I beg to move Amendment No. 381, in

Clause 69, page 42, line 3, after 'publication', insert

'appearing anywhere in the United Kingdom.'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No. 380, in

Clause 70, page 42, line 40, after 'publication', insert

'appearing anywhere in the United Kingdom.'.

We come to the question of restrictions on reporting. Some play has been made by the Government of the fact that a number of those who responded to representations said that it is essential that reporting restrictions be imposed on Court of Appeal proceedings, so that they do not become widely publicised and give rise to the public concluding that the court has arrived at a conclusion that could prejudice a jury's subsequent consideration of the case were a retrial to be ordered.

I confess that I assumed that ordinary reporting restrictions would apply, but I was struck by the Minister's saying that the procedure for retrial would not apply north of the border. The Scottish Executive have indicated to the Government that they have no desire to see the Scottish legal system altered to cater for the possibility of retrials. Therefore, the issue arises of the operation of reporting restrictions on Scottish newspapers—and not only on their publication but on their distribution in the rest of the United Kingdom.

I would be grateful for clarification, because I infer from the restrictions on reporting in Clause 69—and from the offences in connection with reporting in clause 70—that it would be possible for a Scottish journalist to attend Court of Appeal proceedings and report them verbatim in a Scottish newspaper, and that nothing could be done about it. Is that a correct inference?

That brings up an intriguing possibility. The editor of The Scotsman is Mr. Andrew Neil, who broadcasts on the BBC. Under the Bill, he would not be able to speak about what was reported in his newspaper.

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I would be interested to know where the mechanism is in clauses 69 and 70 that would allow restrictions throughout the United Kingdom.

The Government are at one with the hon. Gentleman in seeking to ensure that the reporting restrictions cover the whole of the United Kingdom. Clause 272(2) is the provision under which the object that he desires is achieved.

I am grateful to the Minister for drawing that to my attention. I have not had the opportunity to read Clause 272(2), but I have just glanced at it and note that it extends to Scotland and Northern Ireland. I therefore infer that the Scottish Executive are agreeable to the law being enforced north of the border and that for us to legislate on that in the Bill.

I am happy to confirm that.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move Amendment No. 354, in

Clause 69, page 42, line 6, after 'application', insert

'including the fact that the application has been made'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No.353, in

Clause 69, page 42, line 8, at end add

'and

(c) the previous trial.'.

Here again, we are concerned with clarifying exactly what will be restricted. Subsection (2) says that the matters to be restricted are ''the application'' and

''anything done in connection with the application under this Part or Part 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c. 19) or under rules of court.''

The questions arise whether that covers the mere fact that the application has been made, and whether the decision to make the application in the first place should essentially be secret until such time as it has been decided one way or another. The issue is important, and I would hope that the matter was so covered. I seek the Minister's assurance on that.

There is also the issue of the previous trial. If the newspapers are making reference to the previous trial as a nudge, nudge, wink, wink to the public when the application is being made, that could go a long way to defeating the restrictions on reporting that we seek. In my view there should be a rather draconian, blanket ban on reporting the fact that such an application is taking place until such time as it is finished.

There is obviously regular concurrence between the police and press over requests for silence to be kept and for reporting not to happen. I share the hon. Gentleman's view that that is not sufficient protection in such cases. One should be able effectively to prevent any reporting in advance, and there should be sanctions that follow.

I absolutely support the hon. Gentleman's second point. It happens increasingly that when the tabloids are worried about publishing the name of somebody in relation to whom an allegation has been made they invariably juxtapose an article about that person, so that all but the most stupid realise, and suddenly think that the person in the photograph on the right is the subject of the story on the left. One has seen that regularly over recent months—it is simply blatant now. That would be exactly the danger. One would find that there would be an article on the same page that would describe the previous trial, or there would be a one-year or two-years-on memorial article that just so happened to appear then. We should not tolerate that, and should take all steps to stop it.

I hope that I can offer the hon. Member for Beaconsfield the reassurance that he is looking for on Amendment No. 354. The Clause already makes it quite clear that reporting restrictions apply to both the application and anything done in connection with it, which would include the making of the application itself. If he at subsections (1) and (2) together, he will find that they say that

''no publication shall, except as provided by this section, include a report of . . . the application, and anything done in connection with the application''.

