I beg to move amendment No. 138, in

clause 13, page 10, line 4, leave out 'capable of'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 232, in

clause 13, page 10, line 4, leave out 'capable of causing' and insert

'causing or is likely to cause'.

Amendment No. 139, in

clause 13, page 10, line 4, leave out 'or annoyance'.

Amendment No. 193, in

clause 13, page 10, line 5, leave out 'and' and insert 'or'.

Amendment No. 140, in

clause 13, page 10, line 12, after 'engaging', insert 'or'.

Amendment No. 141, in

clause 13, page 10, line 12, leave out 'or threatens to engage'.

Amendment No. 142, in

clause 13, page 10, line 14, leave out 'capable of'.

Amendment No. 143, in

clause 13, page 10, line 28, leave out 'or threatening to use'.

Amendment No. 146, in

clause 14, page 13, line 9, leave out

'or has threatened to engage'.

Amendment No. 147, in

clause 14, page 13, line 39, leave out

'or has threatened to engage'.

We come to the crux of this part of the Bill—injunctions against antisocial behaviour used on application. I shall run through our amendments as quickly as I can. Some are designed to establish the Government's thinking on the detail of the clause.

Amendment No. 138 would remove the phrase ''capable of'' from proposed new section 153A(1)(a), making it read:

''This section applies to conduct . . . which is causing nuisance or annoyance to any person''.

We want the Government to clarify what they mean by conduct ''capable of'' causing nuisance or annoyance. Excessively loud music, late night parties and people hanging around outside might be capable of causing nuisance to people, but surrounding tenants may be entirely happy that that is happening. I accept that that is unlikely, but we are testing why the Government have used the phrase ''capable of causing nuisance'' rather than ''is causing nuisance''.

Amendment No. 139 is designed to test the difference between nuisance and annoyance. Nuisance is an understandable condition, but many different things could be described as causing annoyance to neighbours, some of which would not be at all reasonable. What do the Government class as annoyance? There is a clearer line on nuisance.

In passing, I should say that we do not support Conservative amendment No. 193. Using ''or'' instead

of ''and'' would mean that the proposed new section could apply to conduct

''which directly or indirectly relates to or affects the housing management functions of a relevant landlord''

without reference to the nuisance test. I think that the Conservatives want the amendment to work differently, but it would not quite achieve their aim.

Amendment Nos. 140 and 141 go together. They are similar to previous amendments and relate to the idea that the people in question should be actually engaged in behaviour that causes a problem. Subsection (3) talks about a person who

''threatens to engage in conduct to which this section applies.''

I am uncertain about the condition of threatening to engage in antisocial behaviour, as the requirement that the person is engaging or has engaged in such conduct would be sufficient. Will the Minister explain why it is necessary to include the other condition? Does he have in mind specific circumstances in which it might apply? We are concerned that the wording is not tight enough, so we seek clarification.

Amendment No. 142 would remove the phrase ''capable of'', again tightening the drafting. It is the same as amendment No. 138, and the question is whether any conduct is causing a nuisance, rather than is just capable of causing a nuisance. Amendment No. 143 is similar to amendments Nos. 140 and 141. If it were made, subsection (1) would refer to conduct which

''involves using . . . housing accommodation owned or managed by a relevant landlord''.

We are seeking to discover what problem the Government see in using the idea that someone might do something rather than actually doing it.

Amendments Nos. 146 and 147 are along the same lines. Clause 14 includes:

''or has threatened to engage in conduct''.

That is perhaps more understandable if someone has threatened, for example, to play his music all night long every night. It may be slightly more relevant than in the implied circumstances in which someone has not actually engaged in antisocial behaviour but might have done.

There is a broad theme to the amendments. I hope that the Minister can explain why those phrases should remain in the Bill.

I do not intend to comment in detail on all the amendments spoken to by the hon. Member for Ludlow before I come to the two standing in my name. I understand his approach and support the principle of trying to find out what the Government are seeking to achieve. I am not going to say that I support or oppose the detail of his amendments, but I support the objective of inquiry behind them and indeed behind my amendments, in particular amendment No. 193.

The hon. Member for Ludlow stated that he could not support that amendment, and indeed I would have been horrified if he could. That is not a partisan comment: I would not support it myself if someone were daft enough to press it to a vote. It was tabled

simply to challenge the Government to remove ''and'' and insert ''or'', as the hon. Gentleman said, and thus separate the issue of management from nuisance and annoyance. That would not be wise, but it enables me in a different way from that chosen by the hon. Gentleman to ask the Minister to explain what he means by ''nuisance and annoyance''. It is part of the overall challenge to the Government. I have tabled other amendments on later clauses that in their own way similarly challenge the Government.

