I beg to move amendment No. 138, in

clause 11, page 7, line 38, leave out subsection (c).

With this we may take the following amendments: No. 217, in

clause 11, page 7, line 40, leave out 'for his own welfare or'.

No. 218, in

clause 11, page 7, line 40, leave out 'or in his own interests'.

No. 219, in

clause 11, page 8, line 5, leave out 'for his own welfare or'.

No. 220, in

clause 11, page 8, line 5, leave out 'or in his own interests'.

It is a delight to be here in Committee again. Fresh from my debates with the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) on the niceties of the treaty of Nice, I was pleased to find that this Committee was still sitting and that I had the opportunity to contribute.

The amendment would remove subsection (c), which provides new grounds for the imposition of bail conditions—namely,

''for his own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare or in his own interests''.

The amendment is designed to help us understand why the Minister supports that proposal: it is not intended to wipe it out, but to elicit a fuller explanation. Until now, bail conditions have been based on straightforward grounds relating to the alleged offence or an assessment of the likelihood of reoffending. The clause extends that to conditions that are comparable to the grounds on which an alleged offender could be remanded in custody, and we are concerned principally with the position of the children.

It is difficult to find circumstances in which a custody sergeant, who presumably would be the one who makes such a decision, would have the opportunity to make a full assessment of the welfare needs of the child to such an extent that proper conditions could be applied. As we know, under article 3 of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child, we have the commitment that all actions concerning children will be based on the best interests of the child. That will be the paramount consideration. There will be circumstances in which the best interests of the child will be for a conditional bail, for example to deliver that child into the hands of the responsible welfare authorities such as social services. I understand that, but feel that there are better ways of ensuring that in existing child welfare legislation. We could build on the experience of inter-agency working on children, which has grown considerably in past years, rather than the inevitably superficial examination that is the maximum that could be expected from a police officer in the circumstances.

I have some questions for the Minister. Under what circumstances does he expect the new provision to be used? How does he expect it to be used, and what conditions does he expect to be imposed on bail? Given that we all hope that the Bill's provisions will be in accordance with our obligations under the convention on the rights of the child, in what way does he feel that the proposals fully comply with the possible consequences of an arbitrary use of conditions of bail when that was previously unavailable?

As the Minister will see, the Conservative amendments, although different in wording from the Liberal ones, have the same purpose of eliciting from the Government the

background to the measure. I would go slightly further than the hon. Gentleman in voicing an anxiety—I put it no more strongly than that; it is not something that would yet make me vote against the clause—about the introduction of the welfare considerations into the granting of bail. As I said in my closing comments on clause 10, we appear to be slipping gently into a hybrid world in which children's welfare issues will no longer be the responsibility of the civil courts. Instead, we are being moved increasingly into intervention, not only when a child has been convicted of an offence but when a child is awaiting trial for an alleged offence and in circumstances in which full representation, which is appointed to ensure that the child's interests are properly addressed, is not available.

I fully appreciate that at first sight there appear to be compelling reasons for adopting that course of action. If a child appears to have welfare requirements when he first comes into contact with the criminal justice system, it may be argued that to delay intervention will not be in his interests. Therefore, to impose bail conditions that have reference to his welfare may appear to be in his interest. However, we must face the fact that, in so doing, we are short-cutting the normal procedure, and as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, it is at least questionable whether we are observing our international obligations.

I suppose that that will in part depend on what the welfare considerations and the measures imposed on a child in those circumstances are in practice. I assumed, although I may be wrong, that with the welfare considerations that had been introduced, we might envisage a variety of measures, particularly relating to the question of the risk in terms of drug addiction. That is just one example.

I may be wrong, but we must be careful, or we could be in danger of introducing a parallel child care system that is imposed without the child's rights being adequately protected. Where, in such a case, is the child's representative? Where is the representative of the possible competing interests between parent and child, or between local authority and child? There is none of these. What there is, apparently, is a move to a short-cut procedure to address the child's best interests, but which will, I believe, largely be dictated by the police and no one else.

I hope that this is an opportunity to explore that issue. I am not unsympathetic to the Minister's aim, but I am slightly troubled and I know that some outside organisations, including the Children's Society, were extremely troubled by the provision. It may be worth pointing out that I tabled the amendments before they contacted me. I suspect that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome did the same. We were probably working along the same lines as we read the clause, and raising the same questions.

The provision was included in the Bill following a recommendation by the Law Commission, specifically to ensure that our bail legislation complied with the European convention on human rights.

