I beg to move amendment No. 426, in page 186, line 11, after 'he', insert 'knowingly'.

With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 428, in clause 323, page 187, line 2, after 'he', insert 'knowingly'.

Good morning, Mr. O'Brien, and members of the Committee.

The amendment is small, but short amendments often have the greatest significance. We are considering money laundering, a most important part of the Bill. A significant issue will be whether people should be regarded as having committed offences only if they do so with knowledge. The amendments are supported strongly by the Law Society of Scotland and the Law Society of England and Wales. It is fair to say, however, that had the Law Society of Scotland, which is quick off the mark with its proposals, not contacted me and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), we would undoubtedly have tabled an amendment along the same lines, because we feel strongly about such issues.

At present, the Committee does not have the benefit of the attendance of any Liberal Democrats, but I imagine that when they show up—at whatever time that will be—they may agree with us. The amendments are linked with other issues that we shall discuss under part 7. I am sure that the Ministers accept that clauses 321 to 327 are closely interlinked, so it will be a little difficult not to have arguments that are similar, albeit separate, about several provisions.

It is clear from clause 329(3) that the alleged offender must know or suspect that the property concerned constitutes or represents a benefit from criminal conduct before he can be convicted under clause 321(1). However, no reference is made to the mental element that must be attributed to the actions of the offender before the act is constituted as an offence. Although the alleged offender may know that the property is criminal property, he or she should—in the view of my hon. Friend and myself—have knowingly concealed, disguised, converted, transferred or removed the property before being liable to conviction under the clause.

That is precisely the point about which I am not clear. I do not see the purpose of the amendment, bearing in mind the contents of clause 329(3). Despite the hon. Gentleman's elucidation of the difference, I am unclear as to what it is.

I hoped that I had explained what lawyers would regard as mens rea. It is a vital part of any provision that sets a new offence in law. That is what clause 321 does. Before the hon. Gentleman intervened, I expressed my acceptance that there are clear links between clauses 329(3) and 321. Indeed, I specifically spoke about that matter, as he will concede, because I know that he was listening carefully. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that, under any provision that sets out an offence, the mental element should be included in the Bill.

I will listen with great interest to the Minister's response. I expect that he will say that the amendment is unnecessary, because of the existence of clause 329(3).

I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment, because I support a mens rea element. It worries me that the mens rea element under clause 329(3) seems to apply to the definition of the property rather than to the conduct itself.

Not for the first time in this Committee, the hon. Gentleman helps us. I must say—without being churlish—that on Tuesday afternoon this week, he made several impassioned contributions in agreement with the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and myself in support of a different amendment, but then voted against us. No doubt he has a career to think about, and is in thrall to the Government Whip, the hon. Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire), but he has once again expressed sympathy for our amendment. He has dealt with the point that I was about to come to in my response to the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas). Clause 329(3) attaches the mental element to a different aspect. I interpret that provision in exactly the same way as the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) and no doubt he will explain to his party colleague and fellow lawyer, the hon. Member for Wrexham, why he agrees with us, not him. We tabled the amendment in all seriousness, and we shall listen with interest to what the Minister has to say in due course.

It may be useful—picking up on the comments of the hon. Member for Wellingborough—to make a few further remarks before we hear from the Minister. It has been suggested that an amendment to introduce mens rea under clause 321 is unnecessary because of the definitions under clause 329(3). As the hon. Member for Wellingborough correctly pointed out, clause 329(3) is about the definition of criminal property. One of the oddest aspects of that provision is the incompatibility between the definition of property under clause 329(3) and the definition under clause 320 with reference to Revenue functions.

Clause 329(3) introduces the extraordinary concept that criminal property can be defined by reference to the state of mind of the person who is handling it. By its very nature, that is an extraordinarily convoluted way of drafting legislation to define when a person may be culpable. Clause 321, as currently worded, is as about as stark as it possibly can be. It states that:

''A person commits an offence if he . . . conceals criminal property''.

In ordinary English, that means that someone could conceal criminal property without any mens rea and irrespective of whether he has guilty knowledge.

I am not a lawyer, and I bow to the hon. Gentleman's experience in those matters. If I were a lawyer, I would probably support the amendment, because it seems to give members of that profession a cast-iron defence if they are ever charged with an offence under the clause. They could simply say in court, ''I didnae know.'' I am sure that it is not the hon. Gentleman's intention, but he is unwittingly giving a defence to those who help drug dealers to conceal money.

The hon. Gentleman is wrong about that. Plenty of criminal offences require the perpetrator to have guilty knowledge. Prosecutors do not have too much difficulty in satisfying juries or courts that a person had such knowledge, and a jury can often conclude that a person must have known that property was criminal property. The amendment does not provide a cast-iron defence.

We are examining whether there should be an objective or subjective test, and we are considering the wording of part 7. The wording at first creates a stark impression, which is qualified eight or nine clauses later. If we consider the matter in a common-sense way, we find that that is nonsense, as the definition relates to the property, and not to the state of knowledge of the person. The clause contains bad drafting, and that should concern the Committee, especially as the point was made when we discussed clause 320 that there are unsatisfactory and undesirable inconsistencies in the Bill.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham made the good point to me that if someone reasonably suspects that property is criminal, how can they justify any concealment or disguise of that property?

The hon. Gentleman has moved on to an important topic, and it may be sensible to consider it now. Let us consider by way of example the sort of circumstances with which lawyers, advisers or those caught under the clause will deal. No one would wish that someone who was told, ''Here is £1 million, which is the profits of drug trafficking—would you please invest it for me?'' should get away with handling the money. Such a person would clearly have knowledge. However, clause 329(3) uses the word ''suspects''. Today, and possibly also early next week, I shall want to explore carefully with the Minister examples of situations in which that word would be likely to bite.

Let me give another example. A person handles financial arrangements for someone who he knows has a criminal conviction from 25 years earlier. He has no knowledge that the person has been involved in criminality since then. The person asks him to invest money that appears to have a legitimate origin, yet he must accept that, at the back of his mind, he is always aware of that individual's previous convictions. Does

he come under the category of someone who should be suspicious and therefore inform the authorities every time a transaction takes place?

As we shall discuss later, there is no de minimis provision in the part concerning money laundering: it applies from 1p to infinity. The Law Society and others cogently gave me the impression that they felt that the proposal would in practice make life difficult for those who legitimately handle funds for others, such as in purchasing a house, because they will be in a perpetual state of anxiety that they might be committing a criminal offence even though they have no reason to know that they are handling criminal property. Where is the dividing line supposed to fall between a state of knowledge and a state of mere suspicion? Some important issues are involved, and I should be grateful for the views of other Committee members on that.

To return to the amendment, my first impression of clause 321 is that surely the absolute acid test in such circumstances is whether the person has knowledge.

I have always wanted to get free advice from a lawyer, and I will find out whether I can do so now. My hon. Friend referred to a dividing line. Will he explain whether a dividing line is involved when the property is ordinary property and it becomes criminal property? If someone removes something that is criminal, that is covered, but in the case of something that is not criminal, is the moment of its becoming criminal when the conviction is obtained, and up until that time is it suspected? If so, a person can move something that is not criminal and be caught retrospectively.

My hon. Friend may be right. The wording of clause 329(3) is odd, because it defines criminal property not objectively but by reference to the subjective knowledge of an individual handling it, and its origin. That is an extraordinary definition.

If criminal property were defined by reference not to suspicion but to, say, knowing or believing the property to be criminal, would the hon. Gentleman still see a purpose in incorporating a separate mens rea in subsection (1)? What would be the justification of concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property that the person knew or believed to be criminal?

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, but what I have suggested would be better drafting. I dislike an assertion made in a statute that a person commits an offence if he does a number of things, which does not immediately explain the saving clause. However, I accept that that is a matter of drafting, not substance, which would also be true if clause 329(3) were worded differently. I have tried to read the clauses in totality, because they are quite revealing of the drift of the draftsperson. The drift of the person drafting part 7 is draconian—indeed, almost tyrannical—in its desire to instil terror into those who handle money, because of the possible penalties and consequences of doing so. It is necessary to examine the nooks and crannies to find the saving clauses. That is a bad way of drafting legislation.

The hon. Gentleman offered us a few examples to support the amendment. I offer him a different one. If a lawyer or accountant is given a suitcase of money, say £500,000, from a person who says that his girl friend managed to earn that amount through a tanning salon in Mount Florida, in Glasgow, it is quite conceivable that he would have absolutely no knowledge that the money was made illegally. However, I believe that it would be unbelievable to expect him to have no suspicion at all that the money was made illegally, especially if he knows Mount Florida.

The hon. Gentleman asserts that responsibility for a crime must be based on knowledge rather than suspicion. That is a good defence in court that we should not offer such members of the professions.

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman that that would be the consequence. Let us examine stolen goods. A person handles stolen goods if he knows or believes that they are stolen. Frequently, in court—although I am not sure how this happens in Scotland—a person denies that, but the prosecution shows from the surrounding circumstances that the person must have known or believed that the goods, such as a video offered in a pub, were stolen because they were offered at a huge undervalue. Courts have not had historic difficulty in getting round that defence.

I shall take the hon. Gentleman's example. If a solicitor were handed a huge sum that is supposed to have come from a tanning business in Glasgow, he would be put on notice to bring the sum under the definition of clause 321, even with the amendment. There would not be a defence unless the person could show that he knew legitimate reasons why the money from the business was normally handled in cash, and had background knowledge of the profits that caused him to believe that the surrounding circumstances were legitimate.