I have great hopes that the Minister might accept amendment No. 232. The reason is straightforward: its phrasing is quite pedantic, but as the Minister and the Committee will know, the Bill follows closely the Housing Act 1996, passed by the Conservative Government, which brought in the concept of introductory tenancies in which the issue of antisocial behaviour was addressed. It seems logical that we should use the same phraseology in the Bill. The proposal came from the Law Society, so with its support I have tabled the amendment to amend the phraseology of clause 13 to retain the current definition—which is proven to be workable—in the 1996 Act by deleting ''capable of causing'' and replacing it with ''causing or is likely to cause''. It is a small change, but it has the merit of consistency with existing legislation that has been proved to work. I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on that modest proposal.

Without pre-empting what I shall say subsequently on amendment No. 232, I admit that I shall probably disappoint the hon. Gentleman. The essence of clause 13 and, I accept, the thrust of many of the amendments is that people's behaviour has consequences. That is the key. If there is a theme to the Liberal Democrat amendments, it is to narrow our ability and limit the powers of HATs, RSLs and local housing authorities to secure injunctions and correct antisocial behaviour. I am sure that that is not the purpose of the amendments, but it would be the outcome.

Amendments Nos. 138 and 142 would limit the use of injunctions to circumstances in which behaviour had caused nuisance or annoyance to a relevant person, rather than circumstances in which behaviour was capable of causing nuisance or annoyance. That would require a victim to be identified before the landlord could take action and would severely limit what landlords could do in the broader proactive and preventive sense to try to arrest the early stage of antisocial behaviour before it turned into something that ultimately had real consequences.

The amendment would prevent third parties from acting as witnesses where a victim was too scared or intimidated to come to court, which is a real concern. For example, some landlords use professional witnesses on estates where a fear of reprisals has prevented tenants from coming forward to give evidence, not least because their experience of raising their head above the parapet in the past has been sorely disappointing and found wanting.

Some of the most successful schemes that are in place to arrest the early stage of antisocial behaviour and restore greater confidence in local communities

are the various street neighbourhood and community warden schemes in which the professional witness model or duty is part and parcel of the role. That works terribly well. If the Bill referred only to circumstances in which nuisance or annoyance had been caused, that would severely limit the proactive nature of what authorities could do.

The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire was right: amendment No. 232 refers back to the language of the Housing Act 1996. However, it would narrow the ability of social landlords to obtain an injunction to occasions on which the behaviour was causing nuisance or annoyance or on which it was likely to do so. We chose the language of clause 13 very carefully to make the test easier, in the context of being proactive and preventive as well as simply reactive.

I am afraid that I have to pretend to be a lawyer now, at least in some regard, and go through the notion of nuisance and annoyance, which underpins at least some of the amendments. That phrase has been readily understood by the courts. The same wording is used in existing housing injunctions under the powers in the 1996 Act and in the nuisance grounds for possession applicable to secure and assured tenants. The courts have said that those words should be given their usual meaning: nuisance and annoyance are given their ordinary everyday meanings.

Behaviour must be such as to annoy an ordinary person, not an ultra-sensitive person. That relates not least to some of the matters that the Committee discussed under previous provisions and will probably discuss again. The Bill is about antisocial behaviour that deviates from the norm, not about putting everything in the context of how someone ultra-sensitive—probably like me—would react to the circumstances. For example, in one case a possession order was made because a tenant kept cats in the back garden that caused nuisance and annoyance to several adjoining occupiers. Were there only one or two cats? No, there were 38. Such a number can be a nuisance and an annoyance in the wider sense.

Legal argument has tended to focus not on the meaning of nuisance and annoyance, but on whether it is reasonable to grant an injunction or possession order on the basis of the nuisance and annoyance. The phraseology is broadly interpreted in a normal sense and, as ever, the test is of the reasonableness of granting an injunction or possession order on that basis. That is why the words ''nuisance'' and ''annoyance'' are included in the clause.

May I take the Minister back to the phrase ''capable of causing'', as opposed to ''likely to cause''? I assure him that I have no desire to make the barrier tougher to overcome—we want the measures to work and therefore do not want barriers. However, can the Minister explain his reasoning? What is the distinction between the words ''capable of causing'' and ''likely to cause''? That seems to be the nub of why he is resisting amendment No. 232 and the consistency with existing legislation. The two phrases seem to mean the same thing, and it would therefore be better to have consistency.

Although my previous experience in Committee is limited, the hon. Gentleman is, as ever, falling into the trap of thinking that English legislation is drafted in English. As I understand the matter, the key difficulty with the legalese is precisely to do with the word ''likely''. That word opens up legal arguments that focus on the probability that a particular conduct will cause nuisance or annoyance. However, I am assured that ''capable of'' is a far easier test that does not take us down the muddy inclines of a debate about tossing coins, throwing dice or other elements of probability theory. That sounds strange and arcane, but those who have the happy experience of being lawyers assure me that that is why the test is easier.

