I beg to move amendment No. 456, in page 170, line 24, leave out 'three months' and insert 'one month'.

With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 457, in page 170, line 27, leave out 'two years' and insert 'six months'.

Clause 294 provides that once the initial period of detention of the seized cash has been accomplished, there is a period during which one may apply to the court to retain the cash for a further period. The Bill provides for two periods. The first period lasts for three months, and a further order under the clause could provide for up to two years. That is a long time. One would have thought that if there were such a seizure of cash, especially if it was led by intelligence, it would be possible, within the period in question, for steps to be taken to recover that cash, and to establish the basis on which it was seized. Therefore, I am troubled by the duration of the periods specified.

I will listen carefully to the Minister's explanation of why these periods have been selected, and why they are so long. I am prepared to be persuaded by him, which is why the amendments that I have tabled are probing amendments—although I am not saying that I will not press the matter to a Division. My amendments provide for shorter periods of one

month and six months—which is a particularly appropriate period because, for instance, in summary proceedings in court, a summons must be served within six months of an offence.

The Minister might provide cogent reasons why the periods proposed are necessary, but two years is a long time for cash to be detained without the issues surrounding it having been resolved. It suggests that money can be seized in the manner of a fishing expedition—one seizes it, and then one ferrets around to find a justification for the seizure.

This is where I stop trying to defend the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends from the onslaught of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok and revert to the accusation that the hon. Gentleman is the sidekick of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins), and has gone soft on crime and soft on the causes of crime. [Interruption.] I am trying to buy back the position that I lost a few minutes ago, as I wish to regain some support from my Back Benches.

Existing legislation relating to drugs and terrorism—as contained in the Terrorism Act 2000—allows for the same detention periods for cash as are set out in clause 294. These are maximum time limits, and it is for the court to decide whether to authorise the detention of cash for such periods. We are not aware that there has been any suggestion that the existing time limits are unreasonable.

It is, of course, for the courts to decide whether the conditions for continued detention are met. No detention can be authorised—whether for the maximum period allowed, or any other period—if a magistrates court, or a sheriff, is not satisfied that one of the detention conditions set out in clause 294 is met.

In addition to those protections, an application for the release of detained cash can be made by the person from whom the cash was seized—or a victim—at any time while cash is detained under clause 294. If the court is satisfied that the detention conditions are no longer met, or that the cash belongs to a victim as provided for in new clause 9, the court will have discretion to release the cash.

The Minister is right: the explanations are provided in clause 294. However, they reinforce my concern about fishing expeditions.

The Minister has been talking about such cash seizures being based on substantial intelligence, and being well targeted, but it is envisaged that the cash may be retained for up to two years

''while its derivation is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing . . . proceedings against any person for an offence in respect of the unlawful conduct with which it is connected''.

I can just about see the point of the lengthy detention period for the cash with regard to bringing proceedings against

''any person for an offence in respect of the unlawful conduct with which it is connected'',

but I find it harder to understand why such a lengthy period is legitimate simply to make further investigations of its derivation. That is a fishing expedition.

The hon. Gentleman is being a little exclusive in his choice of bits to read out. He attempts to suggest an ability to hold cash for two years. That is the case only after repeated extensions allowed by the magistrate or sheriff and justified on each occasion, as he knows.

Customs officers who have operated the cash recovery scheme under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 tell us that in practice, cases are unlikely to result in successful forfeiture. It is unusual for them to be dealt with so quickly, and money returned. It is extremely rare that cases taken on by customs officers can substantively be dealt with in six months. That is the advice from the people currently operating the scheme, who say that it is more usual for cases to take 12 to 18 months, with some going the full distance allowed within the current law. The reasons for that include the time taken for financial investigation and to make foreign inquiries. In many cases, the party from whom the cash was seized will seek to delay the forfeiture. Experience therefore suggests that the existing time limits are appropriate to operational requirements.

Any requirement for more regular detention hearings will also have serious resource implications. Even without the extension of the workload that the Bill will impose, the customs unit at Heathrow currently has 80 to 90 cases on hand. Inland, however, cases are not as concentrated as those at the border, which fall disproportionately on particular courts. Officers are attending court on an almost daily basis for extended detention hearings—even with a three-month maximum. If the time span were reduced to one month, there would clearly be serious problems in maintaining that schedule. There would also be an impact on the courts that would be required to hold additional hearings.

We fully accept the need for independent scrutiny and on-going authorisation of any continued detention. However, judicial involvement and the detention of cash must be tailored to the circumstances. Courts can decide not to allow continued detention for the whole three-month period. If courts feel it appropriate, they can decide to say, ''You must come back before the end of the three-month period.'' However, there is a maximum period of three months, after which people must return to court and seek a renewed period of detention.

Cutting the overall maximum down to six months would not be operationally viable, and going to court every month for detentions would be over-burdensome and costly. I ask the hon. Gentleman to take that into consideration and withdraw his amendment.

As I said, having vented his spleen yesterday, the Minister has become even more reasonable. His most compelling argument was that it is proving difficult for the proceedings to be concluded within a shorter time than the periods set down in the legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 411, in page 170, line 33, leave out 'a procurator fiscal' and insert 'the Scottish Ministers'.

My hon. Friends and I tabled this amendment, and some amendments in subsequent groups, because when our proceedings in Committee were already well under way, I received a detailed e-mail from Anne Keenan, the deputy director of the Law Society of Scotland, who suggested various constructive improvements to the Bill. She sought not to water it down, but to make it more effective. I spoke to Mrs. Keenan a few minutes ago, and I shall receive further information that applies to later parts of the Bill to which we have also tabled amendments. Because of the Law Society of Scotland's involvement with anti-terrorism provisions, it has compiled a briefing note in the past few days, and I shall soon be receiving a copy of it—I thought it would be helpful to inform the Under-Secretary of that.

