I beg to move amendment No. 101, in page 6, line 28, leave out `on' and insert `within seven days of'.

With this we may discuss amendment No. 102, in Clause 13, page 7, line 3, leave out

`when it is required to be paid'

and insert

`within seven days of the making of the order'

.

This is my first opportunity to move an amendment. I trust that Labour Members will be easy on me. [Laughter.] That is wishful thinking, I suppose.

And a hostage to fortune.

Indeed.

I am disappointed that my adversary from Second Reading, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok (Mr. Davidson), is not present, because it seems to me that he holds to the view that if one has nothing to hide, there is no reason why one should object to the Assets Recovery Agency, or any police authority, bugging one's phone-or, rather, my phone-or searching my house at will, or inspecting my bank account without my consent. Concerns about such matters have been expressed. The Committee has had a great debate on clause 11, which is one of the key clauses. Clause 12 follows on from it by addressing the matter of the time of payment.

One of my fundamental concerns is about the balance between the individual and the state. As I have said, concern is felt in many of our inner cities about the large number of criminals who are able to get away with murder-so to speak-by having extensive assets that seem to be beyond the grasp of the state.

As the Minister pointed out, it was a Conservative Government of the 1980s that first introduced more draconian powers through the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, which was repealed by the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. However, there is an issue about the balance between the power of the state and the power of the individual. My overriding concern is that so many new powers are being introduced that soon the balance will be shifted in favour of the state-and that will be the case not only for criminals but for every individual. That is why we have gone into what might be described as tortuous detail to try to tease out from the Government how they feel such matters will pan out.

I appreciate the frustrations that are felt concerning this matter. I am sure that the Minister looks at what is going on and is greatly concerned that large sums of drug money are not being confiscated, and that many Mr. Bigs are able to hire expensive lawyers and to invest much of their money overseas. There is a desire to try to get hold of that cash, particularly since the outrage of 11 September. He will recall that, when I spoke about that matter on Second Reading, I mentioned that the terrorists often have legitimate money. Certainly, much of Osama bin Laden's money had a legitimate origin and would not fall within the scope of much that we are discussing.

I want to touch on the practicalities involved in the issue of time for payment. We are all aware that the defendant in such a case will have already been subject to a full financial investigation. I propose these small changes for practical purposes. Obviously a fundamental assessment will be made of a person's financial affairs when they are under investigation and at some point close to conviction. The amendment struck me as a practical proposition. I wanted to leave that flexibility, which will make sense for the practical application of the time frame, not so much to give seven days' grace-that is not the idea-but merely to allow the authorities to ensure that the matter proceeds as smoothly as possible.

I was interested to see the amendment on the amendment paper, but I am more interested to hear that the basis on which it is offered is one of practicality. From a practical point of view, although I accept that the hon. Gentleman tabled it in a spirit of helpfulness, the amendment might cause confusion, because subsections (2) onwards provide for payment to be made within a certain amount of time. The practical position is that at present a monetary penalty such as a fine paid in court is always payable at the time that it is imposed, but as a matter of practice the court will allow time for payment where the need is shown.

I take on board the hon. Gentleman's comments, but it is important to get the Bill right, and my strong feeling was that-

I endorse the comments of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) and suggest to the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. Field) that another problem is involved. In many circumstances in which such an order is likely to be made, the defendant may have taken the precaution of trying to dispose of or hide assets prior to its being made. Does the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster accept that the defendant may not have taken such precautions? Does he not believe that giving a convicted person seven days' grace is an invitation to that person to hide as much of the money as he can in that period?

I fully understand how the hon. Gentleman might on first reading have come to that conclusion. The practical reality is that a person who is subject to a lengthy criminal trial will have been subject to a sophisticated analysis of assets, and the idea that within those seven days-which I regard as good housekeeping as much as anything else-he would be able salt away assets is unrealistic. I notice that my honourable adversary the Member for Glasgow, Pollok, about whom I spoke in vain, is now present. He will have to read in the report what I said earlier.

I accept that the hon. Gentleman's argument about assets having been salted away at an earlier stage may apply in circumstances such as those involving money laundering, in which I understand that he has a particular interest. The case of the cash economy of a drug dealer is an example that has been much discussed in Committee. Is not that precisely a case in which assets might be held as large amounts of cash that could easily be dissipated in seven days, if that period of grace was allowed? As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland points out, if such a case comes to court, the time for payment can be extended not just for seven days but for up to six months. Is not that much fairer than the loophole for drug dealers that I fear is contained in the amendment?