Following his own logic, will the Minister table an amendment to the Bill to amend the 1996 Act? One type of phraseology is used in that Act in the section about antisocial behaviour in which introductory tenancies are mentioned. I am not going to argue with the Minister about the legalese, because neither of us can do so in great depth. However, it seems somewhat daft and odd that there is inconsistency between two pieces of legislation that deal with the same issue. From what the Minister said, I should think it would be logical to amend the 1996 Act if there is a problem with the word ''likely''.

If the hon. Gentleman refers to schedule 3 of the Bill, which is about repeals, he will find that sections 152 and 153 of the 1996 Act are repealed. If it will help and he wants, I can give the hon. Gentleman my copy of the 1996 Act, although sadly it is from the internet rather than an actual copy. However, he makes an entirely proper point: the Bill will supersede sections 152 and 153 of the 1996 Act, as the hon. Gentleman rightly said it should.

May I return to the theme of enforcing the policies and the powers that we are introducing? The 1996 Act allowed injunctions in much more limited circumstances than the Bill proposes. The 1996 Act allowed injunctions to be taken out by local authorities and, in some circumstances, registered social landlords, but from my experience and from talking to hon. Friends and other hon. Members, I understand that those powers have not been used extensively. What hope does my hon. Friend have that the injunctions in the Bill, which are much more extensive and much more widely available, will actually be used?

What my hon. Friend has just said goes to the nub of the clause. If the amendments were accepted, we would more or less be back to the 1996 position and relatively limited success. The test in the Bill is easier in the legal sense, for reasons that I just outlined, and there is greater scope for RSLs, HATs and local housing authorities to be far more proactive. Although it might be unfair, that is broadly the context of sections 152 and 153 of the 1996 Act, under which the process was very often crisis driven and injunctions were secured way down the line as a last resort. In the context of the five clauses relating to housing, however, we believe that the ability to take the injunction route will have far more bite and work far more readily than the provisions of the 1996 Act.

Hopefully, given the way in which the Bill has been drafted, and notwithstanding any acceptance of the amendments, RSLs, HATs and local housing authorities will be far more proactive as well as reactive. There will also be greater transparency, so that people know what is happening and why. Crucially, the Bill codifies the consequences of people's antisocial acts far more readily than the 1996 Act or any of the other principal Acts that preceded the Bill have done. That is the nub of the Bill, but it operates only if the amendments are not accepted.

Hon. Members will know that it is imperative to do something about threatened as well as actual behaviour. Within the confines of natural justice and the law it is imperative that we do something about the potential for intimidation, perceived intimidation, and perceived and subsequent antisocial behaviour. That is why I cannot emphasise enough that it is not sufficient to talk about things that have actually happened and respond to those alone. The real difficulty with the estates and streets about which we are talking is the threat and perceived threat of subsequent behaviour. That is why many of the amendments in the group go against the grain. We are trying to broaden the range of powers within which, in a strict legal sense, there is the ability to secure and pursue injunctions.

As I said, the threat of attack can be as distressing as the attack itself. It leaves the victim feeling frightened and unsafe, and it is only right that landlords are able to seek to protect people from distressing threatening behaviour by their tenants. I suggest that it would not be much comfort to the victim of constant threats to be told that action could not be taken because the threats had never been carried out. The victim can reasonably expect that threats will be followed by antisocial acts; equally, under the Bill, they can expect that action can and should be taken to prevent that. That is the thrust of the Bill, and it reveals the real difference between its provisions and the two sections of the 1996 Act to which my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling alluded.

Does the Minister agree that the clauses outline and enforce the fact that the measure is a threat as well as a reality and that it must be spelled out in plain English to the tenants? If they do not understand that the threshold is lower and the expectation of behaviour higher, the clauses will not be implemented in the way in which we want them to be.

I fully accept that. That goes to the heart of the clause 12. It is about not only setting the provisions in train, but about letting everyone know what has been determined. That is why, without returning to our previous debate, the degree of local autonomy is so important. There is no point in setting up elaborate consequences for people's actions and shifting thresholds that they are used to—I promised myself that I would not use that word, because it clearly has a resonance in the Committee to which I am not party—if they are not fully aware of the possible consequences through the injunction and the

demotion routes, the second of which we will discuss later. I fully accept what my hon. Friend says.

We have put the provisions together carefully, and the balance between threatened and actual behaviour, nuisance and annoyance and capability and likelihood of causing annoyance is designed to ensure a robust set of injunctive powers that will work effectively both proactively and reactively. The balance would be diluted by each amendment, so I ask hon. Members not to press the amendments.