Would adopting the words ''knowing or believing'', as in the Theft Act 1978, address the concern behind the amendment? That has operated successfully, in my personal experience. Should we import the words, ''knowing or believing'', rather than, ''knowing or suspecting''?

As often happens in the Committee, discussion has led us to a potentially better wording than the original drafting or the amendments. I would have little problem with the hon. Gentleman's suggestion. If the Minister tells us this morning that he will return on Report with such an amendment, leaving aside the question of the drafting, I would be happier. I think that ''knowing and suspecting'' is unusual terminology.

We are dealing here with highly qualified people, such as accountants and solicitors. We are not dealing with Joe Soap on the housing estate who bumps into somebody in the pub. The Theft Act addresses a different situation. Why should the Bill not provide a stiffer test for those who have greater opportunity and experience to examine the money that they handle? Would a court that

examines the Bill not introduce the reasonable test? In effect, there would be reasonable suspicion.

The last point is the hon. Gentleman's best. I need much persuasion before getting rid of the ordinary terminology.

As for the higher test, the money laundering provision will catch people who are not the professionals that the hon. Gentleman described. For example, an estate agent who handles funds on a property transaction could be covered. We are not discussing only solicitors.

I have a considerable worry about the difficulties, including unintended and potentially racist consequences, that part 7 will cause to individuals. At what point does one wonder why a person has so much money? Do we start to judge people on their appearance or nation of origin? If an Armenian or Georgian business man asks a person to carry out investments, should he be suspicious because the business man is from a country with a reputation for lawlessness, although other circumstances do not give rise to the suspicion that criminal property is involved?

Part 7 poses considerable difficulties for professionals, and we shall consider it in more detail later. If we start by getting right the basis of the criminal test under which people will be convicted of handling property, everything else in part 7 will start to fall into place. Suspicion on its own would put far too great a burden on the professionals concerned. That is why I would prefer a subjective test to be introduced, which exists in many other areas of the criminal law, and is capable of meeting the requirements.

In response to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins), I should point out to the Committee, and for the sake of Hansard, that the Liberal Democrats have now joined us. For the sake of fairness, I should also mention that he did not point out that his Whip, who has also now joined us, was also not present earlier—not that I would want to be churlish, either.

As we are now correcting my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, I should like to point out that Opposition Members are equally in thrall to the hon. Member for Stirling.

How gallant. I shall have to ensure that one or two of my hon. Friends in the Whips Office are aware of the comments that have been made. It would give me great pleasure to do so.

On the substantive issue, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield seems to be obsessed with the draftsman, who continually amuses and concerns him. He uses colourful language about the ''tyrannical'' drift of the draftsman. I am fascinated by the contrast between the way in which the two Conservative spokesmen present their views on the issue. At least the hon. Member for Surrey Heath had the decency to be straightforward, blunt and to the point. He said that he was worried about the amendment, and that it was a matter of policy. We know where we stand with him—the

amendment is an issue of substance—but the hon. Member for Beaconsfield continued at great length to try to pretend that most, or at least half, of his concerns are about what the draftsman did. He is well aware that the draftsman drafts policy. Admittedly, we should try, when we can, to help the draftsman to produce a Bill that is clear and succinct, but he knows that from time to time draftsmen are obliged to turn inside out and upside down in order to be clear and to encapsulate the policy that they have been asked to encapsulate. That is the case in this instance.

The criticism therefore lies with the Minister and the Government, and not with the draftsman. The Government's policy is to deal with money laundering in this way, and I can well imagine that the draftsman's efforts are a reflection of the draconian and tyrannical way in which the Government have decided to approach the issue.

Absolutely. I am glad that I caused the hon. Gentleman to say that I, and not the draftsman, am the tyrant, at least for the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok (Mr. Davidson). We have exposed the fact that the Opposition are worried about policy, not drafting. We should flush that out from behind the trees: the Opposition want to change the policy.

I think that this is also what my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield was about to say, but I got in just before him. To reinforce the point—I am grateful to the Minister for saying that I made my point bluntly, as I always try to be blunt in such matters—we do have a policy difference with the Government, but it is perfectly acceptable for a member of any Committee to say that one of the ways of addressing the matter might be by drafting a piece of legislation in a more logical and sensible way.

The Minister ought to be realistic. Instead of attacking my hon. Friend, he should recognise that many of the interventions from his own side—notably from the hon. Members for Wellingborough and for Wrexham—also expressed concern about the way in which the provision is constructed. Indeed, the hon. Member for Wellingborough suggested a way of redrafting the Bill that might address my hon. Friend's concerns. Drafting is indeed also an issue.

I am only reaching for honesty and clarity.

Half of what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said gave the impression that, if the Bill were worded differently, everything would be fine and dandy. However, the argument is not about whether the wording is contorted, because he also said that an issue of principle is at stake about which Opposition Members have strong feelings.

The amendments are unnecessary. The Bill already includes the provision that there must be a mental element of either knowledge or—and this is the point—suspicion before either of the money laundering offences in question can be deemed to have been committed. The amendments have been drafted in a way that does not take into account the

fact that these offences need to be read in conjunction with clause 329—as has been pointed out by my hon. Friends.

The Minister is reading from his brief, but he should have adapted it to acknowledge the fact that I specifically stated that we understood the link between clauses 321 and 329.

I do not wish that to be interpreted as a cheap point, as the Minister has worked hard on the Bill.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not being churlish.

No, I am not.

The hon. Gentleman has said a lot—as has the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. He said that he thought that clause 329 dealt only with property, when he knows jolly well that that is not the case. Clause 329(3) employs the word ''property'' as a drafting device to enable us to get where we want to go; it does not simply deal with property.

I also wish to point out that I am not reading from the brief.

I accept that.

Although my notes addressed the issue of property in clause 329(3), the first person to raise it was the hon. Member for Wellingborough; he observed that the mens rea was attached to the property, not the person. The Minister should acknowledge that.

Let us try to keep to issues of substance. The hon. Gentleman knows that clause 329(3) states that property should be classified as criminal property if,

''(a) it constitutes a person's benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and

(b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.''

Therefore, the element of knowledge or suspicion already applies. That also applies to clause 323.

The Bill refers to an element of knowledge or suspicion—rather than knowledge alone. The hon. Gentleman's comments have made it clear that the Opposition wish to remove that. We do not accept that the offences that are set out in clauses 321 and 323 should be deemed to have been committed only on the basis of knowledge, as it is extremely different to secure a conviction on the basis of knowledge alone.

I appreciate that the test for the acquisition offence in current legislation is actual knowledge, but in the case of concealment—with regard to which Opposition Members are also suggesting alterations—the current test provides for reasonable grounds for suspicion. That is a lower test than suspicion itself.

Although the acquisition, possession and use offence is currently based on knowledge only, we cannot see any reason why we should not tidy up the provisions, and in so doing use a general approach to the mental element for all the offences based on actual knowledge or suspicion.

If the Minister were to table an amendment introducing the words ''reasonable

grounds to believe or suspect,'' my hon. Friend and I, as well as, more importantly, the Law Society of England and Wales and the Law Society of Scotland would be happy. I hope that he will add that suggestion to what is already a lengthy list of issues that we have asked him to consider. He is entirely reasonable but, in light of what he has said, does he understand that, although he describes them as a lower test, those words would deal with the issue?

No, I do not want to do that, for good reasons. We are highly dissatisfied with the way in which matters operate currently. We want a sea change in how we deal with money laundering in this country. If that is the issue of principle on which we shall clash throughout this part of the Bill, let the arguments be up front so that we understand the situation.

The Minister talks of a sea change. I want to stop crime, and the prevention of money laundering is important. It is worth while his bearing in mind that, if the system that is imposed becomes unworkable, it will create a parallel criminal legal system such as exists in some countries, Italy being one. In that country, people go to the crooked lawyer within the system to enable such transactions to be carried out. It may turn out under the clause that, far from limiting money laundering, it is facilitated. One of my worries is that the impact of such legislation would make it unworkable by those who are honest and legitimate.

The hon. Gentleman deftly flits around to justify his position. I am now no longer a tyrant and his only worry is that what I propose will be unworkable. That is not what the amendment is about. He is worried about what he said he was worried about—tyrannical legislation.

Tyrants often turn out to be inefficient and ineffective. This is not the first time that that has happened. The imposition of burdens on individuals that go far beyond what is fair amounts to tyrannical legislation. Even having done that, I am not sure that the clause will meet the laudable objective that the Minister has in mind. Many tyrants are benevolent. I do not know in which category to put him, because I do not really think that he is a tyrant. I am sure that it was not his idea to come up with this clause to deal with money laundering.

The poor old draftsman.

The Home Secretary.

Aha.

Money laundering accurately describes the problem with which part 7 is concerned. It is the processes through which illegal money is passed, or washed, so that its origins are disguised and it assumes the appearance of legitimate funds. In 1999, the leading authority on money laundering, the Financial Action Task Force—which is based in Paris under the umbrella of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—reported on the estimate provided by the International Monetary Fund and said that money laundering accounts for

between 2 per cent. and 5 per cent. of the world's gross domestic product. That is the scale of the problem.

The good reputation of the United Kingdom as an international financial centre means that, when funds are accepted into our financial institutions, they are generally perceived to be clean. It is therefore an attractive target for launderers, which is why it is important to take strong measures to discourage criminals from using this country's financial services sector, and thereby protect our reputation for clean dealing and reduce the risk of money distortion and instability in the United Kingdom's financial markets.

