I beg to move amendment No. 100, in

clause 16, page 11, line 24, after 'conducted' insert 'in premises notified by the Secretary of State in pursuance of subsection (6C)(a) above'.

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 101, in

clause 16, page 11, line 25, leave out 'suitably' and insert 'medically'.

No. 102, in

clause 16, page 11, line 25, leave out 'suitably qualified person' and insert 'person who is medically qualified or is possessed of a qualification recognised by practitioners licensed to give any form of treatment to persons dependent on Class A drugs, using only procedures which are recognised by such practitioners.'.

Government amendment No. 52.

I have three questions for the Minister in order to help us understand the clause. What specialist facilities do the Government have in mind for the assessments? Who do the Government propose should carry out those assessments? What do the Government mean by their proposed assessment?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his probing amendment. It gives me the opportunity to tell the Committee that it is important that suitably qualified personnel carry out the assessment of offenders. I am sure that all Committee members agree with that. That is the purpose of Government amendment No. 52, which will allow the Secretary of State, from time to time, to specify the necessary qualifications or experience to undertake such an assessment.

Members will appreciate that assessment does not involve the provision of drug treatment. Rather, it is designed to identify the offender's needs and develop a comprehensive care plan. For that reason, to undertake an assessment does not require the assessor to have a medical qualification. Although it is important for the assessment to be carried out in appropriate premises, the availability of accommodation will vary from area to area. We do not wish to restrict the location of assessments to specific premises in each area. However, we do intend to provide guidance to those areas where the powers are introduced. That guidance will set out the types of premises that will be suitable to undertake an assessment under clause 16.

With those reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 146, in

clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out 'assistance or'.

This small amendment has behind it a major question on drugs treatment. At our last sitting, I raised the over-dominance of the probation service on matters relating to drugs treatment. The phrase ''assistance or treatment'' is not accidental, but it is wrong. The notion that a drug addict or person with a propensity to misuse specified class A drugs can be ''assisted'' without being treated is a misnomer.

One of the recommendations that I have made, both locally and to the Government, is that there be an expansion of supported tenancies. That is the sort of assistance that should be given. The idea that someone with a health problem can be given a supported tenancy without the health problem being treated is a highly dangerous notion. Over recent years, it has led to the cycle of offenders not being treated—and, crucially, their being given alternatives to treatment that do not work. It provides a suitable excuse for the drugs treatment services not treating people's health problems. It is one of the major problems in drugs treatment, and it is a cop-out.

If I have a health problem, I would expect it to be treated as such. A series of additional factors may be involved—for example, I may be or may have been homeless, or I might have been abused at home, either as a child or an adult. It is right that a multi-agency approach should be taken.

I am following my hon. Friend's argument with great interest. I agree with him but I wonder whether, given the additional assistance that many of those people will need, a more appropriate amendment might not delete the words ''assistance or'' but replace the word ''or'' with the word ''and''.

If that is what the Bill had stated, I would not have needed to table the amendment. In my view, the definition of treatment needs to be considered. If an amendment was tabled that replaced the word ''or'' with the word ''and'', the points that I am making would be suitably dealt with. It is crucial, however, that we go beyond the framing of the legislation and consider how it is put into practice. We must get away from the notion that it is acceptable that people with a drug dependency can be given assistance that does not include treatment for their health problem. If the word ''or'' was replaced with the word ''and'', or if the definition of treatment incorporated other forms of assistance such as supported tenancies, I would be happy; but I am most unhappy with the existing phrase, which allows the option for non-treatment. I wait to hear what the Minister has to say.

I have listened with care to my hon. Friend. It is clear that, in many circumstances, individuals with drug misuse problems require support or help other than clinical intervention. As my hon. Friend just acknowledged, that support may include the provision of a range of counselling options to address social problems underlying drug use, such as housing and employment problems, or it may include other therapies. My hon. Friend asked what constitutes treatment. The straight answer is that a range of treatments will be available to address the underlying cause, and it is our intention that a wide range of effective interventions should be available, because my hon. Friend is right that that is what matters in dealing with drug use. We want to maintain flexibility in this area so that the most appropriate follow-up in the circumstances can be offered to any individual.