I beg to differ. We have discussed the point. I do not think that the amendment creates a loophole that creates a risk that money may go far afield. It has been pointed out that there are certain safeguards, but they are the discretionary safeguards of the courts. I wanted to tidy up the measure, and had hoped that the amendment would be no more than a practicality that points out how the clause would work in reality.

I have a simple point to make. I recall that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Surrey Heath earlier made the strong point that they wanted to put the defendant out of his or her misery, and did not want a delay between sentencing and the issue of the confiscation order. Now the former is pleading to give the defendant a longer period of misery. Is not he concerned that he should resume his earlier argument about tidying up matters as quickly as possible?

I respectfully suggest that the hon. Gentleman has missed the point of what we want to achieve. A handful of days will not make much difference in the way of misery.

I have made my initial comments on the matter and should like to hear the Minister's response.

My hon. Friend has done the Committee a favour by moving the amendment, which raises an interesting issue-one that is by no means favourable to the defendant. I was struck by the interventions of the hon. Members for Edinburgh, North and Leith (Mr. Lazarowicz) and for Orkney and Shetland, who raised the issue of the normal practice by which fines are levied. They are quite right. Normally, the fine is payable immediately. Those of us who have practised in magistrates courts recollect times when the magistrate inquired of a police officer how much money a defendant had in his pockets, and made the assessment then and there. The money was handed over, and that was the end of the matter. I think that that is effectively the original method-certainly, when a fine is levied, it is assumed that the defendant has the assets to pay it.

In contrast, it is implied that the Bill will frequently be used in complex asset cases. After all, assets must first be realised, unless they are in cash. Assets could take the form of shareholdings or chattels-there is a wide range of assets that the courts would want to confiscate, and could make orders to confiscate. One must assume that if there is a danger that someone will dispose of their assets, those assets shall be subject to restraint before the order is made. I do not think that the ``salting away'' argument is valid, because the seven-day theory will not make a difference to that.

The hon. Gentleman is right about salting away. He mentions that the assets may be of a complicated nature. Surely subsection (2) addresses that.

The Minister is right. Subsection (2) provides what I would call the normal mechanism for the payment of fines. The merit of the amendment is that in reality there will be no instance in which immediate payment of such sums will ever be made. In reality, defendants will always need time to pay. The oddity is that, by stipulating seven days or 28 days, we would probably be putting more pressure on the defendant than if such action had to be taken immediately. We would at least be defining the rapidity with which Parliament has deemed that payment should be made.

While associating myself with the remarks of my hon. Friend the Minister of State, may I bring it to the hon. Gentleman's attention that such action will be coming at the end of a complex inquisitory procedure? Surely the courts should have a substantial amount of information at their disposal by the time we proceed under subsection (2).

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, which is why I shall not labour my remarks. The point is narrow. Nevertheless, it is interesting. Measures under subsection (1) will be unrealistic in practice. I can envisage some instances when payment in seven days is possible, but I do not envisage circumstances in which someone will hand over the cash then and there. If Parliament is trying to realistic and logical, there is merit in the amendment.

We could look at the matter in a different way and make the period 28 days to ensure that the proceedings are not too spun out and to provide a benchmark against which the payment proceedings should be operated. I am sure that the Minister will agree that the problem of not providing a definition means that the opportunity to expand the periods in which to make the payment may be easier-curiously enough-than if a reasonable time limit had been set. That is a narrow point, but it is perfectly reasonable and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster for bringing it to our attention.

Despite the disarming introduction to the amendment by the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster, on which I congratulate him, I must resist it. The amendment would stop the court ordering the payment of a confiscation order within less than seven days, and amendment No. 102 would require the defendant to pay interest on every confiscation order that has not been paid within seven days of the making of the order, even if the court had allowed longer than seven days to pay it. That may not be what the hon. Gentleman had intended.

The court has always had the power to order the payment of a confiscation order immediately, because Crown court fine enforcement procedures allow it. As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said, payment is deemed to be required forthwith, unless time to pay is allowed. The amendment, like other Opposition amendments before it, would row back even from the existing legislation concerning immediate payment.