When we consider later groups of amendments to the clause, it may be helpful if we, the Minister and the Law Society of Scotland are working on the same lines. For example, the Government have tabled amendment No. 327, which, in part, would have the same effect as our amendment No. 415. I hope that that confirms things for sceptical Labour Members, although the most sceptical of all—the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok—is not in Committee at present. I may have to repeat what I said when he returns to the Room, so that he does not suspect me of being involved in a dark plot to water down our proceedings. I hope that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland—being a Scottish lawyer—can shed more light on the precise significance of the later amendments. However, as for the amendment under discussion, the Law Society of Scotland suggested that it would be more helpful if Scottish Ministers made the decisions rather than the procurators fiscal.

Will the hon. Gentleman clarify why he considers that Scottish Ministers should be involved in individual applications to the court?

There have been many changes in Scottish law as a result of devolution. The amendment is a probing amendment on behalf of the Law Society of Scotland. I am not a member of that, but if it feels sufficiently strongly to say to the official Opposition that it thinks that such matters are worth exploring, it is reasonable for such a professional body to be taken seriously.

Will the hon. Gentleman explain why the Law Society of Scotland is in favour of the amendment?

I am not a Scots lawyer. I can do no more than probe into such matters on behalf of the Law Society of Scotland. If I were an expert on Scots law, I might be able to give the hon. Gentleman a better answer than that. He and I are both English barristers, and we have had some arcane disputes on matters of principle in respect of English law. I have explained the basis of the amendment, but it is slightly difficult for me to pretend to have expertise in Scots law. The fact that the Government have matched some of the other amendments to the clause proposed by the

Law Society of Scotland suggests that the society may be on to a good point. I shall listen with interest to the Minister, who will have been advised by his officials, who would, in turn, have talked to Scottish lawyers. The hon. Gentleman and his officials may themselves have talked to the Law Society of Scotland. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland may have views on the matter, so I shall end my remarks now.

Clause 294 deals with the detention of seized suspect cash. It provides that cash can be held initially for 48 hours by a customs officer or a constable if reasonable grounds for the suspicion that justified the seizure of the cash remain. If cash is to be detained for longer than 48 hours, an application must be made for judicial authorisation for that continued detention. As for Scotland, the Bill provides that the application for continued detention is to be made by the procurator fiscal for a period of up to three months in the first instance. In England and Wales, a constable or an officer of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise would make the application.

The main purpose of the provision as it is drafted in relation to Scotland is to give the procurator fiscal time in which to investigate further the derivation of the cash.

Mr. Carmichael rose—

It may help the hon. Gentleman if I continue. Things that I say may impact on the burden of his arguments, because other issues arise in this case.

We will give the procurator fiscal time in which to investigate further the derivation of the cash and to consider whether criminal proceedings should be brought against a person for an offence with which the cash is connected. Amendment No. 411 would provide that Scottish Ministers, rather than the procurator fiscal, would apply to the court for the cash to be detained in the first instance and at all future detention hearings.

Clause 294 is modelled on the provisions in section 42 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, which deal with the seizure and detention of suspect cash on import or export. Under the Act, the local procurator fiscal makes the application to the sheriff for the detention of cash. The reason for that is that the case must be referred to the procurator fiscal in the first instance because he will consider, on the basis of evidence, whether a criminal prosecution would be appropriate, rather than the cash detention and forfeiture procedure.

The need to consider whether criminal prosecution is appropriate will apply equally to the new cash seizure provisions in the Bill. It is essential that the case be referred initially to the procurator fiscal. His role cannot be usurped. Prosecution must always be considered first. That is consistent with the proposed hierarchical operation of the legislation: criminal confiscation and criminal action comes before we encounter seizure, forfeiture or civil cases under part 5. It would be inappropriate to pass that responsibility to Scottish Ministers as the amendment proposes.

If the procurator fiscal decides to pursue a prosecution, clause 294 makes provision for the cash to be held pending the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. If the procurator fiscal concludes that a criminal prosecution is not feasible, the matter passes to Scottish Ministers who, under clause 297(1), would be responsible for applying to the sheriff for the forfeiture of the cash when that was appropriate. That is because the forfeiture of seized cash is a civil procedure, and it is appropriate for Scottish Ministers, rather than the procurator fiscal, to pursue that.

However, one point must be addressed. If the procurator fiscal decides that criminal proceedings are inappropriate, it may be necessary for Scottish Ministers to undertake further investigation of the derivation of the cash before making an application for forfeiture. In such circumstances, it would be appropriate for any application for further detention to be made by Scottish Ministers because the procurator fiscal would no longer be involved in the case. That situation does not arise in England, Wales or Northern Ireland because the police or customs officers undertake the proceedings at all stages. We plan to table an amendment on Report to address that point.

I hope that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath will be satisfied with that explanation and will withdraw his amendment, and I hope that I have outlined the situation sufficiently to allow the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland to make whatever points he wishes on the back of the amended intention of the Bill.

The wonderful thing about the Law Society of Scotland—or indeed, the Law Society, as we in Scotland prefer to call it—is that the manner in which it acts is not immediately apparent to those of us who are not privy to its inner counsels. However, it does eventually become clear. The Minister's helpful explanation has made it clear why the Law Society might want to make the amendments. My concern is that his explanation strikes at many other confusions in the Bill, which are more fundamental than what is before us today.

My initial question was: why should the procurator fiscal be charged with executing functions under this passage in the Bill when the Lord Advocate, who is a Scottish Minister, is more widely empowered in part 5 and other parts? The Minister explains that that is because criminal proceedings might arise from the detention of cash. That is an inevitable consequence of the unhelpful confusion brought about by clause 293 (1)(b), which states that an officer may seize cash if he suspects that it is recoverable property or is

''intended by any person for use in unlawful conduct.''

We have previously highlighted our concern that these are completely different species. It is not helpful to provide one power to deal with both.

I see the force of what the Minister says, but I am unhappy that the powers of the procurator fiscal in investigations of crime are being so profoundly confused with powers that relate to the forfeiture and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. In most

instances, the procurator fiscal would bring an application on behalf of the Lord Advocate in a sheriff court in any case. I cannot imagine, for example, that if an application were brought before the sheriff at Wick, or even Kirkwall or Lerwick, one of the Lord Advocate's solicitors from Edinburgh would go to the necessary court. The local procurator fiscal would bring it. I would argue that it would be more appropriate for him to bring it in the name of the Lord Advocate, a Scottish Minister.