The clause makes it clear that we do not intend to rule out assistance or treatment, especially bearing in mind my point about flexibility. We certainly intend to take up that point in guidance, because we do not want to put a court in the position of having to choose between one or the other. We want both. I undertake to reflect a little further on the point that my hon. Friend raised to ensure that we have the clause entirely right, but our intention is clear. Perhaps we can deal with the issue in guidance, and if it would be helpful, I undertake to write to my hon. Friend, following further reflection, on the important points that he raised.

In the light of the assurances given, and the fact that we shall have another opportunity to discuss the matter in relation to clause 179—along with another seven amendments, which I am sure the civil servants will want to look at because some address the same issue—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 52, in

clause 16, page 11, line 37, at end insert—

'(6F) In subsection (6E)(a) above, ''suitably qualified person'' means a person who has such qualifications or experience as are from time to time specified by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this subsection.'.—[Hilary Benn.]

I beg to move amendment No. 53, in

clause 16, page 11, line 38, leave out '3A' and insert '3A(3)'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 54, 55, 57 and 58.

We propose some purely technical amendments to ensure that references in the clause are precise. At a bail hearing, the court should consider whether a defendant falls within the provisions of the clause and thus whether a presumption against bail should apply. Only after having so deliberated should the court consider the circumstances, set out in current legislation, in which a defendant may be refused bail.

There may well be cases in which a person caught in possession of class A drugs is charged only with the more serious offence of possessing those drugs with intent to supply. In such a case, the person may not be charged solely with possession and would not fall within the clause's provisions. The changes seem sensible, therefore, to cover that eventuality.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 54, in

clause 16, page 11, line 39, leave out '(6E)' and insert '(6F)'.

No. 55, in

clause 16, page 11, line 41, at end insert—

'( ) the existing text of paragraph 2 is to be subparagraph (1) of that paragraph, and after that subparagraph (as so renumbered) there is inserted—

''(2) If the defendant falls within paragraph 6B below, the court shall determine whether or not it is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph 6A below before turning (if it is so satisfied) to this paragraph.'','.

—[Hilary Benn.]

I beg to move amendment No. 140, in

clause 16 page 11, line 44, leave out from 'below' to end of line 48 and insert

'in deciding whether a defendant who falls into paragraph 6B below should be granted bail, the court shall give particular weight to the fact that the defendant failed to comply with the condition set out in paragraph 6B(2) below'.

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 116, in

clause 16 page 11, line 45, leave out 'not' and insert 'only'.

No. 117, in

clause 16 page 11, line 45, leave out 'unless' and insert 'if'.

At present, clause 16(4) refers to schedule 1 and seeks to insert an

''Exception applicable to drug users in certain areas''

when granting bail. Paragraph 6A reads:

''Subject to paragraph 6C below, a defendant who falls within paragraph 6B below may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of his committing an offence while on bail; but this does not require the court, if so satisfied, to grant bail (disregarding other conditions)''.

The thinking should be that if certain conditions are met, there will be no bail unless the court is persuaded by the person or by their advocate that there is no significant risk of his committing an offence. That does not necessarily mean that bail should be granted; other factors must be taken into account.

The considerations are set out in paragraph 6B(1):

''A defendant falls within this paragraph if—

(a) he is aged 18 or over;

(b) a sample taken—

(i) under section 63B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (testing for presence of Class A drugs) in connection with the offence; or

(ii) under section 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (drug testing after conviction of an offence but before sentence),

has revealed the presence in his body of a specified Class A drug;

(c) either the offence is his having possession of any specified Class A drug contrary to section 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, or the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing—

(i) that misuse by him or any specified Class A drug caused or contributed to the offence; or

(ii) (even if it did not) that the offence was motivated wholly or partly by his intended misuse of such a drug;

Paragraph 6B(2)(a) states the condition that

(a) a relevant assessment has been offered to the defendant but he does not agree to undergo it; or

(b) he has undergone a relevant assessment, and relevant follow-up has been proposed to him, but he does not agree to participate in it.