Is it not relevant to consider that subsection (1) does not create the offence of a person simply holding money that he knows to be criminal? It states:

''A person commits an offence if he . . . conceals . . . disguises . . . converts . . . transfers . . . removes''.

The person must do something with money that he knows or suspects to be obtained dishonestly. That important point has not been addressed.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We are addressing concealment. As I said, the clause must be read in conjunction with clause 329. The Opposition accept that. A person commits an offence if he takes action, such as concealing, disguising or converting the money, and he knows or suspects that the money is criminal property.

This is another feature. The clause is worded redolently and is polemic. The clause refers to ''conceals'', ''disguises'', ''converts'', ''transfers'' and ''removes'', which are all words that sound nasty and unpleasant and are actions that should not be done—I agree with that. However, when we analyse the clause, the transfer of criminal property is the mere process, for example, in a house purchase in the United Kingdom, of handling or dealing with money in any way. The money need not have any criminal taint. I agree that the only person who is exempt is the person who holds the money, who should be ringing the National Criminal Intelligence Service to alert it that he holds the money, at which point he cannot go ahead with the transaction. We shall return to that later.

The fact that the words used have pejorative meanings does not mean that legitimate activities do not fall under the subsection. Disguising criminal property is, presumably, mixing criminal property with legitimate property, because that would effect its disguise. I am sure that the words were carefully chosen to sound like nasty activities, but they may apply to innocent and proper transactions involving legitimate money.

The hon. Gentleman seems to be obsessed with the idea that the tyrannical Home Secretary, draftsman or I drew up the words. If a tyrant exists, he exists in an international form because the words are taken from our international obligations under treaties to combat money laundering. He should modify his suspicions.

I understand entirely what the Minister said about the Financial Action Task Force. We support the body and its work, and I

have studied it carefully. Does he understand that when international concepts are translated to United Kingdom law, one must remember the lengthy tradition of people being considered as innocent unless they have guilty knowledge, which was established by 100 years or more of English criminal law? Concepts of Napoleonic law cannot be imported wholesale into English law.

We have stumbled on the problem, which arose because I said that the tyrant might be a foreigner, and might even be European. How dreadful. Let us get back to the facts.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham said, a person must take action on criminal property, and the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that that might be only a transfer. The definition of criminal property applies if a person

''knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.''

The offence is committed if the person knows or suspects that fact first and subsequently takes action. The hon. Gentleman wants to remove half that offence.

Can the Minister help me to uncover the precise scale of the policy decision that he took for the reasons that he set out? An analogous or similar provision is contained in the Theft Act 1978, as my hon. Friend will know. The provision criminalises handling stolen goods. Two mental elements are incorporated under that provision. First, a person must know or believe the goods to be stolen. Secondly, they must receive them dishonestly. The Bill goes further in both regards for the policy reasons that the Minister has given. It does so first by removing the word ''believes'' and incorporating the word ''suspects'', and secondly by removing the requirement for dishonest intention.

We are dealing with the regulated sector, not with everybody, as other people—but not I—have said. We believe that the sector should work as a result of the adequate training of all its staff. If the sector is to be effective, we must require it to insist on that and to put measures in place. Many of the discussions held during the drafting of the Bill were aimed at ensuring that exactly that happens, and that employers are able to issue guidelines and to ensure that those guidelines are available and that training takes place.

Is it unreasonable to say that if trained workers in the regulated financial sector take some action concerning property that they know or suspect is criminal in origin, it should not be possible to suppose that they have committed an offence and should appear in court? I do not think that unreasonable, but clearly the Opposition do.

The Minister cannot have it both ways. I do not see why the elementary clarification cannot be made. He has been unnecessarily tough on my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, who has made a point that is to do with both the drafting and the substance of the clause. Why can we not insert ''knowingly''? Why can the

clause not say, ''knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect,'' especially as clause 329 says ''knows or suspects''? What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. I suspect that the intention of the draftsman, the Minister and whoever else was involved in drawing up the provision is to crack down on people who do not have the full mens rea, to use the legal phrase.

I am almost as tough as the principals of public schools are when they expel pupils for using cannabis and then fine the parents.

The hon. Gentleman is trying to come to the rescue of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. I do not blame him for that; it is commendable. However, the amendment does not make a simple clarification. It removes the ''suspicion'' element from the offence.

My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield made the good point—it has yet to be addressed by the Committee—that suspicion is not a good test. It is hard to prove that someone has suspected a person. If I were an accountant, I might have a client whose bona fides I have no reason to doubt. He asks me to do something with a large sum of money. The momentary suspicion that it is a bit fishy flashes across my mind, but I then dismiss it. Am I guilty under the provisions of the Bill? It would be unfair if I were imprisoned for having that momentary suspicion. It would be much better if the provision were clarified as my hon. Friend suggests.

The answer is potentially yes, but not automatically. Those are matters for first the prosecuting agencies and then the courts to take into account. The hon. Gentleman—and the amendment—would have us remove suspicion altogether. If that happened, someone could be transferring or concealing laundered goods and the proceeds of crime. They could be drug trafficking, and so on. If we accepted the amendment, we would be lowering the threshold against which people are required to prove their position. We would have to prove that they knew. A person who had acted in such a way, not momentarily but systematically, over a period, would be able to say, ''You don't know that I knew, and you can't prove that I knew, so I'm free and you can't do anything about it.''

The Minister makes a couple of revealing comments. First, he said, ''Potentially, yes.'' Then, a little further on, he said, ''Of course, if the activity is done momentarily and not systematically, it would not apply.'' That is why I find the provision tyrannical.

Rubbish.

Yes it is, because it leaves people in a state of massive uncertainty about where they stand, whereas the normal tests in English law, knowledge and belief, are well established and make sense to the ordinary lay person and the person dealing with the matter. The Minister is introducing a different test that will ultimately be left to the discretion of those who decide to prosecute people, with the potential of

sending them to prison for 14 years. That is what I do not like about the provision.

Good old English law, not foreigners, or Europeans, or anyone else, would exercise that discretion, but that is what the hon. Gentleman does not like. I do not know where he is coming from. As I said, I and the Government believe that we have a problem, and that is why we are introducing the clause.

I have not intervened up to now because it seemed to be a debate between lawyers. Am I right in understanding that the way out of all the draconian things that it is being suggested would fall on someone's head if they did this, that or the other is to make a disclosure? The Opposition are arguing against making a disclosure and for such movements of huge amounts to be kept secret so that, presumably, they can take a rake-off from them. A fleeting suspicion might flit across the mind of the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson), were he an accountant, but any problem could be alleviated simply by making a disclosure. Given those circumstances, the provision does not seem tyrannical.

My hon. Friend is right, and he exposes well the point made by the hon. Member for Henley. In the event of suspicion, no matter how fleeting, all that the person must do is report it—make a disclosure—and he relieves himself of any doubt about any consequences.

I wonder whether the Minister seriously means that. How can an accountant have a professional relationship with his client if he goes around sneaking—

Sneaking?

Yes, sneaking. They are a bunch of sneaks over there on the Government Benches. How can that relationship be possible if the accountant is sneaking to all and sundry about his private transactions with his clients? It is odd that the Minister should support the hon. Gentleman's view.

The hon. Gentleman seems to be arguing that the need for a confidential relationship between a person and his accountant should relieve people from a requirement to abide by the law and report criminal proceeds.

Does not the matter turn on the extent of suspicion that might be deemed appropriate or deemed to trigger the threshold at which a disclosure should be made? In clause 329(3)(b), might it not be sensible, and meet some of the anxieties expressed this morning, to insert the word ''reasonably'' in front of the word ''suspect''? One of the Minister's colleagues suggested that that happened in courts, and that is how courts behave. Might that meet some of the anxieties expressed without diluting the impact of what the Minister is trying to do?

I can deal only with the amendment that is before me, and that is not it. I do not know how we can put into clause 329(3) the requirement that someone should have a high degree of suspicion, or a reasonable degree of suspicion, or a low degree of suspicion, or whatever.

If someone suspects that he is laundering money that is the proceeds of crime—that is criminal property—I fail to understand why there is a problem with the idea that he should report that. That is the crux of the matter, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok has pointed out.

The Minister might find it helpful if I mention a point that I first raised on Second Reading about the Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland) Order 2001, which the Government introduced before the general election. The clause closely replicates those provisions. They were opposed by the Conservative party and the professions in Northern Ireland, but they have proved to be extremely effective in clamping down on money laundering there.

Yesterday, I drifted into Northern Ireland Questions and heard Opposition spokesmen saying, ''Isn't it dreadful that we are not taking effective action against organised crime in Northern Ireland?'' In the Chamber, Conservative Members are saying that that is awful and that the Government are being ineffective, but here they are doing their level best to render ineffective legislation that is intended to tackle crime.

My previous intervention was intended to provide certainty, as people should know where they stand: they should be clear about when a disclosure should be made. The point made by the hon. Member for Henley was not entirely inappropriate. If the tiniest doubt were suddenly to enter someone's mind that there was a remote possibility that they might be dealing with criminal property, should that automatically trigger them to make a disclosure? If that is the case, there will be a lot of disclosures.

Let us examine that point. A small doubt fleetingly enters someone's mind that they might be dealing with criminal property—drug money, for instance. What should they do? Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that, if it is only a small and fleeting doubt, they should ignore it and carry on and conduct the transaction? That is, in effect, what he is suggesting by seeking to introduce a threshold with regard to suspicion. He is suggesting that if people have merely a small and fleeting doubt, they should carry on with the transaction—that they should get it off their plates and ignore the consequences.

