I beg to move amendment No.355, in

clause 70, page 42, line 42, leave out 'or publisher' and insert ', publisher or distributor'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 356, in

clause 70, page 43, line 6, after 'it', insert 'or distributing it'.

I have lost my place. It is my fault for trying to go too fast in considering amendments. That is always a problem for the Opposition. It is a grave penalty that is visited on Opposition Members.

Simon Hughes rose—

Now perhaps another grave penalty will be visited on us all.

I am only trying to be helpful. When the hon. Gentleman elaborates on the arguments about publishers and distributors, will he tell the Committee whether he has had an opportunity to discuss the issue with representatives of the newspaper industry, and received professional advice about whether they would find it helpful to have it clarified?

I have to admit that I have not discussed the amendments with the industry—certainly not at what I should call an official level.

The issue to which the amendments relate is of long standing—whether restrictions should be applied to those who distribute as well as those who publish newspapers. It could be argued that distributors are not normally likely to peruse the contents of newspapers in great detail, as they pass through their hands at 2 am, to see whether one or another reporting restriction order has been breached. On the other hand, the amendment is intended to highlight the importance of the issue.

I am perhaps focusing on a slightly different aspect of the matter from the one about which the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey has expressed concern, but it seems to me that we are living, at the start of the 21st century, in an age in which reporting restrictions are increasingly being flouted with impunity. For a variety of reasons, newspapers seem to have got it into their heads that they can get away with it. They have become either sloppy or deliberately contemptuous of the court's power to control their publications. What I would have regarded 15 or 20 years ago as the blanket silence that descended when court proceedings began—when a matter was considered to be sub judice—has been substantially eroded, both in what is said and the manner in which it is said.

Of course, one can say certain things in certain circumstances. All kinds of devices seem to be employed to try and get around reporting restrictions. There are exceptions, but on the whole, it strikes me that the Attorney-General—whoever he or she may be at the time—has shown marked reluctance to bring proceedings in order to remind newspapers of their duties. If one were to extend those duties to distributors, the cat would truly be among the pigeons. Newspapers would find it very difficult to continue getting around reporting restrictions,

although to make distribution an offence might be harsh on distributors.

We may have an opportunity with what is a particularly important provision. Even more so than in the case of the ordinary criminal trial, unless we can get observance of the reporting restrictions, the whole procedure is doomed, so it is singularly important that Parliament look afresh at how reporting restrictions operate. If it is felt that the restrictions need to be toughened up, we now have an opportunity to consider how that might be done.

I agree that the present situation is not satisfactory. Would the hon. Gentleman like to comment on how the clause and his amendment would apply to internet publishing? That is often an area that is deliberately designed to circumvent any restrictions that there may be on published reporting procedures. Would his amendment include internet providers as distributors?

Yes, it is quite clear that the internet's arrival is one of the mechanisms by which a coach and horses have been driven through the principles of reporting restrictions. That said, it is possible to prosecute those who contravene reporting restrictions on the internet, although that is partly dependent on where they do it from and whether they lie within the jurisdiction. However, there is no reason in principle why a prosecution should not be brought against those who do so if it is possible to trace them. What may also have to be considered in time is to what extent a fetter can be introduced on the broadcasting of that information through the internet, if it is found to be on the internet. That raises all kinds of other problems, which would take me more time to discuss than I would wish to spend at this stage in Committee.

There is another important issue, which the Minister will see soon when I come on to another group of amendments. I say this slightly tongue-in-cheek, but perhaps I may be forgiven, Mr. Cran, if I suggest that we might shorten matters by touching on them here.

I suggest a rather more draconian sentence for those who perpetrate a breach of reporting restrictions. Level 5 on the standard scale for a large national newspaper is fairly laughable—it is a pinprick. The matter is very important because the justice system in this country has been undermined by the way in which reporting restrictions are being deliberately distorted in several fields. If we are to send out a message, I am afraid that the clang of the prison door behind the odd newspaper editor is probably the only way in which we shall achieve a satisfactory result. I await with interest what the Minister has to say.

I am not sure that I shall follow the hon. Gentleman down the road that he went with his remarks, for reasons of self-protection if nothing else. Since we are peering over the fence at the next amendment—

No one is watching.

That is true. I was going to say that we are discussing matters in Parliament, and that more or

less guarantees that nobody is watching—more is the pity.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield raised an important point. I tried to say in answer to the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that there are several issues concerning the amendment and that he added one or two others. We must reflect on those issues. However, this is not the place to discuss the provisions in the Bill dealing with double jeopardy. The hon. Gentleman answered his own slightly tongue-in-cheek question on distributors, arguing that it would not be appropriate to extend the restriction and the penalty to distributors, as they were much less likely to be aware of the contents of a publication.

The clause, in replicating the provisions on reporting restrictions elsewhere in legislation, makes it clear that the burden falls on the proprietor, the editor or the publisher of a newspaper or periodical. They would be guilty of the offence. The same culpability cannot be said to extend to distributors.