It will be obvious to colleagues that the issue is whether there should be a presumption of bail or no such presumption or whether we should in these circumstances change the constitutional position that assumes that defendants are entitled to bail. Many have expressed their concerns, to the Government and to me, that this could be in breach of our obligations under the European convention on human rights, as it reverses the rules on considering the burden of

evidence when granting bail. It raises concerns under article 8 of the convention, which states that

''Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life''.

I would be grateful to hear from the Minister whether the Government have considered the possible breaches of article 8 that paragraph 6A may constitute and why they consider that it does not breach it.

Paragraph 6A is constitutionally interesting in that it is a presumption that will apply only if certain facilities are available. Unless they are available, the arrangement is not triggered. It is dependent—given that the Government have accepted that there is not universal provision across the country—on the accidental coincidence of the location of the court where the person appears and the treatment facilities. There is therefore a question of principle.

If I were arrested and charged with an offence that came into the category in question, and a bail issue arose, should I be treated differently because of an accident of geography, depending on whether I was being dealt with by Camberwell, Tonbridge or Leeds magistrates court? It seems to me that there is an unfair and arbitrary change of presumption. Bail might be more likely to be granted to one person than another simply because facilities were available in one place and not elsewhere. That raises the issue of inequality.

I am struggling to follow the argument that the provision establishes a presumption. It seems to me that it simply imposes a condition. Can the hon. Gentleman conceive of circumstances in which a court would grant bail to a person even though it was satisfied that there was a significant risk of their committing an offence?

I am exploring the question of what presumption is being made. It seems to me a perfectly proper question. Given that the new paragraph 6A of schedule 1 to the 1976 Act is entitled

''Exception applicable to drug users in certain areas'',

and that it provides that there will be an exception to the presumption, I take it that a change is being made to the presumption. That is what the Bill states.

I just wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could answer the specific question that I asked. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which a court that was satisfied that there was a significant risk of someone committing an offence would grant bail?

Obviously, the court must weigh up the balance of the interests with respect to the community, and my presumption would be that it would take into account, perfectly properly, significant risk of further offending. My experience is that when the courts encounter that issue they do not give bail. That is the motivating criterion: no court that I have attended, when confronted with a significant likelihood of the person before it reoffending, grants bail. I agree with the hon. Gentleman's implication that logically, if there is significant risk, the court will not grant bail. A court would not do that now. That is not what is being changed.

If that is the hon. Gentleman's position, why does he want to delete the relevant words from the new paragraph?

Because if the hon. Gentleman reads the amendment he will see that it provides that a decision as to whether to grant bail should be made giving particular weight to the conditions on drug compliance, without making them overriding.

I am perfectly happy to retain the presumption in law that someone who presents a significant risk of continuing to offend while on bail should not get bail. My question for Ministers is whether it should be a precondition that the person should agree to and comply with the relevant procedures, given that they will, first, change the presumption that I have been talking about, and secondly, be unequal in their effect. Should not every bail application be considered on its merits? A number of factors are weighed, and the court must be given the discretion to decide whether the presumption should be discharged. Without any legislative change, the presumption that one begins with is that people should be given bail, but if there are reasons why they should not, the presumption is dislodged.

A considerable number of people believe that drug users will have to agree to undertake drug treatment to avoid being remanded in custody. I think that the Committee agrees that it is desirable for people to receive effective drug treatment. We talked about intervention on Tuesday, and I am up for the idea of easier and earlier intervention. In reality, however, any proposal in law will be relatively worthless if the facilities are not in place, and we shall come to that in the clause stand part debate. The Select Committee on Home Affairs considered the issue and said that the big question was what facilities were available and where they were. There is therefore an argument for saying that the proposed sanction, which involves the loss of liberty, will force on us a policy that is unequal in its application and for which facilities are not generally available. The Minister may want to touch on that, although he may want to reserve his points about the availability of treatment and to answer the questions raised by the Home Affairs Committee when he responds to the clause stand part debate.

The hon. Gentleman has raised an important issue, and he may be aware that amendments Nos. 116 and 117 also probe it. Before I discuss them, however, I should say that I am inclined to disagree with his point about different treatment being provided in different parts of the country. I understand the point, but what he describes already happens. For instance, whether someone gets bail often depends on whether a place is available for them in a bail hostel, and that will vary from part of the country to another. If the hon. Gentleman wants to take his point further, he will have to show that the provisions institutionalise that difference, but I am not sure that they do.