The Minister has clarified some of the reasons for the provisions in the clause. I am not sure that he has dealt with them all to everyone's satisfaction, although I suspect that he has done enough to satisfy his own side. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 100, in

clause 13, page 10, line 19, leave out from 'or' to 'of' and insert 'within 100 metres'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment No. 225.

Amendment No. 99, in

clause 13, page 10, line 22, at end insert—

'(4A) ''Nuisance and Annoyance'' includes conduct which reasonably intrudes into the peaceful occupation of the properties of the relevant landlord including visitors to those properties and to harassment or intimidation of tenants and visitors.'.

Amendment No. 144, in

clause 13, page 10, leave out line 23.

Amendment No. 101, in

clause 13, page 10, line 25, after 'in', insert 'any'.

Amendment No. 194, in

clause 13, page 10, line 30, leave out 'immoral or'.

Amendment No. 196, in

clause 14, page 13, line 11, leave out 'immoral or'.

The majority of the amendments in the group are Conservative amendments and there are two distinct themes. Amendment No. 100 stands as a reasonable amendment in itself, but it is designed to establish what the Government mean by

''the locality of the housing accommodation''

in new section 153A to the Housing Act 1996. Subsection (4) states:

''The second condition is that the conduct is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to . . . a person visiting the housing accommodation or otherwise engaged in lawful activity in or in the locality of the housing accommodation''.

Amendment No. 100 would delete ''in the locality'' and insert ''within 100 metres''. Hon. Members might say that that figure is unreasonable and that it should be 20, 50 or 500 metres, but we need either a definition of ''locality'' or to be told who will decide what it is in any particular situation.

The Minister has described the difference between nuisance and annoyance, but I am not conscious of a meaningful definition of locality. Is it down to the landlord to decide, or does the Minister anticipate that a definition will be laid down in the Secretary of State's

guidance? If so, how can the Secretary of State possibly set guidance on the definition of a locality that will apply up and down the country? I am moving the amendment in an exploratory way. I am not saying that I will not press it, but I am more interested in the Minister's response than in the detail of whether 100 metres is the right figure.

I shall not speak to amendment No. 99, and the Minister need not bother either. He has already addressed the definition of a nuisance and annoyance, which is what the amendment pursues. Amendment No. 101, which would introduce one word, has also been addressed.

I wish to spend a few moments on amendments Nos. 194 and 196. They stand alone in comparison to the rest of the group. Our objective is to remove the words ''immoral or'' from the measure. I fully recognise that it is an ancient phraseology in law; no doubt, the Minister has briefing notes that explain the 1,001 places where it already appears in law, and he might therefore argue that to remove it would seem odd, but I wish to challenge the Minister on that point, for a number of reasons.

Immorality is a totally obsolete concept in the context of the Bill, which is preventing antisocial behaviour and tackling it when it happens. We all support that noble objective, although we our views on the way in which the Government are seeking to reach it may differ. However, by including the words ''immoral or'' in the Bill, we seem to be saying that immorality is automatically antisocial. That is a non sequitur; I do not follow the logic of that.

The term ''immorality'' is judgmental; it is the judgment of someone else about what is or is not defined as immoral. What most people today consider immoral is certainly not the same as what would have been considered immoral 50 or 100 years ago. That may change in the future, but I am concerned that the term is subject to changing nuances, rather than definitive. In other contexts, we know that the courts have problems in defining immorality. It is judgmental and subjective. Most important, it is not relevant to antisocial behaviour.

Obviously, some acts that most people construe as immoral may lead to antisocial behaviour. Kerb crawling is antisocial, but it is the nature of the act rather than the immorality of the act that makes it antisocial. Traditionally, the term immoral behaviour in terms of the use of premises, which the clause addresses, refers to the use of premises for prostitution. The running of a brothel is unlawful and there are many other aspects of prostitution for which one can be prosecuted, but prostitution per se is not unlawful. I am not passing judgment on whether it is right or wrong or acceptable or not, but by using the word immoral, we are saying that it is automatically antisocial.

I do not wish to be judgmental about how other people live their lives. We all know that some people live their lives in a very different way to most of us. There are plenty of people who have regular and frequent changes of sexual partner, day in, day out, but who are not prostitutes, inasmuch as no money

changes hands. Most people would argue that in some ways that is just as immoral as the actions of a prostitute, but where is the antisocial behaviour? Why are we saying that somebody who is a prostitute is acting antisocially because they have a succession of people knocking on their door at night whereas somebody who is doing it simply because they have what might be called loose morals is not acting antisocially? I do not understand where the automatic link is made between immorality and nuisance and annoyance.