The people to whom we are referring work in the regulated financial sector. If small, fleeting doubts enter their minds, is there no responsibility on them to pry a little to discover whether their doubts have any basis in truth? What does the hon. Gentleman want? He seems to be suggesting that if they do not really think about those doubts—if they are not fully engaged because it is early in the morning, for instance—they should be relieved of any obligation to report them.

I suggest that they should investigate those doubts: if, by doing that, they dispel them, they should carry on with the transaction; but if they confirm them, they should make a disclosure.

That might not always be possible. Someone who has fleeting doubts might investigate a

transaction, but although they might fail to find evidence of criminal activity, their doubts might linger. Should a disclosure be made under such circumstances? With regard to the legislation, I suggest that ''a reasonable suspicion'' is not an unreasonable test.

It appears that the hon. Gentleman is concerned about the volume of disclosures. We will discuss the advice that we have received, and whether NCIS and other forces of law and order are happy with the potential increase in the volume of disclosures. Of course, such a doubt should not be considered fleetingly but examined further. However, if on reflection the person cannot dispel that doubt, he should be required to disclose it.

Before we continue to explore the impact of the Bill, I ask the Minister to consider a point that relates directly to his response to what the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Harris) said about Northern Ireland. Representatives of some of the most reputable firms in the country—who have never been suspected of being dishonest—have spent considerable time discussing matters with me and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. When the Minister seriously thinks about the matter rather than wanting to score a political point, does not he recognise—as those representatives did—that, as drafted, the Bill will be unworkable?

If the Minister introduces a provision that representatives of reputable firms tell us will not work, there will be a problem with organised crime. It is a cheap point to say that the Government cannot be accused of both not dealing with organised crime and introducing unworkable legislation. We are saying both: the Bill will not work, because it will not deal with organised crime.

There are Opposition Members to whom—if they accused me of making a cheap political point—I would pay some attention. The hon. Gentleman is not one of them. I am not trying to make a cheap political point. I am entitled to point out that there are clear contradictions between what the Opposition say in one forum and what they say in another. They cannot have their cake and eat it.

The hon. Gentleman talks about reputable organisations, but he is wrong if he believes for a moment that we have not discussed the issue or received representations, or that we did not publish a draft Bill and did not enter into a consultation process. Our officials repeatedly met representatives of such organisations. If he believes that I have not listened to those representations and have tried to minimise the burden through that process, he is wrong. Our decision is that those powers are needed, and I am sorry if he does not accept that.

On disclosures and the threshold of suspicion that would require disclosure to be made, I am worried about the dovetailing of the provision with clause 327(3). If a person disclosed information solely on the basis of a fleeting suspicion, the disclosure might not be protected. Has that matter

been taken into account, and what would be the outcome?

We are talking about a different situation when referring to protected disclosures. Under clause 324(4), the third condition is that the disclosure be made to

''a constable, a customs officer or a nominated officer as soon as is practicable''

after the information or other matters come to the discloser.

If the discloser believed that his suspicion required further thought and investigation before a disclosure was made, he would potentially be protected under clause 324(4). Such a person could say that he disclosed the matter as soon as it was practicable, after he had obtained the information and had satisfied himself that the information was valid, bona fide and warranted disclosure.

Does the Minister agree that we should join together and give thanks to God for the hon. Member for Henley, because his comments about sneaking, which I am waiting for the Opposition spokesman to rebut, reveal the Conservatives' attitude? They see disclosure as sneaking—or clyping, to use a Scottish term. They consider that good chaps together should be able to launder drugs money without the nanny state intervening. That is what this is all about.

The Minister is in danger of being too soft on this matter. He mentioned, in the context of fleeting doubts, that a person might know or suspect that cash is dishonest. I worry that that allows somebody to choose not to know or suspect that. We should have a provision to say that if a person did not know or suspect, they bloody well ought to have. Does the Minister agree that that would be a valuable addition to the Bill and would stop corrupt lawyers, bankers and accountants from washing their hands of the deaths that drug money causes in my constituency and many others?

Let us not pre-empt our possible discussion on clause 324.

I do not want us to be complacent about the matter. From time to time we hear, ''We haven't got a problem. It is good old English law. Aren't we marvellous?'' We are one of the major financial institutions of the world, and our reputation is extremely important. We should protect that and do nothing through negligent or positive action to damage that position.

I agree with the Minister. It is worth pointing out, to pick up the point of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok, that even today, if a financial adviser or lawyer has any doubt about the legitimacy of a transaction, under the current confidentiality requirements, he should not carry it out. That is a well-established and well-observed rule, although I accept that there may be exceptions to it.

The Minister has not answered the question about the workability of the provision, although we may address it later. To what extent will the quantity of

disclosure that will be required make ordinary, commercial transactions impossible? There must be disclosure, but as he will acknowledge, a person must get the consent of NCIS or the police before going ahead with the transaction. There is ample current evidence that that causes enormous problems because people are left in limbo and not told what to do about such transactions.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. We discussed the issue extensively with those who lobbied us. We must ensure that the provision works and does not cripple the ability of people to do their jobs.

NCIS is urging us on because it wants this level of disclosure. That may come out during our discussion of other clauses. If we want NCIS to be effective, it is phenomenally important that it gets that. Even a small and isolated disclosure may lever up something that is concealed and much larger than that.

The Minister has been very helpful during our sittings by giving members of the Committee further information. I think that I am right in saying that we have not seen in the public domain, either during the consultation process or when the Bill was drafted, the specific advice from NCIS on the point to which he has referred. Given that he is relying directly on that to support his case, will he consider, either today or at a later stage, allowing all members of the Committee to have sight of it?

NCIS has made public statements, as it did during the consultation process, and I have not tried to restrict what it has said about all the measures in the Bill, nor am I attempting to do so now. If a member of the Committee wishes to approach NCIS and ask for its opinion on the matter under discussion, I will be relaxed about that. I am sure that what it says publicly will be in line with what I have told the Committee. The hon. Gentleman knows that it is not my practice to publish advice to Ministers and I shall not open up such issues.

I want again to put on the record what I said on Second Reading. When conducting evaluations of all its members—there have been two rounds since 1991—the Financial Action Task Force issued information in an attempt to promote policies to combat money laundering. It has 29 members, including major financial centres throughout North America, Europe, Asia and South America. The information exposes the assertion that the United Kingdom has a massive burdensome system of reporting. It is quite the reverse. In 1994 to 1999, there were 273 prosecutions in Belgium. In Germany, there were 298. In the latest year for which there are figures, there were 118 prosecutions and 39 convictions in the United Kingdom. In Belgium, the figure for convictions was 182. We know the relative size of the financial sectors in our two countries, and that is the top example that I can give.

We do not have a good record in such matters. A substantial change is needed if we are to combat money laundering. An integral part of organised crime is that so many of its facets cannot operate unless it

can turn its ill-gotten gains into seemingly legitimate moneys. Tough action is needed. I ask the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to withdraw the amendment. If he does not, I shall ask my hon. Friends to vote against it.

I seek your guidance, Mr. O'Brien, on how to deal with the amendment without straying into stand part issues. Similarly, it is difficult to talk to the amendment or the clause without referring to clause 329. I know the dangers of straying too far into a clause that we have not reached, and I apologise in advance if I do.

One or two of the arguments that have been advanced during the past hour are worthy of comment. I agree with the Minister that we must be as hard as we can on people who want to launder money. I have no difficulty with that. He said that we had a problem. I agree with that, too. However, we cannot go from saying that we have a problem to saying, ''And this is the only solution.'' The solution suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath does not commend itself to the Government. I have received that message clearly. I am not a lawyer, so I shall not try to improve on my hon. Friend's solution—

Is it one that commends itself to the hon. Gentleman, given the comments that he has just made?

Of course. If my hon. Friend wants me to support him on a technical matter I shall do so unhesitatingly, as he is the expert who speaks on our behalf. I have no problem with that. All I am saying is that I cannot stand up and offer other alternatives. It is not good enough for the Minister to say, ''I don't like what the Opposition are saying, and they don't have any other ideas. Therefore my idea is guaranteed to be brilliant.'' I cannot go along with that train of thought.

First, will the Minister tell us whether he has considered alternatives? We have come up with one alternative, and there are bound to be plenty more. If the Minister wants us to believe that his solution and choice of wording is the best, he ought to be able to tell us all the alternatives that have been considered by the experts—whether they are tyrants or not is irrelevant—and explain why they are not as good as the preferred choice. I have not heard that, and I am therefore not persuaded. I do not believe that the assertion, ''This is the best; vote for it,'' is good enough for the Committee.

Secondly—although I am conscious that to go down this route is wholly out of order—the comments that have been made about relationships between clients, accountants and lawyers open up a debate that we ought to have if the point is to be pursued—although I shall not do that, Mr. O'Brien. The question of professional conduct and standards, and relationships between individuals and qualified people, cannot be discussed in relation to accountants and lawyers alone, as it is also relevant to the confessional, the medical consulting room and so on. Even if there is a determination to rewrite that relationship, it cannot be done merely by a statement in this Bill that

accountants and lawyers will be treated differently from other professionals.

I do not want to open up the issue too much, but it strikes me that that is relevant to our constituency surgeries, too. Individuals, some of whom can be excitable, may come to speak to us confidentially. Is it seriously being suggested that if we are made aware, even by an excitable individual, that a criminal act may have taken place, and we think that there may be a grain of truth in what that individual says, we are obliged to go to the police?