It may be helpful if I point out that, although the Bail Act 1976 allows a defendant to be remanded in custody for their own protection, or welfare in the case of a juvenile, there is no provision to enable bail conditions to be imposed in the same circumstances. The Law Commission pointed out that that might lead to a defendant being remanded in custody where release on conditional bail would have sufficed had the power to impose a condition—for example, residence at a hostel—been available. Clause 11(1) amends section 3(6) of the 1976 Act to permit that. The commission recommended that wholly positive step to deal with the gap in current provision that might result in someone being remanded in custody when they could be released on bail if appropriate conditions could be imposed. As I said, the provision is also intended to ensure compatibility with the European convention.

Our other objective is to ensure that there is a power to impose conditions on bail in the case of under-18s in circumstances in which they could be detained in their own interests under PACE or remanded in custody under the 1976 Act. That is the reason for the dual formula of

''for his own welfare or in his own interests''.

A point was made about examples of where the provisions might be used in respect of young people. There could be a requirement to reside at a particular address or not to have contact with an older alleged offender. I hope that my answers have reassured hon. Members that this is a positive change. As I said, it is a direct response to a Law Commission recommendation.

I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which moves us forward. However, it is not entirely satisfactory to remedy a potential breach of the convention on human rights if that introduces a breach of the convention on the rights of the child. There is still a degree of creative tension. My remarks and those of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield were about the provisions that deal with children rather than adults, for whom the issues are more clear cut. However, I think that the Minister's reply was helpful in indicating the circumstances in which he expects the conditions to apply.

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman would agree that the question is whether the purpose is to maintain welfare, pending the determination of the trial, or something wider. The Minister made a point about welfare in terms of locking somebody up. The purpose in those circumstances is to prevent that person from being lynched by a mob outside, committing suicide prior to trial, or another reason that requires their protection pending the trial, rather than to provide a device aimed at administrative convenience in the long term.

The hon. Gentleman has made an important and interesting point, and I agree with him.

A lot of the potential difficulties could be avoided if there were sufficient clarity in the guidelines produced

by either the Home Office or the Association of Chief Police Officers on how to interpret the provision and how officers will use it. I still have reservations about whether a custody sergeant—the person responsible—will have sufficient information to make a proper assessment of the welfare needs of a child who is brought in suspected of a crime, though not at that stage convicted, without the assistance of the relevant welfare authorities. In almost every circumstance that I can imagine, if there are serious concerns about the child's welfare, it would be far better for those authorities to be involved at that stage than for arbitrary conditions on bail to be imposed.

However, I am partially reassured by what the Minister said. He may like to reflect further on the guidance that can be issued on the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the provision. Those outside bodies that have concerns on the issue and understand the situation may also wish to reflect on his words. We may return to the matter later.

I would be very happy to reflect on the points that the hon. Gentleman has made in response to what I said, and to write to him if that would be helpful.

I am grateful, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 249, in

clause 11, page 8, line 6, at end insert

', or

(e) for the purpose of contributing to a national DNA profile providing evidence of identity and kinship of each resident of England and Wales.'.

Before the Minister says it, I appreciate that the amendment is drafted extremely clumsily. Its purpose is to enable the police to obtain DNA samples from all suspects held in custody, and it is intended to be the first step towards the establishment of an independent, national DNA database, on which the DNA fingerprints of all individuals in the UK could eventually be stored. As well as crime suspects, other members of the public could be invited to contribute their details voluntarily, and the end result would be a national resource, the uses of which would extend beyond the obvious example of assisting criminal detection. For example, accident victims could be more easily identified and with far less trauma to relatives. DNA fingerprinting can also be used to clear those wrongly accused of crimes.

The process might take many years to complete, but a start must be made. People are already talking about the subject in scientific and academic circles. In my view, it is a process of some inevitability. The technology now exists—there is no question about that—and I hope that this will be the beginning of a serious and sensible debate that could be viewed in an ethical framework, rather than one that makes commercial profit its main concern. I am sure that the Minister will help to initiate that debate. Once the Minister has given a response, I shall be happy to withdraw the amendment if necessary, and will perhaps table a new clause later on.

As I think my hon. Friend acknowledged in his opening words—I am trying to phrase this with appropriate delicacy—the amendment is not, perhaps, in the most appropriate place, although I understand entirely its central point. He has touched on a very important issue. As he rightly says, technology is making possible what was not possible. In the interests of time and of making progress, I shall say that I will be happy to write to him on those points. As he says, we may return to the issue later in the Bill.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.