All investigation of crime in Scotland is made on the instruction of the Lord Advocate. The Minister is concerned about whether the power to investigate crime would still be available if the applications were made to a Scottish Minister, or, more specifically, to the Lord Advocate, rather than the local procurator fiscal.

The Minister made a good point about the powers of Customs and Excise. However, I fear that those are not the most helpful of powers and they are probably wrongly drafted. Under the Scottish criminal justice system, Customs and Excise effectively acts as an investigating authority. It has no prosecution powers, and it reports to the procurator fiscal, who brings a prosecution. It would have been more appropriate if our predecessors in other Committees had given the power to Customs and Excise officials, rather than procurators fiscal.

I did not follow what the Minister said about forfeiture, and I wonder whether he meant forfeiture post-conviction—but that is of no great importance. The Law Society has drafted a useful probing amendment, and I hope that it will be given further consideration between now and Report.

The hon. Gentleman is raising issues that, I am told, are relevant only north of the border. Customs officers and constables have civil powers and responsibilities as well as criminal ones, so there is no impact in Wales and England, where they will exercise those powers. I think that his point may have been covered. However, I am certain that the Law Society of Scotland will examine my comments, and consider whether it is satisfied that it is appropriate for the procurator fiscal to be involved at that stage, because of the hierarchical nature of the Bill, and Scottish Ministers afterwards. If that is not the case, I am certain that it will make further representations, and, clearly, we will consider them.

I am not sure whether I am intervening on the Minister, or he was intervening on me.

You are intervening on me.

I take the point about the hierarchy. However, by virtue of the power in clause 293, the hierarchy has become confused. That is my concern. Mrs. Keenan, to whom reference has been made, is a former procurator fiscal.

I have responded to the point that has been made. I am sure that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will have further discussions, and if those who follow our proceedings want to make further points, they will do so, and we shall take them

into account. Given my explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath will withdraw the amendment, although he may wish to take further soundings, and we may return to the issue.

I am somewhat puzzled as to why the director of the Assets Recovery Agency is not involved in this matter. It seems to me that he would be the obvious person to make the application, if it is necessary for an application to be made other than by a constable. Will the Minister explain that? Alternatively, will he consider the matter further?

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted the point that I was about to make. This is an interesting issue, which has developed as a result of our discussion about Scotland.

Clearly, when there are forfeiture proceedings, the thrust of the Bill is that the director of the Assets Recovery Agency has control. However, when one considers clause 297, as we shall do in a moment, the constable appears to be the initiator of those proceedings. Indeed, that runs through the procedure that we have considered under clauses 293 and 294. That may not matter, but one would expect the director of the Assets Recovery Agency to make those decisions. If he is making all the central decisions on civil forfeiture throughout the Bill, why is this a discrete area that is left to the police to determine? That raises an interesting issue, and I cannot help wondering whether it is because of the derivation of the Bill and its predecessors, and because the issue has not been focused on. As the Minister is aware, the Bill sets up an administrative law system, with an administrative officer—the director of the Assets Recovery Agency—who is supposed to be managing it. In this case, however, as the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) rightly says, a police constable will make the choices and decisions on the application.

The issue raised by the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham does not impact on Scotland, because the director has no powers there. The point raised is a more fundamental one about the operation of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is right that the Bill is derived from the existing provision, which is also successful in the border situation. It is worth reflecting that the director is not exclusively involved in part 2, but he can become involved; where it is felt appropriate, he can assist in complicated cases of criminal confiscation. With regard to the matters addressed in chapter 2 of part 5, the director is in charge, because that chapter deals with civil recovery in the High Court and the Court of Session, and it addresses investigative cases against people for the civil recovery of the proceeds of crime.

We are discussing the seizure of cash, and instruments that can be considered to be cash. That has operated at the border for a long while, and frequently to good effect. The performance and innovation unit's report revealed that the same circumstances often arise inland. In such cases, constables or—where customs powers are involved—customs officers initiate and conduct the

investigations, and get involved in the proceedings in the High Court or the magistrates court, because such cases deal with cash issues, so some of the complications that we have discussed at length with regard to property do not arise.

The hon. Gentleman has said that the director should never be excluded, but I do not understand that. The director will not be the initiator of such cases, and the overwhelming majority of them will not be very complex, so the police, or customs officers, will be capable of investigating them. There is no reason why the director should necessarily be involved. I hope that the hon. Gentleman can appreciate that point, as he raises an issue that might be worth examining when, instead, he asks, ''Why should the director not sometimes be involved?''

The Minister has been helpful. When the legislation was drafted, it was decided to create a director of an Assets Recovery Agency, rather than to give such powers to the police. There were good reasons for taking that decision: one of them is that some of the aspects of the legislation are concerned with civil recovery proceedings, which the police would not usually deal with.

I take on board the Minister's point that a police constable will usually be the person who seizes the cash. However, as forfeiture is essentially a civil proceeding, one might have expected that decisions with regard to it would not be taken by the police—although I accept the Minister's statement that that has happened—but by the director of the Assets Recovery Agency, who is in charge of the totality of Government policy in relation to civil forfeiture of assets that are the proceeds of crime. There is a valid argument that forfeiture should be brought under that single umbrella. The Minister has hinted that that might be done by co-ordination, but that raises an anxiety in my mind—

Order. This is an intervention. We should be discussing the amendment, but we are straying from that subject.

I apologise, Mr. O'Brien.

It raises an anxiety about functions being split.

We are indeed straying considerably from that subject, Mr. O'Brien.

I wish to answer the points raised by the hon. Gentleman, and by my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham. The hon. Gentleman's comments about the relationship between the concept of the legislation and the creation of the Assets Recovery Agency are incorrect. The concept of the legislation is broader than his remarks suggest. The legislation creates an Assets Recovery Agency to do specific things, but the intention is also to extend certain powers that exist in current legislation with regard to criminal confiscation, so that further categories of proceeds of crime are covered, and the powers apply inland. That group of powers has not been operated by constables, but mostly by customs officers, and I am told that they have civil powers as well as criminal powers. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be extended to, and used by, them.

