The subsection relates to circumstances in which

``the defendant's benefit exceeds the amount found as his benefit for the purposes of the confiscation order''.

Paragraph (b) states that

``if it exceeds the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order''

the court

``may vary the order by substituting for the amount required to be paid such amount as it believes is just.''

Therefore, if the amount is increased but the court believes that to take the entire increase into account would be unjust, it may choose not to take into account the entire increase. The Bill does not allow the court to conclude that the benefits were lower than those in the original confiscation order, and nor should it.

As I said, at the time of the original confiscation, the defendant can put his case and show that his property was not the proceeds of crime. He has the opportunity to request a postponement in order to do that, of up to two years in normal circumstances and, in exceptional circumstances, beyond two years. That should provide him with the opportunity to prove his case. I do not understand why we should include yet another provision for that.

In discussing subsection (9), the hon. Gentleman suggests that we are being too soft and allowing people unnecessarily to keep the proceeds of crime. The provisions in subsection (9), like those in earlier clauses, are included in order to avoid double counting. The court goes through a process when it originally confiscates the proceeds of crime. It discounts other orders that may have been made subsequently. It may have imposed a fine after the confiscation order was made. It would be wrong if, in revisiting the benefits of the proceeds of crime, the court did not take into account any other orders that the defendant had been required to meet, and the fine imposed on him. We would effectively be confiscating the proceeds of crime twice, through either other orders or the fine imposed at the original confiscation hearing.