However, I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman's important point about presumptions. We are altering the basic presumption in such cases, which was clearly set out in section 4 of the Bail Act 1976. The Act states:

''A person to whom this section applies shall be granted bail except as provided in schedule 1 to this Act''.

The exception in the Bill is very general. It pertains not to the nature of the offence but to matters that, on any showing, the Government see as related to the likelihood of someone committing a further offence. I do not disagree with that approach, but in many respects those matters fall outside the immediate scope of the offence. I do not want to put a spoke in the Government's wheels as they try to achieve their objective. Indeed, I share that objective, and I accept that there will be a continuing risk of habitual drug users committing burglary offences unless action is taken. However, I question whether it is necessary to draft paragraph 6A in such a peculiarly draconian fashion to achieve that objective.

A defendant covered by paragraph 6B

''may not be granted bail unless''

the court believes that there is no significant risk, but such a provision is not required. Amendment No. 116 would remove the word ''not'' and insert ''only'', while amendment No. 117 would leave out ''unless'' and insert ''if''. That may appear to be an exercise in semantics, but the Bill would be more likely to survive a challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998—the hon. Gentleman touched on that—if it were amended along the lines that we propose. As drafted, it appears to place a prohibition on bail. That causes me some concern, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response.

Words matter when drafting. Heaven knows, we sometimes tinker about with just one word—to good effect, I hope. I am therefore a little startled that such a bald statement has been included in the Bill. It takes drug addicts outside the scope and protection of the Bail Act 1976 altogether. The Minister might want to reconsider the matter, while still trying to meet the objectives that most Committee members share.

I am grateful for the amendments. They give us the opportunity to get to the heart of the clause. I accept that the proposed change is fundamental and significant. The hon. Gentleman is entirely right: the clause alters the presumption. However, it does so in order to deal with a problem with which we are all familiar. If I had to give an instance that would advance the case for the clause, it would be the conversation that I had about three months ago with a young man who was in a bail hostel, awaiting trial for an offence that he had committed. He had been addicted to heroin for eight or nine years. Because he had had trouble in getting a prescription while he was in the hostel, he had been trying to steal from a store in the city centre. That conversation brought home to me very forcefully the extent to which the young man was imprisoned by his addiction. He could look no further than where the next fix was to come from, so he could look no further than the means by which he would acquire money to pay for it.

I welcome the fact that Conservative spokespeople have recently emphasised the importance of addressing drug addiction and its impact on offending. That

demonstrates the broad consensus about the need to do something. The clause aims to tackle the problem in a way that involves a significant change in the arrangements.

The situation, which the Minister accepts requires a significant change in the law, is similar to that of people who are imprisoned by their own mental or psychological illness or another condition that involves liberty issues. The difficulty with his argument is that it would give different liberties to people with different conditions, whether self-induced or not.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. My response would be that such is the scale and nature of the suffering that drug addiction and the imprisonment of drug addicts causes—both to the addicts who are imprisoned and to the victims of the crimes that they commit—that it makes sense to try arrangements that do more than we currently do to break the cycle. Such arrangements are set out in the clause, and I am coming on to the pilot. I accept entirely that getting out of an addiction is a difficult thing to do. It is hard to offer help to somebody who might not want to take it. People have to want to change their lives; nobody underestimates the difficulty of change. However, that does not mean that we should not try to do something. It is a big social problem.

The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) asked about ECHR compatibility. We have, of course, considered the compatibility of the provisions with the human rights convention. We are convinced that they comply, because the court retains the discretion to grant bail if satisfied that the offender will not commit offences while on bail. We are also happy that the clause contains a proportionate response to what is clearly a significant problem.

On the issue of inconsistency, which was the hon. Gentleman's second substantive point, he was well answered by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield: it is not unknown. We shall run a pilot. I accept entirely the arguments about the need for appropriate assessment, help and treatment, so we shall run the pilot in areas that can offer a practical response to the identification of drug problems. We need to learn from that process, and there is nothing wrong in doing that while trying to address that major problem.