I shall explain why the Government oppose the amendments. Clause 12 aims to tighten up the current time-to-pay regime. We do not want any time to pay allowed unless the defendant specifically applies for it and justifies it. The power to order immediate payment of a confiscation order is clearly justified. We start from the premise that a confiscation order is made by the court only if the defendant has sufficient funds available in cash or property to pay it. By definition, a defendant must have the assets to pay a confiscation order, as the amount of the order cannot exceed the available amount that has been calculated by the court.

There may be cases when a confiscation order will be for a small sum and the defendant may have on his or her person in court sufficient funds to pay it there and then, whether by cash or cheque. I put it to the hon. Gentleman that, under such circumstances, it would not be appropriate to allow any time to pay.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield referred to circumstances in which the defendant needs time to realise property or to arrange for investments to be cashed so that he can pay the confiscation order. The clause will allow that, subject to a cut-off point of a maximum period of 12 months.

I am concerned about the effect that amendment No. 102 would have. It cannot be right that a defendant should have to pay interest from seven days after the confiscation order was made when the court had agreed that he should have longer. Is that really what the Opposition intended?

The Minister said earlier that the Opposition were, as usual, trying to row back from the force of the legislation. In the light of his most recent comments, that was clearly uncalled for, so I hope that he will withdraw the remark.

I will certainly do so in the case of amendment No. 102, but I will persist in advocating that my remark applies to amendment No. 101.

Perhaps the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster has made a valid point and highlighted a possible defect. A court may allow a period of time for payment to be made, but during that time the criminal could presumably continue to earn interest on the sums that he possessed during those six months. In those circumstances, it would be quite fair for interest to be charged on the sum that the defendant was due to pay. Perhaps the Minister will consider whether the amendment has some merit.

That is an interesting argument. It seems to have the support of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok, so I wonder whether I should ignore it.

I want to deal with two points raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. Incidentally, I understand that he had a fantastic slogan when he was elected: ``Grieve for Beaconsfield''.

We talked about earlier generations, and it was a member of an earlier generation of my family who had the slogan, ``Grieve for Lincoln''. I have never had the slogan, ``Grieve for Beaconsfield'', even though my e-mail address at the House of Commons-it is appropriate for an Opposition Member of Parliament-is grieved@parliament.uk.

Order. That was a fascinating intervention, but I do not propose to give the Committee seven minutes to think about it, never mind seven days.

I was going to reply to the hon. Gentleman's intervention, but I shall not.

The hon. Gentleman raised several interesting points about the complex issues. The thrust of the Government's approach is that confiscation should be much more commonly applied, as I hope he understands. Also, the defendant will know from the trial that a confiscation order is likely to be made. In spite of his eloquent and disarming introduction, I must ask the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster not to insist on the amendments, and especially amendment No. 102.

I hope that you will be happy, Mr. Gale, if I briefly foray into the subject of surnames and slogans. With a name such as Field, it is entirely appropriate that I should be in the Conservative party's least rural seat in the country. I am sure that we could all make such observations.

I thank the Minister for his explanation and kind words. I was amazed at the soft heart that he suddenly showed towards the criminal fraternity. The Committee has made strange bedfellows of us, as I agree with the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok on what I accept is a narrow point. We will withdraw the amendment, but it strikes us that the subject of interest might be considered further, especially if the time for payment is protracted. The hon. Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith made a good point. An enormous sum of money might literally earn thousands of pounds of interest each week.

After all, interest accrues immediately on a civil judgment debt imposed on the day of the hearing.

I was in the throes of ending my remarks when my hon. Friend intervened. I thank the Minister and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

I beg to move amendment No. 61, in page 6, line 41, leave out from `made' to end of line 42.

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 36 and 37.

In addition to my normal dose of sweet reason and good nature, I bring a particularly unpleasant north isles bug to the Committee today, which I shall do my best not to share. If I do not run out of arguments, I fear that I shall run out of voice.

The genesis of the amendment is in a briefing received from a body styling itself the Law Society. As a member of the Law Society of Scotland, I have always found the Law Society's use of the definite article just a tad presumptuous. Let us say that the briefing is from a Law Society. I am being candid in this way because the explanation that was offered to me, which persuaded me to table the amendment, involves a scenario with which I have never been acquainted. However, my experience is north of the border and we are dealing with provisions that are largely applicable in England and Wales.