The Minister is right. In the past, I have done civil work for the Customs and Excise relating to that type of work. Customs and Excise has extensive powers that extend to civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. The police do not usually have such powers. That is why the involvement of the police constable in forfeiture proceedings causes me some anxiety.

I think that I am happy with the way in which the measure is structured. In the overwhelming majority of cases, there is no practical necessity to involve the director in cash confiscation proceedings. The hon. Gentleman may reflect on that matter, which is valid, but it is not the subject of the amendment that we are discussing.

I am sorry to trouble the Minister. A sudden thought has flashed into my head that could save a great deal of money. Perhaps we have inadvertently stumbled across a brilliant way of economising. If it is possible for a constable not only to seize the cash but to hold on to it for two years, what is the purpose of the Assets Recovery Agency?

Order. We are moving away from the basis of the amendment. It appears that we have exhausted the debate—[Hon. Members: ''Hear, hear.'']

The constable cannot seize cash and keep it for two years. He has the ability, when he has reasonable grounds, to seize cash and keep it for 48 hours. He must appear in front of a magistrate and justify the decision that he has taken. If he subsequently wishes to keep that cash, he must return to a magistrate every three months. The hon. Gentleman paints a caricature of the police powers. As you said, Mr. O'Brien, the issue has been exhausted. We should allow the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to consider whether he wishes to pursue the amendment.

When I moved the probing amendment—originally drafted by the Law Society of Scotland—I did not anticipate such an interesting debate. What has emerged from the Minister's very helpful response—particularly when he said that he might propose further Government amendments to address the point—is that the Law Society of Scotland was right to encourage us to table the amendment. To begin with, the hon. Members for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) and for Wrexham were puzzled about the involvement of the Scottish Ministers.

I wanted to know why such an austere body as the Law Society of Scotland proposed the amendment. Unfortunately, the hon. Gentleman failed to give a reason.

My point was that the Law Society of Scotland was right to draw attention to the Scottish Ministers. Initially, that puzzled all of us, but it has been clarified by the Minister's helpful response. As I anticipated when moving the amendment, the Minister and his officials have been talking to the Law Society of Scotland, and have realised that there was an important issue. The hon. Member for Wellingborough has received his answer, not from

me, but from his own Minister. That reflects the fact that the Minister can utilise the enormous resources of the civil service to explore those points more fully than Members on the Opposition Front Bench who are not Scots lawyers.

The importance of the relationship between Scottish Ministers and procurators fiscal, and the inherent dangers, was further expanded on by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. The debate has been useful, and the object of probing has been achieved, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 412, in page 170, line 35, leave out 'either of'.

With this it will be convenient to take the following: Amendment No. 413, in page 170, line 35, leave out 'conditions' and insert 'condition'.

Amendment No. 415, in page 170, line 36, leave out subsections (5) and (6).

Government amendments Nos. 326 and 327.

Amendment No. 416, in page 171, line 7, leave out 'second'.

Government amendments Nos. 328, 332 and 342.

Again, these amendments were drafted by the Law Society of Scotland. Now that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok has returned, I can stress to him—as I have to other members of the Committee—that the Law Society of Scotland intended for the amendments to clarify and improve the Bill. They are not intended to provide lawyers' loopholes through which the Mr. Bigs of Pollok and elsewhere may slip. Government amendment No. 327 would delete subsection (6), in a similar way to half the Law Society of Scotland's amendment No. 415. I hope that that reassures him that the society is again on to a sensible point.

Clearly, the Government have an alternative way of doing things, through the Government amendments, but I stress to the Minister and the Committee that the amendments are probing. I suspect that the Minister will tell us that following his officials' consultation with the Law Society of Scotland, his solution to clarify and improve the clause is better than the society's initial draft, which we have adopted. If he satisfies us that the Government have thought of a better way of dealing with the problem, I will take on board what I anticipate he will say. However, I hope that he will acknowledge that we and the Law Society of Scotland made a legitimate attempt to improve the Bill by clarifying it.

Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether he is suggesting that the only circumstances in which cash may be seized are when proceedings have been commenced? That seems to be the upshot of the amendment. Do I understand him correctly?

Yes, I think that the hon. Gentleman understands me correctly. I cannot claim to be an expert on Scots law, but I believe that that is what the Law Society of Scotland was driving at. We agree with that, and I shall listen with interest to what the

Minister and the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland say.

The purpose of the cash recovery scheme is to allow for the seizure, detention and forfeiture of cash that is either recoverable property—in other words the proceeds of crime—or intended for use in unlawful conduct, and is connected to any crime. That reflects exactly the existing similar schemes under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the recent Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Those Acts allow for the seizure, continued detention and forfeiture of cash that represents the proceeds of either drug trafficking or terrorism.

The cash recovery scheme that we are considering provides a straightforward means of recovering cash, whether it is the proceeds of unlawful conduct or intended for use in unlawful conduct.

The removal of recoverable cash from circulation is a crucial aspect of preventing crime. Recoverable cash is readily recycled—for example, to buy more drugs. It may also serve to allow a person to maintain an extravagant lifestyle that furnishes an undesirable role model for young people.

It would have been possible to include cash that is recoverable property in the civil recovery scheme set out in chapter 2. That will be the case where cash is part of a wider portfolio of property that the director of the Assets Recovery Agency or Scottish Ministers are seeking to recover in civil recovery proceedings.

However, the scheme that is provided for in chapter 3 of part 5 is a rather different one. It is more appropriate to cases where cash is detained after coming to the attention of the police or Customs officers in the normal course of their work. Pure cash is quick and simple, and there is little room for the complex arguments that arose in our roving debates on the previous amendment. The existing pure cash schemes before the magistrates court illustrate the effectiveness of such arrangements. In 2000, £4.5 million of drugs-related cash was forfeited under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. The scheme is successful and fully understood and has stood the test of time.

The amendments would withdraw the ability to detain cash under the scheme for more than 48 hours if it is suspected of being the proceeds of crime. Under the legislation, such cash can continue to be detained if its derivation is being further investigated or if it is connected to criminal proceedings that are being contemplated or have begun. The amendments would remove the ability to detain such cash beyond 48 hours even if forfeiture proceedings were initiated during that period. Cash that was seized on the basis that it was recoverable property would therefore be detainable for only 48 hours, even if the case for making an application for forfeiture were made at that early stage. That is not desirable, nor would there be any point in detaining cash in those circumstances.