It is a tough proposition for the offender. The provisions of the clause confront offenders with a choice—but they do have a choice, and consequences will flow from it. Our argument, in essence, is that we believe it to be a sensible and proportionate response to a serious problem.

I am sorry to keep on picking on the Minister, but schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 lists the exceptions against the granting of bail. It states that bail need not be granted in certain circumstances, including failure to surrender to custody, committing an offence and interfering with witnesses. The provision that we are debating is totally dissimilar in nature and character from any exceptions listed in the Bail Act. In terms of the protection that the law

affords them, it removes drug addicts into a completely different world. For that reason, I worry about the Bill's compatibility with the Human Rights Act.

I accept that the Bill creates a set of circumstances, which are the subject of the amendments, so I shall not argue with the hon. Gentleman's substantive point. We have clearly considered the matter of compatibility, and in the end all such things are tested in the courts. However, there is something particular about the nature of this problem, which all members of the Committee accept, that justifies our proposals. We are trying to do something sensible and practical about a major problem, which damages individuals and communities, but to do it in a way that offers a practical way forward—namely, the opportunity of assistance or treatment following assessment. It is not solely punitive: as well as imposing particular obligations on those with a class A drug problem, it is saying to them that they should avail themselves of what we are providing to support them while they are trying to get off that drug, and if they do not, other consequences may follow.

I understand the Minister's argument, but I do not accept it. That is the difference between socialists and liberals. It is fundamental. The Minister argues that it is for the good of society that the state should be able to curtail a person's liberty for a particular category of crime. I start from the presumption that all citizens have the right to liberty, and that it can be taken away only if it is perceived as being fair throughout society, done in a way that is equal and justified and done only in exceptional circumstances and with the most careful caveats.

I accept that the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield would be better, because they avoid one of the problems of my amendment. I will be happy not to press my amendment to a vote, but I shall be reassured to think that when the time comes—a little later in our deliberations when the amendments fall to be debated—he will press his amendment to a Division, because I would support it. If the clause is not amended, at least as he proposes, I will not be able to vote for it; it has not been and could not be justified as grounds for changing the presumption.

The hon. Gentleman has offered the Committee a way that does not appear to take away the right of the court to decide that bail should be withheld if there is a significant risk of an offence being committed. It also deals with the point made by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) on the weakness of my amendment, which I accept. None the less, it sustains my argument about presumption.

Just to be clear about this, would the hon. Gentleman be happy to vote for amendments Nos. 116 and 117?

Yes.

I am grateful to him for confirming that.

On the substantive issue that motivates the Minister's proposition, I understand the concern, but I think that it would be met by the alternative formulation that starts from a presumption of bail being obtained. That would still give the courts the ability to do all the things that the Minister wants them to be able to do without either breaking the presumption or risking the possibility that certain people may be treated differently. I hope that I have made clear my concerns about the clause and I hope that colleagues, perhaps including some on the Labour Benches, will join me in voting to amend the clause as suggested in amendments Nos. 116 and 117.

On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. When should I move those amendments? I am always slightly confused about when to move amendments other than the lead amendment, but I wish to put them to a vote.

Does the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey wish to withdraw amendment No. 140?

I seek you guidance, Mr. Illsley, as I want the Committee to have the opportunity to vote on amendments Nos. 116 and 117.

If the hon. Gentleman wishes to withdraw amendment No. 140, we can proceed to a Division on amendment No. 116. If amendment No. 116 falls, I am advised that it will not make any sense to move amendment No. 117.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 116, in

clause 16, page 11, line 45, leave out 'not' and insert 'only'.—[Mr. Grieve.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 15.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move amendment No. 56, in

clause 16, page 12, line 13, leave out from 'is' to 'or' in line 15 and insert

'one under section 5(2) or (3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and relates to a specified Class A drug,'.

This amendment is in the same vein as my previous amendment. There may well be cases in which a person caught in possession of a class A drug is charged only with the more serious offence of intent to supply. In such cases, the person would not be solely charged with possession and would not fall within the

provisions of the clause. The amendment would enable a presumption against bail to apply in the event that a person was charged only with the more serious offence of possession with intent to supply, whether or not that person was also charged with simple possession.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 57, in

clause 16, page 12, line 23, at end insert

'or (if the court is considering on a second or subsequent occasion whether or not to grant bail) has been, and continues to be, satisfied.'.

