Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) rose—

Order. I apologise to the hon. Gentleman, but I have neglected the Committee's comfort. I understand that this morning Mr. McWilliam gave permission for hon. Members to remove their jackets if they wished, and I shall do the same.

On the face of it, clause 4 is brief and largely innocuous. It is obvious that if the director is to exercise his functions he must have co-operation from other law enforcement agencies. Subsection (1)(a) refers to persons who have functions

``relating to the investigation or prosecution of offences''.

That is easily comprehensible; indeed, the explanatory notes specify

``police officers, officers of HM Customs and Excise and members of the Crown Prosecution Service and the National Criminal Intelligence Service.''

Clearly, all those people are concerned with the investigation or prosecution of offences. However, I am puzzled by the fact that subsection (1)(b) covers people who have functions ``otherwise relating to crime''. If the people that I have listed all fall within subsection (1)(a), why did those who drafted the Bill think it necessary to insert a further category under subsection (1)(b)? Who is being referred to?

Lawyers.

I heard that sedentary intervention. However, as the Minister will know from several cases involving legal professional privilege, lawyers representing people who have been subject to prosecution cannot be required to co-operate in that way. A celebrated case—I cannot remember its name, but I am sure that the Minister's Department will be familiar with it—concerned the Inland Revenue's attempts to get hold of a tax lawyer's papers. The court held that that was a serious breach of legal professional privilege, and impinged on human rights.

Can the Minister clarify who is supposed to fall into the interesting category of persons with functions ``otherwise relating to crime'' who must co-operate with the director? Is the paragraph otiose—that is, unnecessary? If it is required, to whom does it refer?

I want to raise a similar point with the Minister, in an entirely friendly way. The definition in subsection (1)(b) of persons who have functions ``otherwise related to crime'' appears at first sight to be wide enough to include judges as well as lawyers, solicitors and probation officers, who have a duty of confidentiality to their clients. There cannot be any difficulty in expecting those criminal justice professionals to co-operate in making the procedure work smoothly—that is part and parcel of their work within the courts structure.

However, it would be odd and misplaced to impose a statutory duty of co-operation on a judge, who will have to make findings of fact when the director says that a person has a criminal lifestyle and the person denies it. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said, legal professional privilege cannot be overborne by statute, and I do not imagine that the clause is an attempt to do so. That would oblige a person who had come across information in pursuit of his professional duties to disclose it because there was a conflict between that confidentiality and the statutory duty in subsection (1)(b). Probation officers frequently receive confidential information, and they have a professional duty not to disclose it, yet they may fall within the category of those who are intended to co-operate with the director. I am looking for an assurance that those problems have been considered and the category is not intended to include those people, because a conflict would be the inevitable result if it did.

I often find short clauses the most intriguing, because they can raise fundamental issues. Will the Under-Secretary tell us why the clause is necessary? In a sensible world, people would co-operate. I suspect that the penny has just dropped in Government circles that in the past there has not been the necessary co-operation for the conviction of criminals. I have in mind the issues that arose over the tracking down of terrorists or suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland, where a turf war, which required an intervention to knock heads together, broke out between the Metropolitan police and the security services.

Will the Under-Secretary confirm why the clause is included in the Bill? Is it here, like a piece of folklore, because it ought to be? Is it included because things are not what they should be? Is it here because when Ministers discussed their intentions for the Bill, they got wind that we might be heading for a rerun of that lack of co-operation between the various agencies? If that is the case, the Committee must be told, because it would be a serious matter. I do not raise the issue in a party political sense, as I imagine that it would unite members of the Committee. If the provision is concerned with people arguing about who does what, and saying, ``We're not going to talk to you,'' that is something on which we should take a view.

Having said why the clause is necessary, the Under-Secretary can help us by explaining what ``co-operation'' means, because it can mean all things to all people. If we are to avoid a return to the days of the turf war, when Customs and Excise did not want to talk to the Inland Revenue, the Inland Revenue did not want to talk to the police and the police did not want to talk to MI5, we must know what ``co-operation'' means. Will it be sufficient for someone to pick up the phone once in a while and say, ``How are things going?'' In order to avoid the problems of the past, will there be a clearly defined regime that states exactly what is expected?

In drafting the legislation, has anyone in Government or the parliamentary draftsman's office raised the issues involved with the various agencies? Has there been a pre-discussion? Can we be given a steer on how this will be received in the various independent fiefdoms that have not got on too well in the past?

The Under-Secretary may find it difficult to comment on this in detail, but in the list of bodies that must co-operate with the director—the director must also co-operate with them—there is no mention of the security services. I hope that that omission is intended to draw a veil over things, rather than an admission that the Government do not think that the security services will co-operate, or that they do not want them to co-operate. We must spell out that the fact we expect them to co-operate in same way as everyone else.