I find this fascinating—

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

If the hon. Gentleman can contain his enthusiasm, I shall deal with one intervention at a time, and come back to him.

I agree with my hon. Friend that another relationship is under discussion. My only hesitation is that as a Member of Parliament, I have never considered myself a professional, but rather as a tradesman. However, my hon. Friend is right about the principle—we are all are told things in our surgeries, in confidence, by people who are desperate to cry on the shoulder of someone who can be trusted not to go rushing around telling other people. I do not believe that the issue can be considered in isolation.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I acknowledge his comment about professionals and Members of Parliament. I am not sure that Members of Parliament, or doctors, have too much to do with such financial transactions, but does he agree with the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster that if someone came to a Member of Parliament's advice centre and disclosed details of a criminal act, he should use the guise of confidentiality to keep it concealed from the authorities?

That is an interesting question.

Yes or no?

I am conscious of the need to choose my words carefully. When information is given in confidence to a doctor, accountant or lawyer, or me, as a Member of Parliament—I make no attempt to speak for my hon. Friend, but only for myself—

My hon. Friend is a Whip, so he does tend to speak for me as far as my vote is concerned.

The confidentiality of the Whips Office—the torture chamber—is another matter altogether.

I shall try to give the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe) a serious answer, as that is what his question deserves, rather than a flippant party political one. All professionals who from time to time hear things that are passed on to them in confidence—I include myself in that category—need to ask themselves what is in the best interests both of the constituent and of society at large before they decide what action to take about what they have heard. I would not therefore be willing to give the hon.

Gentleman a categorical assurance that I would never pass on information, nor that I would always pass it on. That would be a matter for consideration.

Even if there had been a criminal act?

That would depend on whether it seemed blatantly criminal, and whether one had knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect. I do not believe that one can have a blanket set of rules. That is the problem with the professional relationship. We cannot draw up rules for every circumstance. If, for example, someone goes into a confessional and says, ''I killed Joe Bloggs last night''—

Order. I think that we have had a stand part debate on this amendment. I draw the Committee's attention to what the clause says. It mentions concealing, disguising, converting and transferring criminal property, and we would not hear about that in a confessional box or an advisory centre. I suggest that we look at the clause and deliver our deliberations on what we are supposed to be talking about. I make it clear now that there will be no stand part debate on the clause, because I believe that we have already covered that.

On a point of order, Mr. O'Brien. I accept your ruling that we have had a stand part debate and will not have a second one, but although the amendment would insert the word ''knowingly'', paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), to which you referred, are part of subsection (1). If one were to debate the whole issue, one would have also to consider the defences in subsection (2), which deals with authorised disclosure, and the issue of what is appropriate and what might be revealed—which is what I was going to say had I been able to intervene on my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire). [Interruption.] Yes, clause 323, too, deals with authorised disclosure. Some of the points made about the constituency surgeries of Members of Parliament could be relevant to clause 321(2) and the points linked with it.

We are considering disclosures, and the fact that the amendment would insert the word ''knowingly''. Can we direct our remarks to what the amendment says and what impact it would have on the clause?

I accept that, Mr. O'Brien. I was trying to respond as fully as you would allow me to what I consider a relevant question that should not be simply shrugged off.

I do not want to disrupt my hon. Friend's flow, but in the context of debating the relevant issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster, may I point out that as well as debating the amendment tabled to clause 321, we are debating amendment No. 428, with which it is grouped, and that would affect clause 323.

Labour Back-Benchers, particularly those who represent Glasgow constituencies, have repeatedly said in Committee that there may be people in their constituencies who have large amounts of money and appear reputable pillars of the community, but are in fact Mr. Bigs. If any of those people came to one of the

Labour Back-Benchers' constituency surgeries and said things that their Member of Parliament would usually treat in confidence, would not my hon. Friend's comments be particularly relevant, even to those Members?

I certainly understand what my hon. Friend says. I do not want to pursue the point—and neither do you, Mr. O'Brien. All I shall say about what I might hear at a surgery—I believe that this point is relevant to the Bill—is that my response would be based on whether I had reasonable grounds for suspecting that what I had heard was criminal. That takes us back to the question of whether we must assume that every constituent is a criminal unless they prove that they are not, or how we are to decide whether what we hear gives us reasonable grounds to suspect. That is where the debate started, and that is where it will undoubtedly finish.

The Minister gave us some statistics. If the Belgians have more cases than we do, I accept that, given the size of the financial market in Brussels compared with that in London, we must take that point seriously.

However, there is an additional point, which I do not know whether the Minister wants us to consider. I think that he said that 180 cases were brought in the United Kingdom last year, and that there were 32 convictions. I hope that I was not to take that as meaning that too many people were being found not guilty, and that the intention of the Bill was to make sure that more people were convicted. I am worried about that, as it would simply be an attempt to get the statistics right. The innocent would be put behind bars, and the odds would be stacked so much in favour of the prosecution that every time a case was brought, it would result in a conviction. If that is the purpose of this part of the Bill I am appalled, and would be deeply worried. I can understand that it may lead to an increase in the number of cases brought, but if the argument is based on the difference between the number of cases and the number of convictions, the legislation would be tyrannical.

My concerns centre on the point concerning which I intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath—the question of criminal property. That is why it is necessary to think about clause 329, too. I asked my hon. Friend at what point property became criminal property, thinking that if someone is acquitted, the property is not criminal, and never has been. However, clause 329 states that property is—not might be—criminal property

''if . . . the alleged offender . . . suspects''

that it is.

That is not entirely right, as the definition of criminal property in clause 329(3) has two parts. The first condition is that criminal property

''constitutes a person's benefit from criminal conduct'',

and the second is that

''the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.''

I am grateful for that explanation, but it does not reassure me at all.

Not being a lawyer, I consider such matters in personal terms. I do not know what other Members do, but when I am in need of cash, I use the cashpoint in this building. I am aware that 3 or 5 per cent. of the gross domestic product of this planet is involved in money laundering. Therefore, when I withdraw the money that I have in my pocket—I apologise to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok for having £20 notes, which probably makes me a suspected person, because I should have £5 notes—it might suddenly cross my mind, as I wait for the notes to be counted out, that somewhere along the line, laundered money will have got into the banking system. I mean no ill to Lloyds bank, with which I have banked for more years than I wish to confess, but it is inevitable, despite the best endeavours of the banks, that that will have happened. As I wait for the money to come out, it might occur to me that the money that Lloyds bank is giving me may, in one way or another, be laundered money. Having suspected that, I therefore have criminal property, which has been transferred from the cash machine to my pocket.

I presume that the Minister will explain to Committee members that the fact that we have all been serving on this Committee will mean that we have notice of the fact that every cash withdrawal that we make might be the proceeds of crime.

Indeed—

How would the prosecution prove that the money in the hon. Gentleman's possession was criminal property?

I have no idea. I have never been hauled before a court and had that happen to me. I am only observing that if I understand clause 329 correctly—[Interruption.] The Minister could have explained it to me. My intervention would be unnecessary if he had addressed hon. Members' concerns—but he did not, so he must listen to my worries.

According to the provision, if I take money out of the cash machine and I suspect that it is criminal property, it is criminal property. Yet, the Minister tells me that I should not worry because all I have to do is make a disclosure. If that is the case, the policeman at the end of the corridor by the cafeteria should be given a large book, because every time any of us withdraw money from the cash machine, we must go to him and say, ''I have just taken this out of the cash machine. It might be criminal property, and I am making a disclosure before I buy my tea in the cafeteria.''

If that is what the provision states, the Minister's way of solving the problem is stupid and he must do something about it. I would be grateful for reassurance that we do not have to go through that rigmarole every time we get money from a bank.

There is a serious point—[Hon. Members: ''Aha.''] There just might be one lurking behind my example. As we said previously—the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok found this difficult to believe—people can possess reasonable and sometimes large amounts of cash for perfectly legitimate reasons. Yet if a person pays that money into a bank, the bank will have to go through the most enormous contortions. An employee

will probably have to go to the police and say, ''Somebody walked into this bank this morning. We don't know where the money's come from. We've asked a few questions, but we don't know how many we ought to ask. We can't be certain that the money is legitimate, so we're reporting it.''

Some people keep significant amounts of cash for reasons that are private, rather than criminal.

Such as?

I hesitate to say. Some people wish to keep their properly gained profits from the knowledge of their friends and relatives.

And the taxman.

That is possible. A person could own a large amount of cash during a year that must, in due course, be included in tax returns. However, that person is entitled to keep that cash without telling anybody until the deadline for the submission of a tax return. No crime would have been committed. If we say that banks must disclose the existence of money before the deadline for tax returns, we are exploring dangerous territory.

I am fascinated by what the hon. Gentleman says. Will he turn his mind to the fact that guidance is already widely used in the sector, and more will accompany the Bill? How does that impact on the problems that he appears to be exposing?

I am well aware that there is guidance, because I have examined it to find out what a bank must do. Those of us who have any interest in offshore banking will know that those involved in that business must ask much tighter questions than before about the origin of transferred money. Many hon. Members have examined that development and understand it.

This measure goes so much further that it puts a bank in the position of having to assume that all cash is suspect, and therefore cannot be handled. Unless the Minister reassures me, I shall have a vision of the whole banking system grinding to a halt because nobody can pay in money, because the bank may suspect it just for a moment. The bank does not need to know whether the money is criminal property under the Bill. Even if it takes reasonable steps to find out whether it is, but still has a lingering doubt about it, the money is criminal property. If that is the case, the banking system will grind to a halt.