I agree that it falls within the remit of what the Minister was talking about earlier. In considering these matters, Ministers must reflect on the law of defamation, and unless I am misguided, a person who distributes a libellous document is just as liable for the libel as the person who publishes or produces it. I am keen to have consistency.

I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing that the issue is important. A sentence of 10 years' imprisonment was suggested in new clause 2 in the second set of amendments, which I would like to deal with now. I drafted it slightly tongue-in-cheek; it crossed my mind as I drafted it that I might include it in the schedule of retriable offences. However, I thought that perhaps a little extreme.

On a point of order, Mr. Cran. I am slightly confused by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield trespassing into the next group of amendments. I would be grateful to him if he would keep the two matters separate.

I shall say nothing further on the matter at the moment. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 357, in

clause 70, page 43, line 22, at end insert

''and a term of imprisonment of 10 years''.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—

Offences in connection with reporting—

''( ) Any person knowingly disclosing information concerning matters in section 69(1) and (2) shall be guilty of an indictable only offence punishable on indictment by 10 years imprisonment.''.

I have already said that the new clause would provide for a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment rather than level 5 on the standard scale, as set out in clause 70(9). It is not quite clear to me whether the offence is indictable, and if so what the

sentence would be on indictment. Perhaps the Minister will clarify.

I am concerned that there should be a sufficient deterrent. I accept that 10 years is excessive, and I do not wish to send newspaper editors to prison for 10 years—well, not normally. The penalty ought to be sufficiently strong to act as a deterrent. There have been several notable instances when trials have become impossible because of appalling behaviour by the press.

I recognise that my hon. Friend is unlikely to be part of the charm offensive against national newspaper editors. Will he remind us what the present maximum sentence is for contempt of court by newspapers?

I was awaiting enlightenment from the Minister.

My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome commented that there is a danger that by expressing more widely those views on behalf of his party, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield might undermine all the work done by his party's charm offensive with newspaper editors. I can only say that the strategy has not been entirely successful, and a new one might be worth exploring.

Prison or else! [Laughter.]

If debates on the Floor of the House reflect that draconian, preparatory warnings of intervention are the only way to make people comply, that procedure may be worth testing.

More seriously, I share the view that contravention has become a regular abuse. I interpret the clause to mean that a breach can be only a summary offence, which it should not be. I have said on record for some time that one exception to the principle that I propound—that the presumption that someone should go to prison should apply only to offences of violence—is the offence of interfering with the course of justice, and contravening reporting restrictions would be interfering with the course of justice.

My understanding is that the amendment and the new clause do not go down the road of a mandatory sentence. There is some ambiguity about the new clause, but I hope that an aberration by the hon. Gentleman, even late at night when doing his homework, does not mean that he feels that the offence, however large or small, should attract a mandatory sentence.

I think that the hon. Gentleman knows that I do not believe in mandatory sentences. Indeed, I expressed myself somewhat amused at the Prime Minister's belief that firearms offences would be visited with mandatory sentences when they plainly would not.

I thought that, but I am glad to hear it, because it was not entirely clear from the amendment and the new clause.

I join the plea for Ministers to examine making the offence an indictable offence or summary offence with a term of imprisonment. We are talking about short rather than long terms of imprisonment, and it would

be beneficial to have that as a remedy, particularly if it could be suspended. An editor or proprietor who was at risk of going to prison if he committed an offence again within a certain period would be much more likely to comply. I am serious about that, as we must make it clear that interfering with the course of justice is unacceptable. It does not matter how high or mighty one is, and the press must be reined in on the issue before the situation gets completely out of control. I have not seen evidence about how often such matters are argued before courts, but counsel for defendants are increasingly citing press abuses in arguing that fair trials are impossible. Our objective of more justice will not be achieved, as there will be fewer trials that result in correct convictions.

I will resist the amendment for reasons that we touched on in an earlier debate. Level 5 is currently £5,000, but I understand that a higher maximum fine could be imposed as an exceptional summary maximum penalty. I was asked about the operation of the clause, which replicates existing provisions for contempt of court. A summary conviction will bring a fine of £2,500 or one year's imprisonment.

I am grateful to the Minister, because I was not sure about the penalties. The Government may wish to consider, perhaps not in the context of the Bill but during a global rethink, whether the penalties are sufficient. I suggest that the financial penalties, rather than the penalties of imprisonment, could be re-examined to provide a penalty that bites on a newspaper. I accept that to lock up an editor of previous good character for 12 months would be seen as draconian, but I am not so sure about the finances.

The hon. Gentleman is a lawyer and I am not, so I may be off the mark, but when a trial has been abandoned because of the activities of a publisher or proprietor, is there any scope for recovery of costs?