If the director is to be able do his job, he must establish good working relationships with law enforcement authorities and others whose remits overlap with his own. It is vital that all authorities involved in efforts to recover the proceeds of crime co-operate with each other and co-ordinate their activities. The clause achieves that by giving the director and other bodies a duty to co-operate with each other. Persons with investigative functions, prosecution functions or other functions relating to crime would have a duty to co-operate with the director in the exercise of his duties. Such persons would include, for example, police officers, officers of Customs and Excise, and members of the Crown Prosecution Service and the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

The Financial Services Authority will be obliged to co-operate, but only so far as it is involved in criminal investigations. The intent behind subsection (1)(b) was to make it certain that we encompassed all the people involved. It was never intended, nor should it ever be intended, that the clause encompass lawyers, judges or anyone else connected with crime. I recognise the potential for misunderstanding in the clause, and we must consider the wording to make it certain that it adequately covers all appropriate organisations—the intelligence services, the FSA, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and so on—while not drawing in others for which an obligation to co-operate with the director would be inappropriate.

The point is taken that we need to consider the ramifications of subsection (1)(b), so we shall do so and return to the subject. With that explanation, I ask that the clause stand part of the Bill.

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I think that he understands my point of view. The hon. Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) also picked up on the same point. The problem is one of definition, and it should be possible to define subsection (1)(b) more closely so that there is no ambiguity. Therefore I shall not oppose the clause.

Did the Minister reply to any of the issues that I raised?

I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I thought that the main issue that he raised was whether it was intended that the intelligence services be involved in the co-operation—the answer to which was yes. When he referred to the motivation behind the provision, I thought that he was merely making a point, but I shall give him an answer. There is always a propensity for organisations not to co-operate unless, from the top, they are obliged to do so. I do not think that the situation is anything like as bad as he makes out. None the less, there is always the possibility that people will not co-operate and form part of a team.

In preparation for the Bill, we secured the agreement of all the appropriate authorities to the asset recovery strategy, which will be introduced before the Bill. All the relevant people—the police, the prosecution services, NCIS, Customs and Excise, the lot—have agreed the strategy in principle in a joint effort to lift our game on the recovery of the proceeds of crime. In preparation for the powers in the Bill, we have made some effort to ensure a good working relationship between all the relevant people. We want to ensure that this aspect of fighting crime is given the priority that it deserves, which it has not been given in the past. The fact that the duty to co-operate with the director, and the director's duty to co-operate with others, is stated in statute will help. There is no preconceived idea about a particular problem in the formulation of the Bill.

Will the Minister assure us that subsection (2) will not involve evidence acquired in the course of the preparation for civil proceedings being passed to the authorities that prosecute for crime? It is arguable that the prosecution authorities would still be exercising their function under the Bill, and as such they could be in a position to impose a duty of co-operation on the recovery agency.

Another part of the Bill ring-fences information gained by the director under his taxation functions. For the purposes of taxing the proceeds of crime, the director of the agency may have control of someone's tax records, but we do not want them to be passed to the Inland Revenue, as it would expand the Revenue's investigation powers by default. Contained within the Bill are precautions to make certain that that does not happen. However, with regard to other information that comes within his knowledge, the director will have to co-operate with other organisations; he will be obliged to share the information with them. Notwithstanding that, people have the right in law not to incriminate themselves. The right not to incriminate oneself is protected. I hope that I have covered the point raised by the hon. Gentleman.

May I press the Minister on that point? It seems to me that an important distinction should be made. The Bill gives draconian powers of recovery and disclosure to the director, and to the Lord Advocate in Scotland, in relation to the obtaining of information. I am less uncomfortable than I might otherwise be in giving the director and the Lord Advocate those powers because the information obtained under them is to be used in the pursuit of civil proceedings rather than criminal proceedings. In the latter case, defendants have a right to silence and need not incriminate themselves—

Order. We had better establish the principle now that interventions should be interventions, and not speeches.

We do not want to create artificial barriers to the transfer of information that it is right and appropriate to transfer. We are therefore trying to provide gateways to facilitate co-operation between law enforcement agencies and allow the passage of information between them. Equally—I think that this is the point that the hon. Gentleman sought to make—if someone faces criminal proceedings, information that they might have been obliged to disclose, but which would incriminate them in connection with the proceedings being taken against them, cannot be used and should not be used. That right is protected in the Bill.

May I pursue a point with the Minister? I am slightly concerned about the creation of loopholes. Is the Minister telling us that if, during an investigation of financial matters, the investigator—we have just agreed that he should be trained—trips over a body and discovers that Colonel Mustard has been done in with a metal pipe in the drawing room, that information cannot be used by anyone else in any other case? Earlier, in connection with the relationship between Scotland and England, I raised the question of information that had been collected falling down the cracks. We do not want that to happen here. Surely if evidence of crime is discovered, it ought to be available for use by whoever collects it, or passed on to those with whom they co-operate.

When we were speaking about the phrase ``otherwise relating to crime'', a strong point was made about lawyers and professional privilege. I understand that, but will the Minister clarify whether members of that august body the British Bankers Association will similarly be expected to co-operate? Will accountants, too, be expected to co-operate? We have already dealt with the idea of spies. Will Benefits Agency staff be expected to co-operate in matters pertaining to the issues that we are concerned with?