Presumably, if the 48-hour period were to exist, that would be enough time for the director of the Assets Recovery Agency to start such proceedings,

if he wished to deal with the matter under his other powers.

The hon. Gentleman expects that the director could involve himself in every case and satisfy the court that there is a good, arguable case, as required under chapter 2 of part 5, to transfer seized cash in effect to that part of the Bill and to continue with detection under civil forfeiture. That would be difficult to ensure in every case. He is suggesting that we dismantle something that has worked well in its context, which I accept that we are broadening, and replace it with something else. We would do so at great risk of losing that effectiveness and allowing those moneys to continue in circulation. I ask him to reflect on what he is asking us to do. We should not dismantle something that has worked well, which his Government introduced in 1994, and we certainly do not intend to go down that route.

It would be complicated to expect the director to respond to every request in any part of the country from the police who have managed to obtain cash, and make a good, arguable case in civil recovery and take it to court all within 48 hours, or give the money back to the individuals concerned. That would be detrimental.

Under the amendments, cash that was seized on the basis that it was recoverable property could be detained for only 48 hours. If prosecution were contemplated, an application for restraint would be possible, but even in those circumstances the cash would have to be released until a restraint order had been obtained. The cash would remain in the control of the individual concerned rather than in detention and could fairly easily go missing.

I wonder whether this matter is unnecessarily complicated. If a physical sum of cash is identified as possibly having been the subject of unlawful conduct—the commission of a crime—the police already have the power to hold it as a production and they will routinely do so.

I am sorry, but I missed the hon. Gentleman's point. Could he repeat it?

The Minister is talking about the holding of a physical sum of money in relation to a criminal proceeding. He seems to be suggesting that the money would have to be released before a restraining order could be obtained. We are talking about the investigation of crime. Let us suppose that the police come across a large sum of money and say, ''What's this, then? It looks a bit fishy and we're going to investigate.'' If they are pursuing a reasonable suspicion, they already have the power to take that money to be a production—I think that the term used in England is ''exhibit''—and to hold it under the powers in the Police (Scotland) Act 1967.

Not necessarily. The hon. Gentleman is talking about criminal proceedings under part 2; the hon. Member for Beaconsfield talked about the use of civil proceedings under chapter 2 of part 5. Under that part of the Bill, a criminal act does not need to be proven. For part 2 to

kick in—the hierarchy suggests that that should be the case when appropriate—there will have to be the chance of a prosecution for criminality. That is the test that will apply. Chapter 2 of part 5, on civil recovery, is not intended to be used in cash-only cases. To suggest otherwise would mean having to rewrite almost the entire Bill. Chapter 3 is a straightforward extension of what is currently operated by Customs and Excise at the border, and in inland situations the power is extended to constables.

I struggle to understand the hon. Gentlemen's concerns. They are effectively saying that criminality must be proven at the relevant point or the cash released in relation to part 2 kicking in, which will not always be the case, or that cash be included in the civil recovery case. However, obtaining a restraint order under chapter 2 of part 5 within 48 hours would be difficult.

I think that I understand the position—perhaps the Minister will correct me if I have misunderstood his scenario. Money is seized within 48 hours, and it becomes apparent that it will be the subject of a criminal investigation. If I misrepresent the Minister, I apologise, but he then seemed to suggest that it would be necessary to obtain a restraining order in order to hold on to the money. That is unnecessary, because the police's existing powers entitle them to hold the money as part of their investigation.

But we shall not always be able to bring criminal investigations. We are discussing a civil proceeding for moneys intended for use in crime, or the proceeds of crime.

If the money is intended for use in crime, it is part of a criminal investigation, and the police have the power to hold it, surely.

Possibly, but not exclusively, and certainly not in the case of the proceeds of crime. The hon. Gentleman suggests that moneys that are the proceeds of crime would have to be released. I do not know whether I have satisfied him—I seem to have confused him. A point that may have an impact on his anxieties is that, once criminal proceedings are initiated, the power to hold on to the money applies only if it is required as evidence. That is a narrower power than is currently available to Customs officers at the border and would be provided by the extension envisaged under the Bill. In some circumstances, the money would have to be released.

Of course, the issue of hanging on to the cash when it is required as evidence will crop up under clause 295, which we shall discuss in a moment. I hope that the Minister will be aware that, on behalf of the Law Society of Scotland, and for good reasons with which we agree, my hon. Friends and I have tabled amendment No. 417, which would delete clause 295(2). I do not want to anticipate that debate, because that is a separate amendment, but that issue is involved, and we shall debate it.

Don't do it, then.

I think that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland accepts that the power to hold on to money

that can be shown to be required as evidence will in some circumstances be far narrower than that which we are providing in the Bill. In some circumstances, the cash will need to be released.

If the cash were believed to be the direct fruits of crime or stolen property, there would be no problem holding on to it, irrespective of whether it was needed for evidence in criminal proceedings. If the police recover money that they believe might be the property of another person, I understand that, under their current powers, they would have no difficulty in holding on to it.

That is not so. If it were, we would not be introducing the Bill. We are told that, as the performance and innovation unit report exposed, police and Customs officers operating inland sometimes come across cash that is clearly derived from crime and that they believe they can show to be derived from crime, or intended for use in crime, that they have no powers to detain, although they do have them at borders. It was at their instigation, not as a result of some great plan on the part of the Home Secretary, the Prime Minister or another politician, that the Bill was introduced. The problem was brought to our attention, and it is that problem that the Bill is intended to tackle. The hon. Gentleman seems to suggest that there is no problem, and that we were deceived about the extent to which moneys remain unseizable.

The Minister may have misunderstood my question. I am sure that he would agree that the police have the power to detain cash that they believe to be stolen property. They do not require any of the powers that we are discussing. They have had that power for about as long as that of recovering stolen property. The police frequently hold on to cash in the course of criminal investigations if they have a reasonable suspicion that it might be stolen property.

