeditions. Suppose that information is received that a weapon can be found at a certain place—namely, the premises owned or occupied by the person who was acquitted. Clearly, finding the weapon would be new evidence and the information received would provide reasonable grounds. That explains the wording of subsection (4)(b).

We are dealing with a matter of urgency where the risk is that the weapon can no longer be found in a certain place, presumably because the acquitted person has taken steps to dispose of it. Having fulfilled the second condition, the third has to be fulfilled—that it is ''a matter of urgency''. It cannot be a fishing expedition, as it must be an urgent matter—in this case, to prevent the investigation from being ''substantially and irrevocably prejudiced''. I remind hon. Members that that is about as high a test as it is possible to apply. In simple terms, the vital evidence may disappear for good unless we act quickly. Otherwise, searching the premises owned or occupied by the accused is specifically precluded under clause 72(3). The protections were put in place precisely in response to general concerns about the police using the

double jeopardy provisions to harass people. Clauses 72 and 73 must be viewed as working in concert.

I submit as vigorously as possible that the circumstances that I have described demonstrate precisely why clause 73 is necessary: otherwise, a crucial piece of evidence could disappear for ever, which surely none of us would want.

I followed the Minister's argument, and I am about half persuaded. Part of the problem concerns what counts as evidence. If it is evidence, it falls within subsection (4)(a), so paragraph (b) is unnecessary. The question is whether new information constitutes viable evidence: it all depends on the nature of the information. An anonymous tip-off may be no more than that, but I am troubled about the wide powers provided in the clause. I may return to the issue later, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 385, in

clause 73, page 45, line 36, leave out paragraph (b).

This is the same argument with knobs on. The police do not need the power ''to prevent death''. Subsection (5) states:

''The third condition is that the action is necessary as a matter of urgency . . . to prevent the investigation being substantially and irrevocably prejudiced''—

I can understand that—or

''to prevent death or serious personal injury.''

The police have no need of such a power, as ample common laws are already in place to do precisely that.

Once the police are into reinvestigation territory, are they not prohibited from carrying out any of the actions listed in clause 72(3) before the DPP gives consent without an express power to do so? That is what the provision is about. The police would not be entitled to arrest someone for a reinvestigation—even in extremis, which is worrying—because the power to do so is expressly taken away under clause 72.

I disagree. If the police are aware of the possibility of an individual dying, by either foul play or suicide—the circumstances in which we can know about possible death beforehand—they already have ample power to take action, because they will be acting not in the investigation of the offence of which the person has previously been acquitted but to prevent either the commission of a further offence or a suicide.

I submit that the same applies to serious personal injury. The police often break down doors when they hear that milk is piling up outside. If they knew that someone was going to a garage to gas himself in a car, they could intervene and would be fully justified in doing so. If they were told that a defendant who was acquitted in a past inquiry had decided to kill Mr. Bloggs, who went to see them yesterday to say that he had information that that acquittal might be wrong, they would have immediate powers to intervene without their being granted under the clause.

The hon. Gentleman may be right, but I am concerned that if one begins an investigation

preparatory to going to the Director of Public Prosecutions under clause 72, the one thing that an officer involved in that investigation may not do is arrest the would-be defendant, because he is banned from doing so under clause 72(3). If the only way to prevent the death was to arrest Mr. X, the officer would not be entitled to do so because of clause 72(2)—he would be involved in a reinvestigation. That is my concern about rubbing out the extra power to allow him to do that.

I still do not believe that the power is needed. The officer would be prevented from arresting or questioning the person, from searching him, premises owned or occupied by him or a vehicle, from seizing anything and from taking his fingerprints—in relation to the original offence. What the hon. and learned Lady suggests cannot apply. If it did, anyone who had been acquitted could say to the police for the rest of his life, ''I'm terribly sorry, but you can't investigate me for anything. Even though I happen to have killed my next-door neighbour yesterday, you can't touch me. I was acquitted of something before.'' That is a serious point.

I appreciate that the hon. and learned Lady is trying to be helpful, but I cannot see how clause 72(3) or any other power under the clause can act as a fetter on the police in investigating another crime and preventing the commission of a further crime. If I am wrong, I hope that the Minister will tell us, because we could be doing something pretty terrible in passing the legislation.

Is not it clear from the opening words of clause 72 that it applies to the investigation of the commission of a qualifying offence? Clearly, a new offence of suspected murder or whatever is not a qualifying offence under the terms of the clause, so the police are perfectly free to take any action that they feel is necessary.

I agree. I do not want to labour the point, because we have to hear from the Minister, but at the moment I am minded to press the amendment to a Division, not because it involves some great issue but because on the whole I like to have legislation that makes sense and is compatible with common sense. The police do not require the power, because they already have it.

We discussed subsection (4)(b), and I made my views clear. On reflection, I think that the point from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the powers that the police have if they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that a new offence has been committed was well made. If he undertakes to withdraw the amendment, I shall reflect further on that point and return to it.

The Minister has cheered me up no end. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

What is the qualification for the authorisation of an investigation under clause 73(2)?

I am not clear that there is any qualification other than the one under subsection (7), that the authorisation ''be given in writing''. Nor is it clear to me what matters the superintendent has to take into account when giving that authorisation. The clause does not qualify or fetter that.

What consideration was given by the Minister and his draftsmen to simplifying the clause and issuing more guidance? We should bear it in mind that the police will have to read and understand it.

One general point occurs to me from listening to this and previous debates. We are trying to do two things. First, we want to stop the unreasonable reinvestigation of people who have been acquitted. Secondly, we want there to be a set of clear and understandable rules about what the police can and cannot do in such circumstances. The Minister can think about my suggestion, and reject it on Report if it makes no sense, but would it not be simpler to impose a blanket ban on the reinvestigation of crimes of which people have been acquitted unless it is sanctioned by the Director of Public Prosecutions—with the one proviso, already mentioned, that if something urgent occurs, the police should have 24 or 48 hours in which to seek the DPP's permission retrospectively?

As for the rest, why not issue guidance on what the police can and cannot do when reinvestigating crimes rather than doing it though such complicated clauses? I worry that the police will get slightly lost. Having listened to the points made by the Front Benchers from both Opposition parties, it seems that the police may sometimes be nervous of investigating people for committing new crimes who have previously been acquitted of crimes. What I suggest would have at least one advantage: the police would not to have to plod though complicated laws that they did not understand if guidance was available.

In answer to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, the authorisation referred to in clause 73(2) is authorisation having regard to the conditions in subsections (4), (5) and (6).

What is to be authorised?

What is to be authorised is those considerations that are implied and pretty clear from clause 73. The hon. Gentleman asked what was the purpose of the authorisation; it is because someone will have to make a judgment—and the clause specifically provides for an officer of the rank of superintendent or above to make that judgment.

In answer to the second point raised by the hon. Member for Witney, given the seriousness of the change that we are making by amending the rules on double jeopardy, the Committee has rightly taken a considerable time to ensure that the rules, safeguards and conditions applied to making the change are fully set out, and that is why they are specified in the Bill and not in regulations. It is another safeguard.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 74 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.