Will the Minister consider the fact that, currently, persons subject to confiscation orders can be made to pay at the rate of £2 to £5 a week. If they have no means with which to pay, a mandatory time limit might lead to their serving a default prison sentence, with the order still to pay. That leaves the unfortunate position that the state incurs the expense of a sentence being served and the proceeds of crime are not recovered.

This might be worthy of consideration because the basis on which the confiscation of the proceeds of crime is allowed to proceed is now so wide. It is possible that we shall be dealing with a lower range of offences than is currently the case, and people of much more restricted means might become the subject of confiscation orders.

The final consideration is, as has been made clear by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield on a number of occasions, that the amount of assets identified in a confiscation order is often greater than the recoverable amount. It is often the case that the money by which a confiscation order is to be satisfied is money acquired at a date later than that of the order. As a Presbyterian, I am always keen to promote the cause of the genuine penitent. If somebody intends to make every effort to fulfil obligations under a confiscation order by using new resources, every opportunity should be allowed for that, and as much time given as might be considered reasonable.

I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman and his northern bug. I have a southern one.

The amendment would allow the court, in exceptional circumstances, to grant the defendant an unlimited period in which to pay the confiscation order. The Government's position is that clause 12 sets out to tackle one of the main problems with the current system for enforcing confiscation orders. Confiscation orders are basically enforced like Crown court fines. One of the consequences of that regime is that the Crown court, when it makes a confiscation order, has the power to allow payment by instalments and time to pay.

We have removed payment by instalments because by definition the individual must have assets with which to pay the order, as we said earlier with reference to the available amount. There is also some evidence of unacceptable use of the present powers. We are informed that the present typical period seems to be between two and three years. To improve matters, we are abolishing payment by instalments and placing a finite limit on the court's power to allow time to pay. The Bill expects offenders to pay their confiscation orders straight away, as provided for. The amount of a confiscation order is based on the value of the property available for enforcement when the order is made, not on an assessment of future earnings, which is important which and deals with one of the points raised by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland.

I understand exactly what the Minister is trying to achieve and I am sympathetic to it. However, has any assessment been made, by means of inquiring of the judiciary, of why the old system tended to allow such huge periods for payment, particularly in the light of what the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland has said about the historical problem of overestimating the assets? Are those two matters linked and are we confident that the new mechanism will not have similar problems?

I will deal with the hon. Gentleman's first point later. On his second point, the Bill's definition of ``available amount'', which includes many qualifications and conditions, will prevent overestimation. I cannot answer the point on consultation with the judiciary immediately, but I understand why the hon. Gentleman asked the question and I will endeavour to give him an answer or to have my hon. friend the Under-Secretary give him an answer later.

Let me respond to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. The chance of default imprisonment is low. The defendant must have the assets to pay the order, as I said. If he does not, he can ask the court to revisit the available amount under clause 24. The hon. Gentleman will find that safeguard in clause 24, which ensures that the defendant is able to say, ``Please revisit this, because I don't have the available assets.''

I am now able to advise the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that we have taken advice from the prosecuting authorities and have received information from the inter-departmental working group in relation to the matter. I hope that that will satisfy him to some extent. In no circumstances, not even exceptional ones, should the period be extended beyond 12 months. No defendant should take more than a year to dispose of their assets in order to satisfy a confiscation order. If, for example, they wish to sell a house, they have the opportunity to do that at the most propitious time during the course of an annual cycle.

I hope that my remarks make it clear why we have some difficulty with the amendment. Far from speeding up enforcement, it would preserve the open-ended payment regime that is one of the system's weak points. I hope that in light of my remarks the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

I would like to deal with Government amendments Nos. 36 and 37 together. Amendment No. 37 is dependent on the acceptance of amendment No. 36. They are technical amendments that relate to applications for more time to pay and payment of interest. As we can see from subsection (1), confiscation orders must normally be paid immediately on the making of a confiscation order. However, under the circumstances described in subsection (2), the court may grant a period of six months for paying the confiscation order; and, in exceptional circumstances, that period may be extended upon application by the defendant to a maximum of 12 months from the date on which the confiscation order was made.

However, the clause does not make it clear what happens when a defendant applies for more time to pay before the expiry of the previous time limit but the court does not have time to deal with the application before the time to pay expires. The amendment makes it clear that the court may continue to deal with the application after the previous period of time to pay has expired. The amendment removes doubt about the procedures involved in handling applications for further time to pay. I hope that that will assist the courts.