I should not have thought that there was any scope for recovery of costs against a third party. I may be wrong, but I have certainly never heard of it. Substantial costs have certainly been incurred in notable instances. If ever the observance of reporting restrictions was essential for the processes of justice to be done, it is here.

I am grateful that when we met the Minister of State, Lord Falconer, he took what we said into account, and what had not been part of the package previously then became so. I heartily approve of that, but it has to work. The temptation to subvert it in the undoubted media interest that would be generated may be considerable, and I do not want the whole system to break down because of it. I have no particular desire to lock people up, but the penalties must be sufficient to provide deterrence.

Now that the Minister has reassured me on the custody penalties, it is mainly the financial penalties that should be re-examined. Obviously, any judge would be reluctant to send someone to prison and would prefer to impose a financial penalty, but the penalty must be substantial enough to make a large

organisation—a newspaper—feel the pinch. For this, as for health and safety at work matters, small penalties—the petty cash—are inappropriate. Larger penalties are needed to send out a clear message and to affect the bank balance sufficiently to lead to a footnote in the shareholders' report.

Health and safety is the obvious parallel. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will at least partly endorse the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome—that one way of making people pay for crimes is to link the costs lost by the state to the costs incurred by the person causing that loss. It would be wrong for the state to incur the costs when someone else has flagrantly broken the rules. Ministers should reflect further on that increasingly frequent problem.

That is a very good idea and the Minister and the Home Office could usefully consider the wider implications of it.

Just to place the issue in context, I worked in the television industry for many years and my hon. Friend may be interested to know that the Independent Television Commission can fine television companies that break the programme code up to 3 per cent. of their turnover. I recall commercial television companies being fined £1 million in one case and £600,000 in another. That was not for contempt of court, but it gives an idea of the sort of penalties that can be imposed and it relates to his point about notes in shareholders' annual reports. A £5,000 fine would cause no trouble.

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I know of some instances when the television industry breached contempt of court orders, but experience shows that it is far more common in the newspaper industry. Sometimes a breach can be a mistake, an unfortunate disaster, and the authors have to admit that they made a complete mess of it. However, I have sometimes detected slightly subversive reporting in the written media, which is worrying because it suggests a lack of respect for rules that are in place to protect defendants and the trial process.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I shall not detain the Committee long, but I want the Minister to clarify a point relating to Northern Ireland. In a helpful explanation to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield of the extent of reporting restrictions, he referred to clause 272(2), which mentions Northern Ireland. Clause 70(10) states that proceedings for an offence under clause 70 may not be instituted in England or Wales

''otherwise than by or with the consent of the Attorney-General'',

or, in Northern Ireland

''otherwise than by or with the consent of the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.''

If my memory serves me right—I am not a criminal lawyer—the Attorney-General for England and Wales is also the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.

The Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 indicated that when and if criminal justice is devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, whether or not the Assembly is suspended, responsibility for it will remain in Westminster. Only on the devolution of criminal justice and policing would we have an Attorney-General for Northern Ireland and an Advocate-General. Perhaps the Minister knows something that I do not; perhaps the Government are more confident about the devolution of criminal justice to Northern Ireland. Will he check the reference to the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland?

First, I pass on my thanks to Ministers for taking on board the general issue of reporting restrictions, which has given us a peg on which to hang further matters. Secondly, as the Minister said that he would look at the matter again, it would be sensible to deal also with the general rules on reporting restrictions, because we are still talking about double jeopardy and retrials. There may be an argument for greater sanctions or penalties, but we need to decide whether the same rules should apply, as a matter of principle, to both first and second time round, or whether tougher rules should apply for the second time round because of the greater prejudice of a second trial. I hope that consideration will be given to both issues, and that the same penalty should not apply in different circumstances.

Has my hon. Friend considered whether there might be a read-across from the Communications Bill, which deals with many of the matters that regulate the press and media. There is the potential to co-ordinate the two Bills to provide a better whole.

That is an entirely sensible suggestion, but I doubt whether it is possible, as both Bills are being considered in Committee, to join up Government so much that the point made by the hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) could be linked in to the deliberations of both Committees. However, it is a good idea and I commend it to the Minister. Our business managers may tell us that the opportunity may not come again in the near future. Members of the Committee considering the Communications Bill will be sending out little messages saying that they hope not to have another such Bill in the near future—just as some of us have said that we do not want a criminal justice Bill every year.

In answer to the point raised by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), I am advised that the formula to be found in subsection (10) is widely used, but she is absolutely correct that, at present, the Attorney-General for England and Wales is the same person as the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.

In relation to the point on reporting restrictions raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, I have gladly undertaken to reflect on how to achieve analogous protection to that which currently applies in relation to trials, and I have heard, and in part responded to, the arguments made about

general provisions relating to reporting restrictions. Many issues are involved, and the Bill is not he right place to deal with them. However, I have certainly heard the comments that hon. Members have made.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.