That is why I challenge the Government to say why it is necessary to use the word ''immoral''. We all agree on the principle of nuisance and annoyance. I accept the definition that the Minister referred to earlier, and that it is long established in law. That should be sufficient. If behaviour is causing nuisance or annoyance, I do not care whether it is immoral in my judgment or somebody else's; it is nuisance or annoyance. I challenge the Minister to explain why it is necessary for this part of the Bill to introduce a moral judgment into the law.

Unlawfulness is clearly a separate issue. To link it with immorality as the clause does, is inexplicable. We all agree that ''unlawful'' is clear: if somebody uses his property in an unlawful way, the policies that the landlords must lay down and the ability to obtain an injunction should apply. However, to assume a link between immorality and unlawfulness that does not necessarily exist in today's world and to suggest that such behaviour automatically causes nuisance or annoyance is to retain an unnecessary semblance of Victorian legislation. I am all for enabling landlords to obtain injunctions against nuisance and annoyance, and I support what the Minister said in that respect. However, I do not see why a judgmental word like immorality is necessary, which is why I have taken a few moments to introduce the amendments.

The Liberal Democrats have one amendment in the group—amendment No. 144, which would remove new section 153A(5). Our aim is to seek clarification from the Minister.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Our concern is about why the Government are introducing the provision. I can see that they may want to make it clear that the conduct does not necessarily have to take place in the premises or their immediate vicinity. However, the provision may be taken to mean that antisocial behaviour that occurs well away from the premises where somebody lives could be a reason to bring in a demoted tenancy. I am sure that that is not the Government's intention. Our amendment seeks clarification as to what they mean by

''It is immaterial where conduct . . . occurs''.

I welcome the fact that the Conservatives have tabled amendments Nos. 194 and 196. In the light of

what the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire has said, the use of the word ''immoral'' seems inconsistent with an antisocial behaviour bill. If people's conduct is unlawful or they are causing a nuisance, that will be covered. Therefore, I am not sure what possible immoral purpose that caused a nuisance or annoyance would not be caught up by the earlier clause.

I hope that this is one area in which lawmakers are beginning to move from attempting to impose morality on people's behaviour to addressing the effects of that behaviour. I am grateful to the Conservatives and will be interested in the Minister's response to amendment No. 100, which deals with a similar issue to our amendment No. 144 in that it is concerned with the locality that is to be considered.

I fully take on board what the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire said about the distinct nature of the two sets of amendments. I shall take them in turn.

Amendment No. 100 would provide absolute precision about the area within which injunctive protection can be given to visitors and others. At the moment, locality is determined by judicial discretion in each case. That is as it should be. It is up to the courts to decide exactly what is covered in given circumstances, and we do not intend that it should be defined as narrowly as pertaining to particular residences. That goes to the heart of the amendment to which the hon. Member for Ludlow referred.

An action, if deemed antisocial, needs to be dealt with wherever it takes place. The consequence is in part demotion of tenancy, but it is also the protection of the victim. We need to unpick what might be done with the tenancy as a punishment for or deterrent to antisocial behaviour from the action that caused the tenant to be in that position.

Imposing a fixed distance is likely to have some anomalous consequences. Perpetrators could lie in wait for someone to step over an imaginary line—in this case, 101 m from the residence—knowing that the person's protection ceased at that point. It would not be useful for legal argument to focus on whether the correct measurement to where the behaviour took place was 100 m or 101 m. The injunction is about proscribing the action of the individual.

Tenants and their visitors are one group that the clause aims to protect but there are others too: staff and anyone else lawfully in the locality of the landlord's housing stock. All those people are and should be protected against anyone. That may include tenants. Protecting people in that way is precisely the purpose of Government amendment No. 225. Often, it is not the landlord's employees who carry out some or all of the tasks associated with the landlord's housing management function but a third party. For example, some or all of the functions may be delegated to arms length management organisations, tenant management organisations, or let as a contract to another organisation. The clause as currently drafted does not widen the protection to ALMOs, TMOs and so on. The amendment rectifies that.

Under amendment No. 144, protection could be given only where the antisocial behaviour happened in the housing accommodation or its locality. That would have undesirable consequences. For example, our intention is that a housing officer who has refused a tenant a transfer could be protected if that tenant later sees him in a supermarket some miles away and attacks him. It comes back to the relationship between the action and the consequence. The effect of this amendment, doubtless unintentional, would be that if the tenant attacked the housing officer in the locality of the housing accommodation he would be protected but if the tenant laid in wait and attacked him as he left the locality, he would not be protected.