Amendment No. 37 is consequential on amendment No. 36. Under clause 13, if the defendant fails to pay the confiscation order in full before the time to pay expires, the order automatically accrues interest at a fixed rate, which is currently 8 per cent. The amendment provides that when a defendant applies for an extension of time to pay before a previous period expires, no interest shall accrue on the order as long as the application is outstanding, or if it is less than 12 months since the order was made, after which time no extension can be given in any case.

Amendment No. 37 will ensure that defendants are not unfairly subjected to the payment of interest. I hope that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will find it attractive. In light of my previous explanation, I urge the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland to consider withdrawing his amendment.

On a point of order, Mr. Gale. I am sorry that I was not here earlier, but the Minister has just referred to clauses 12 and 13. Will it be possible to debate clause 13 separately, even after we have disposed of the Government amendments? Some issues overlap, and I would like to know whether we need to deal with them both now.

The amendments are being taken together, but the clauses are not. In due course, we shall move to a Division or accept the amendments before the Committee. One of those amendments relates to clause 13. When we come to the stand part debate on clause 13, hon. Members will have an opportunity to discuss further matters arising.

I have briefly considered the terms of clause 24. It is a generally commendable provision, and I look forward to debating it in due course. My only observation is that subsection 24(2) appears to require application of the provisions of clause 10, but that there is no provision for reopening matters otherwise. If one gets it wrong the first time, I do not see what is to stop one getting it wrong again. That is something to be considered when we visit clause 24. I have pleaded the cause but, as a genuine penitent, I am persuaded that it is not appropriate to pursue the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Grieve rose-

Order.

On a point of order, Mr. Gale. I am conscious that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield wished to catch your eye, and was in the process of rising to his feet when I interrupted him. For the record, I saw him stand. However, I shall accept whatever ruling you give on the matter.

It is up to hon. Members to catch the eye of the Chair. As I said in an earlier ruling, if the mover of the amendment has been called to wind up and if he seeks to withdraw the amendment, that is the end of the debate. However, the hon. Gentleman has been a Member of the House long enough to be aware that he has the opportunity in certain circumstances to raise matters arising during the stand part debate.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 36, in page 6, line 42, at end add-

`(6) An order under subsection (4)-

(a) may be made after the end of the specified period, but

(b) must not be made after the end of the period of 12 months starting with the day on which the confiscation order is made.'-[Mr. Foulkes.]

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I apologise for having to avail myself of this opportunity to speak. Although I stood up vigorously before my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne made his point of order, I was perhaps a bit slower when he sat down.

I turn to the amendment that the Minister has just made. I fully understand its purpose, do not want to quibble with it and would not have wanted to vote against it. However, some clarification would be helpful. Clearly, the intention behind proposed new subsection (6) is that if someone fails to go back to the court within the 12-month period to tell the court that he does not have the assets originally sought, it is that person's tough luck. If an individual is properly advised, his adviser will tell him, once eleven and a half months have passed, ``We haven't succeeded in realising the assets that we thought we had. We have sold some assets, but they have brought in less than we expected and, given that 12 months have almost passed, you should go straight back to court to make an application for the variation.'' I assume that the words ``make the application'' imply not having the application heard but the physical process of making it. That was my assumption when the Minister explained the provision.

What would happen in the case of someone who leads a chaotic lifestyle-we have heard about that-who fails to do what is required within the 12-month period, when it is glaringly obvious that a mistake has been made over the assets? Does that person simply go to prison in default? I ask that question because we need to consider the point. That may be what the Minister intends, and one could of course say that people in such cases are simply being irresponsible. However, most of us who practise at the Bar know of numerous examples of people who failed to make applications within the period when they should have been made. It does not necessarily mean that their application was bogus or unwarranted.

I approach the matter as a layman. Having listened to the Minister's explanation of why we needed proposed new subsection (6), I thought carefully about what I had been asked to agree to, which the Committee has now approved. The clause seems to say that something must be done immediately, then suggests that it may not have to be done immediately but in a ``specified period'', then goes on to say not simply ``specified period'' but ``six months''. Now that we have accepted the amendment, the clause seems to say that whatever must be done must be done within ``12 months''. As a layman, I am puzzled by the fact that a single clause in a 400-clause Bill can make four differing statements about the same thing.