I think that that is clear.

I should like to reflect on amendment No. 353 and the point that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey made, partly because of the

arguments that he advanced, but partly because, in connection with the time line that will work in relation to the provisions for Double Jeopardy, a person may have been rearrested prior to the point in question. That will be reported. At that stage, the newspapers might choose to refer back to the evidence that was adduced in the original trial. Our objective should be to ensure that reporting restrictions kick in at the same stage as in relation to an ordinary case. I have found our discussion extremely helpful, although the Government are already considering the matter. On the understanding that I undertake to return to the issue, I hope that hon. Members will not press the amendments to a vote.

I am grateful to the Minister for being so helpful. I share his objectives, so I am comfortable with the idea that the Government will think about that. Perhaps he will reflect on one more thing. There is a worrying trend, in that, increasingly, the police release information. For example, a raid is about to be carried out and someone is arrested. The information clearly comes from the police, because there is no other source from which it could have come. Although the intention of the police is that the information should be in the public domain, their actions are sometimes unhelpful and prejudicial. They sometimes do it with good intention, to be transparent, but there is a danger that even the well-intentioned second motive may now prejudice fair trials.

I should be grateful if the Minister would discuss with his colleagues whether clearer rules could be established governing the release of information by the police—be it formally or informally, because the same issues apply. It would be very helpful if he would consider that in the context of the beginning of the process, when reporting becomes relevant, but I hope that he will also consider the wider issue of reporting, not only in relation to Double Jeopardy, but in the context of the criminal justice system as a whole. As I think the Minister accepts, this is a very live issue, which gives regular cause for concern.

I am reassured by the Minister's comments and grateful that the Government's approach appears to be compatible with my views about what should be done. I look forward to hearing further from him on that point, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move Amendment No. 315, in

Clause 69, page 42, line 10, after 'made', insert

'with the defendant's consent or in the interests of justice.'.

There are exceptions to the reporting restrictions in relation to a report of an appeal to the House of Lords or a report of an application to the House of Lords for leave to appeal, and an exception may be granted by the Court of Appeal in any other case. I understand the reason for including those exceptions, but we must have regard to the unusual nature of the proceedings. A person who has previously been acquitted of an offence is being put through a process that greatly interferes with his civil liberties for a second time, so he

is entitled to maximum protection, something that the amendment was designed to ensure.

I hope that the House of Lords and Court of Appeal would have the interests of justice in mind anyway, so I accept that the words in the amendment may be a little otiose, but there is no harm in including them. It seems legitimate for the Committee to consider the question of the defendant's right to veto publication of information about the trial during the proceedings. I accept that it is most unlikely that circumstances will arise in which the House of Lords or Court of Appeal wants to permit a live application to be publicised but the defendant objects. With great respect to their Lordships in the House of Lords and in the Court of Appeal, if there was such an objection while proceedings were continuing, I would take the view that, given the nature of the proceedings, the defendant's right should be superior to anyone else's, even if it seemed to be intransigent. That is why I tabled the amendment.

The Government consider the Amendment unnecessary, and I hope that I shall be able to reassure the hon. Gentleman about the reasons for that. Clause 69(4) already caters for the purpose of the amendment, because it provides that, if an acquitted person objects, reporting restrictions can be lifted only if the court, having heard the representations—and I have taken note of what the hon. Gentleman said about the acquitted person's interests in that regard—is satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to do so.

It was slightly unclear to me whether the amendment was intended to go further, and give the acquitted person a veto over the lifting of reporting restrictions when it would be in the interests of justice to lift them, or entitle him to have them lifted when that would not be in the interests of justice. If so, I could not agree. The interests of justice should be the test, and the Bill provides for those.

The Amendment was intended not to override the interests of justice but to give the defendant a veto over publicity while the application proceedings are current, on the basis that the procedure is on the face of it a major infringement of his civil rights. It is at least arguable that he should have the right to determine the question of publicity while the proceedings are still live.

I hear the hon. Gentleman's point, but I remain of the view that in the end the right test would be the interests of justice, having regard to the representations that the defendant could make, which would be provided for by subsection (4).

I dare say that if anyone in the other place thinks that there is an issue to be dealt with, they will pursue it further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.