No. 58, in

clause 16, page 12, line 47, leave out '8' and insert '8(1)'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Given my views on the matter that we have just debated I shall not be able to vote for the clause, but I want to explain to the Minister two substantive matters that were raised by the Home Affairs Committee, which said:

''Whether or not Clause 16 will work in practice is dependent on two things. First, the ability to enforce the bail condition and secondly, the availability of treatment, to which the bail condition relates. On the first point, the Association of Police Authorities have highlighted some potential problems. We were told that, in some pilot areas, a 'large percentage' of those who test positive for Class A drugs do not comply with drug treatment orders 'thus ending back in court for re-sentencing'.

We are accordingly concerned about the practicality of enforcing such conditions against drugs misusers who consent to the bail condition, but then fail to comply with the treatment. We look forward to hearing from the Home Office on this point.''

I should be grateful if the Minister could make the Home Office's response to that.

The Select Committee report continued:

''On the second point, we are pleased to note the provisions under Clause 16 will only apply in areas within which treatment is available. Therefore a person 'could not be refused bail simply on the basis that he had refused treatment where there was not treatment available'. As the Minister conceded, there is not enough treatment available at the moment. We were informed that in one police area there is an eight month waiting list for detainees willing to submit to treatment. The Minister informed us that, within the next few weeks, he would hope to set out his proposals as to 'where and when treatment will be available' for the purposes of clause 16.''

I should be grateful if the Minister could update the Committee on the matter of where and when treatment is now, or will be, available for the purposes of clause 16. I do not know whether the Government deal with the information by way of a table showing police authority or magistrates court areas. I think that all members of the Committee would be interested to know in which areas treatment is available, and in which it is not. Colleagues involved in health matters would be interested too.

In any event, as it has not been possible to amend the clause now, I hope that the Government will reflect on the points that were made in the previous debate. I, together with, I am sure, our Conservative colleagues, would be happy, if the question arose of agreeing on a formulation, to work with the Government on an improved provision that would meet our objections.

As this is the first time that I have been able to speak in this Committee, I wish you and the Committee a happy new year, Mr. Illsley. I apologise for missing the sittings before Christmas. I was stuck in hospital. I have a son with severe epilepsy. I mention that because at home I have a large cabinet full of clobazam, phenobarbitone and temazepam, which are all now class C drugs—not only that, but possession of them illegally is an arrestable offence. I reassure the Minister that when I go out with them I shall be careful to take the prescription with me.

I am glad to be on this Committee, because I am also a member of the Home Affairs Committee. We tried to conduct some pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, although that was difficult, because it was not published a long time in advance. I thoroughly approve of the clause and the intention behind it. As my vote on the previous amendment showed, I am not particularly concerned about the reversal of the presumption about bail. The Home Affairs Committee examined the issue and stated that the clause

''will also create a presumption against bail if the defendant refuses to agree to undergo any assessment or treatment that is offered.''

It continued:

''As we understand it, the purpose is not simply to extend the grounds for refusing bail . . . but to encourage Class A drug users to undergo treatment.''

I say amen to that—that is the point of the clause.

On the issue of drugs, the report boils down to one or two points: focus on the 250,000 to 300,000 serious drug users, and get them into treatment as quickly as possible. We all know the figures. Class A drug users carry out 50 per cent. of property crimes. Every other time one's car is broken into or one's house is burgled, it is likely to be by someone addicted to class A drugs. The health problems are also huge. Some 300,000 people have hepatitis C through intravenous drug use, and approximately one third of them will probably die prematurely. Anything that gets addicts into treatment will not only cut crime but save a large number of lives.