The argument that all one has to do is make a disclosure distorts relationships, as I said earlier. Until the Minister explains to my satisfaction why all other options have been dismissed, I cannot support him.

I may be able to assist the Committee. Between 1997 and 2001 I was a responsible person under the Financial Services Act 1986—I will continue with these confessions for the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok. I was part of a small firm—a general practice—and I employed a financial adviser. During the four years that I was part of that firm, not once did I suspect that any money that I received, or that was in my possession, was the

proceeds of crime, or criminal money. That is an important point, because we must not get carried away with the idea that what we are discussing will occur frequently.

[Mr. John McWilliam in the Chair]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is right in saying that his experience under that legislation is unique among the members of the Committee. However, I was in a similar position under the previous legislation, when I was a corporate lawyer chairing a compliance committee for a plc.

The hon. Gentleman has stated that in his small firm, suspicion of possession of the proceeds of crime were not a daily occurrence. However, as the people who have been briefing my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and me have stated, that would be a daily occurrence for firms in the City, which would be very costly, as they would therefore have to bear heavy compliance burdens.

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman suggests that suspicion of possession of the proceeds of crime is a regular occurrence.

May I mention to the hon. Gentleman what my hon. Friend and I were told, in a meeting held as recently as Monday lunchtime, by a member of the committee that the Law Society of England and Wales established to examine this issue, who works for a very large and highly reputable firm in the City? He told us that he felt that as it is currently drafted—we will address the arguments about whether there should be de minimus provisions later—the legislation would lead to the imposition of an enormous regulatory burden. That applies to this entire group of clauses—not merely to clauses 321 and 323.

What he told us will certainly be true for big firms that deal with big transactions; almost all their transactions will have regulatory implications. [Interruption.] I hear that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster is agreeing with that point—and many of his constituents would be affected by it.

We are talking about suspicion. That must attach to a particular case, and I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman seems to be suggesting that that arises regularly with regard to the transactions of the firms to which he refers.

With regard to suspicion, my main concern is for large law or accountancy firms that have many international clients, and conduct transactions throughout the regulated financial sector in the City of London.

The reputation of the City of London is at the heart of the matter. Such firms will have to employ an army of regulation and compliance officers to ensure that they are beyond reproach. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that suspicions will probably not arise concerning every transaction—or, perhaps, concerning any transaction undertaken by junior staff. However, an underlying culture will have to be

established within such large firms, and that will create an enormous regulatory and bureaucratic burden.

The hon. Gentleman has made an interesting point. It highlights the difference in approach to this issue between Opposition Members and my hon. Friends. We are striking a balance between the burden—as he describes it—of additional requirements for businesses, and the effect on our constituents of the proceeds of crime—and especially of the proceeds of drug crime.

My experience—which is what I am currently describing—leads me to support the Government's line with regard to the matter under discussion, which is different from that of Opposition Members.

I want to reinforce my hon. Friend's point. The cost of compliance must be balanced against that of non-compliance. In my constituency, and in those of other hon. Members, non-compliance has resulted in several deaths. If the City of London and others had not dealt with drug money with impunity, we would not be in that situation. I want to discuss later the reputation of the City of London in connection with the Abacha money from Nigeria. A host of banks and reputable professionals in the City were only too glad to take money from corrupt sources.

My hon. Friend has, as always, made his point very well.

The first aspect is suspicion. The second aspect is that positive action by the person is required. If I were in the position—and I have been in an analogous position—of suspecting that I had received such money, I would also have to have taken positive action, such as concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing it. That is an extremely important point, and we have not focused sufficiently on it.

The hon. Gentleman is right about the amendment to clause 321. I, too, would like to speak about that and will try to catch your eye later, Mr. O'Brien. There is also an amendment to clause 323, and both clauses should be read together. Clause 323 relates to ''Acquisition, use and possession'' and is so widely drafted that the offence of handling stolen goods need never be proceeded with again once the Bill has been passed. That is because everybody could be prosecuted under clause 323, and thus be subject to a completely different standard test of guilt.

Order. Mr. O'Brien is now on his way to his constituency, for which I am sure we are all jealous of him. I am in the Chair now.

On a point of order, Mr. McWilliam. You and Mr. O'Brien have just effected a seamless transition of power that would be the envy of Governments throughout the world.

I was perhaps making a mistake by confining my remarks to amendment No. 426. An important point has been made, because if I had ever suspected that money in my possession was the proceeds of crime, what would I have done? I would not have dealt with that money. To have committed an

offence under clause 321, I would have to have done something with the money that I suspected was the proceeds of crime.

I understand why the hon. Gentleman's argument is directed towards clause 321, but he must appreciate that my hon. Friend and I are discussing two amendments that have been grouped together, because we will not be allowed to return to amendment No. 428 when we discuss clause 323 at a later stage. We must have the debate now. Our argument is more powerful because the amendments were tabled to both clauses. That reinforces the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.

Order. It strikes me that the amendments are narrow, and the only point at issue is whether or not a person does something knowingly.

The two elements of the offence are first, the initial suspicion, and secondly, the fact that a person does something. If I had still been responsible for regulating financial services with a firm, what would I have done? The first thing would have been to call in the individual concerned. As a solicitor, not only was I representing an individual client, but as an officer of the court, I already had duties in respect of such matters, and not only under financial services legislation. If, having discussed with the client the money in my possession, I still had a suspicion that it was the proceeds of crime, it would not have unreasonable for me to have been required to make a disclosure.

I have been greatly assisted by the excellent debate this morning, and in particular by the comments of my hon. Friend the Minister. He has shifted my position and has satisfied me that in such circumstances, suspicion should be regarded as sufficient to require me to make a disclosure. As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok asked, is that really too heavy a burden?

My hon. Friend goes to the heart of the matter. The only defence put forward by Opposition Members is, ''Oh dear, we tabled two amendments and the clauses have to be taken together.'' They have not said in their defence that they did not have to table the amendment to clause 321, so my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham is right to expose what the Opposition are trying to do to that clause.

That is nonsense.

The hon. Member for Surrey Heath knows that what I said is true.

I hope that the benefit of my experience before I became a Member of Parliament has been of assistance to the Committee. On occasions I have criticised the Government's position, but I believe that they have achieved the right balance with the clause.

The Minister's intervention on the hon. Gentleman's serious and rational contribution to the debate cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. I was saying to the hon. Gentleman that, when considering our amendments, clauses 321 and 323 have to be looked at together. That was not our only defence of the amendments, as the Minister

pejoratively suggested. We have advanced a series of arguments that he has spent a long time seeking—wholly unsuccessfully—to rebuff.

I have finished speaking now.

Mr. Field rose—[Interruption.]

Order. There seems to be muttering in the Room. Will members of the Committee allow the hon. Gentleman to make his speech?

Thank you, Mr. McWilliam, for protecting me.

We have had a long debate and I, like other members of the Committee, agree entirely with the general thrust of what the Government are trying to achieve with the money-laundering provisions. It is important to maintain the good name of the City. I was looking out for the facial expression of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok when I said that, but he managed to keep a straight face. Over the centuries, the City of London has been an important part of this country's economy, and I hope that it will remain so for many centuries to come. As an integral part of that position, it must as far as possible be above reproach.

I want to be open with the Minister and the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok. During the past decade or so when I worked in the City of London, I was worried that, because of the large fees that were coming into law firms—even reputable law firms—a blind eye was being turned to the Maxwell affair and various others. As in the cases of Enron and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, both of which had large, reputable auditors—Arthur Andersen and PricewaterhouseCoopers respectively—partners who were responsible for large streams of fee income turned a blind eye to certain things that were going on. I therefore fully appreciate that there is a need for certain money-laundering provisions. However, we must get the balance right. We shall discuss how draconian the provisions are at great length later.

May I ask the hon. Gentleman for clarification? He says that the Bill should take care of certain forms of money laundering. Does that mean that he thinks that certain other types of money laundering are acceptable?

No. I am sorry if I articulated my point incorrectly. I meant that money laundering has to be taken seriously, particularly in a global economy in which large sums of money go daily into accounts through the internet. The City of London rightly plays an integral role in looking after international business.

I was concerned with what the Minister said about English law. There was a bit of banter about the perceived anti-foreigner stance taken by Conservative Members. English law has played an integral part in the development of international trade and commerce in the past two or three centuries. Many contracts are written in English law, even when they are between two parties that have nothing to do with England. A Bermudan shipping firm and a Portuguese wine exporter, for example, may wish to ensure that their

contractual arrangements are handled under English law so that if their case went to arbitration, it would do so through an English court of law or a British arbitration organisation. That is healthy.

One reason why English law has maintained its pre-eminence is its sense of certainty, and because it is a fair system in the world of commerce. We have every reason to be proud that English law is used in that way. When Conservative Members express concerns about foreign legal jurisdictions, it is because we have cause to feel proud of the importance of English law. The knock-on effect of that importance has been the pre-eminence of the City of London.

It strikes me that the clause puts an unreasonable burden on the professional adviser. If it is shown that money or property has been the proceeds of crime, the clause almost reverses the normal burden. If the slightest hint of suspicion falls on any professional adviser under clause 321, it will be used to build a case on what may be the most flimsy of grounds. It is for that reason that we wish at least some sense of mens rea to be included.

If there is the slightest hint of suspicion, does the hon. Gentleman believe it unreasonable for the financial adviser to make investigations to satisfy himself about that suspicion?