I have heard hon. Members talk about the valuable skill some people possess of ensuring that a lawyer or a court cannot pin them down. A lot of the debate has related to that point. If people can find only a technicality, a curiosity or confusion in the law, they may discover a possible loophole. They will then spend a great deal of time and-to the lawyers' benefit-a great deal of money in seeking to nullify what the law was designed to achieve. By drafting a clause such as this, we seem to be moving into that territory. Giving the person to whom the law applies those four choices-immediately, specified, six months or 12 months-is a recipe that will allow that person to wriggle and squirm. I hope that the Minister will assure us that there will be no repetition of the problem and that, between now and future sittings, someone will go through the Bill and ensure that it specifies one term or another rather than if, but, when or how.

We all agree that we are trying to take the proceeds of crime away from people who deserve it. Therefore, we should make common cause to prevent clauses such as this from cropping up, as they give people four choices-in my view, four opportunities to get out from under-when one clear statement would be adequate.

The debate has been interesting. Some of the comments that we made earlier about Opposition Members being soft must have struck home, because they no longer appear to be the criminal's friends. Instead, they seem to have taken our advice.

Incidentally, I should say that if the debate continues in the afternoon, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will answer it as I have to be elsewhere. I would like to deal with it now.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield will understand the need for the provision. If the money is available and the sum is not too large-we know that the sum required to be paid under the order will be no greater than the available sum-the person could and should pay it immediately by cheque or cash. Under certain circumstances, property may have to be sold and assets may have to be realised. The hon. Member for Spelthorne told us about all his shares. In the extremely unlikely event that he were a criminal, or if a criminal had a similar amount of shares, those shares would have to be sold and realised. It is appropriate to specify a period no greater than six months.

When the Minister referred to me having to sell shares, he triggered a thought in my mind about when the court considered shares as the asset to be sold in the specified period. If someone said that the shares of company X were not doing well, but that they were expected to increase in value during the specified period or at a time to which the period ought therefore to be extended, would the court be entitled-would the Government encourage it-to make an order so that the shares could rise in value and more money would be made? Is that what the Minister has in mind?

No.

As I said earlier to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, it would be possible under clause 24 for the order to be revisited, so various points could be made at another time. For the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, I add the fact that the available sum could be revisited after 12 months under clause 24, but interest would start to accrue.

The provisions are not designed to be soft on criminals. They are meant not to make life easier for criminals, but to make it easier for the court to take money from criminals. They will ensure that money and assets-property, shares and anything else-can be obtained, realised and liquidated so that the cash can be paid to the court.

The Minister makes a good point. I accept that clause 24 allows the possibility of going back to court to reapply for a variation of the order when the available sum is inadequate. The sum could therefore be re-calculated. Under the provision that we have recently incorporated in the Bill, interest would accrue on the sum originally ordered, but that may be found to be wrong. Is the Minister saying that, in those circumstances, the person would have to pay interest on a sum that it is subsequently accepted that he should never have had to pay?

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could clarify that point because I did not quite understand it.

I hope that I am correct to suggest-and I think that the Minister suggested-that there are mechanisms for reconsidering the benefit where an individual is ordered to pay an amount. The new figure-whether higher or lower-can then be imposed. However, those who want more time to pay under the system that, for very valid reasons, is incorporated in the clause must return to court within the specified period or within a maximum of 12 months. If they do not, interest will accrue. However, if it is found on reconsideration that they should pay less, will they have to pay interest on the initial sum, which was eventually found not to be due? I hope that I have made myself clear.

Yes, the hon. Gentleman has made himself clear. He is an able lawyer and explained the point very well.

Clause 24 refers to substituting for the available amount such amount as is just-the crucial word is ``just''. The court could take excessive interest into account.

I want to be certain that I heard the Minister correctly. I think that I heard him suggest that certain actions might be taken notwithstanding the provisions of the clause as they relate to the immediately specified period of six months or to the 12-month period and that there could be some other period under clause 24. Reference was also made to interest, but clause 12 has nothing to do with interest. Is the position the same as that for clause 7? That clause clearly stated something, but a subsequent provision said that it did not matter and that the position could be different. In this case, the period is either immediately specified as six months or it is 12 months, but did I hear the Minister say, ``Clause 24 says that it can be longer, providing that interest is paid.''? Is that not sloppy draftsmanship?

No, it is not sloppy draftsmanship. The hon. Gentleman can take up the question about interest under clause 13.

I think that all the issues have been tackled.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.