The clause helps because it says that if one has committed an imprisonable offence, or has been accused of doing so, and one then either refuses a drug test or fails one yet does not accept treatment, one cannot get bail. I think that I have got that right. The clause is one of the most complexly drafted. The Minister and the draftsmen should always aim to draft legislation like Ronseal—it should do exactly what it says on the tin. One has to read the clause several times, and thank God for the explanatory notes, which make it clearer. I notice that the aim of amendment No. 103, tabled by hon. Member for Nottingham, North, is to clarify whether certain provisions in clause 17 mean what the explanatory notes say. I thoroughly agree with that.

Some of us batter away endlessly on that issue, particularly on criminal justice legislation. I support the hon. Gentleman thoroughly, and hope that his reminder of how awful the clause is might allow Ministers to replace the original. Instead of

having to marry the original with the amendments, one could simply say, ''Delete A, put in B.'' Whatever we agree B should be, it is at least in one place, where one can find, read and understand it.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that because the clause is an amendment to the Bail Act 1976 the conclusion comes before the argument. The clause starts by saying what the Secretary of State has to state before saying what the clause is designed to achieve.

As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, the Home Affairs Committee pointed out the key to the clause's working. The explanatory notes state:

''The provision can only apply in areas where appropriate assessment and treatment facilities are in place.''

The question concerns not only resources and money but priorities. The Home Affairs Committee found that for every £1 one spends on treatment, one is likely to save some £3, in terms of prevention, policing and other matters. On that issue, we can make an impact in reducing drug abuse and drug-related crime, and saving lives. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield have made the issue such a priority for the Conservative party.

My plea to the Minister is that we should not be too prescriptive about the type of treatment or assistance—I think that he said that in his opening remarks. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) spoke about that issue in earlier debates. Everyone that I have spoken to who has gone through drug rehabilitation says that different courses work for different people. For some people, though a methadone scrip does not get them off their addiction to opiates, it gives them time to think about things and rebuild their lives. For other people, it must be the 12-step programme, the complete rebuilding of one's life at some hideous residential centre in the middle of the downs, where ones pulls oneself apart and puts oneself back together again. For others, the solution might be something completely different.

A drugs worker in south London put the issue to me in a good way. He said, ''It's a bit like diets. Anyone who's successfully done a diet''—one can tell that I have not done so—''will tell you that the one they did is the only way to do it.'' If that person did the F-plan diet, he or she will say that that is the only one that works. If it was a fibre-only diet, or whatever, he or she will explain its brilliance. It is the same with getting off drugs. The individuals for whom it has worked become messianic about how good it was for them. However, they should not become too prescriptive—let a thousand flowers bloom if possible.

Why do we apply the clause to over-18s only? I noticed in some of the Bill's earlier provisions that we are saying that because some of the drug treatment and testing order-type stuff has started to work we should start to apply it to children aged 14, 15 and 16. Why can we not do the same here? It seems that it is important to get treatment for people who have an addiction and who are in court accused of offences.

The more that can be done to concertina that approach and save time, the better. We should not have to wait until people are 18.

I am so supportive of doing that because it brings together addiction and treatment. I had a very interesting meeting with Chief Superintendent Love in Oxford, which is near my constituency. He wanted to go further than the Government suggest. I put this suggestion to the Minister for consideration. Chief Superintendent Love asked why entering treatment could not be a condition of police bail, rather than just bail being available only when an individual goes to court. I know that problems would arise because the person would not yet have gone before a legal body. However, if we are trying to ensure that the addict enters treatment as quickly as possible, we must realise that for every day of delay between arrest and a court appearance, that person is still addicted, still must steal to fund a drug habit and still commits crimes—and is still at risk of self-harm or even death.

I ask the Minister to see whether he can do anything to reduce the age of persons who can appear in court and whether anything can be done earlier at the police bail stage. Otherwise, the Bill is absolutely right, and I look forward to supporting it.

In welcoming the presence on the Committee of my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron), I wish to say much of the same. This clause will potentially be important. Since we consider drug addiction to be a major cause of crime, we support finding a device to tackle it, and I welcome the clause.

I have a slight difference with my hon. Friend about drafting: I would stick to the preference of my earlier amendment, because it is important that the clause stand up to legal scrutiny. Above all, I do not want us to waste time on legal challenges—I want the clause to work smoothly and effectively. Even at this late stage, I put in a plea to the Minister, when he leaves with his officials, to review the drafting. My hon. Friend rightly pointed out that the clause is complex. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North made that clear also.