It is a matter of degree. My point is that the authorities' thinking will be almost reversed. Once a state of affairs that may have led to the use or misuse of the proceeds of crime is discovered, there will be a reverse burden. That means that when there is the merest hint of a suspicion, a professional adviser will fall foul of the clause. The question is, and must always be, one of degree.

Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Henley made the point, fairly forcefully, that someone might be caught under the provision if a particular client of theirs, with whom they had a long-standing relationship, suddenly wanted to transfer a larger amount of money than usual into an account. The professional might think, ''Gosh, that was rather odd,'' and then think no more of it. That was the merest hint. If we are to have reasonable commerce, the nature of that minor hint should not necessarily trigger the procedures in the Bill—yet under clause 329(3), there seems to be little doubt that that suspicion would in itself be enough to trigger all the other provisions.

But should that suspicion not trigger internal procedures concerned with asking the client about the money? Is that not the correct course of action to take?

We shall discuss internal procedures and regulation later in part 7, and I do not want to rehearse those arguments. As I said in response to the hon. Gentleman's speech, large banks and firms of accountants will probably have to build up an enormous regulatory infrastructure. However, for small practitioners, such as the average sole practitioner, almost the opposite is true. Either they must incur enormous expense and employ or contract staff for the purpose, or they will turn a blind eye and may be regarded as fair and easy game by both the

regulatory authorities and would-be money launderers.

We are enormously grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing to the Committee his experience not only of working in the City but of representing his constituency. Although we are all worried about the well-being of the City, he is bound to be extra worried. As the suspicion test is already in the existing legislation on concealment, what does he believe the effect on our reputation for financial institutions would be if we were now to remove it?

That is a fair comment. Such consideration must be carried out in the round and include all regulations, because part and parcel of the Bill is to put in place and encapsulate a lot of other rules, and put them under the single head of money laundering. That is a worry. In spite of the view of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok, the Opposition are here not to do the City's talking but to do what is right in all circumstances. The Minister is right to highlight an anxiety that the perception might be that we were moving away from the provisions relating to money laundering and making them less highly regulated That might cause anxiety both in the City of London and in a European context, where people are trying to ensure a level playing field in Europe.

I am interested in this discussion, because most of our discussion has centred on the regulated financial sector. However, as my hon. Friend may agree, part 7 applies not only to the regulated financial sector but to everyone, including those who, unlike the people whom my hon. Friend describes in the City, will have no knowledge of or access to such provisions. My hon. Friend may agree that that should colour the Committee's approach to this part, to clause 321 and to the tests under it.

I could not agree more. The point is well made. However, inevitably the money-laundering provisions will in the main highlight the regulated sector. To be candid, I suppose that professionals who deal with such matters on a day-to-day basis should have a greater burden, which goes beyond that of the everyday man in the street. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, people might ask whether the courts would use the provisions if anxiety were expressed about an everyday man in the street who would otherwise fall foul of them. Are they geared towards the regulated financial services sector? I accept that the burden might be slightly different between professionals and the everyday man in the street. Equally, however, I would have great anxiety if we did not recognise that if a person is to fall foul of the draconian measures in part 7, he must have at least some knowledge.

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak on the amendment and the clause, as I want to explain why I shall support the provision, and the Minister's argument. It is because the questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.

However, there is a real point to be made about the amendment. It is not the point made in the speech by the hon. Member for Spelthorne, which was breathtaking nonsense; it is what the Conservative

spokesman said about whether to incorporate mens rea into the offence under discussion, and if so, to what extent. In this country, offences of strict liability are not ordinarily created, so that one can be convicted whether one acted intentionally, recklessly, negligently or whatever. How do we incorporate mens rea, and what is the appropriate mens rea to incorporate into this offence?

As the Committee heard, the mens rea thus far incorporated into the Bill derives not directly from clause 321 but from clause 329, whereby the person would have to know or suspect that the property with which he was dealing was criminal property. That could be compared with the provision under section 22 of the Theft Act 1978, in respect of handling stolen goods, whereby the person would normally have to know or believe that the goods were stolen. The difference is therefore small—it is between belief and suspicion. The question is whether the threshold in the Bill should be lowered from belief to suspicion. Having heard the arguments put forward by the Minister, I am persuaded that it should be lowered. The principal reason is that, as the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster just said, this part of the Bill, which deals with money laundering, will hit the regulated sector most obviously and massively.

Perhaps I am intervening too early, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that one might have greater sympathy with the Minister's position if this part of the Bill were confined to the regulated financial sector, which it is not. The hon. Gentleman may agree with me that clause 323 provides a total replacement for the offence of handling, which could be used against any individual, anywhere in this country. It introduces a completely different and lower test from that which has historically been applied to handling stolen goods. Clause 321 is slightly different, because it relates to other activities, but clause 323 covers exactly the same offence.

I am grateful for that contribution, and I think that the hon. Gentleman is right about clause 323. However, I will not refer directly to that clause at this stage, as we have not reached it.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I shall first deal with the initial point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, which was that he would have more sympathy for the Minister's position if clause 321 were confined to the regulated sector. On the contrary, if it were confined to the regulated sector, the Minister's arguments would be compelling, for two reasons. First, in the regulated sector one is dealing with professionals who are making large sums of money out of dealing with particular property, and who are trained to deal with it in a professional and appropriate way, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham said.

Secondly, as the hon. Members for Surrey Heath and for Cities of London and Westminster both argued, the sheer scale of the laundered money with which we are dealing must be taken into account. If it is true that virtually every transaction with which big

City firms are dealing involves money that they suspect may be tainted by criminality, a different culture and a new professionalism should be introduced in the City of London and big institutions, to stop that happening. That is precisely the reason why people in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok are dying: we are allowing a huge culture of criminality relating to drugs money and other factors to infect ordinary people in the drawing rooms of Pollok and the institutions of commerce in this country.

May I make two points to the hon. Gentleman? First, he said that he could not deal with issues that relate to clause 323 because we have not yet reached it. However, I remind him, as I reminded the hon. Member for Wrexham, that one of the amendments in the group relates to clause 323, so we are dealing with that clause, although we shall have another debate about it later. However, this is the only debate that we will be able to have on this specific issue in clause 323. It would be out of order to return to it later.

The hon. Gentleman genuinely misunderstood what my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster and I said. There is a regulatory and compliance culture in the City of London now. All reputable institutions want to stop money laundering now. However, the over-draconian way in which the Bill is drafted will impose huge unnecessary regulatory burdens that will enforce a reporting regime in which things that have nothing to do with money laundering cost our institutions huge sums for no good purpose. That will not stop deaths. We all want to stop deaths and money laundering.

The Minister and the hon. Member for Wellingborough both know that there is no difference between what we and they want the legislation to achieve. However, the provision will be ineffective and unworkable, and so costly and bureaucratic that it will be counter-productive.

Order. May I remind the Committee that interventions should be just that? That intervention was rather long.

I am grateful for the intervention, which brings me directly to the point that I was about to address.

We are conducting a balancing exercise. On one hand, we have criminality, which causes the loss of many lives. On the other hand, there are administrative burdens for institutions in the City of London and elsewhere, which are simply to make a disclosure to a nominated officer. The balance struck in the Bill is right because of the policy reasons that my hon. Friend the Minister explained. If a professional is suspicious that money with which he deals is criminal, the least he should do is disclose that. If the problems are on the scale that has been suggested, the burden is not too big to bear; it is a burden that must be borne.

We are considering not only the regulated sector, but money launderers and other fences whom the provision would criminalise. I will be happy to do that. We read about money launders in the papers, and we see what happened to gold bullion that was stolen and melted down. Such criminals should be prosecuted if there is suspicion that property with which they deal is criminal property, and they subsequently conceal, disguise, convert, transfer or remove that criminal property.

If I, as an ordinary citizen, dealt with property that I thought to be criminal, I would stop dealing with it, and I would want to bring it to the attention of an appropriate person, because of my obligation to act responsibly in civil society. I would have responsibility for not only my actions, but for people who might be harmed should I act wrongly.

This has been—and is—a fascinating debate because, as I am the first to accept, new ideas have come to mind as it has developed. I am prepared to be swayed by arguments that are put forward. There are different ways to examine the problem, and I was impressed by the speech by the hon. Member for Wrexham about how he operated under the previous regime.

I tend to agree that people would be in a good position to pick up suspicion in a well organised institution that is financially regulated. I can see that suspicions may be justified as grounds to communicate with the authorities for which the Bill provides. That said, we shall return to the absence of de minimis provisions and the lack of clarity in respect of gaining consent to continue with a transaction when the authorities have been notified. That will undoubtedly raise procedural issues of immense complexity. I tend to hold the same view as my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster: that the over-burdening that the provision will cause is something to which we must pay some attention, if not through the amendment that we are discussing, then later in our proceedings.

We cannot run away from the fact that, as drafted, the Bill goes much further than the regulated financial sector. It covers everybody. [Hon. Members: ''Hear, hear.''] Fine, but the Committee must consider the circumstances in which the Bill could apply to individuals who are unlikely to have read part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act and will not know about authorised disclosure under section 328. If asked my opinion, I encourage people to open bank accounts, but many people in the country do not have bank accounts.

They are not millionaires.

Let us imagine that someone says to a friend, ''I have just earned £250 in cash. Can you put it in your bank account for me and keep it there?'' Such a situation would be covered by the clause if the money was criminal property, and the test would be suspicion.