Under clause 4 there is no statutory duty for anyone other than such people as I have mentioned to co-operate with the agency. Other provisions in the Bill, as my hon. Friend will see, place duties of disclosure on the appropriate financial institutions so that people can be investigated. That is different from what we are considering now, which is the obligation on the relevant prosecuting and investigating authorities to co-operate with the director, who will also be obliged to co-operate with them. That is essential if we are to implement the Bill as Parliament would want, and secure the precedence of the pursuit of criminal investigation over the pursuit of the proceeds of crime.

If the director wants to commence or recommence a case with respect to civil recovery, he will have to check with the appropriate authorities that that will not cut across criminal proceedings being taken against relevant individuals. If he is not given such a duty, the methodology arrived at to protect the primacy of the pursuit of criminal investigation, and to establish a hierarchy of powers to be used by the agency, will not be effective. Financial institutions and the banking sector are not relevant in the present context, although later provisions deal with duties of disclosure and the power to oblige people to make disclosures to the director.

Material gained from the interception of communications is, of course, covered by statute, and information obtained by MI5 or special branch would normally be reserved for their eyes only. Is it expected that under the clause, that information would be made available to the director?

None of the duties to co-operate and to disclose information cut across the Data Protection Act 1998 or the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Stipulations in those Acts will stand, and there will be no duty on anyone to disclose information outwith the regulations. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok (Mr. Davidson) seemed to be accusing me of being soft on the proceeds of crime, but we do not want to prevent the passage of information. There are legitimate concerns, and there would be grave concern if we allowed information gained by the director to be passed on and used by the Revenue. However, with that exception, we want to allow the free flow of information between the various agencies involved.

We need to protect the right in law against self-incrimination. Therefore, information gained in civil proceedings under the obligation to co-operate with and make disclosures to the director will not be admissible in subsequent prosecutions in connection with which using it would amount, effectively, to obliging someone to incriminate themselves. That is the only protection, and it would kick in at the point when a person went to court. It would not prevent the passage of information between the various agencies, but would protect the defendant and would make certain that existing rights applying in those circumstances were not eroded.

Information obtained from a telephone tap might influence the activities of the security services without being admissible in a court action, because of the way in which it was obtained. Would that information be available to the director for civil cases?

Organisations will be obliged to co-operate with the director. They will not be allowed to cut across the regulations imposed under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. In passing information to the director, they will be able to include stipulations about how that information can be used, and about its further disclosure. That is necessary in such situations. I hope that satisfies the hon. Gentleman but he is looking rather puzzled, as if it does not.

Is that not an argument for people getting their confessions in first, on civil proceedings matters, and then arguing that they cannot then be used against them for criminal prosecutions?

That situation is most unlikely to arise because, as we have already established, the main priority will be the prosecution of criminals under the law. Where a prosecution is being conducted, confiscation attached to that prosecution will be the main means by which we pursue the proceeds of crime. In the overwhelming majority of cases civil recovery or the taxation powers will be used only when, for whatever reason, prosecution is not available and is not likely to become available. If we get the co-operation right and the director is fully aware of the intentions of the prosecuting authorities, it is not likely that he will pursue anybody for civil recovery who is likely to be put in front of a court of law and pursued for some criminal activity. We want to operate a hierarchy so that we bear down on crime and are as effective as possible in reducing it.

As for the point made by the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker), intercept material gained under part I of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 will not be disclosable. I do not know whether that information satisfies him.

Although I am grateful for the Minister's clear answer on that piece of legislation, it does not cover the wider issue, which we need to understand. For example, there is the question of communications data that is available to the police service without a warrant having been issued or being necessary, such as telephone numbers dialled, and the frequency and length of phone calls. Will such data be available to the director or not? I am trying to establish how far the co-operation can go, and what the legislative limits are that will prevent information from being disclosed across the boundaries.

I am not sure that I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman, apart from repeating what I have already said. The protections built in to Acts such as the Data Protection Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act continue to apply, and will prevent the disclosure of information to the agency. Where those protections do not apply, organisations such as the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service will be expected to co-operate with the agency and vice versa. I do not see a big problem with that, and I do not know how I can further satisfy the hon. Gentleman that there is no problem.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Before we proceed, it was probably discourteous of me not to have realised before that some members of the Committee may not have served on a Committee on a major Bill before—or even on any Standing Committee at all. We should therefore lay down a few ground rules about what is permitted and what is not, as we are likely to be considering the Bill for a considerable period.

Messages passed between Ministers and civil servants must go through the Parliamentary Private Secretary. The issues are complex, and I appreciate that all hon. Members may from time to time require information or assistance from outside bodies. I would like therefore to say to those on the Back Benches that Members receiving information from people beyond the Bar of the Committee Room should do so outside the Room. It is not permissible to hand messages across the Bar to Members in the Room.

If Members wish to have private conversations, other than the occasional necessary word, I should be grateful if they would use the Green Benches outside the Room so to do. I will always permit reasonable interventions, but interventions must not take the form of speeches. The opportunity is almost always there to catch the Chairman's eye and make a full speech if that is required. Ordinarily—this does not apply to stand part debates, but certainly applies to debates on amendments—once the mover of the amendment has wound up the debate on that amendment, the Chairman is unlikely to accept any further interventions.