The clause tries to insert into the Bail Act 1976 something that its draftsman would not in a month of Sundays have imagined likely. That is one reason why it reads so inelegantly. As I said earlier, it is also contrary the entire thrust of the Bail Act. That may be a good thing in this particular exception, but in my limited experience of drafting Bills it is always wise to marry the amendments to an existing piece of legislation to the spirit of that legislation, if the same end can be achieved by doing so.

I hope that the Minister may ponder that when he leaves the Committee today and before we go any further. I doubt whether it will be revisited at some later stage, because it is ultimately, as he said, a matter that may be resolved in the courts. However, I want the clause to work, and to work effectively. I wish it well, because it is an important component in trying to tackle crime.

Let me deal with the two substantive points raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey in relation to comments made in the Home Affairs Committee report. We shall respond to that report in due course. I accept the point made by the Select Committee about enforceability. That, and especially managing breach, is a matter of practicality. We shall have to learn from the experience of implementing criminal justice interventions, in particular in the high crime areas. Presumption against bail is part of a package of changes to the criminal justice system identified in the updated drugs strategy.

I referred earlier to additional resources, but I accept the point of the hon. Member for Witney that it is not simply a question of resources. However, part of the answer to the reasonable questions that have been asked about whether the arrangements can work in practice is that we should ensure that the resources are available to provide appropriate treatment. So far as the areas are concerned, I am not in a position to give the list that he has asked for, but I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman. I have also undertaken that we shall cover the matter in response to the Home Affairs Committee.

When are the Government expecting to respond to the Home Affairs Committee report? We are in the slightly complicated position that the Bill has been produced and scrutinised and suggestions have been made, but we are in Committee and have not had a response.

I am tempted to give the answer that my late mother always gave when we asked when supper would be. She said, ''When it's ready.'' That is the honest answer, and I shall attempt to give an indication in the letter that I have promised to send the hon. Gentleman in response to his very fair point.

I welcome the contribution—in both senses, because it was his first—of the hon. Member for Witney. He helpfully reminded us of the Home Affairs Committee's support for the changes and set out most cogently the case for them. I am with him in the Ronseal camp. Having had discussions with parliamentary draftsmen, I know that there is a tension between the purity of wording and ensuring that it is spare and does not include anything that does not need to be there. That is useful one respect, but it does not always help lay people, myself included, to understand Parliament's intentions. Where these amendments are concerned, I acknowledge that, because the Bail Act has been amended a number of times, things are becoming complicated. We aim to consolidate when time allows.

My hon. Friend mentioned the parliamentary draftsmen. Could he ask them, or others who advise him, whether there would be any difference in the interpretation of the clause if amendments Nos. 116 and 117 were made?

That is a very helpful intervention, because I have already asked the question. The advice I received was that it would make no difference. That is why I voted no—

When we discussed those amendments, perhaps because he was concentrating on amendment No. 140, the Minister did not say that. I am grateful that he has said it now. I understand his argument, but I still think that the wording that I proposed was better.

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. When I first read those amendments, I thought that they were further grammatical improvements. However, we shall let the matter rest.

In response to the first of the three points raised by the hon. Member for Witney, I am 100 per cent. with him. It is an extremely sensible observation: we should not be too prescriptive. If something helps a person with a drug problem to get off it, we should try it. In relation to the under-18s, clause 10 is being piloted for those aged 14-plus. However, we recognise that there are differences in young people's needs and in the provision of effective treatment. The drug testing pilots will ensure that we have the evidence that we need to decide the most appropriate ways of intervening with the relevant age ranges.

My understanding is that clause 10 is about extending DTTOs to young people. What would be wrong with considering attaching conditions to young people's bail in the same way?

Clause 10 is about testing, not extending DTTOs to under-18s. Tests would be followed up by the provision of assessment and treatment for young people. The purpose of clause 10 is therefore different from what the hon. Gentleman thought.

As regards police bail, I understand the motivation, but the difficulty is that there must be assessment if the clause is to work. It is rather hard to see how one could marry effective assessment with timely decisions on police bail.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.