The police have to be satisfied that they can show that the property is stolen. On occasion, in the course of their duties, the police come across money that they have to let go, because they cannot hold on to it as they do not currently have that power. We are discussing a civil procedure, and the standard of proof is therefore lower than in criminal procedures, in which the case must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

Provisions under similar schemes in drug and terrorism legislation allow for the continued detention of the proceeds of crime. They also allow cash to be detained for the same period as cash that is suspected of being intended for use in crimes. That allows for the continued detention of cash if criminal proceedings are contemplated or on-going. We can see no reason, operationally or theoretically, to distinguish the scheme from equivalent ones. I hope that, in light of my comments, the Opposition amendments will not be pressed to a vote.

The Government amendments cover some of the same issues. Amendment No. 326 is a minor drafting amendment to ensure consistency between paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (5). Amendment No. 328 makes the language in subsection (7) consistent with

that in subsection (5), as there is no reason for the two subsections to differ. Subsection (7) sets out conditions for detaining cash suspected of being intended for use in unlawful conduct. Subsection (5) sets out conditions for detaining cash suspected of being recoverable property because it has been obtained through unlawful conduct. The two sets of conditions should be more closely aligned.

Subsection (7) currently permits the detention of cash suspected of being intended for use in unlawful conduct while its intended use is further investigated. Amendment No. 328 allows for continued detention of the cash while consideration is given to the criminal proceedings for an offence with which the cash is connected, or pending the conclusion of such proceedings. That is similar to subsection (5), which allows cash that is suspected of having been derived through unlawful conduct to be detained while its derivation is investigated, or while consideration is given to bringing criminal proceedings for an offence with which it is connected.

Amendment No. 328 reflects the fact that an intention to commit unlawful conduct may lead to criminal proceedings in, for example, a charge of conspiracy. It is right that cash intended for such use should be detained while a charge is considered or pending the conclusion of criminal proceedings. A similar approach has been taken in paragraph (3)(6) of schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 for the detention of terrorist cash.

Amendments Nos. 327, 332 and 342 are purely drafting amendments and make no substantive change. Amendment No. 342 provides a single, general interpretation of what is meant in part 5 by the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

I come back to an issue that has exercised the Committee. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland has commented on it, and it was first raised by the Law Society of Scotland. Amendments on the issue were moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath. Perhaps lawyers have tidy minds. We are considering a new structure that is being set up by the Government. It includes a confiscation system and a civil recovery system. In the passage dealing with civil recovery procedure, there is a section on the recovery of cash in summary proceedings.

As the Minister so rightly explained—he almost, unintentionally I think, let the cat out of the bag—the recovery of cash in the summary proceedings part had been prompted by representations from Customs and Excise and other law enforcement authorities. He has put in the middle of the civil recovery proceedings a pre-existing power that had previously been given to Customs and Excise and, at its request, has expanded it. There is nothing wrong in that. He said that the system is tried and tested, and that the Government will make it possible to be implemented by police constables in inland situations. It also applies to Scotland. The Law Society of Scotland considered the

matter and found it a little odd. It seems to the society—it is, indeed, a valid point—that the mixing of the civil recovery provisions with other powers is not conducive to clarity.

That ties in very much with our comments on an earlier amendment about the lack of involvement of the director of the Assets Recovery Agency in the forfeiture that may follow upon the recovery of cash. I am mindful of what the Minister said about such matters. I accept that the powers of Customs and Excise have been tried and tested. What is proposed will be a substantial alteration of a pre-existing situation.

Equally, the Minister must accept that the Bill is introducing a new regime. It is perfectly legitimate for the Government to say that they will create new powers, but they say that there may be occasions when existing powers can be done away with or altered because those new powers have been brought into operation. I accept the Government's reassurances about what are, as the Minister has acknowledged, fairly draconian provisions designed to target the proceeds of crime. Provisions in respect of the confiscation of people's assets in civil proceedings, even if they have not committed a criminal offence, have not existed in this country before. However, it is important that the public are reassured that a consistent system will be implemented by an individual who will be answerable for his actions. We know that the director of the Assets Recovery Agency will be answerable for his actions and reports. We do not want a position in which there are parallel powers unless it is absolutely essential that that must be so.

The Law Society of Scotland has a good point, and it applies equally to England and Wales. The Minister is allowing a situation to occur in which cash is separated from other assets for the purposes of civil and criminal recovery. Under the clause, it will be entrusted in its civil context, not to the civil recovery authority that the Government have set up but to Customs and Excise, and the power will be widened to include the police. The Law Society of Scotland has tried to remove that power, so that it is made clear that the director of the Assets Recovery Agency will call the shots the moment that civil forfeiture, not criminal proceedings, is being dealt with.

I am open to persuasion, and I also accept that, until it was flagged up by the Law Society of Scotland, I failed to focus on the issue. Like the Minister, I went along with the view that there was a previous tried and tested procedure, which is being slightly widened. However, some interesting issues of principle are involved. We may have to return to this issue on Report, when we will have had more time to consider it more carefully, but when the seizure of cash leads, effectively, to civil forfeiture, albeit in short form, I find it difficult to understand why the director of the Assets Recovery Agency is not involved, as he is answerable for the system.

Historically, a previous Conservative Government gave extra powers to the organisations that enforce the criminal law, thereby extending their jurisdiction to bringing cases for confiscation on the balance of

probabilities in order to deter crime. I was not a Member of Parliament at the time but I understand exactly why it was done. I also suspect that if one looks at Hansard for that time—I remember doing so at some point—one will see that civil liberties issues were raised, because the power was novel. Given that we are creating a completely new structure, and the Minister is eager to provide reassurance that people's civil liberties will not be trampled on, there might have been an opportunity to separate civil and criminal jurisdictions and put the director of the Assets Recovery Agency in control of civil proceedings. I do not know the extent to which he wishes to comment further on that, but it is an absolutely valid point.

We may be in danger, unnecessarily, of setting up a hybrid system in which the channels of accountability are blurred. I do not know whether the seizure of cash will form a major part of asset recovery—it may remain tiny—but if it does, and it is done on the civil basis, it would be highly desirable for the director of the Assets Recovery Agency to be answerable for the steps that are taken. Under the amendments, as has been highlighted, the police could seize the asset, hold it for 48 hours, ring up the director of the Assets Recovery Agency, and say, ''Look, we've no interest in this in respect of criminal proceedings, but £25,000 was found on this person. Are you interested?'' If the director said yes, he could do something about it. That might even be an argument for extending the 48-hour detention period to, say, five days, which would give him that opportunity. The ball would still be in his court, rather than the police officer's.