Where behaviour happens outside the locality, there must be some link to the housing management function. It is not the intention that the landlord should police the activities of tenants wherever they are, regardless of the circumstances. I have no difficulty in agreeing with the sentiment expressed by hon. Members but the amendments would not have the desired consequence, which is the protection under an injunction of people from antisocial behaviour.

Amendment No. 194 prompted a more interesting discussion. Its aim is to restrict the ability of landlords to seek injunctions against the use of premises to conduct that is unlawful, rather than immoral or unlawful. I suspect, and I ask hon. Members to bear with me, that the phrase ''immoral or unlawful'' was in section 152 of the 1996 Act. The clear policy in the initial drafting of the Bill was that any power or right accorded under previous Acts should be maintained and if anything built upon and consolidated, not diminished in any way.

I hesitate to find anything other than the activity around prostitution as the reason why ''immoral'' should remain. I am tempted by the argument advanced by the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire, but I should like to have a further look to see whether there are other reasons—perhaps relating to the crack house elements that have been mentioned—why ''immoral'' should be included as well as ''unlawful''.

I take the thrust of the hon. Gentleman's argument and assure the Committee that I will return with a firm answer one way or the other. Currently, I am not persuaded by my own briefing that ''immoral'' should be included but I do not profess to be the master of all I survey even with regard to clauses 12 to 17. The hon. Gentleman made a fair point. If he agrees not to press his amendment, I undertake to examine it further and to remove the offending ''immoral'' phrase if there is no substantive reason for including it other than, rightly, not seeking to lose any elements of substance from previous legislation. There may be some reason of which I am not aware but I was more persuaded than otherwise by the hon. Gentleman and will examine the matter.

I think that I have covered most of the issues raised, and I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Taking the last matter first, I am grateful for the Minister's comments about the amendments

regarding immorality. When he started by saying that he suspected the reason for its inclusion was ''x'', I knew that we were on fairly strong ground.

Maybe.

Maybe. I am also pleased that my explanation of the reasons behind the amendment has caused the Minister to think about the issue. I am grateful to him for that. I take note of the fact that the phrase is already contained in the 1996 Act. Bearing it in mind that that Act was passed by the Government of which I was a member, far be it from me to say that it is wrong. However, the world moves on, the Bill is purely about antisocial behaviour, and my view remains that we should not be making judgmental decisions about immorality. If something is causing nuisance and annoyance, it should be covered by the Bill and be the cause of an injunction but if it is not causing nuisance or annoyance, I do not see why the landlord should be able to obtain an injunction under the antisocial behaviour legislation.

On the inclusion of 100 m in the lead amendment, I realised that whatever figure was included would cause problems, but I am grateful for the Minister's explanation of the need for judicial freedom about locality. I confess that at one stage he slightly lost me on his explanation.

Oh, good.

The Minister says, ''Oh, good'', but I suspect that he also lost himself, as he certainly did elsewhere in his comments, including in the introduction to his own amendment. I accept the need for judicial freedom, and therefore I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 225, in

clause 13, page 10, line 21, leave out from 'employed' to 'housing' in line 22 and insert

'(whether or not by the relevant landlord) in connection with the exercise of the relevant landlord's'.—[Mr. McNulty.]

I beg to move amendment No. 216, in

clause 13, page 11, leave out lines 8 and 9.

The amendment, which has the support of Shelter, would clarify the use of injunctions, and in particular the fact that an injunction could exclude a person from their normal place of residence. It is not concerned with a person losing their tenancy. The amendment would ensure that people could only be excluded from their normal place of residence if they had used, or threatened to use, violence, or where there was a significant risk of harm, and even that sanction should only be available in serious cases of antisocial behaviour. The amendment would ensure that people could not be excluded from their homes for low-level antisocial behaviour. I say that with some caution, as I realise that there are significant problems. However, excluding someone—

Several hon. Members rose—

Bear with me for one moment. I am concerned about the sanction of excluding someone from their home—that is not the same as

them losing their tenancy—for a period of three to six months. I am sure that it would not be used excessively, but if used disproportionately it would have an effect on the Government's homelessness strategy.

Can the hon. Gentleman define what he considers to be low-level antisocial behaviour?

''Low-level'' may not be an appropriate term. There is clearly a difference between the level of intimidation caused by behaviour that is potentially threatening or violent and antisocial behaviour that relates to noise in the person's house.

An injunction that bars someone from his own home is a pretty severe sanction. It is not the same as losing a tenancy. There is a difference. The injunction would bar people from their own homes, and the amendment seeks to ensure that the power would apply only in certain cases. The Minister may assure us that it can be dealt with by guidance, and that the power will be used only in extreme circumstances. That may be one way around what appears to be too powerful a provision. The effect of making people homeless for a period could be disruptive for a huge number of people, possibly leading to them sleeping on the streets.

