I beg to move amendment No. 39, in

clause 13, page 9, line 11, at end insert—

'(ca) section 24C of that Act (intention as to plea by child or young person: adjournment),'.

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 45 and 46.

These are technical amendments to tidy up the clause. Subsection (1) defines the circumstances under which an appeal will lie to the Crown court against a condition of bail imposed by a magistrates court. It does so by reference to bail granted on the adjournment of a case and lists the provisions under which a case may be so adjourned. Amendment No. 39 adds to that list a reference to an adjournment under a new provision, section 24C,

which appears in schedule 3, which we shall debate later. The amendment is a tidying up amendment in that it makes the clause consistent with what is already in schedule 3. Amendments Nos. 45 and 46 do the same in respect of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move amendment No. 25, in

clause 13, page 9, line 25, at end insert—

''(e) that the person concerned does not enter a specified postal area.

(f) that the person concerned does not come within a specified distance of a property.

(g) that the person concerned resides at a particular address.

(h) that the person concerned makes no contact with another person or persons.''

The amendment was the inspiration of my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), who from his experience as a deputy district judge questions the state of the appeal to the Crown court under clause 13. It may also shorten matters on clause 14 that the principle that the old appeal procedures of the High Court should be removed and substituted with an appeal to the Crown court. That strikes us as sensible, although it may be slightly inconvenient for members of my profession who will no longer be able to pop over to the Bear Garden at the Royal Courts of Justice and will have to go out to Crown courts in distant towns.

The question arises whether the conditions or circumstances in which one can appeal against conditions of bail as set out in subsection (3) are too narrowly drafted. The conditions are:

''(a) that the person concerned resides away from a particular place or area and at a place other than a bail hostel,

(b) for the provision of a surety or sureties or the giving of a security,

(c) that the person concerned remains indoors between certain hours, or

(d) imposed under section 3(6ZAA) of the 1976 Act (requirements with respect to electronic monitoring).''

We seek to add four matters that, in my experience and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, are frequently imposed conditions.

Reading the explanatory notes, I was conscious that the old High Court procedure may have been limited in the way proposed in the clause. However, that came as a surprise to me, because the appeals that I recollect against or for bail in the High Court covered a wide range of issues and could often lead to substantial variations in bail. That may have arisen simply because one was normally appealing against the refusal of a grant of bail rather than the conditions. It is a while since I last made such an application and my memory may be rusty on that point.

However, even if that were the case, seeing as we are setting up a new regime it seems there is no reason why the Committee should not try to improve on the old system unless it will place too onerous a burden on the Crown court. The four areas that we have proposed as being within the Crown court's jurisdiction to grant a

variation strike as us sensible. If they will not cause the Crown court serious inconvenience in dealing with such applications, considering the other conditions that can be varied, could they be included?

The justifying criterion for the amendment is that if conditions have been wrongly imposed along the lines set out here they can cause a defendant substantial inconvenience. That in itself would merit and justify the Crown court being able to consider the conditions that we propose. I would be grateful for the Minister's views.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and I have subscribed to the amendment, which is entirely sensible. It is not only a matter of inconvenience to the defendant; material loss may be engendered by conditions that will be subject to appeal if the amendment is accepted. A loss of trade or the loss of the ability to carry on a trade may result from those specific requirements. If the Crown court can consider the other spectrum of conditions there is no obvious reason why they should not be extended.

The professional concerns of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about travelling to Crown courts may be rectified by the attitude of the Lord Chancellor's Department in closing Crown courts and centralising their provisions. In future, there may be far fewer venues requiring the hon. Gentleman's attendance.

I shall set out briefly the background to the provisions. I accept that there is consensus in the Committee that we should do away with the right of appeal to the High Court.

The proposal arises from Lord Justice Auld's consideration of the issue. He said that it would be

''sensible, in general, to restrict a defendant's right of appeal against conditional grant of bail. Otherwise the appellate process could be corrupted by endless wrangling over conditions that in most cases should be manageable for the defendant.''

Auld continued:

''There are two possible exceptions in the case of conditional bail granted in the magistrates' courts. The first is where he cannot comply with the condition of residence away from the area of the alleged offence or the home of a victim or witness and there is no suitable bail hostel placement. The second is a requirement to provide sureties or to give a security.''

The Bar Council agreed with Auld's proposal for a restricted right of appeal. However, it considered that the appealable conditions should be extended to include curfew, which it described as

''a condition which represents a clear restriction of liberty'',

and electronic tagging, for the same reason. That argument was accepted, and is included in the clause. The Bar Council also suggested that a condition not to enter a certain area should be subject to appeal, but the Government do not accept that argument.

I listened with interest to the points made in the debate. I am not persuaded that the requirement to avoid a particular geographical area, which is a commonly imposed condition, is so great a restriction on a defendant's liberty as to require a right of appeal. However, members of the Committee should bear it in mind that defendants may already apply to the magistrates who set the conditions

originally to vary them. That is the first route of appeal. In respect of all bail conditions, there is a right of appeal to the magistrates, advancing the argument that the condition imposes an unreasonable burden. The clause makes it clear that in respect of the provisions for which we propose to provide a right of appeal, no appeal to the Crown court would lie unless such an application had been made and decided by the magistrates court.

The residence condition in paragraph (g) of the amendment could be accommodated by adjusting paragraph (a) in the clause as drafted. It could be argued that paragraph (a) could be interpreted as including a residence provision, but I would like to look at the proposal and to consider further the point made by the hon. Gentleman in respect of paragraph

(h) about not contacting particular persons. In view of my comments, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

In the light of the Minister's remarks, I hope that he will give the matter further thought, but I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Adjourned accordingly at six minutes to Ten o'clock till Thursday 9 January at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.