I beg to move amendment No. 384, in page 150, line 3, leave out from 'that' to the end of line 5 and insert

'it is just so to do'.

The clause deals with the exclusion of property that is not recoverable. Subsection (3) states:

''The court may exclude any property within subsection (2) on any terms or conditions, applying while the interim receiving order has effect, which the court thinks necessary or expedient.''

The amendment would replace that with

'it is just so to do'.

On a previous occasion, members of the Committee debated the use of expressions and, in particular, the word ''appropriate''. The Minister and I were poles apart. I said that I did not like the use of the word ''appropriate'' and that I preferred the word ''just''. The reason for that was that the word ''appropriate'' covered administrative convenience. Under subsection (3), the wording is even more heavily weighted towards administrative convenience. What do the words ''necessary or expedient'' mean? How do they square with the principles of justice? If the words ''necessary or expedient'' mean the same as ''just so to do'', let us have ''just so to do'' because that is a better form of words. If they do not, there is a distinct difference in meaning between ''just so to do'' and ''necessary or expedient''.

I worry about the word ''expedient'', because that which is expedient is not necessarily fair or just. Subsection (3) refers to whether property that is not recoverable should be excluded. Subsection (1) states:

''If the court decides that any property to which''—

Order. I have been listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. Far be it from me to quarrel with his legal expertise, but it appears that he is speaking to subsection (3), whereas his amendment appears to apply to subsection (2). I am perfectly happy for the hon. Gentleman to broaden the debate slightly, on the understanding that there will not be a stand part debate. However, in the interests of marshalling his argument, he may wish to review his position.

I am very grateful, Mr. Gale, and I apologise profusely to the Committee. I am having to consider whether the error is in my reading, or in my amendment, which I drafted late at night as usual, or whether I intended it to refer to subsection (3). I am sure that I have made an error in identifying the line in which the amendment was supposed to feature, but I am bound to say that I intended to amend subsection (3) for the reasons that I have given—to change ''necessary or expedient'' to ''just so to do''. I am reinforced in that view by the fact that my manuscript note is against the passage concerned. I apologise to the Committee and the Minister, who will have notes prepared with reference to something entirely different. Indeed, I was just trying to look at subsection (2) to see whether it would make sense to make the amendment—

Order. With respect, the hon. Gentleman cannot move an amendment that is not on the amendment paper. It might be for his convenience to consider not moving it, and engage in the debate that he wants on clause stand part, which would give the Minister the opportunity to reply. Although that would not create an amendment, it would allow the Minister to give any assurances that he wants to give.

I can only apologise further. It is clear that I am in a muddled condition. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause contains provisions that are intended to ensure that property does not remain subject to an interim receiving order unnecessarily. Clause 254, which we have already discussed, provides that the court has the power to vary or set aside an interim receiving order at any time. Clause 257 makes further specific provision for the court to vary an order so that certain properties are excluded from the proceedings altogether. It covers two situations: those in which the court decides before the final trial of the action that the property to which the order applies is neither recoverable property nor associated property, and those in which the court thinks that alleged associated property could be excluded from the terms of the interim receiving order without prejudicing the director's right to recover property. The clause therefore provides useful safeguards.

Clearly, property that is neither recoverable nor associated property should not remain the subject of an interim receiving order once it has been established that that is the case. The court may decide that following an application by an interested person, or in response to a report from the interim receiver made under clause 258. If it so decides, it will be required to exclude the relevant property from the terms of the interim receiving order, which could apply to all of the property subject to the order or just some of it. Property that is alleged to be associated property may be in the hands of persons who are willing to co-operate with the proceedings, and who have no interest in frustrating the future making of a recovery order. When that is the case, there may be no need to apply an interim receiving order to such property. The court may therefore exclude from the terms of the interim receiving order alleged associated property, if it thinks that the property may be excluded without prejudice to possible further rights of the director to recover recoverable property. If the court decides to vary the order so as to exclude associated property, it may apply terms and conditions that it believes necessary or expedient, which may remain in force while the order has effect. The clause ensures that interim receiving orders will be reviewed as necessary and that property found not to be recoverable or associated is removed from the ambit of an order. It will allow the removal of alleged associated property from the terms of the order without prejudicing the director's right of recovery.

I am grateful to the Minister for his clear exposition of the clause. I apologise again to the Committee. I now have the opportunity to reread the provision, instead of moving rapidly from one amendment to another. Perhaps when I drafted the amendment, at 1 o'clock in the morning or whenever it was, I considered tinkering with both subsections (2) and (3). I appreciate that the earlier amendment that I did not move could have been made to subsection (2) in order to achieve a similar impact to the one that I

hoped to achieve in subsection (3). A general point is involved that, in a funny way, applies to either; we might consider it.

I realise that the purpose of the clause is to provide a measure of relief in cases in which the court decides that an interim receiving order should be varied so as to exclude property, especially associated property. As the Minister is aware, that takes us back to our discussion of a few minutes ago.

Under subsection (2), the varying of an interim receiving order

''so as to exclude from the property to which the order applies any property which is alleged to be associated property'' is not based on whether the court believes that it is just to do so but gives primacy to not prejudicing the enforcement authority's ability to recover the property. In a sense, we are duplicating our earlier discussion.

Under subsection (3), on the other hand,

''The court may exclude property within subsection (2) on any terms or conditions, applying while the interim receiving order has effect, which the court thinks necessary or expedient.''

That is the point at which I tried to tinker with the provision. Although I developed the argument in relation to the wrong amendment a few minutes ago, the amendment that I developed to subsection (3) was the better of the two amendments and better than messing around with subsection (2). Subsection (3) defines the basis on which subsection (2) should operate.

I simply voice that anxiety. I certainly will not resist the incorporation of the clause into the Bill, but I ask the Minister to consider carefully, especially in relation to subsection (3), whether the words ''necessary or expedient'' are correct, for the reasons that I explained in my failed argument a few minutes ago.

The court should decide to exclude property on the basis of justice between the parties, especially in relation to the party who has an interest in associated property that may be prejudiced. I do not know whether the Minister and his draftsman can do that, but I ask him to consider the matter.

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has considered that some of the amendments with which he has been tinkering might have an effect that he does not necessarily intend. Perhaps he will reflect on that, and I shall reflect on his point.

We are dealing with property that is still in dispute. Some of the suggestions that the hon. Gentleman makes might remove the requirement to continue to consider the director's or enforcement authority's right in that dispute. The hon. Gentleman may be thinking of individuals who own associated property and who are not willing to co-operate in the proceedings and he may be thinking that, despite that lack of co-operation, they should have the ability to unfreeze the property to their benefit. I am not dead sure that that is what he wants to achieve, but I shall look into the matter with regard to the amendment that he tabled. We want to give the court the discretion

to unravel such matters and take into account the rights of the director and others. I accept that that is a rerun of an earlier debate.

The Minister was correct to say that the director and the enforcement authority have rights. After all, they are bringing the action and they wish to recover recoverable property. I am worried about the innocent individual with associated property who is caught up in the process. Such a position has applied to several clauses that we have discussed, in that the balance is tipped firmly in favour of the director and the enforcement authority against that of the individual. That is why the use of the word ''just'' seemed to go some way to redress that balance in the way in which the court exercises its discretion to exclude property under subsection (2). Clearly, I failed dismally to achieve my objective under the previous amendment.

Given the mix-up between the hon. Gentleman and myself, I agree to consider the issue.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 257 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 258 to 262 ordered to stand part of the Bill.