Does it ever occur to the hon. Gentleman that the person who is responsible for that behaviour has the choice of whether or not to continue with it but that those on the receiving end have no such choice?

Yes, it does occur to me. However, we are talking about not a person losing his tenancy but an injunction banning him from his home. Under the Bill, a tenancy may be demoted and then removed. We are talking about a separate power, and I wish to hear the Minister justify it. We are not saying that people should never lose their homes because of their highly antisocial behaviour. We are saying that it is appropriate to go through the proper steps to get to the end, rather than use an injunction to bar someone from his home, which would be strange.

Amendment No. 216 seems—not unusually, given that it was probably penned by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes)—to have no practical effect. A power to exclude a perpetrator of antisocial behaviour is set out in proposed new section 153C(2), which states:

''The court may include in the injunction a provision prohibiting the person in respect of whom it is granted from entering or being in . . . any premises specified in the injunction''.

It does not declare otherwise. It clearly includes the person's home. Proposed new section 153D(2)(b) merely makes it explicit that the injunction can include the perpetrator's home. Even if the purpose of the amendment were as the hon. Member for Ludlow suggested, it would not achieve what he seeks.

It is possible under sections 152 and 153 of the Housing Act 1996 to exclude a person from his normal place of residence by means of an injunction. That is a powerful tool, and we do not wish to weaken it. Deliberately or otherwise, the amendment would dilute the strong message that we wish to give; it would shift policy. The power to exclude someone from their own home is very strong, and rightly so. There are conditions attached to its use. It can be used only where there is the use or threat of violence or a significant risk of harm. It is at the court's discretion and will be granted only where the court is satisfied that it is necessary given all the facts of the case. It is in line with antisocial behaviour orders, by which perpetrators can be excluded from their own homes.

I strongly urge the Committee to resist the amendment, which would give the message that we are not serious about getting to the heart of antisocial behaviour. The Committee cannot want to give such a message. The amendment would dilute the import and thrust of the Bill and would not achieve what it seeks to achieve, which is not unusual. It should be resisted.

The amendment is interesting but clause 13 is important, particularly in dealing with those who choose to behave badly and are not tenants of registered social landlords or local authorities. Can the power to extend the use of injunctions be used in the case of private homes to deal with those who have exercised the right to buy and are causing difficulties for local people?

I have been assured that the powers can be extended. The clause sends the important message that the Bill is a serious attempt to get to the heart of the problem, but it is tempered by the realisation that the power is very strong and should be used only in exceptional circumstances.

On excluding a person from their normal place of residence, will the Minister clarify whether the provision applies only to new section 153C(1) and not to new section 153A? New section 153D(1) states:

''This section applies for the purposes of sections 153A to 153C.''

Perhaps I am misreading the Bill and perhaps that is where the confusion has come from, but the Minister is saying that the power applies only to new section 153C. If he were to clarify that, we could move on rapidly.

Perhaps unusually—it is not for me to denigrate legal language—new section 153C(1) is very explicit:

''This section applies if the court grants an injunction under subsection (2) of section 153A or 153B and it thinks that either of the following paragraphs applies—

(a) the conduct consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence;

(b) there is a significant risk of harm to a person mentioned in section 153A(4).''

Now that the Minister has explained that part of the clause, if he wants to stop talking about the amendment, I will quickly withdraw it.

I want to make a final clarification to answer my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Laura Moffatt). The power must be linked to the landlord's management function to protect the tenant or leaseholder. In those circumstances, the answer to her question is yes. I hope and pray—I think that I have received an indication—that the hon. Member for Ludlow will withdraw the amendment.

Because the Minister has made it clear that the power would apply only if new section 153C(1) and new sections 153A and 153B apply, my concern has been allayed. I apologise to the Committee for taking up its time by misreading the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 145, in

clause 13, page 11, line 31, leave out 'and appurtenances'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 102, in

clause 13, page 11, line 40, leave out 'three' and insert 'one'.

This brief amendment is designed to question the words ''and appurtenances''.

On a point of order, Mr. O'Brien. May we clarify how to pronounce that word? I am not sure how to do so.

I call Mr. Green.

Thank you, Mr. O'Brien.

A dictionary definition states that an appurtenance is

''a belonging; an appendage; an accessory.''

If that is correct, why does the word add anything to the Bill? It seems to apply naturally with the other aspects of the provision, so we are slightly baffled as to why the word is in the Bill, even if I cannot pronounce it properly.

I can assure you, Mr. O'Brien, that I do not wish to enter into the animal, vegetable or mineral debate on the meaning of the word ''appurtenance''. I simply want to say a few words about amendment No. 102, which you have graciously linked to amendment No. 145 for reasons that I am sure you will keep to yourself.

