I beg to move amendment No. 358, in

clause 71, page 43, line 35, leave out '2 months' and insert 'one month'.

We now come to consider the procedure for retrial. Because the order comes right at the end of the investigative process, the Government clearly believe that it should be possible to move speedily from the order to a retrial taking place. It is most desirable that that should happen. This is a probing amendment.

The Minister may argue that the Government want a longer period but, as I have suggested, the amendment is designed to probe why the period of two months was chosen. I am pleased that the period is as short as that, but if it could be shortened I would be even happier, because I think that the process should move with great expedition. I should be grateful to hear the rationale behind the two-month period.

The clause allows for a period of two months between the Court of Appeal making an order for a retrial and the arraignment of the defendant on the new indictment. During that time, the prosecution will have to put together its full case against the defendant, but the clause provides safeguards, which means that the court must give leave for that period to be extended.

The amendment would reduce the period to one month, but the Government do not consider that two months is an excessive period to allow the prosecution at that stage, particularly given those safeguards, to do what needs to be done. In essence, two months is an appropriate period and one month would be too short.

I am persuaded. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 382, in

clause 71, page 43, line 42, after 'he', insert

'or in the event of his death or incapacity, his personal representatives.'.

The amendment raises a point that I raised with the Minister at a previous sitting. I said that I was slightly unhappy about the processes whereby a defendant lost the status of an acquitted person and wondered how he could regain it if the proceedings against him were then dropped for some reason. The Minister provided some reassurance that it was possible to apply for the original acquittal to be restored. I prefer to use the word ''suspended'', but he preferred to use the usual word ''quashed'', and we had a debate about that, which I do not want to revisit.

It seemed to me that, if the defendant dropped down dead between the date of the quashing of his acquittal and his rearraignment before the jury for his

retrial, there was no mechanism for his personal representatives to have his acquittal restored posthumously. I believe that such a person is entitled to the restoration of that acquittal, or his family are, so I tabled the amendment to try to provide a mechanism whereby that could happen. It may commend itself to the Minister.

I remember the point that the hon. Gentleman raised. His amendment asks a question about what would happen if the person died—

Or was incapacitated—

Or became incapacitated after his acquittal had been quashed, but before he had been rearraigned. Clearly, these circumstances are distinguishable from those currently provided for in the clause, as the person is no longer in jeopardy of a conviction, and there is no longer any issue of that nature to force. However, I understand the general point of principle that is being raised. The quashing of an acquittal is simply intended to allow a case to be reopened if there are compelling reasons for that. Our starting point has been that a person who dies or is incapacitated at any time after his acquittal is quashed, but before a fresh verdict is returned, should be in exactly the same position as anyone else on whom such misfortunes fall part way into an investigation or trial. No special provision is needed.

That said, I should like to reflect further on the general principle to take into account the hon. Gentleman's point. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.

The Minister should think again about this point. I can see the argument. Until a person is convicted, he is not guilty of an offence. Someone who is charged with an offence in the ordinary course of events may die or be incapacitated so that the prosecution decides not to proceed. If he dies, it cannot proceed and if he is incapacitated it may choose not to. In those circumstances, he remains not guilty before the world. It is strange that we are quashing an existing acquittal, which is a statement that somebody has been tried and acquitted. The Government clearly consider that, in the event of an acquittal being quashed against a live defendant and the Crown, for some reason, coming across further information or deciding not to proceed with a retrial, that defendant is entitled not only to maintain that acquitted status but to have it restored.

In the case of an incapacitated person, as opposed to someone who is dead, the ability of personal representatives to apply on his behalf, rather than his applying himself, has some protection value for him for the future. For a dead person, it is symbolic; but such things matter. The Hanratty case was reopened in front of the Court of Appeal when it was not an issue of direct relevance to anyone other than the family and the public. There should be a mechanism, and I hope that the Government will provide one. It would be a simple amendment and it would give some reassurance as to the way in which the system will operate. Subject to that—I am grateful to the Minister for

reconsidering it—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.