The Minister seems to think that this is a simple matter: that cash is a simple issue, and that the constable can deal with it. That may be so, but it might become complex in certain circumstances. During the past 12 months, a racehorse trainer was found with £55,000 as he left Heathrow airport. The money was seized, but it was returned to him when he was able to establish clearly that it was neither the proceeds of crime nor intended for the furtherance of criminal activities. Will the Minister consider whether the Law Society of Scotland has done us a good service by trying to highlight what may be a mistake in the Bill?

I shall be brief, because the hon. Gentleman has said nothing with which I can disagree. The debate reminds me why I thought that life as a politician might be more agreeable than life as a lawyer. Parliament makes life unnecessarily complicated for lawyers.

The Minister must give some serious consideration between now and Report stage to the points made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the separation of civil and criminal jurisdictions. I return to the plea about not lumping together the powers concerning confiscation or forfeiture on the one hand, and the investigation of crime on the other, because it unnecessarily confuses the matter and is unhelpful.

With regard to letting the cat out of the bag, nobody should be under any illusions. We consulted people on the provisions in the Bill. Practitioners of the current scheme were part of that consultation and their views were taken into account, so to what extent did I let the cat out of the bag? There

has been no representation from Customs officers to say, ''Wait a minute. We have certain powers at the border but we sometimes come across similar situations that are not at the border and we can't touch the stuff.''

I did not make my comment pejoratively. The Minister has been honest and forthcoming with the Committee and has often had to suffer bombardment throughout the weeks that we have been sitting. I am grateful to him, but when he said, ''Well, that was their idea, and that's why we've put it in,'' it made me wonder whether the totality of the picture had been examined when the course of action was embarked on.

The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland want me to consider a major rewrite of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman knows that the logistics would be horrendous and the issues raised would be of concern to the Committee. As he has said, we would have to extend the two-day period considerably and there would be a great deal of bureaucracy.

The Assets Recovery Agency is meant to be an agency that provides the necessary expertise for serious investigations of civil recovery under chapter 2 and the expertise to back up the confiscation procedures. I have not the faintest idea about the size of the agency, but for it to be able not only to perform those functions but to take over from Customs and Excise and constables, I suggest to Opposition Members that we are talking about considerable growth in a new institution over and above that which is currently envisaged.

Customs and Excise currently operates the scheme. We would not be removing the police, as the hon. Gentleman recognises, from involvement in the procedures. As he says, they were brought in under previous Governments and that was extended by the current Government. The police operate antisocial behaviour orders, which are civil procedures, so we would not be separating out some great principle in moving to what he suggests.

We have a workable scheme. It is considered by the police and Customs officers to be extendable in a workable fashion. That is how the Bill is currently read and I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a commitment that I will consider a total rewrite of all responsibilities for the director of the agency.

Once again, as the Minister has fairly acknowledged, the Law Society of Scotland's drafts have opened an interesting debate. Despite his dismissive comment that he is not prepared to consider a complete rewrite of the Bill, I have no doubt that, having heard the debate, his officials will consider a rewrite and we may see a change of heart in due course.

The hon. Gentleman is trying to foment rebellion.

I do not know whether I am inciting rebellion, but during my parliamentary career it has not been unknown for Ministers of both Labour and

Conservative Governments to be dismissive about prospects for further change when on their feet but for there to be a subsequent change of heart.

The Minister should consider seriously the wise words of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland about how he decided to stand for Parliament because it made life more difficult for lawyers. That was also part of my motivation to stand. After wrestling with arcane statutory drafting in the courts while in practice at the Bar, I thought to myself that there must be a better way of doing things and perhaps I should get inside the system and try to improve the drafting to ensure that we have workable laws. I am sure that even the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok and I would unite to believe that we should have laws that actually work and hit the Mr. Bigs at whom we aim.

It is astonishing that the hon. Members for Surrey Heath and for Orkney and Shetland admitted that they came to Parliament to make life easier for lawyers. Here is simple me, who came to Parliament to try to overthrow capitalism.

The hon. Gentleman may certainly have had a different motivation. We shall have to see which of us will be the more disappointed.

Order. Whether hon. Members came to Parliament to help lawyers or to get social justice, they should stick to the amendment.

The point that I make is that we want laws that work, which reinforces the point that was made by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland.

The Law Society of Scotland did the Committee a service by raising the serious point that the way in which the clause is drafted may not provide the most effective way of dealing with matters. Opposition Members think that the society may have come up with improvements. I am sure that the Government will consider the matter further.

I shall not press the amendments to a vote. There are Government amendments that draw on some of the spirit that the Law Society of Scotland got at. However, the procedure is not finished, and the Government may wish to consider further improvements on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 414, in page 170, line 35, at end insert—

'(4A) Before making an order under this section, the court must take into account any representations made to it by any person whom the court thinks is likely to be affected by the order.

(4B) In making representations to the court under subsection (4A), any person whom the court thinks is likely to be affected by the order shall be entitled to appear before the court.'.

This is a matter of considerable substance. I do not move the amendment as a probing amendment, unlike the previous ones. Again, my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, myself and other Conservative Members are indebted to the Law Society of Scotland for drafting the precise wording of the amendment.

Again, we are worried about the possibility of the seizure of cash that may be entirely innocent. Other parts of the Bill make express provision to allow interested parties to make representations to the court. Clause 94 gives that power to those affected by the making of the confiscation order and clause 136 gives the power for the protection of a person who is affected by action taken by any administrator. Given the potential impact of the making of an order under this clause, a similar power to make representations should be incorporated.

I appreciate that the Government have tabled new clause 9, which relates specifically to victims. We will debate the new clause later, but the amendment provides a better way of paralleling what the Government have already included in clauses 94 and 136, and I cannot think of a good reason why there should not be a parallel power in this part of the Bill.

I am sure that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will, once again, give the Committee the benefit of his experience of how such matters are usually dealt with in Scotland.