I want to point out, before his sedentary comment is lost and not recorded in Hansard, that the Minister of State, Scotland Office observed that those who do not have bank accounts

do not have millions of pounds either. On the contrary, both my hon. Friend and I have met many people, particularly those who may belong to the traveller, gypsy or Romany community—many of whom live in the two constituencies that I have represented—who do not have bank accounts, but who have large sums of money. Some of those people are not unknown to the constabulary for financial offences.

My hon. Friend makes a good point, which brings me back to what I said earlier about branding individuals as people of whom we should be suspicious. It is a serious issue. The Government are inclusive and say that we should not discriminate against people, yet that is one of the things that the provisions invite us to do.

I wish to take the hon. Gentleman back to the point that he made before his hon. Friend intervened. If someone asked him to put money into his bank account that he suspected was stolen, would he not just say no?

If I suspected that the money was stolen, of course I would not agree to such action. I am concerned about the justification for changing the test of criminality with regard to handling stolen property. I also have to face up to the fact that I am a barrister. I have had 20 years in practice and the grounds on which I would suspect someone who handed me money to put into my bank account and the grounds of an individual who has not had the same professional career may be different.

The law has been put together over many years, and it has often been designed to protect the weak, the inadequate and the foolish. As we are discussing the amendment to clause 323 as well as the amendment to clause 321, we are addressing whether to change the standard of proof in relation to the handling of stolen property.

If the Bill is enacted as it is, the offence of handling stolen goods might wither on the vine. A lawyer who wishes to convict someone for what we regard as the normal offence of handling stolen goods would, if asked, have to advise the Crown Prosecution Service that a conviction would be more likely if clause 323 were invoked, rather than the other definition of the offence, because two different tests of the same offence would now be on the statute book.

There was no mention of that in the preliminary discussions about the Bill. I do not remember the Minister saying that an accidental consequence of dealing with money laundering—which people consider to be an offence that principally relates to financial institutions—would be that the general criminal law would be impinged upon in this way. Yet that is what will happen.

I do not remember the Minister offering any substantive comment about the amendment to clause 323—although, in fairness to him, we did not address that in detail. However, amendments to clauses 321 and 323 have ramifications that go much further than the regulated financial sector. If we were dealing solely with that sector, I would have greater sympathy with the Minister's position.

The Committee could approach the matter in several ways. The Minister could undertake to look again at the tests in clauses 321 and 323, and perhaps come back on Report and say that he wishes to retain the tests for clause 321, but not those for clause 323. Alternatively, he might come back and say that he is prepared to consider limiting the tests to the financial sector—although it is clear that a policy decision was taken to go far beyond that sector.

The Minister might also enlighten us about how, in the light of clause 323, the Government view the future of the offence of handling stolen goods. I have heard nothing about that. Will there be a discretionary choice, so that if the offence is thought to be money laundering, in the sense that the layman might understand that, the prosecution would take place under clause 323, but that the traditional test for handling stolen goods would apply to, for example, the illegal trading in videos in pubs? I do not know the answer to that, because the Minister has not enlightened us about the matter.

The hon. Gentleman sometimes makes life difficult for himself by changing his thought processes in mid-stream, and by leaping ahead in the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that we are discussing two amendments to different clauses, but we are dealing with both of them. We will discuss further amendments to clause 323 and, if the Chairman allows it, there will also be a substantive stand part debate on that clause.

I can deal only with the amendments that the Opposition have tabled, and they remove the suspicion test—as does the entire thrust of the hon. Gentleman's argument.

The substantive response that the hon. Gentleman offered to the questions that he was asked was that he would not do the wrong thing, but certain other people would. I am amazed that he thinks that there are people who ought to be able to pay money into their bank accounts even though they suspect that it is criminal property, and to say nothing about it. He does not want the test to apply to barristers, but he does want it to apply to lower forms of life. It is he, rather than us, who is being discriminatory.

I find the Minister's final comment astonishing.

I find what the hon. Gentleman said astonishing.

I was always brought up to believe that one of the things that one had to consider carefully, with regard to the application of the criminal law, was the way that it would impact, not on oneself, but on people who might not enjoy similar advantages in terms of education, professional background or breadth of knowledge. It is such a central philosophical principle that I am appalled to hear the Minister denigrate it in such a cheap fashion.

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman. However, will he give an example of the kind of person who puts money into his bank account, when he suspects that it is criminal property, and is not

subject to the law for so doing? What kind of person should be able to do that?

Absolutely.

We are replacing knowing and believing with knowing and suspecting.

No answer.

We are making a fundamental change to the criminal law without an adequate explanation of the difference between those two tests, although it is glaringly apparent that suspecting is a much lower test than believing. Moreover, the construction of the clause alters the mens rea of the offence.

I can think of circumstances in which a person might take money from another and hold it in his bank account on the other's behalf. The individual might say, ''I certainly did not know that it was criminal property.'' However, the Minister must remember that the suspecting test will be based not on the comments of the defendant, but on the conclusion that the court reaches on his actions. Why should the protection of belief, which has been in our law for a very long time, suddenly be removed from every citizen of this country by a Bill that concentrates on dealing with those in the City who have the knowledge and expertise to make the necessary disclosures, protect themselves and decide on their suspicions? I am not satisfied with that, and the Minister has not adequately dealt with the issue.

If the provision were restricted to the regulated financial sector, I would be prepared to be convinced that such a major change was desirable, although I would still have anxieties about it. However, given that the Bill extends the provision to every person in the country, I require much more persuasion.

As my hon. Friend knows, I agree 100 per cent. with what he has been saying.

What a surprise.

Would it not reinforce my hon. Friend's argument if he were to remind the Ministers—especially the Minister of State, Scotland Office, who keeps making comments from a sedentary position—that, in response to an earlier intervention, I said that if the Government had inserted ''reasonable belief'' into clause 321, we would not have had a problem? Is not that the comprehensive answer to all of the suspicious comments being made by the Under-Secretary and other Labour Members?

My hon. Friend is right. Throughout weeks of sittings, I come have to this Committee willing to be persuaded by argument. One of the merits of the Committee system is the ability to have a dialogue that is, on the whole, free of party political polemics. This morning, however, we seem to have had more of that than on previous occasions, and I regret that. The Under-Secretary has been the principal initiator of that process. I am always prepared to be persuaded, and, on occasions during the Committee, I have said to him that he has persuaded me.

However, the way in which part 7 has been tackled is noteworthy. First, the Under-Secretary has been defensive. Secondly, there has been a tendency to say, ''This is designed to achieve a laudable end, and, therefore, those who stand in the way of it must be trampled into the dust, as they are the supporters of criminality.'' Finally, there has been a worrying unwillingness to go into the details of some of the, perhaps unintended, consequences of the way in which the Bill is drafted. The first amendment must be tackled now. I cannot leave it until a further discussion of clause 323. The way in which the amendments have been selected require that, which may be unfortunate, but it is not our fault. I will be grateful if that is dealt with and I will tell the Under-Secretary if he succeeds in persuading me.

Government Back Benchers put forward good, and persuasive, arguments about the impact on the regulated financial sector. At the same time, as the debate progressed, I have become more troubled about the knock-on consequences that we have not examined. It is up to the Under-Secretary whether he wishes to go down that road.

I continue to have the gravest reservations about the change to the standard mens rea test. By leaving the test as it is in other areas of criminal law, we would create a terrible barrier to the prosecution of those who launder money, including those in the financial sector. We often go around changing tests and trying to beef things up, and that does not make a huge difference at the end of the day. That is a compelling reason to leave the principles as they are.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield was speaking about his regret that party politics has entered the debate and that it has become somewhat polemic. I confess that he is about to get a bit more of that. Politics is involved in the matter. It is clear who the Conservatives speak for and who we speak for. Some arguments by Conservative Members were a disgrace. You have not attempted to take account of the seriousness of the situation that people in our communities face. You argue in defence—

Order. I am not arguing anything.

Indeed you are not, Mr. McWilliam.

The Conservatives have defended vested interests and did not convince me that they are concerned meaningfully about the effects of money laundering and corrupt practices.

Mr. Hawkins rose—

I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman. He is not altogether a bad man, but he has not convinced me that he has much concern about the issue.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman both for giving way and for his description of me, which is perhaps as good as I shall get in his eyes.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give all Conservative Members credit for saying on several occasions—as Hansard will show—that we want to help the Government to stop money laundering and that we are worried about drugs. I have seen the appalling effect of drugs at first hand from experience

in my constituency and when I defended and prosecuted serious drugs cases. Conservatives are worried about the way in which the Government have gone about the provision and the way in which it will affect people who are not sophisticated and who are not solicitors or accountants. Clauses 321 and 323 are not restricted to the professional fields to which the hon. Gentleman objects. We are worried that the Bill will not be effective enough to protect the hon. Gentleman's constituents.

Order. May I remind the Committee—nobody has broken the rule yet—that all members of the Committee are hon. Members, and we must address each other as such. We should certainly not question the honour or conduct of any member of the Committee.

I am almost speechless after the long case for the defence by the hon. Member for Surrey

Heath. The Opposition say that they are concerned about the impact of these crimes on our constituents. After listening to their arguments, I do not believe it. The emphasis on everything that they said did not lead me to believe that the Tories are serious about pursuing that vigorously.

The Conservative's amendment—the stupidity, or ignorance, defence—reminds me of the tale of the Scottish sinner who was about to be consigned to the flames by God. He said, ''Lord, Lord, we didnae ken.'' The Lord said, ''Well, ye ken noo.'' The defence that the Conservatives put forward would allow people to say, ''We simply didn't know.'' That is too weak.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.