The issue is the period of the remainder of the lease under which a landlord is considered a landlord and can seek an injunction. The Bill refers to three years, and we seek to reduce that to one year. I am not particularly hung up on one year, but three years seems a long period. The hon. Member for Cleethorpes has left the Committee but this is the point to which I was referring when she made an intervention about leasehold property—[Interruption.] I am sorry. She is here. She has moved into the Parliamentary Private Secretary position, and I congratulate her on her promotion. I apologise; my sight is obviously worse than I thought.

For a landlord to have to have three years still to run on the lease before he can seek an injunction for antisocial behaviour seems an extraordinary

restriction. I cannot see why it is necessary. As long as he has a leasehold and sufficient leasehold to cover the period of the sub-lease or the lease to the tenant who is the subject of the injunction, that should be sufficient. That is why we tabled the amendment. A considerable amount of nuisance and annoyance can be caused in three years. To eliminate from the power all properties for which there is less than three years left on the landlord's lease seems unnecessary and contrary to the spirit of what the Minister said earlier about putting as few restrictions in the way of the legislation as possible. I should be interested in his explanation.

The purpose of adding the words ''and appurtenances'' to the clause and resisting the amendment that would delete them is that we want there to be no doubt under law about what is meant by the term ''housing accommodation''. Again, we want the Bill to be enacted as quickly as possible. We do not want there to be any legal wrangling or arm wrestling over what a particular term means, so it is appropriate to include the word ''appurtenances''.

Appurtenances are things that belong or pertain to the housing accommodation. The term includes anything that will pass on a conveyance or letting of a lease. It could include garages, sheds, separate storage areas or gardens. Given that we want the term ''housing accommodation'' to have as broad a scope as possible, it is appropriate that the words ''and appurtenances'' stay in the legislation.

The word is used in numerous statutes, such as the Housing Act 1988, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, the Local Government and Finance Acts of 1988 and 1992 and the Noise Act 1996. It is possible that, without the word ''appurtenances'', the courts will include in the definition of housing accommodation what I have described, but we do not want there to be any question about the intention, which is why the definition is so full. It would not be terribly useful in terms of the import and thrust of the Bill to remove the phrase ''and appurtenances''.

On amendment No. 102, proposed new section 153D(10)(b) has been drafted to mirror provisions in other housing legislation, specifically the Housing Act 1985. We think that three years is the correct term. However, the amendment has highlighted another issue concerning the clause. We shall consider whether any changes to the clause are necessary on Report. The clause states that an owner of a property is either a freeholder or anyone who has more than three years left to run on a lease. In effect, someone who has a 50-year lease with less than three years left to run on the term would not be classified as an owner.

We are considering whether it is necessary to make an amendment that states that the owner is a freeholder or anyone who has a lease in which the original term was for three years or more. That involves a small technicality. With the best will in the world, I would need to read that a few more times to understand it fully. We will take it away to reconsider whether we need that technical adjustment to reflect what I have just read out and do not yet entirely understand.

I shall certainly undertake to take on board the point made about a year. I suspect that, even if we chose to tighten things up or to redraft because of that technical anomaly, we would still settle on three years, but I shall happily look again at the notion of one year instead of three.

If we are considering the remaining period of a lease, I point out to my hon. Friend that the majority of the people who fall into the relevant category, certainly in leasehold houses in my constituency, tend to be pensioners, often quite elderly ones. I do not think that that people in that category are likely to be guilty of much antisocial behaviour, but the change could make them vulnerable to unscrupulous freeholders.

We will look at it. I shall certainly take account of my hon. Friend's points.

I strongly resist losing my appurtenances and I will ask the hon. Member for Ludlow to withdraw the amendment, but first I give way to the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire.

I strongly appreciate what the Minister has said about my arguments on the amendment. With respect to the hon. Member for Cleethorpes, my intention is certainly not to try to get her elderly tenants kicked out of their properties. As she rightly says, they are not likely to be the source of nuisance or annoyance—or at least most of them are not. However, the issue is whether the landlord is considered to be an owner if he has fewer than three years left on the lease. The Minister said that the measure might apply if his original lease was for three years or more. I entirely understand and support that, which is an entirely different concept from having three years left to run. I am grateful that the Minister has undertaken to take that point away, but I stress that if he wants to stick with three years, that should be connected to the original lease rather than with the period left to run. To debar for a three-year period is to allow a lot of antisocial behaviour.

As I have said, I shall certainly take all those points on board when we consider whether we need to redraft the clause for technical reasons. We will consider inserting one year rather than three years, and report back at the appropriate time.

After listening to the Minister, I think that we will leave his appurtenances well alone. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.