The Minister might not be prepared immediately to accept the amendment, as drafted, but I hope that he will be willing to reconsider the serious point that I have raised—perhaps on Report, or in another place.

The amendment would allow anyone who appears to be affected by the continued detention of the cash to make representations, in person, at the initial detention hearing, and at any subsequent hearing. As the Bill is currently drafted, those affected by a detention order must be given notice of it under subsection (8). We intend to make rules of court to the effect that such people must be notified of hearings—other than the initial one—and that they must have a right to be heard before the court. They will have the right to make representations at all hearings except the first one.

An exception is made for the first hearing because it is unlikely to be practicable for those affected by the detention of the cash to be notified in time for them to attend a hearing that must be held within 48 hours of the seizure. We agree that those affected by a detention order should have a right to make representations. That will be provided for—other than in respect of the initial hearing,

The hon. Gentleman and I have no substantive disagreement. I hope that he will accept that my proposals represent the right way to address the matter, and that, in the light of my assurances, he will withdraw the amendment.

The Minister's comments have some force, but I want him to explain why affected parties should be excluded from being present in person or represented at the initial hearing. It might be true that it would be difficult to notify such parties—that is often the case in interdict proceedings, for example—but if, through their own volition or otherwise, they are aware of the proceedings, I can see no reason why they should not be entitled to appear at the first hearing. The amendment would give them that entitlement, and that is sensible.

I share the hon. Gentleman's view. I accept that the only person present at the first hearing might be the person from whom the cash was seized. However, in some cases, another person might be able to provide a rapid and easy explanation about the cash—for example, he might have entrusted it to the person from whom it was seized to effect a transaction.

Ha.

The hon. Gentleman wants to ask who hands £35,000 to somebody to go and carry out a transaction. Before he does so, I remind him that instruments that are in common commercial use are covered by this measure, such as cheques, banker's drafts and bearer bonds.

A bearer bond might be worth a substantial sum, and a first person might hand it to a second person to complete a transaction: if that has happened, it seems odd that the first person might not be allowed to make a representation at the earliest possible stage. It could be argued that that person could equally easily contact the police, or Customs and Excise, and say, ''Here is the documentation to prove that that is my money.'' We must allow for the fact that Customs and Excise and the police sometimes get it wrong. Otherwise, there would be no need for any form of judicial reviewing of their decision making. It is difficult to see why the provision should not be included and I hope that the Minister will consider it.

I entirely endorse the comments made by my hon. Friends the Members for Surrey Heath and for Beaconsfield, and the sensible suggestion of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland.

Our worry is that the provision is rather strict. It provides no opportunity for a third party to give an explanation. I appreciate that—given the narrow time frame and the nature of the bureaucracy that will inevitably surround such a system—it would be difficult to oblige the authorities to ensure that every person who may have been affected is contacted. However, when moneys have been seized, it is probable that any third party will be put on the back foot. To counter an initial court hearing, that third party then has to try and prove the case in an entirely different way.

I am interested to hear how the Minister envisages the system working. A third party who has a good explanation stands to lose significant sums in the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield described. A person who passed on a bearer bond or a banker's draft may find that a prolonged delay puts him in a position of financial embarrassment. If such an individual would not have any locus standi at the initial investigation, how does the Minister envisage the system working?

I am a little worried that I am arguing against a pre-determined decision to vote on the matter. There is no issue of substance between us. We do not intend to provoke people and bring in the rules of court to prevent them from making representations at the initial hearing. We will not insist that the court gives the right to every person affected at the initial hearing because, logistically, that

is not possible. A person will have the right to make representations to the initial hearing. He will also have the right to make representations to the Customs or police officer prior to that hearing. We intend to insist that all those affected are given notification and have the right to make representations at all subsequent hearings.

As I have said, there is not an issue of substance between us. We are talking about a methodology in terms of whether the provision is written into the Bill or included in the rules of court. The only other issue is that of logistics. I think that hon. Gentlemen accept that it is not logistically possible for the court to notify every affected person within the 48-hour period.

That point is accepted. However, can the Minister show me the part in the proposed new subsections (4A) and (4B) that would require the court to do that?

No, I cannot. As I said, we intend to include such a provision in the rules of court to ensure that everyone has the right to make representations at all subsequent hearings and not to exclude that right at the initial hearing.

The Minister is right. There is a dispute between us in terms of methodology, but he may have slightly misunderstood the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. The amendment would not oblige the court to try to find people. It states that, if a person is aware, he should have the right to make representations. We are saying that that provision should be written into the Bill, not merely in the rules of court.

Perhaps I have misread the amendment, and if that is the case, I will make the hon. Gentleman aware of it. However, with my stated intention as to how the provision will apply, I hope that he does not see a necessity to push it to a Division now.

The hon. Member for Surrey Heath put his finger on an important point about what the Minister said about making provision and rules of court. In Scotland, that will be done by Ministers through Acts of Sederunt promulgated by the president of the Court of Session. I believe that it is a matter of sufficient importance. It is a fundamental principle that when someone is and is not entitled to appear should be specified in the Bill, not by statutory instrument.

The hon. Gentleman makes a point on which it is worth reflecting, and I assure him that I shall reflect on it.

I appreciate that the Minister will reflect on the matter, but I believe that he has genuinely—I make no accusation—misunderstood our intention in proposing new subsections (4A) and (4B). To reinforce his intention to consider the matter further, I should like to press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 12.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendments made: No. 326, in page 170, line 41, leave out from beginning to 'is' and insert 'with which the cash'.

No. 327, in page 171, line 1, leave out subsection (6).

No. 328, in page 171, leave out lines 8 to 11 and insert

'that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash is intended to be used in unlawful conduct and that either—

(a) its continued detention is justified while its intended use is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected, or

(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected have been started and have not been concluded'.

No. 445, in page 171, line 11, at end insert—

'(7A) An application for an order under subsection (2) may also be made in respect of any cash seized under section 293(1A), and the court, sheriff or justice may make the order if satisfied that—

(a) the condition in subsection (5) or (7) is met in respect of part of the cash, and

(b) it is not reasonably practicable to detain only that part'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]

Clause 294, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.